By Dr. David Wurmser

The problem with the Israel-Lebanon maritime agreement just concluded is not only its content, but the surrounding arguments promulgated to justify it in the public eye. There may be secret provisions to the agreement that render it an achievement, but the public disclosures of the terms and rationale for the agreement fall far short, and in some cases are flat out wrong or are invented assertions. One might be tempted to excuse these as public roll-out efforts, which are often akin to putting makeup on warthogs, but some of the public statements from Israel meant to justify the agreement go beyond mere spin and become outright misrepresentations. And worse, some reveal a deeper cause for concern about the underlying defense and foreign policy conceptions informing Israel’s security establishment. 

 
The agreement at least is an historic first…Not. 

The United States negotiator, US envoy Amos Hochstein asserted the agreement as historic since it is the first agreement ever between Israel and Lebanon.¹ An impressive achievement indeed, if it true. But it isn’t.  In fact, there was an agreement – several to be accurate – between Israel and Lebanon.  The Rhodes Agreements of 1948 established a de facto demarcation line, which is what was just reset under this agreement although this is heralded as the first such line established between the two nations.  Second, like this agreement, it actually was both sides’ putting their signature to paper through an intermediary, the United States, so this agreement breaks no new ground in terms of tacit recognition of Israel. 

Indeed, there was even a previous peace treaty between Israel and Lebanon signed on May 17,  1983.  This was not a peace treaty dictated to Lebanon by Israel, but one negotiated under the auspices of the United States Special Envoy for the Middle East, Morris Draper. It contained provisions for buffer zones under the control of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and even contained security cooperation between the LAF and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to ensure deconfliction and to prevent third parties from using the territory to trigger conflict between the two nations.  The treaty collapsed because the Syrian government, who occupied Lebanon but had been momentarily thrown on their heels by the Israeli invasion, recovered and toppled the Lebanese government and then installed a puppet regime in Beirut to move parliament under a new Speaker, Hussein al-Husseini, to formally revoke the treaty. Ironically, the previous Speaker, Kamel Assad, had championed the agreement with Israel, and had come from a prominent Lebanese Shiite family in Bent Jbail in the heart of the Shiite community of southern Lebanon, so his ouster became the main target not only of Syrian efforts to sabotage the agreement but of an Iranian campaign to destroy the traditional Shiite leadership of Lebanon and seize from it the mantle of the “Shiite Awakening” (which under Imam Musa al-Sadr’s leadership preceded the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979 by a half decade) and to pave the way for replacing the old elite with a new Hizballah-based Iranian Islamic revolutionary monopoly. 

In short, there is nothing new or historic about the agreement.  In fact, it aimed far lower and achieved far less than its predecessor agreements. 

Well, then it strengthens Israel strategically by codifying an American security guarantee…Not. 

The agreement erodes, and even endangers, US support for Israel for three reasons. 

First, it is rather baffling that the strongest ally of the United States in the region should need a security guarantee from the United States bought through confessions to its enemy. Israel says that were it not for the agreement, there could well be war with Hizballah, which is also one of the most inimical and murderous entities to the United States, not only Israel. Lebanon at this point is a captive state dominated by Iran through Hizballah. Standing with Israel against Hizballah and the Hizballahi-run Lebanon should emerge from an inherent American interest and should not require either Israeli concessions or the imprimatur of Lebanon to validate it.  In other words, the agreement does not display tightening and elevating US-Israeli strategic cooperation but reflects the fallen state of those relations – rather than emerging from a strictly bilateral understanding – that it now requires some sort of purchase from Israel’s enemy and a string of Israeli concessions to allow for its codification. 

Second, the agreement ostensibly codifies the red lines and casus belli for Israel’s and the US’s responses if Israel’s waters or fields are again threatened. The fact that the Lebanese government has said it recognizes no such delineation as legally binding only hours after the deal was reached is disturbing enough, but in terms of US-Israeli relations, the true parameters of danger can be illustrated through a cautionary lesson from the end of the 2006 Israeli-Lebanon/Hizballah war of how this “commitment” could easily boomerang to haunt Israel gravely and potentially even cause the United States to cross Israel strategically in the future. After a month of war with Hizballah, Israel was seeking an exit. Israel’s foreign minister at the time, Tzippi Livni, turned both to Washington and to France, since they were seen as able to sway Lebanon, to help secure a ceasefire resolution through the United Nations. John Bolton was the US-UN ambassador, and I was the point of contact for the Vice President’s office. 

France sought almost immediately to craft a UN resolution that would be legally binding – an idea onto which Israel’s security and foreign policy establishment quickly seized, believing that it would finally be able to cap and regulate Hizballah’s presence in Lebanon in such a way that its threatening behavior would be met with an international response.  In essence, Israel tried to substitute its freedom of action and the power of the IDF for an international security guarantee to leash Hizballah and secure its norther border.  

The United States, through the efforts of Deputy National Security Advisor Elliott Abrams and US UN Ambassador John Bolton, resisted the pressure of Foreign Minister Livni and the French, and torpedoed this effort. The fear that motivated us – and disturbingly not Israel’s defense and foreign affairs elite – was that it would clearly commit the US to side against the party that was internationally labeled as the violator of the ceasefire.  One does not have to be a historian or Middle East scholar to know that the international community will not declare either Hizballah’s rearmament and redeployment onto the border a casus belli and justify an Israeli – let alone international – preemptive strike.  

And then, a Hobson’s choice would be thrust upon Israel. Either Israel would have to acquiesce without any response to Hizballah’s buildup, or it would have to preempt but risk (really a certainty, not risk) its being labelled the aggressor which would trigger the legally binding provisions of response of the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1701.  In short, were UNSCR 1701 legally binding, then Israel would soon have found itself in a situation where it would be unable to act preemptively to prevent further build-up and threatening movements of Hizballah unless it would be willing do so – in the opinion of the international community – in violation of the legally binding resolution to which the United States would have been bound to uphold. To prevent this trap, US Ambassador Bolton stood his ground and forced through a tough but non-binding resolution, much to the chagrin of the French and Israelis. Of course, the moment the ceasefire was signed, Iran began resupplying Hizballah and Hizballah began deploying dangerously toward the south.  One can only imagine how impossible it would have been for Israel over the last 17 years to continuously slice Hizballah down to size as it has by using force – including against depots and shipments, let alone against leadership. Israel would long ago have been subject to the very provisions it had sought to subcontract its defense to a outside entity through legal commitments. 

Unfortunately, the current Israel-Lebanon agreement falls into the very trap which was avoided under UNSCR 1701. In fact, it is an even worse trap since this agreement fails to clearly define the behaviors by Lebanon that would trigger the security commitments. There is a failure in the agreement to define what would constitute a material violation on the Lebanese side, but it does clearly define Israeli commitments under the agreement, many of which are impossible to uphold if Lebanon or Hizballah act without such clearly defined legal restrictions.  As such, this agreement threatens the exact same nightmare scenario as the Israeli-French proposal in 2006, which was rejected as the basis for UNSCR 1701.  

Third, and perhaps most disturbing, is the assumption underlying this – that entangling the United States into a commitment to defend Israeli interests strengthens the Israeli-American relationship and reinforces the American strategic backstop – should not be taken as a given. In fact, it is worth examination. 

For years, Israel’s defense elites have been seized by the conception that the support of the US government is an essential component of any strategic move or substantial military action, the key to which the Israeli government and security establishment believes demanded launching a full court campaign of convincing Washington’s elites in the corridors of power.  

On one side, there is a” Zionist” problem with this outlook. One of the most refreshing and important aspects of the solidification of Zionism and the mooring of Israeli identity was the idea that it represented the rejection of the Diaspora “Galut” Jew – a person whose institutionalized weakness and disempowerment distorted the soul and left him at the mercy of the non-Jewish world and attempting futilely to make peace with his implacable haters. Israel’s defense establishment in recent years seems to be too burdened by the idea that it cannot act without approval from the United States in critical moments. This is most evinced by its belief that the Iran problem ultimately requires an American solution. But if it does, then what happens when the US refuses, or the US simply withdraws from the region, or the US enters an introverted or isolationist stage.  The whole point of Zionism was that Israel’s fate is in Israel’s hands regardless of what others demand of it. 

But on the other side, there is an equally large “American” problem. The support of the American leadership for Israel in America generally comes from the strong foundation of public support and sense of cultural affinity which Israel enjoys broadly in the American population. Part of this emerges from the unique Judeo-Christian roots of American identity which views itself as the New Jerusalem and seeks guidance culturally from its Christianity (even secular Americans still culturally respect their Judeo-Christian foundations).  But part of this also emerges from the respect Israel has earned through its actions and its fierce independence – and distinctly NOT from appreciation of a history of seeking prior permission.  

Indeed, Americans are increasingly displaying signs of exhaustion in bearing the burden for the defense of other nations who appear unwilling to bear the burden primarily themselves for their own defense. Very few American administrations in the last four or five decades, for example, have avoided a welling demand in the public for greater defense-burden sharing from our European allies. Israel has long stood out precisely because it never asked for American troops or entangling security guarantees.  It was precisely the idea that when Israel acts, it does so because it is so important that it bear the burden alone.  This independent determination and willingness to pay the price reminds Americans of themselves and convinces Americans popularly, and thus the leadership particularly, that they should support Israel both during specific episodes and in a more general sense.  

Transforming Israel from strategic asset to albatross – from an independently-minded ally to a dependent obligation – is perhaps one of the greatest threats to public support, and through it the leadership’s support, for Israel that can be imagined. And yet, consistently over the last several decades, Israel’s defense establishment has tried to entangle the United States in Israel’s defense structure, thankfully all stillborn, through various schemes that could damage Israel’s brand image and erode American respect. This includes through the years:  

• the idea of American guarantees in Judea and Samaria (even deployments to protect Israel) in exchange for Israel‘s withdrawal during the Oslo period,  
• Israeli acquiescence during the Obama administration in American diplomatic efforts on Iran or to entice Israel to join the International Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and accept a regional nuclear weapons free zone in the region by offering a nuclear umbrella (Hillary Clinton) in exchange for Israel’s surrendering its reported nuclear capability,  
• the idea of deploying US troops to the Golan Heights to secure Israeli withdrawal from there in the mid-1990s, and now  

These efforts all never came to be, making this agreement the first to really be accepted by Israel since Eisenhower’s security guarantee to Israel in 1957 for withdrawing from the Sinai. The fate of that guarantee leaves room for anxiousness.  

Simply put, Americans get tired of supporting nations that are not willing to defend themselves, and Israel is in danger through this constant tendency among Israel’s defense elites to slide into that category. 

Equally disconcerting, however, is that while the primacy of maintaining Israel’s freedom of strategic maneuver has been rhetorically loudly tempted by virtually every Israeli politician, it took bold leadership to act on that conviction at the political level since the underlying defense establishment conception is that securing American approval transcends strategic maneuver. This ossified conception has gripped and dominated Israel’s defense elites since 1970, and it has left along the way a horrific trail of failure behind it starting with 1973.  Strategic maneuvers and independence of action, including the ability to launch strategic preemption, is a critical, if not one of the two most critical, pillars of a proper Israeli defense strategy (the other pillar is strategic depth through buffers to allow for mobilization). Dependency and habitual reliance on “the green light” from Washington devastates that pillar. 

Ah, but it reinforces deterrence…Not 

The agreement exposes several deeply disturbing ideas that afflict the Israeli defense establishment about strategy and deterrence, some of which in truth reflect a more broadly-shared decay in Western strategic thinking. 

The logic of the specific agreement as publicly stated is deeply flawed and troubling. All of its logic and assumptions are in one form or another a rendition of the belief that by bolstering Lebanon, you will create conditions for their severing their ties with Iran — or at least reducing them below other national objectives that gravitate toward a Beirut-Tehran rupture. It rests on two assumptions.  

First that deterrence is a foundational strategy, but that the enemy might lack enough value that it renders it impossible to effectively threaten enough to deter. Thus, the more value the enemy is given by Israel which he would lose in war, the stronger the deterrent. This logic has been applied to the Palestinians as well, and it has proven entirely erroneous. The US tried a diluted and tenuous version with the Soviets in the 1970s, and it ended in failure with the Russian invasion of Afghanistan‎.   

Indeed, just this week it was revealed that one of the core conceptions underlying the German government’s support (under Angela Merkel) for the Nord Stream II natural gas pipeline from Russia was that by giving Russia so great an economic interest, it would stabilize Russian European relations, make war impossible, and increase energy security for the European continent – an almost verbatim duplicate of the Israeli arguments regarding the Lebanon agreement.  Of course, we all know how well these German assumptions panned out on February 24, 2022.  

Second, proponents rely on a bedrock assumption that the enemy, in this case Lebanon, has any agency. That somehow it has power of decision to go to war, to make peace, to cease hostility, and that only if the incentives were great enough, then they would really cast the Iranians away and enter the promised utopia. Lebanon is a captive nation and has no agency, as did neither Czechoslovakia, Hungary nor Poland and others during the Cold War. No matter what we would have given the Czechs in 1945-1989, it would never have resulted in their choosing to bolt, because ‎it was not a choice over which they had power to make. So too Lebanon. I have yet to meet a single Lebanese who does not wish dearly to rid themselves of Iran, they do not need a gas field to do so, but they are desperate because they have no power or control over any decision.  

Moreover, if Hizballah’s centrally held value is to survive, and Iran’s centrally held value is to dominate Lebanon through Hizballah, then any attempt to develop a foundation of any sort for Lebanese independence inherently becomes a target for Hizballah’s and Iran’s ire – and their determined sabotage.  In that way, it is precisely because the fields could become a foundation for reducing Lebanon’s dependence on Iran that it raises the latter’s interest in escalating hostilities, precisely to sabotage that movement. In other words, unless Hizballah is already neutralized and Iran’s clench broken, these moves toward building a Lebanese economy of separation will be still born, or even invite attack … unless the moves can be incentivized to be in Hizballah’s and Iran’s interest.  The only pathway for that would be to allow these fields to become a structure for enriching and laundering money in times when they face international ostracism and sanctions.  But that would then mean that this agreement — reached at time when the Iranian people are braving bullets to oust their tormentors – becomes a vehicle whereby Israel has allowed funding for the internally repressive and externally aggressive apparatus (including the Huthis, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, let alone militias in Iraq) serving the Islamic Revolution to be infused with new sources of income.  

Third, is a corollary to the last point.  Could perhaps it arise that if Hizballah financially benefits from the gas proceeds — since no Israeli official has as yet argued that it will be possible to insulate the money from Hizballah skimming ‎– then perhaps it might lead to a split between Hizballah (who will enjoy the revenue proceeds) and Iran‎ (which will not)? But this betrays a highly questionable assumption regarding the interwoven and symbiotic nature of Hizballah-Iranian relations. Hizballah relies on Iran on so many levels, financial being only one. Hizballah’s uniqueness with respect to other Shiite factions in Lebanon has always been that it is essentially an Iranian appendage, but that this quisling status was masked through its alignment with the reigning ideological construct of the Iranian regime, the “Valeyat e-Faqeh” or Rule of the Jurisprudent. The Valeyat e-Faqeh must be understood as a revolutionary movement within Shiite Islam, and thus does not genuinely enjoy the theological support of Lebanon’s Shiite religious establishment. Without Iranian overlay, the clerical establishment of Hizballah would be superseded and wiped out by the older Shiite establishment, much of which still exists in Iraq. Remember the founding charter of 1985 of Hizballah:  

“we, the Umma of Hizballah, consider ourselves a part of the state of Iran…We are committed to the orders of one leadership, represented by the Valeyat e-Faqeh, the Supreme leader.”   

The most prominent clerics of Lebanon, such as the Ayatollah in Tyre, have far greater following and Silsalah (pedigree), oppose the idea of the Valeyat e-Faqeh. They would seek to diminish and subordinate Hizballah clerics’ influence in a heartbeat. The same can be said of Amal against Hizballah. Indeed, in an attempt at subordinating and fusing Amal with Hizballah, Hizballah made Shaykh Subhi al-Tufayli for two years (1998-91) the Secretary General of the Hizballah. Tufayli was a valued student of the father of the Shiite Awakening, the vanished Imam, Musa al-Sadr. But he opposed Iran’s revolutionary reigning theology of Valeyat e-Faqeh, which strongly suggested – given that he was that the most senior and genuine actor that was present at the creation of the Shiite Awakening in the 1970s – that Musa al-Sadr himself would likely have been opposed to the Iran’s definition of Shiism. This profoundly threatened the Iranian regime which was trying to usurp the mantle to itself of being the father of the Shiite Awakening and the successor to Imam Musa al-Sadr.  Indeed, Iran was already on thin ice in terms of the Shiite Awakening since its key strategic ally at the beginning of the revolution in Iran was Yasser Arafat and the PLO, who is largely believed among Shiites to have ordered the assassination/disappearance of Imam Musa al-Sadr and executed him via his ties to Qadhafi in Libya, who was the other Arab leader with whom the Iranian regime established an early strategic partner. As such, the threat of Tufayli’s opposition to the Iranian regime was clear and present, and as such he was removed and ostracized.  Without Iran’s heavy hand, not only would old Shiite patterns almost instantly resurface and consume Hizballah, but Iran’s usurped mantle of leading the Shiite Awakening would be exposed and collapse. 

As such, Hizballah does not have an indigenous basis to survive its competition with other Shiite trends. There is no Hizballah possible without its being an interwoven part of Iran’s dominance, and vice versa, there is no Iran in Lebanon without Hizballah. As such, trying to create a Hizballah-Iran wedge is like trying to seduce an arm to sever itself from a body. Neither Hizballah nor the arm even have a central nervous system and brain independent of the mother body. 

 
Finally, as a last thought about whether this agreement strengthens Israel’s deterrence. Israel’s government has trumpeted that were there no agreement, then there would be war and that Israeli gas fields would be threatened.  This is all but an admission that Hizballah’s threats against Karish – backed up by the flying of a few unarmed Hizballahi drones that Israel shot down – drove Israel’s government to concede vast maritime rights and even its sovereign territorial waters as essentially a protection payment against the Hizballah mafiosi-like threat.  The logic underpinning the idea that this strengthens deterrence in the future frankly simply eludes me.  

‎Well, Israel is emerging as a strategic gas player, and this unlocks that potential…Not 

The Israeli government has argued that it needed this agreement to bring its Karish gas field on-line.  Hizballah, sometimes itself and sometimes channeled through Lebanon’s voice, has threatened every Israeli gas find exploration and development until now, and insists that it now has an agreement with the Palestinian Islamic Jihad to attack Israeli fields in a future conflict.  Lebanon last year threatened to act against Israel’s giant Leviathan field, at times claiming it was part of its territory and at times because it accused Israel of stealing its gas through horizontal drilling. In short, there was nothing different about the Karish field from all the previous fields, and Israel has in an unencumbered way thus far developed all those fields thanks to the superior defense capabilities of its navy. And in the end, it is the maintenance of those capabilities that will continue to be the foundation for the security needed to develop Karish. It is thus hardly believable that for some reason Karish could not be developed when others were because Lebanon did not green-light it.  Moreover, even the Lebanese admit that Karish was never really on the table in these talks, and that they never seriously claimed Karish.  In other words, it is unclear how this agreement makes it easier in any way to develop Karish. 

Broadening the aperture, one notices that Israel is at the edge of perhaps one of the greatest moments of strategic good luck it has ever faced. The sudden, great dependency of Europe on finding new sources of gas, combined with the presence of gas in Israel and the ability offered to bring yet more gas through Israel to Europe, position Israel to become a critical gas transmission hub of about 60 to 80 billion cubic meters of gas per annum. But Israel is deliberately denying its territory for transmission by:  

• Sabotaging the UAE’s desire to build a transmission pipeline for gas through the Eilat-Ashqelon pipeline company rights of way,  

• Pushing export of Israeli gas through Egypt,  
• surrendering territory in which it is possible substantial more gas may yet be discovered,  
• Wasting a precious year of exploration by imposing an inexplicable moratorium, and  
• Pushing the robust evolution of Lebanese gas which will compete with Israeli gas in Europe and could itself offer as the competing‎ location of being a hub for gas from Iraq, Syria and Lebanon — thus effectively forfeiting for Israel this immense strategic gift over which it had no competition until the Israeli government created it via Egypt and Lebanon.  

Taken together, there is no way to avoid concluding that out of ideological reasons (possibly environmental), Israel’s government has deliberately retarded and diminished the potential for finding, producing and exporting gas, let alone to position Israel as a vital national asset in becoming the core east-Mediterranean gas hub. 

Indeed, Israel may have just unlocked the potential for a large alternative gas hub structure anchored to Qatar and Turkey just announced its intention to become the new gas hub for Europe (although including Russian gas).  This unlocks the potential for Qatar to lead an effort to connect its own gas structures to the eastern leveraging the Lebanese gas fields to connect to a Turkish-based pipeline structure into Europe. Six months ago, this was not a conceivable state of development since Lebanon was considered too unstable, the legal infrastructure in Lebanon was rickety, sanctions afflicted the development of the fields, as did the irresolution of the demarcation line with Israel. Israel, and Egypt — who is in tension with Turkey and would be loath to build a pipeline that crosses Turkish waters or territory — for that matter, thus had no effective competition for becoming a gas hub. And now, suddenly Lebanon may well emerge as the gas hub, leaving Israeli gas stranded beyond its current structure.  

Competition is a natural part of life, and Lebanon certainly had the potential to become a competitor along these parameters all along, about which Israel could do nothing other than expedite its own development – which it curiously has been extremely slow to do (or even outright eager to halt) over that last year.  But what is mystifying is why Israel, after having spent a year stalling its own exploration and export infrastructure development, decided to remove a pound of its own flesh to encourage Lebanon to compete with itself in a way that may render Israel’s potential hydrocarbons strategic importance for Europe dead in the water. 

In the end, why did the Israeli government agree to this deal, and why does it do so with such gusto? One can certainly attribute it to cynical political calculations — especially given that this is the annual election season in Israel. Indeed, the rise of cynicism is a phenomenon worthy of examination in and of itself because it afflicts many Israeli politicians as ideas and ideologies fade in currency in organizing political parties  

But attributing this solely to election cynicism skims over the depth of the problem herein exposed. The government’s public justifications for the deal are possibly heartfelt and genuine.  Indeed, they likely are since they reflect deeply held, but equally dangerous, flawed conceptions governing Israel’s strategic imagery, the evidence for which stretches back for decades already. One shape or form of the arguments forwarded to explain this dal have appeared at various levels of development as far back as a half century and reflect a serious, long-term deterioration in the solidity and rigorousness of Israeli strategic thinking and analysis.  Moreover, it is not one “conception” that bedevils the planners and analysists, but a collection of conceptions which have remained beyond critical examination because of a stilted historiography, or narrative, of events and Israeli strategic history that prevents either realization or reexamination of thought.  

In other words, what disturbs most about this agreement is not only its terms, but what it exposes about the problematic state of strategic thinking governing Israel’s defense establishment. 

By Dr. David Wurmser

Israeli discoveries of natural gas over the last 13 years are enough to allow not only self-sufficiency but also the potential for enough export to emerge as a geostrategic player in the hydrocarbons sector. If done properly and aggressively, Israel has the opportunity to establish itself as the main natural gas export hub in the eastern Mediterranean, servicing not only eastern Mediterranean gas suppliers, but Persian Gulf ones too, and become the conduit to supply Europe as much as a third of its import needs. And yet, Israel’s policies over the last year have undermined expanding its reserves, retarded and limited the development of its transmission structures, and all but sabotaged its ability to become a hub for gas regionally. Indeed, it seems as if Israel prefers regional plans to make Egypt rather than Israel such a major hub, including subordinating the export structure of its own gas to dependency on Egypt.¹ If Israel, thus, seeks to establish itself a strategic player in the natural gas sector – let alone insulate its gas export structure from regional geopolitical instability — it will need to change not only its policies, but its assumptions and attitude.  

Over the last decade, Israel has discovered roughly 200-250 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas. Israel only consumes about 10-15 bcm of gas per annum. There are also other fields that suggest still more finds are possible,  such as the Zeus fields, which taken altogether could indicate Israel has still between 50% to 100% more gas than has hitherto been discovered. This means Israel has a hefty quantity that can be earmarked for export, even under the regulatory export restrictions imposed by the Sheshinski Committee framework.   

Until now, Israeli export has largely been confined to its neighbors.  Currently, Israel exports up to 7 bcm of gas to Egypt per annum and 3 bcm to Jordan. But the quantity of gas discovered is clearly enough to contemplate export to Europe. Two recent developments, moreover, have further focused attention on the potential supply of Israeli gas to Europe. First, the invasion of Ukraine which has resulted in despair in Europe over supply. Israeli gas was seen as an attractive alternative, at least to some extent. Second, Energean, the company exploring and developing the latest fields in Israel announced on October 6 that it discovered another 12-17 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas off its coast in the Hermes field and there is another field that might hold as much as 20 bcm more. 

On top of Israeli gas, there is also the possibility, already suggested by the UAE, of pumping gas from several Persian Gulf lands via Saudi Arabia to the southern terminus of Israel’s Eilat-Ashqelon Pipeline Company (EAPC) in Ramat Yotam in Eilat, and then using the company’s right-of-way to build a gas pipeline (the current pipes carry oil) to transport the gas to the Mediterranean for transmission to Europe via Israel’s emerging export structure.  A potential collapse of Iran’s regime, which partnered with Israel decades ago before the Islamic Revolution to build this pipeline, could as well open up Iran’s vast natural gas deposits for Europe in addition to its natural Asian market. 

In short, Israel has every possibility of becoming a major international hub of export of Persian Gulf and eastern Mediterranean gas, especially when considering the likelihood of more gas being discovered in Cypriot waters. 

These facts and projections of reserves are relatively clear.  But the picture becomes more complex after that, especially concerning the transmission structures.  There are currently no direct transmission structures of gas from Israel to Europe.  The only physical way to export Israeli gas to Europe – which imports from all sources between 150-200 bcm per annum before the Ukraine war– would be through the existing Egyptian-Israeli pipeline structure, which then connects to either the Idku or Damietta gas liquefaction plants for loading onto liquefied natural gas (LNG) ships bound for Europe.  The combined liquefaction capacity of the two LNG plants in Egypt is about 30 bcm. The pipe from Israel to Egypt, however, only holds about 7 bcm per annum, and all the molecules flowing through it are already booked by Egypt for domestic consumption. Although Egypt found a very large reservoir of gas offshore in ENI’s Zohr field, bringing that field to full capacity has proven to fall short of originally expected timelines at this stage. Simply put, Zohr cannot flood Egypt’s market enough at this point to generate export surplus. At this point, it suffices only to offset the increase in Egypt’s domestic demand. And thus, Egypt will need to continue relying on all the gas Israel sends for its domestic use.  

A second gas pipeline to Egypt is being built that will hold up to 11 bcm of gas, but it will take roughly three to four years to complete, and when it does, it is not clear how much of that gas will be consumed by Egypt and how much will be surplus to send to Europe via the two Egyptian LNG terminals.  Egypt’ domestic consumption is growing at a rapid pace, so clearly far less than the 11 bcm capacity of the pipeline will flow to the Idku or Damietta LNG plants for export. 

Moreover, Egypt is politically problematic. It gets along with Israel well enough, but its economy is showing signs of grave danger – even potential bankruptcy. Indeed, JP Morgan estimated that: 

“Egypt’s debt-to-GDP ratio is around 95%. The country is also experiencing one of the most significant foreign exchange outflows this year, estimated at around $11 billion. FIM Partners estimated that Egypt will have $100 billion in hard currency debt over the next five years, including a massive $3.3 billion bond due in 2024.”² 

At the same time, the United States last month announced that it will deduct USD 130 million from Egypt’s annual aid amount as pressure on human rights concerns, which represents a material economic but a much larger psychological hit.³  And thus all coincides with dramatic cost increases in grain and other foodstuffs – price increases over which have led in the past to great upheaval and revolution in Egypt. To survive, it is likely that Egypt will not only face internal pressure to sell its own gas for foreign currency rather than use its export infrastructure for Israel’s, but it will also continue the drift it began under the Obama administration toward Russia’s and China’s orbits.  The pressures that led it in that direction a half decade ago now are exacerbated by the urgency of the current quest to obtain aid, cheap food and regional strategic support (such as in Libya).  Once further driven to seek support from Russia, one can only wonder how long it will be before the phone rings from Moscow telling Cairo that Moscow views with great disfavor Egypt’s being a conduit for exporting Israeli gas to Europe to replace Russia’s.  In short, if Israel’s current export structure to Egypt and possibly Europe emerges and survives then great, but Egypt is is not a structure upon which a fifth of Israel’s economy should depend. 

A small amount of gas could also be compressed at the Hadera terminal (currently used for offloading, not onloading gas) in Israel to load gas onto compressed natural gas (CNG) ships for Europe, but there are very few of these CNG ships left in the world since their transport-capacity-to-cost ration is lower and the amount of gas they can load is quite a bit more limited than LNG ships, although at the ranges that Israel is from Europe (under 2500 km), there may be some cost offsets.⁴  With current technologies, Israel could only export about 0.5 bcm per year this way to Europe (with about 14 million m³ per ship). 

Combined, under the most optimistic circumstances and assumptions, one can imagine up to 5-10 bcm per annum, about one third of Austria’s annual consumption, being transmitted to Europe. This does not amount to a globally and strategically critical production structure. 

The only way Israel will emerge as either a major or reliable source or even hub for gas is by building direct transmission structures from Israel to Europe. One structure is already in process.  An offshore floating LNG platform is already being constructed to service Israel’s Leviathan field. It could theoretically service a capacity of approximately 15 bcm per annum of export.  Under current plans, however, this will take roughly another four years to build. 

Second, there were plans by the EU and Israel to build a direct pipeline from Israel to Europe at a cost of about Euro 6 billion. Since it is still under planning, it is uncertain how much gas it would transport, but comparable pipelines in the Mediterranean carry about 30 bcm of gas. There could always also be an additional such terminal constructed if deemed economically viable. 

Third, Israel could add a pipeline to Cyprus, and connect to a reinvigorated Vassilikos LNG terminal which like other land-based liquefaction plants could be imagined to reach 15-20 bcm capacity per annum.  This option has been considered but given the lack of urgent interest in Israeli gas internationally until the Ukraine war, this option was shelved for the time being.  

Finally, returning for a moment to compressed natural gas, there is a new generation of CNG ships under design that may work effectively to service medium range routes under 2500 km, which is about Israel’s distance to Europe’s Mediterranean ports.⁵ Indeed, the EU has given Italian project developer, Naval Progetti SRL, a grant of Euro 12 million to develop such a ship.  These ships may be able to carry as much as 7 bcm per annum per train, roughly half that of an LNG terminal, but with less prohibitive up-front infrastructure costs (potentially using Israel’s already existing Hadera terminal). These ships, however, are not operational yet. 

But for all this to happen, both Europe and Israel need to adjust their current attitude toward their gas sectors. If Europe considers its need for gas from the eastern Mediterranean to be urgent under wartime conditions and Israel appreciates the unique, acute strategic opportunity it has been handed, then the two could conceive of Israel’s gas hub not in terms of peace-time commercial timelines but as a Manhattan-project level effort. With such prioritization, it is conceivable that Israel could become within a few years a hub (with initial levels of robust export already in two to three years) for Israeli, Cypriot and Gulf Gas to a capacity of about 70-80 bcm per annum, which is about half of Europe’s import. 

But therein lies the problem. Europe is shocked, but still coming to terms with what it means and what will be entailed in truly weaning itself off of Russian gas. Moreover, in Israel’s government, there appears to be a complete absence of any sense of urgency to match the magnitude of the commercial and strategic opportunity.   

The spirit animating Israel’s left is alignment with Europe, and the spirit of Europe until Ukraine was toward moving away from hydrocarbons altogether and toward alternate energy sources.  Ironically, while Europe has been jolted into greater sobriety and began to take interest in diversifying its natural gas suppliers, Israel’s center-left government over the last year bought into more deeply the previously failed European concept and discouraged the development of its own hydrocarbons sector. This outdated and originally questionable attitude has led over the last 18 months to the following deeply flawed policies that suggest its new center-left government elected in 2021 was uninterested in developing the natural gas sector beyond what had already been developed:  

In December 2021, the new Israeli government placed a moratorium on all further exploration of Israeli waters for natural gas.⁶  Israel’s prime minister had said beforehand that he was eager to join the new international climate consensus in pushing for alternatives instead of hydrocarbons. Moreover, his government which relied on leftist parties, who held the energy, science and transport ministries portfolios, with a strong environmental program.  Afflicted by reality, when Russia invaded Ukraine, the Israeli government reversed its decision yet again and reopened its waters for further license tenders and exploration.⁷ 

First, Israel signed a deal in October 2020 to bring UAE gas to the Mediterranean.⁸ But then a year later in November 2021, only one month before it imposed the moratorium on licensing and exploring further prospects,  the new Israeli government reversed the previous government’s agreement and, citing environmental concerns, canceled the UAE’s deal to use Israel as a major transmissions structure for its gas and that of its neighbors.⁹ This reversal not only undermined Israel’s credibility, but also limits greatly, if it is not reversed soon, the amount of gas that could ultimately be sent to Europe. If Israel alone must fill the transmission structure with only its gas, then it holds in its entirety about three years of the sort of capacity (assuming it sends every molecule it has to Europe beyond annual domestic consumption) such a robust transmission structure could export to Europe. And that would mean that after three years, neither Israel nor Europe have any Israeli gas left. Even if Israel finds more gas than it has already found, that only extends the inevitable to a total of five to six years. On the other hand, export of gas from the Gulf would transform this niche “bump” of Israeli gas into an ongoing export structure for regional gas for decades, and thus raise Israel to the level of a major global strategic interest. Otherwise, Israel will remain a niche, boutique and transitory asterisk in the history of Europe’s energy mix. 

Then, after Israel reopened its waters for exploration, the United States, which has no real role in the planned EastMed Israel-to-Europe gas pipeline, came out publicly against it and pressed for its cancellation, saying it is both economically unviable, as well as suggesting it is destabilizing since Turkey expressed strong opposition to it because it would go through Greece rather than through Turkey and it would service Greek Cypriot fields.¹⁰ Moreover, the pipeline appears to have run afoul of US environmental objectives, according to US Under Secretary of State, Victoria Nuland in June 2022 (four months after the Russian invasion of Ukraine): 

“We believe it is too expensive, not economically viable and will take too long … And frankly, we don’t have 10 years, but in 10 years from now, we want to be far, far more green and far more diverse. When we think about hydrocarbons, both in the U.S. context and in the EU context, we are hoping for a quick transition.”¹¹ 

The Israeli government did not respond, let alone push back on this inexplicable US pressure to halt consideration of the Israel-to-EU EastMed pipeline, and appeared at first to be unwilling to cross the United States on this.  However, the government finally relented and signed two agreements – one with Egypt, Cyprus and Greece and one with the EU and Egypt, signaling an intent to realize this option despite US opposition. 

A similarly lackadaisical, if not flailing Israeli attitude seems to inform its approach to the critical question of the northern reaches of its maritime Economic Exclusion Zone (EEC). And now, while the Israeli government has thus far refused to publish a map, it reportedly seeks a deal with Lebanon that would cede to Beirut well over 1000 km² of surface under which no exploration has been done with the exception of the Qana block (Block 12 in Lebanon). That block alone contains a substantial field laying half in currently claimed Israeli waters (line 1, which had been set in 2011 with Cyprus), or one -third in the parameters of either the Hof (US pre-2022 proposed line) or proposed line (line 23) being worked out only three months ago on the basis of a June 2022 Lebanese claim, but is reportedly entirely removed from Israeli possession in the current plan (line 23/29 amalgam). One can only imagine what else lies in the ceded and unexplored 1000 km². 

In other words, the Israeli government has consistently adopted policies that halt exploration and diminish the possession of areas of potential reserves, at the same time it has disappeared in trying to encourage the development of transmissions structures or outright sabotaged them when it came ot U.A.E. Plans. Whatever the merits of the current proposal for an Israeli-Lebanese deal on the EEZ maritime line, its most disconcerting aspect is the attitude it reflects. Israel again displays a lack of determination to maximize and leverage its assets in the gas sector for major geo-strategic objectives, and instead seems almost without afterthought willing to cede areas that could, and by all estimates likely do, contain many more hydrocarbons prospects. 

A month ago, the Israeli government signed with Egypt and Europe an agreement to supply gas to Europe. The optics were impressive, but the reality was empty. The Israeli government has signed agreements for such trade without any policies, nor with the appropriate underlying attitude, that will realize what they signed.   

There has been no governmental urgency to resurrect the idea of a UAE connection to the EAPC structure. Nor has there been any high-level discussion of how to realize, let alone expedite, the EU-Israeli pipeline. There is no discussion about adding a second LNG terminal, and there has been no diplomatic approach to, let alone summit meeting with Cyprus to begin planning to build a structure to connect Israeli fields to Cyprus’ LNG terminal at Vassilikos.  In addition, there has been no indication, nor approach to the UAE, to resurrect the UAE-to EAPC trans-Red Sea pipeline network plan. Moreover, there is no debate in Israel expressing concern about having the core of Israel’s export structure dependent on Egypt’s acquiescence as we enter an era when concerning pressures on Egypt are mounting. 

When one widens the aperture a little, one also sees Israel’s curious and disturbing lack of urgency and lackadaisical attitude as a far broader affliction. For example, consider the behavior of the Israeli government over the last two years toward developing Israel’s port and freight rail structure strategically to establish itself as a major international Europe-to-Asia trade route overland supplement to the Suez Canal at a time when the canal is proving expensive, operating at capacity, slow and every other year shut down for weeks because of accidents.  Modern port technology linked with a high-speed freight rail structure in Israel, which Israel’s rail authority has been pushing for quite some time, had been met with complete disinterest on the political level and has been frankly stalled entirely. The Indian multi-billionaire, Guatam Adani, having apparently a greater sense of strategic importance of Israeli ports than the Israeli government, may have saved Israel from itself by buying Haifa port several months ago.¹²  This occurred after a year in which the UAE had expressed deep interest in buying the port. The UAE’s sovereign wealth fund had even allotted funds to conduct a feasibility study of vast development for the Haifa port to connect Europe to Asia in trade routes. The Israeli government, as it did with the UAE effort to connect its natural gas structures to the EAPC, simply stalled on this offer until it faded.  Were it not for Adani, who likely will work with the UAE, it is likely that Israel would have through inattentiveness allowed the port to pass to Turkish ownership under an American-supported consortium which had only limited interest in seeing the port emerge as a global east Mediterranean hub for Asian-European traffic. 

Israel clearly wants to be seen as a strategic supplier of gas to Europe, but its aspirations are unmatched, if not betrayed, by its actions.  Those actions seem determined to push Egypt and Lebanon to fill the vacuum being left by Israel. And it seems to be part of a larger baffling Israeli outlook, which simply fails to envision Israel as a major strategic player in any international trade, logistics or transmission structure.  Ben Gurion, who may have labored under many flaws as a socialist but like all Israelis of his generation had an acute sense of national interest and an acute sense of strategy nonetheless, would be turning in his grave.

By Dr. David Wurmser

At the time of this writing, the Iranian people are rising up across all its communities to free itself from the Islamic Revolution.  It is unclear that the regime will survive. This hope, combined with the horror of its amassed brutality over the last 43 years and the complete disregard for international convention, let alone international law, should remove the option of proceeding with any new nuclear agreement with Iran. Instead, the West should finally reach consensus that the current talks must be terminated. The reliability of any treaty – which is after all a contract under the very international law the regime has consistently not only violated but whose validity it has dismissed – is futile. The regime is not a legitimate interlocutor.   

Indeed, the very act of negotiating with the regime itself validates and enriches the regime at precisely the time that the Iranian people have rejected its legitimacy and are desperately trying to fight the mechanisms of brutality. An agreement would not only signal that the West assumes the regime’s survival, but it would unlock hundreds of billions of dollars to fund the regime’s repression apparatus internally and its instruments of accelerating aggression externally.  In essence it betrays the Iranian people who are trying to free themselves from the deadening hand of this regime. 

Moreover, the regime has consistently used international negotiations to make a withering argument against its own people whenever its internal legitimacy was shaken.  It has argued that the international community does not care about Iranians and Iranian freedom, but only conspires perpetually to weaken the “great Iranian nation.” The symbol of such greatness, they argue, is Iranian nuclear power.  As such, the regime argues, the West is supporting Iranian popular attempts at liberation only as leverage to suppress the power of the Iranian nation and deny its historical greatness, and that the West will abandon the Iranian people the moment the leverage is spent or worthless.  To this end, it points to the statement by the Obama administration in 2009 during the height of the “Green” revolution that it tempers its support for the demonstrators because it has “other priorities as well,” clearly implying the nuclear talks. 

Beyond these valid and overarching considerations, the obsession with continuing talks with Iran over its nuclear program rests on a key assumption: that in the end, Iran does not want nuclear weapons – indeed, feels religiously opposed to such weapons — but only seeks them for a sense of security or a form of leverage on other matters.  One of the most important documents to which western diplomats consistently refer that bears this assumption out is the Fatwa issued by Ayatollah Khamenei in 1997 which specifically prohibits nuclear weapons as un-Islamic.  Between 1997 and 2012, this Fatwa became a backstop of confidence for diplomats who began conceding verifiable and solid restrictions on Iran’s nuclear activities in exchange for a sweatheart nuclear “cutout” deal with Iran that erases lingering past concerns and gives it rights and privileges within the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) far beyond any other P-5 nation (US, UK, Russia, France and China) within the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).   

The fatwa stood at the center of US debate in the several years leading up to the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA, a.k.a. the 2015 “Iran nuclear deal”).  Despite the fact that there has never been a text issued of this Fatwa in public – and thus we do not know with any certainty what it purports to say, its has been the subject of academic and international policy journals analyses. The Iranian regime encouraged highlighting the solidity and importance of this fatwa, suggesting in its propaganda “academic” journals that it was an even more solid guarantee than the NPT itself.  For example, a Kent University Ph.D., Farhad Sirjani, wrote with the veneer of scholarly garb in 2013: 

The Fatwa elaborates and confirms Iran’s commitment regarding WMD ban, on the one hand, and Iran’s insistence on its NPT right to peaceful uses of nuclear technology, on the other. It is concluded that the commitment undertaken by Iran via the Fatwa, is, in some important respects, more comprehensive and more long-lasting than that Iran has undertaken under the NPT. ¹ 

This fatwa influenced not only the public debate, but policymaking not only at the level of diplomats, but at the presidential level itself under the Obama administration.  For example, on September 24, 2013, at the UN General Assembly’s annual opening in New York, President Obama in his speech said:  

“Meanwhile, the Supreme Leader has issued a fatwa against the development of nuclear weapons, and President Rouhani has just recently reiterated that the Islamic Republic will never develop a nuclear weapon. So these statements made by our respective governments should offer the basis for a meaningful agreement.”² 

The appeal to this fatwa has once again appeared recently in US government briefings and statements as the United States continues to seek a new nuclear agreement with Iran.  Indeed, so much is it understood by Iran that this fatwa remains a core pillar of the assumptions governing western policy that the Iranian regime employed the threat of rescinding it – strongly suggesting it believed such a threat forms effective pressure on the US government.  As Iranian lawmaker, Sabbaghian Bafghi, said on August 2, 2022:  

“We will ask Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to change his fatwa and strategy on the prohibition of producing nuclear weapons if the enemies of the Islamic Republic continue their threats.”³ 

The problem is that this Fatwa has never been published, nor likely has it ever existed.  The core assumption and evidence to which western diplomats cling to allay their fears of Iran’s ultimate intentions for the acquisition and use of a nuclear weapon, in fact, does not exist.  It never did. 

As such, it is important to go back to the evolution of this myth to its origins in the 2008-2012 period to ferret out that western belief in the critical assumption is, in fact, flawed. 

KHAMENEI’S FATWA AGAINST NUCLEAR WEAPONS  

As the negotiations between the P5+1 (the UN Security Council’s five permanent members plus Germany) talks with Iran in Istanbul began in mid-April 2012, the proceedings and public discourse were both seized with reporting of the issuance (or supposed issuance) of a fatwa, or a religious ruling, by Ali Khamenei, the supreme religious authority in Iran’s current revolutionary regime. The fatwa, Iran’s press reported, forbids the production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons – what it called “the three “nos.” 

Iranian officials noisily heralded the fatwa as proof that Iran was not trying to weaponize its nuclear program, and was thus operating within its nuclear rights under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: 

“The fatwa that the Supreme Leader has issued is the best guarantee that Iran will never seek to produce nuclear weapons, Judiciary Chief Ayatollah Sadeq Amoli Larijani said on Wednesday [11 April] … Khamenei has issued a fatwa declaring that production, stockpiling, and use of nuclear weapons are all haram (prohibited in Islam).”⁴ 

Iran’s Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi highlighted this as a turning point in the negotiations, saying that the West realized that Khamenei’s fatwa against making atomic bombs “had a religious basis and was announced on the basis of Shari’ah tenets and not for political purposes. Taking this into consideration, the West came to the conclusion at the Istanbul talks that a joint framework was needed as a basis for advancing the talks with Iran.”⁵  

In recent weeks, the West has led an effort to tighten the screws on Iran through toughened sanctions with the hope of compelling Tehran to accept a restraint on its nuclear program, the first test of which were the Istanbul talks. While it may not be the official US negotiating stance yet, the United States has recently defined its red line in public signaling not around the state of progress of Iran’s program, but whether Iran would cross the threshold of weaponization. As such, Western diplomats were quick to note that such a fatwa could be an important benchmark that suggests the current effort of isolating and pressing the Iranian regime is beginning to show signs of success. As the London Telegraph reported, “[Secretary] Clinton revealed that she has been studying Khamenei’s fatwa, saying that she has discussed it with religious scholars, other experts and with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. ‘If it is indeed a statement of principle, of values, then it is a starting point for being operationalized,’ Clinton said.”⁶ Europeans were even more encouraged: “One of the diplomats, who demanded anonymity because he was sharing information from a closed session, said the Iranians appeared to be moving toward that goal [of discussing their program], engaging in discussion about the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. He said the Iranian team had mentioned supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s ‘fatwa,’ or prohibition, of nuclear weapons for Iran, in the course of the plenary discussions” which European Union foreign policy chief, Catherine Ashton described as “the beginnings of a sustained process.”⁷ 

RECURRING REPORTS OF THE FATWA  

The saga of this heralded fatwa is neither new, nor is it tied to the current state of pressure under which the Iranian regime finds itself. It dates as far back as 1997, and has been reported before – indeed several times – in the Iranian press or referred to in statements by Iranian officials:  

 In an interview in the German paper, Der Spiegel, in early December 2011, Iran’s foreign minister, Ali Akbar Salehi added: “Iranian supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has issued a fatwa saying that nuclear weapons are not acceptable in Islam and that they are banned in Islam. This means that the mass destruction weapons play no role in our defense strategy.”⁸  

 In an interview on November 19, 2011 with the Italian paper, Corriere Della Sera, Iranian ambassador to Rome, Seyed Mohammad Ali Hossaini, said: “Iran has always aimed for a peaceful, civilian use of nuclear energy, we stated that right at the start of our program. Our highest authorities have always said that they believe the production, storage, and use of nuclear arms is something execrable, or even “haram,” which in Islamic religion is a prohibited action, totally to be condemned and banned. This principle is also contained in a fatwa, a religious precept, issued by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who is the highest religious and political authority in the Islamic Republic of Iran. And we immediately issued it worldwide. The importance of this fatwa is such that, even if the international community were to give the green light tomorrow to an Iranian nuclear bomb, our government could not build one.”⁹ 

• During a visit to Slovenia on July 11, 2011, Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi, said that Khamenei issued a fatwa declaring that the production, stockpiling, and use of nuclear weapons are all haram.¹⁰  

• In September 2004, Iran’s broadcasting authority reported that Khamenei had issued a fatwa – apparently as early as 1997 – stating that the use of nuclear weapons was contrary to and forbidden by Islam, and that this fatwa had been mentioned by Iran’s nuclear negotiator and National Security Council head, Hassan Rouhani, during the talks with the West.¹¹ 

• The Islamic republic issued an official statement at the emergency meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna on Aug. 9, 2005, which was reported through a website, saying: “The Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has issued the fatwa that the production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons are forbidden under Islam and that the Islamic Republic of Iran shall never acquire these weapons. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who took office just recently, in his inaugural address reiterated that his government is against weapons of mass destruction and will only pursue nuclear activities in the peaceful domain.”¹² 

But is taking weaponization off the table by Iran really the bottom line issued by the highest religious authority in the land?  

TOLERANCE OF STATEMENTS CONTRADICTING THE FATWA  

Fatwas are serious affairs within a community of believers, and even more so among Shiites who break themselves down into schools of followers headed by one of several religious scholars who have attained the highest form of learning and are worthy of emulation (Marjah al-Taqlids). In Iran’s Islamic Republic, this reaches even greater heights, with the reigning theological premise being that of the Valiyet e-Faqih (Rule of the Jurisprudent) – a concept rejected by most Shiites outside of Iran – in which a ruler is anointed to assume the voice and authority of the occulted 12th Imam in the absence of his return. He is superior to any of the other sources of emulation and assumes the role of supreme ruler with accompanying religious authority.  

As such, it is all the more surprising that ever since 1997 when the original fatwa by Khamenei was ostensibly released, a good number of Iranian leaders have issued fatwas or made statements which seem to directly contradict the religious edict of the unassailable and infallible supreme leader. These fatwas either suggest Iran is contemplating a nuclear weapons strategy, or outright call for Iran to develop, or even use, nuclear weapons:  

• In 2005, Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi published a book titled, The Islamic Revolution – Surges in Political Changes in History. Apparently the publisher, the Center of Publications of the Imam Khomeini Research Institute, released only 3000 copies limited to the seminary in which he taught. On page 337 of his book, clearly referring to nuclear weapons, he wrote: “We have to produce the most advanced weapon inside the country, even if our enemies do not like it. There is no reason that they have the right to produce a certain special type of weapon, but that other nations do not.”¹³ 

Mesbah Yazdi is not only a member of the Council of Experts – the body which chooses the Supreme Leader – but also the founder of the Haqqani school in Qom which trains future cadres of the regime whose alumni form the backbone of the clerical management class that runs Iran’s key political and security institutions. Mesbah Yazdi is one of the most prominent religious figures in Iran and is considered the mentor of President Ahmadinejad and leader of the Mahdist school (those who believe they see the signs aligning that confirm the 12th Imam is on the verge of returning from occultation).  

• On February 16, 2006, the reformist internet daily, Rooz reported that the late Mohsen Gharavian – a lecturer at the Qom seminaries and a prominent disciple of Mesbah Yazdi, issued a fatwa which read: “One must say that when the entire world is armed with nuclear weapons, it is only natural that, as a counter-measure, it is necessary to be able to use these weapons. However, what is important is what goal they may be used for … According to Shari’ah, too, only the goal is important….”¹⁴  

• On April 24, 2011, the website of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Gerdab, published what it envisions the day after Iran’s first nuclear test: “The day after Iran’s first nuclear test will be an ordinary day for us Iranians, but many of us will have a new gleam in our eyes – a gleam of national pride and might.” The article then continued by citing the Koran’s chapter 8, verse 60: “And prepare against them what force you can, and horses tied at the frontier, to frighten thereby the enemy of Allah and your enemy.”¹⁵ In tying this Koranic phrase directly to the quest for nuclear weapons, the IRGC publication in essence defines nuclear weapons as a requirement of the Islamic Republic’s constitution, since Article 151 of Iran’s Constitution relies on the authority of that very passage of the Quran when it states: “Prepare against them whatever force you are able to muster, and horses ready for battle, striking fear into God’s enemy and your enemy.”  

One might be tempted to discount these statements, since they are from officials who could be seen as part of the competing faction to the Supreme Leader. But other officials, who owe their allegiance and careers to Khamenei’s sufferance (and thus cannot be considered to be from a “deviant” or competing faction), also have expressed a quest for weaponization:  

• On December 14, 2001, during the al-Quds (Jerusalem) day sermon, Iran’s former president, Ali Akhbar Hashemi Rafsanjani declared at the University of Tehran not only that Israel can be destroyed with a single bomb, but suggested that Israel’s likely nuclear retaliation is digestible because the Muslim world would only be damaged by it: “If one day … the world of Islam comes to possess the weapons currently in Israel’s possession [nuclear weapons] – on that day this method of global arrogance would come to a dead end. This … is because the use of one nuclear bomb in Israel would leave nothing on the ground, whereas it will only damage the world of Islam.”¹⁶ He added that “It is not irrational to contemplate such an eventuality.”¹⁷ 

• On August 22, 2006, at the ceremony in Arak in which Iran inaugurated its heavy water plant, the Deputy Speaker of the Majlis (parliament), Mohammed Reza Bahonar, declared: “The Iranian people is faced by unreasonable forces that possess nuclear weapons, and there is no [force] that can deter them. If they put pressure [on Iran], the [Iranian] people may ask the government to produce nuclear weapons for the sake of deterrence … You [the West] need to fear the day the Iranian people will amass in the streets, demonstrate and ask of its government to produce nuclear weapons in order to counter the threats…”¹⁸ Far from paying a price for this statement, Bahonar, who is also the Leader of the Islamic Society of Engineers, was reelected and served in the post until 2011.  

• An Iranian paper, Asr-e Iran, published an editorial on February 28, 2010, saying: “The truth is that for Israel … the mere sense of insecurity is deadly poison…The truth is that Israel knows very well that even if Iran obtains nuclear weapons, it will never use them except in self-defense… Rather, Iran’s possession of such weapons will sow in Israel a sense of insecurity – and this sense alone will be enough to shatter the glass palace of this illegitimate regime in the Middle East. An Iran with nuclear weapons means an end to the dream of ‘secure Israel’ – and this means the exodus of most of the residents of this occupied land… This exodus will include human, financial, and other capital, and, therefore, will be a death sentence for this regime.”¹⁹  

These articles by both allies and competitors to Khamenei have never elicited a price or even a reprimand for having so blatantly crossed the Supreme Leader and his fatwa.  

THE FATWA CONTRADICTS OTHER FATWAS  

The effort to gauge the meaning and validity of this supposed fatwa is also problematic since no reasoning or context is provided in the reports or statements discussing why such a weapon is, from a religious point of view, materially different from any other weapon, and why it should be thus forbidden (haram) rather than encouraged to fulfill – as the IRGC’s publication, Gerdab suggests – the stipulation outlined in Koranic verse 8:60 and mentioned in Article 151 of the Constitution.  

In the West, we accord not only nuclear weapons, but an entire category of weaponry, a special status defined by the term “weapons of mass destruction,” namely their ability to inflict mass death and realistically contemplate swift, genocidal annihilation. In Iran, however, mass destruction has been sanctioned as part of a sanctioned cult of annihilation and martyrdom. The Iranian regime has issued numerous fatwas which provide the religious justification for not only the permissibility, but the imperative of inflicting mass killing of the enemy, and the acceptance of severe retaliation as a religiously justified risk and cost.²⁰ This is true not only of the competing clerical leaderships surrounding Khamenei and Ahmadinejad – but even the “moderate” camp defined by the likes of Rafsanjani.  

Given the context of other fatwas’ legitimizing a cult of annihilation and martyrdom, it is impossible that this fatwa grounds its special treatment and prohibition of the nuclear weapon in the ghastly nature of the weapon, as we do in the West. And in every mention of the fatwa, only the one sentence appears and there is no discussion, nor any stated reason – as there often are in fatwas in Shi’ism, which generally list both the verdict and the arguments that led to it – why nuclear weapons alone are singled out for prohibition and inapplicable to the Koran’s chapter 8, verse 60 and Iran’s Constitution’s article 151, both of which command Muslims to “muster whatever force you are able” to fight the enemy. 

Other aspects of Iranian rhetoric are also inconsistent with the heralded fatwa. Specifically, Iran suggests rather bluntly how analogous its current situation is to North Korea’s as Pyongyang moved toward weaponization, implying Tehran reserves the right to pursue the path the fatwa forbids.  

Khamenei’s mouthpiece Keyhan drew the most direct analogy on October 13, 2006 in an editorial entitled: “Lessons from North Korea:”  

“What led Korea to this point was nothing but persistence in the face of the U.S., which would not agree to … assure it that it would not act to topple the North Korean government .… The Koreans said many times before that if America would stop its operations to topple their government … then North Korea would have no problem whatsoever with the inspection of their efforts to produce nuclear weapons. But the Americans, with their usual defective mindset … persisted and now it’s over… North Korea has built a nuclear bomb before America’s eyes, despite the great pressure it was under, and despite years of harsh international sanctions – and no one has managed to do anything against it … What this means is that if any country, such as North Korea, concludes for political or security reasons that it must have nuclear weapons, it will ultimately succeed in implementing its wish – even if the whole world does not want it to.”²¹ 

Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator of last decade, Ali Larijani – who is now the Speaker of Iran’s parliament – made the connection directly:  

“You have pressured North Korea for two years and consequently it withdrew from the NPT and IAEA…I recommend that you once again pay attention to the conduct of North Korea. After two years … you have accepted North Korea’s nuclear technology… So accept ours now… [A]lthough Iran proposes these peaceful conditions, if you want to use aggressive language, Iran will have no choice but to protect its technological accomplishments by withdrawing from the NPT.”²²  

In short, in the view of the Iranian leadership surrounding Khamenei, the United States’ refusal to meet the DPRK’s demands fully not only justified, but left Pyongyang no other choice but to realize its nuclear quest and seek a weapon. Iran’s leaders argue that Iran now finds itself along the same path, implying that if their demands are not met, they too would not only be justified, but impelled, to seek the very nuclear weapons the reported fatwa ruled are forbidden.  

THE HIDDEN FATWA  

Taken together, it is nearly impossible to reconcile Khamenei’s reported fatwa prohibiting nuclear weapons with the gist of Iranian public statements since the first references to it were made in 1997 – all of which flow in the opposite direction.  

Moreover, the problem is compounded by the fact that that Khamenei’s fatwa has never been seen or published – not in 1997, 2005, 2011, or today. The Iranian press referred to it, and Iran’s negotiators at various P5+1 talks have regularly raised the existence of this fatwa as proof of Iran’s good intentions, but Khamenei has never said or released it in public. It is impossible to properly analyze, or understand the context in which it needs to be understood and followed, or if it even exists.  

Either the fatwa outright is a fabrication for the purposes of willful deception of the West or that the operative phrase is embedded in the context of a larger fatwa which makes the prohibition on these weapons – and perhaps others as well – conditional on theoretical circumstances such as, for example, the age in which Islam has universally triumphed and, the Mahdi has returned. Indeed, were the operational phrase in the fatwa so conditioned, then it would have been perfectly consistent and reinforcing for Mohsen Gharavian to have issued his fatwa on Iran’s right to nuclear first use in 2006. And this would explain why there never was any criticism, let alone sanction taken, by any journalist, institution or official connected with Khamenei or the government against Gharavian or any of the others who suggested Iran has a nuclear armaments concept or should have or use a nuclear weapon. 

CONCLUSION: CONTRADICTING FATWAS REVEAL TACTICAL FISSURES IN THE REGIME  

As if the drama surrounding its sudden appearance on the scene without accompanying evidence, not least of which is the absence of any publication to date of any official text of this fatwa, makes this entire episode deeply suspicious. The only evidence that we have that such a fatwa exists is that official statements from Iran say it is so, but they too fail to provide any text.  Mohsen Rafighdoost, a minister in the IRGC responsible for a significant part of the nuclear program, said in 2014 he sought to pursue a nuclear weapons option, but was restrained by the ostensible edit – which led quickly to established Western journals, such as Foreign Policy, to seize on the statement as definitive evidence of the edict.²³ Of course, it is unclear why the IRGC even had a role in the nuclear program if it was not for military purposes.  

In short, there is no evidence that this fatwa exists beyond dubious statements from officials saying it does.  Moreover, assuming the phantom edict does exist, nobody knows what it actually says since its content has never been published. Whole articles have been written by Iranian propagandists about it and analyzing its importance without ever citing even a single phrase or line from the edict.  

In contrast, there is evidence from other, published and clearly existing fatwas that the Iranian regime does consider nuclear weapons as legitimate. And in the last years, there have been several Iranian officials, such as Abolfazl Razavi Ardakani, who have said it was either temporary and in effect – surprise, surprise — only until the most recent period in which Iran actually reached the technical ability to approach a nuclear device.  

Our Leader’s fatwa that Iran would not pursue an atomic weapon was meant for its time. It is possible that the Leader will change his mind. This is based on the Islamic ruling about whether it is allowed to put stones in the enemy’s river in order to poison him. The answer is that this is allowed if it’s the only way to prevail…. It is possible that the Leader will give the order to enrich uranium to 90%. The Leader knows perfectly well when to give which fatwa. The fatwas of the religious scholars, especially secondary ones, are not permanent. There is a difference between primary fatwas and secondary fatwas. A jurisprudent can issue a ruling and then cancel it 10 years later.”²⁴ 

And finally, there are even official statements that suggest that the fatwa never existed. Former Iranian member of the Majlis (parliament), Ali Motahari, said on April 24, 2022 that: 

“From the very beginning, when we entered the nuclear activity, our goal was to build a bomb and strengthen the deterrent forces, but we could not maintain the secrecy of this issue, and the secret reports were revealed by a group of hypocrites.”²⁵ 

On balance then, the evidence is substantial the entire tale of Khamenei’s phantom nuclear fatwa is little more than an attempt at strategic deception. Either the fatwa does not exist or exists within a hidden context, the obvious failure of enforced discipline of message, and the absence of any reprimand is likely a result of fissures within Iran’s regime.  

However, since even allies of Khamenei were on record before 2006 suggesting a nuclear weapons quest, the fissures cannot be understood through categories such as “hardliners” or “moderates” over nuclear policy, but a schism between two schools of thought, reflected most starkly by Khamenei on the one hand, and Mesbah Yazdi on the other. Most of the post-2006 statements overtly suggesting a nuclear weapons quest appear to come from the clerics surrounding Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, while those reinforcing the ostensible fatwa came from the traditional clerical elite aligned with Khamenei and his close associate, Ali Larijani.  

While the disagreement plays itself out over the fatwa issue, it is not about the legitimacy of nuclear weapons at all, but about a disagreement over whether Iran should pursue Taqqiyah (deception) and caution against the West because open confrontation could be dangerous, or whether Iran should flaunt its ambitions since the West is toothless and overt confrontation would only expose that weakness.  

Khamenei represents the clerical establishment, who views the preservation of the revolutionary regime and its mundane moorings as the prime directive. While not moderating or compromising, Khamenei and those close to him have consistently chosen to maneuver and be indirect rather than have a confrontation with the West.  

In contrast, Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi rejects maneuvering and indirect confrontation as too cautious, and even heretical against the will of Allah. Instead, he and his followers believe the hidden 12th Imam is near his return, and that divine intervention – secured by rigid adherence to principle – is the true source of victory for the Islamic Republic. For example, in his book which discussed the need to pursue the “special” (read nuclear) weapon, Yazdi wrote:  

“In seeking to acquire the technology, Iran must be patient and not be deterred by economic shortages. Divine, messianic support has been the determining factor of the Iranian regime during the various trying periods which have plagued it since its foundation.”²⁶  

In late 2007, Khamenei’s ally, Ali Larijani, who hails from one of the grand, traditional clerical families (the Amelis) of Qom, was forced by Ahmadinejad to resign as the head of the Supreme Council for National Security. His replacement, Saeed Jalili is guided by Mesbah Yazdi. In his first major speech published four days after assuming his new position on October 21, 2007, Jalili attacked previous governments for having “strayed from the principles derived from Islamic revolutionary teachings.” In contrast, Jalili argued that under Ahmadinejad, Iran’s foreign policy has returned to its ideological base and is “avoiding the past experience of sacrificing principles when faced with a challenge…Principles should not be sacrificed … in the name of pragmatism.”²⁷ Jalili even went on to suggest previous policies demonstrated “cartoon-like behavior [which causes] 180-degree turns in foreign policy without any basis.” Jalili then echoes Mesbah Yazdi’s eschatological spin: foreign policy should be coupled “with reliance on divine assistance” and should be based on a theological model which will bring “a good ending in this and the next world as was the intention of the Islamic revolution.” Referring to the previous governments’ suspensions of Iran’s nuclear program to avoid international reactions, Jalili “steadfastly stressed” the need to “return to an ideological and principled approach” in order to shape the nature of Iranian foreign policy in accordance with Islamic “authenticity based on the Prophet’s diplomatic strategy.” He went on to suggest that “pragmatism” should be seen as willful disobedience to the divine Will.”²⁸ 

In short, the inconsistency surrounding Iranian governmental statements and the fabrication or selective reporting on Khamenei’s fatwa on the nuclear issue tells us almost nothing about the regime’s theological view of the legitimacy of pursuing nuclear weapons, but it does expose the nature and theological foundations of the fissures within the regime.