Hard questions for King Charles III 

September 12, 2022
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By Ambassador John Bolton

This article was first published in The Hill on September 12th, 2022. Click Here to read the original article.

As the reality of Queen Elizabeth II’s passing sinks in, and international mourning continues, Britain’s unmatched flair for dignified pageantry is affirming the continuity and stability of the nation and its sovereignty. Notwithstanding the ceremony, however, no one is blind to the hard questions King Charles III and the monarchy itself will face in short order.

Inevitably after 70 years of one person’s reign, Charles will face close scrutiny to see if he matches the expectations, accumulating for decades, about the sovereign’s behavior. Equally inevitably, beginning perhaps during the preparations for Charles’s coronation (likely next year), there will be a surge of republican sentiment from Britain’s left advocating elimination of the monarchy itself. 

Accordingly, how the new king comports himself in the coming months could be decisive not merely on some “performance” level but, constitutionally, in handling both near and long-term challenges he and Britain face. 

Since the origins of the United States lie in repudiating the monarchy, many here too readily dismiss its deep-rooted significance for our United Kingdom cousins. Given our (history’s oldest, continuously-in-force, written) Constitution, Britain’s historically derived, unwritten and now almost unique form of constitutional order is even more remote. 

Unquestionably, however, the evolution of Great Britain’s governance structures over centuries has produced a monarchy that is not simply a decoration, an appendage that can be easily excised with few collateral consequences. Even so, early missteps by Charles will complicate his reign; full-blown debate over abolishing the monarchy can only complicate it more.

Doubts about the monarchy’s utility underlie much of the coverage of the ongoing royal transition. Some commentators stress the turmoil, stress and uncertainty Britain faces, led by both a new sovereign and a new prime minister, but such assessments are overwrought.

We are not in World War II. That was stress. Other pundits have excoriated Britain’s imperial past, as if the monarchy alone is responsible for the alleged misdeeds. It is not, nor is it responsible for the enormous benefits stemming from Britain’s empire-building, “mother of parliaments” that it is, not that many today will mount that defense.  

Properly analyzing the monarchy requires assessing its unique function in the UK’s constitutional system, not every aspect of British international policy. Nonetheless, as the living symbol of Britain’s nationhood, the new king will face many more broadside attacks.  

In the first days defining his new role, under unprecedented media attention, Charles has delivered in unexpected ways. Arriving at Buckingham Palace, his new home, rather than just inspecting the flowers and mementoes left to honor the queen, he greeted well-wishers gathered across the palace’s frontage, an image that surely stunned and likely captivated Britons who rarely see such a personal royal touch or public access. Even while mourning his loss, Charles reached out to the British people, and they responded. It was a masterstroke.

Immediately thereafter, the king’s first speech was entirely on target constitutionally.  Duty, service and constancy are obviously Charles’s priorities, as they were Elizabeth’s.  Still, this is just the beginning.

The paramount question is whether Charles can maintain his mother’s distance from day-to-day politics. In these first remarks, he signaled a withdrawal from the political arena: “It will no longer be possible for me to give so much of my time and energies to the charities and issues for which I care so deeply. But I know this important work will go on in the trusted hands of others.”

In Britain’s constitutional system, the king’s duty – and it is a duty of constitutional dimensions, not mere symbolism – is to be the nation’s voice when necessary. His role decidedly does not involve nattering on about current events. 

At moments of grave crisis, such as wartime, the king can exercise a steadying presence, and provide a much-needed sounding board for the prime minister, a presence who should have no agenda other than discerning the national interest and how best to protect it. 

As crown prince, Charles was outspoken on issues such as the environment and climate change, obviously popular for many, but complicated and politically controversial.

A king’s proper stance, by contrast, requires remaining above the specifics of legislative or policy programs at Westminster or 10 Downing Street. He is not a political actor or commentator. Resisting the allure of short-term political acclaim must be a top royal priority, a task requiring sustained effort and discipline to succeed. 

Here, Charles III’s military experience, in both the (appropriately named) Royal Air Force and Royal Navy, marks potentially the most important constitutional role he can play. Although the King’s authority as commander in chief is fully delegated to parliamentary ministers, national defense is existential, and the monarch embodies British nationhood not just sentimentally, but constitutionally. 

Thus, King George VI’s determination to stay in Britain during World War II no matter what, in the face of a feared Nazi invasion and after Buckingham Palace itself had been bombed, compellingly demonstrated the will to survive as a nation.

On another practical level, the king’s constitutional persona as head of the Commonwealth of Nations is potentially quite significant. There are untapped possibilities for the United Kingdom and the West more broadly in the Commonwealth, and Charles’s long international experience provides a foundation for prime ministers to build upon. 

Beyond the Commonwealth, the king could play a significant role representing British national security policies generally. For example, an early visit by the new king to Ukraine would carry enormous weight. Newly liberated from the European Union, global Britain could make full use of the monarchy, probably its best-known national institution.

There are other perils clearly ahead for Charles. Media and critics will scrutinize all things financial and the inevitable efforts of many to take advantage of his new role.  Although he has already endured such a spotlight, the new extent of the attention will be extraordinary. 

Elizabeth was spared much of this pressure, but Charles will have no such luxury.  Success in the monarchy is ultimately a test of character, and therefore will rest only on the king himself.

John Bolton was national security adviser to President Trump from 2018 to 2019, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations from 2005 to 2006 and held senior State Department posts in 2001-2005 and 1985-1989. His most recent book is “The Room Where It Happened” (2020). He is the founder of John Bolton Super PAC, a political action committee supporting candidates who believe in a strong U.S. foreign policy.

Liz Truss May Be Just the Prime Minister America Needs 

September 06, 2022
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By Ambassador John Bolton

This article first appeared in the Wall Street Journal on September 6th, 2022. Click Here to read the original article.

When there’s a leadership vacuum in Washington, a resolute Britain is crucial to Western interests.

Frissons of disapproval shook the State Department last year when British Foreign Secretary Liz Truss first met Secretary of State Antony Blinken. She was “blunt” and “assertive” and took “maximalist positions,” anonymous U.S. sources asserted. The horror: a British official as plainspoken as an American! 

As prime minister, an assertive Ms. Truss could be a force multiplier for the U.S. Boris Johnson, in his farewell to Parliament, advised colleagues to “stay close to the Americans.” These words are strange to American ears because we seldom hear them, even from our closest friends. But Mr. Johnson meant it, and there is no doubt Ms. Truss agrees. In the crises and conflicts ahead, her reward for pro-U.S. inclinations will be criticism that, like Tony Blair during the post 9/11 Iraq war, she is Washington’s “poodle.” Critics don’t grasp that Washington appreciates London’s unvarnished advice and candid criticism as proof of the alliance’s strength. Besides, I’ve never encountered a British poodle. 

For America, bilaterally and globally, the transition from Mr. Johnson to Ms. Truss will likely be smooth. At a time when U.S. leadership is hesitant if not flatly wrong, such as in the tragic decision to withdraw from Afghanistan, British resolve is critical to sustain and advance Western interests. 

Mr. Johnson bequeaths to Ms. Truss the essentially completed job of liberating the U.K. from the European Union, thus enabling her to focus on new priorities. As a former “Remainer,” Ms. Truss is, ironically, well-suited to the post-Brexit imperative of making a success of Britain’s new international reality. This requires abandoning a Eurocentric focus in economics, striving instead to expand British trade and commerce world-wide, and in politics advancing global British interests. While serving as Mr. Johnson’s trade secretary, seeking bilateral deals with the U.S. and other countries, Ms. Truss’s post-Brexit focus was marked by determination and perseverance. The philosophical direction of her policies seems clear. 

The Ukraine war has proved that when it comes to defending continental peace and security, the U.K. can be a better “European” outside the EU than key EU members like France and Germany. While President Biden has stuttered in delineating clear objectives for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and in delivering military assistance to Ukraine, Mr. Johnson’s government never wavered. Ms. Truss has spoken about ensuring that Vladimir Putin “loses in Ukraine” and suffers a “strategic defeat.” By contrast, Mr. Biden and his more timid advisers appear to be dragged along by Congress, more forward-leaning officials and events on the ground. Especially if Ms. Truss keeps Defense Secretary Ben Wallace in place, London is likely to remain resolute even if Washington continues to falter. 

Finland’s and Sweden’s fortuitously timed moves to join NATO will make it easier to keep decision-making on defense and security within the alliance and resist France’s constant push to expand EU involvement in those realms. Ms. Truss will have no difficulty insisting that NATO is the epicenter of Western politico-military debates, rather than indulging the fanciful notion that the EU can or should be. 

Because Ms. Truss is freed from EU parochialism, she appears up to confronting China’s aspirations for Indo-Pacific and then global hegemony. During the just-concluded Tory leadership campaign, she was reportedly ready to reopen Britain’s national-security strategy to declare China, like Russia, an “acute threat,” rather than merely a strategic competitor. As in America, bureaucratic resisters in key departments, such as Treasury and the Foreign Office, resist even acknowledging the struggle with China, but Ms. Truss has no illusions. Her leadership as foreign secretary in establishing the Aukus partnership to build nuclear submarines for Australia proves the point. During the campaign, Ms. Truss’s support from Sino- and Euro-realists like former party leader Iain Duncan Smith and Sir Bill Cash indicates that she is committed on the China issue. 

Iran’s nuclear menace also remains a challenge to Britain and America. As a party to the 2015 nuclear deal, London has a key role, and there are signs Ms. Truss is more skeptical of the failed agreement than prior U.K. governments. Her vocal supporters certainly are. No longer part of the “EU-3” negotiating group with France and Germany, Britain can play a truly independent role. If Ms. Truss used the occasion of her first phone call as prime minister with Mr. Biden to urge that he scrap the deal and emphasize that all options are on the table, her government would be well-launched. 

Margaret Thatcher’s 1979 selection as prime minister foreshadowed Ronald Reagan’s election as president. We can only hope for a reprise, and the sooner the better. 

Mr. Bolton is author of “The Room Where It Happened: A White House Memoir.” He served as the president’s national security adviser, 2018-19, and ambassador to the United Nations, 2005-06. 

Putin’s resolve hasn’t collapsed. He may be planning his most outrageous gambit yet

August 15, 2022
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This article first appeared in The Telegraph on August 12th, 2022. Click here to read the original article.

Be prepared for Russia to halt hostilities and exploit European weakness in a brazen attempt to secure many of its objectives 

Russia’s failure to capture Kyiv shortly after its February 24 invasion, kill or overthrow Volodymyr Zelensky, and seize all of Ukraine, will be a landmark case study for future political and military strategists. So will Russia’s subsequent decision to fight a World War I-style offensive, primarily in eastern Ukraine, grinding out a few miles or less in new territorial gains every day. 

And so will the next phase of the war, as summer turns to fall. In all probability, it will depend more on political strategy than military affairs. Unquestionably, the military state of play is a critical variable, but in the coming months of the war, intangible, hard-to-measure, hard-to-predict political variables could have the dispositive role. Accordingly, Nato and other Ukraine supporters must start thinking now (and should have been thinking long before today) about how to prevent Moscow from seizing the diplomatic high ground and bring the conflict to at least a temporary halt on its terms, not Kyiv’s. The next ninety days is a useful time frame, especially in America, with nation-wide congressional elections looming on November 8. 

At present, Russia is still fighting its excruciatingly slow and painful style of offensive operations, almost entirely in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region. Absent dramatic changes in the next ninety days, there will be no daring Russian armor attacks, no effective use of air power, and no significant, newly-initiated, cross-border incursions. In American football, this ground-game strategy is called “three yards and a cloud of dust.” Moscow’s casualties have been high, debilitating logistical and personnel problems persist, domestic public opinion is mixed and uncertain at best, and international sanctions have strained (albeit not visibly altered) the Kremlin’s war effort. 

Ukraine appears to be readying a “southern strategy”, perhaps aimed to retake Kherson and to punch through the current lines to reach the Black Sea near Mykolaiv, thereby severing direct Russian land access from the Donbas to Crimea and adjacent territories. US, UK, and other Nato deliveries of high-end weapons are finally entering into significant usage on Ukraine’s front lines, although not at levels and in time-lines Kyiv’s military would like. Ukraine has kept a generally effective lid on disclosing its actual military casualties, but these may well be higher than generally understood in the popular Western imagination. And casualties among affected civilian populations, not to mention property and infrastructure destruction in the most contested regions, have been substantial. 

Accordingly, one entirely possible scenario, perhaps even the most likely, is that the war simply grinds on, with no discernible end point, certainly not in the next ninety days. This, however, is where Russia’s political calculations may be dispositive. Before and during the conflict, the West has repeatedly underestimated Russia’s long-term resolve and its cost-benefit analysis about its gains and losses. Eager to personalise “Putin’s war” to show its purported domestic Russian unpopularity, Western leaders have failed to see how widespread – and how deep – is Russian feeling that Ukraine and other former Soviet republics were illegitimately torn away from the rodina, the motherland. People may tire from reading Putin’s 2005 view, but this is his core belief: “The collapse of the Soviet Union was the biggest geopolitical catastrophe of the century.” 

Minimizing the loss of “historical Russia”, in turn, leads to underestimating the Kremlin’s willingness to suffer what seem to foreign observers to be disproportionately high casualties for relatively modest territorial gains. It may also help explain why Russia’s war of attrition is acceptable to Moscow where it might not be in the West. In America’s Civil War, Ulysses S. Grant was harshly criticised (called a “butcher” by some) for his 1864-65 campaign against Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia, as was William Tecumseh Sherman for his 1864 “march to the sea” from Atlanta to Savannah. Grant’s war of attrition against Lee and Sherman’s swath of destruction brought the secessionists to final defeat, the Union’s blunt strength crushing the Confederacy. Similarly, in the 1939-1940 “Winter War” with Finland, Moscow also bled profusely, but persevered to victory. 

So, there should be no surprise that Russia’s resolve has not collapsed. Nonetheless, Putin can certainly see the risk that sufficient supplies of sophisticated weapons and other war materiel from Nato in Ukraine’s hands will jeopardise the gains Russian forces have made to date. Putin also knows that support for Ukraine in Europe, particularly in France and Germany, is not what Nato leaders make it out to be, and that President Biden’s actions (as opposed to rhetoric) during the conflict have hardly been consistent with deep resolve. Finally, signs of disagreements within Ukraine’s political leadership are now appearing – not as yet disabling, but increasingly visible nonetheless. 

Russia thus has a difficult political decision to make. Putin will not want to lose opportunities to retake more Ukraine territory, especially since he is far from his initial goals. Even more importantly, however, he does not want to be caught with Russian forces in broad retreat, where any diplomatic effort would be taken as a sign of weakness. Westerners who believe Putin is inadequately aware of the human and material costs suffered by Russia’s military are kidding themselves; he knows all too well he needs a respite if he can get one on his terms. 

In such circumstances, Russia’s best option may be this. In the next ninety days, Putin announces, with a straight face despite its obvious falsity, that the Kremlin has achieved its objectives. Accordingly, he has ordered all offensive military operations halted, demands Ukraine do the same, and calls for immediate ceasefire negotiations to establish an agreed line-of-control between the forces. Putin will have to grit his teeth to do this, but he knows that a cease fire will give Russia time, years perhaps, to rebuild its military, restore its economy, and perhaps reabsorb more pliant, weaker parts of the Russian empire, from Belarus to Central Asia. 

Moscow will be calculating that it can catch Kyiv unaware. Obviously and understandably, Zelensky, left to his own devices, would flatly reject halting the conflict with Russia still holding perhaps 25 per cent of Ukraine’s territory. He knows full well that any purported “cease-fire line” could become the new Russia-Ukraine border. Unfortunately, Zelensky may not be in a position to give a “Snake Island” response. 

Without a prior agreed-upon diplomatic strategy with Nato, optimally from now forward, Zelensky is vulnerable to political weakness in the United States and key European Union members, which Putin knows and is prepared to exploit. Winter is coming, as they say. Germany and much of Europe are deeply concerned about Russia’s considerable leverage over their energy supplies. And, let’s be honest, many Western Europeans are tired of this war. Continuing economic turbulence, whether inflation, recession or both, only reinforces the angst that, in just 6-9 months, this has become an “endless war” that needs ending. Proclaiming the need for humanitarian relief in war-torn Ukraine, they would seize the chance of a “cease fire” to return to pre-February 24 relations with Russia. 

Ukraine and Nato need diplomatic agreement now against this pre-emptive Russian ploy, which may rapidly gain the initiative regardless of battlefield developments. Indeed, in the coming weeks, Russia’s inclination to spring a “cease fire in place” will increase as its prospects for substantial further military gains recede. 

The most important element of a Western counter-strategy will be to make clear at once that all sanctions against Russia will remain in place until the full withdrawal of Russian forces from Ukraine’s territory. Eliminating the sanctions is central to any Russian expectation of reviving its economy and military, thereby to reinitiate hostilities at some future point. If sanctions looked to be effectively permanent until full Ukrainian sovereignty was restored, Putin’s gambit would fall at the first hurdle. Many other issues, including reparations, prisoners of war and accountability also need resolving, but the key point is to stop Russia from consolidating its territorial gains through a scam, unilateral “ceasefire”. 

Will France and Germany agree to such a counter-strategy? Will Biden be so weak before the November elections that he will jump at the chance for a diplomatic “win” to enhance Democratic prospects on November 8? Achieving real Nato unity on a hardline political stance against Russian efforts to split the West and leave Ukraine in peril will require considerable heavy lifting. Now is the time to start, and underlines why a new government in London, as resolute on Ukraine as Boris Johnson, is so critical. 

How to Stiffen Europe’s Resolve After the Iran Nuclear Deal

July 21, 2022
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Israel and its Arab friends should visit the Continent’s capitals and deliver a message about the danger.

This article first appeared in the Wall Street Journal on July 20th, 2022. Click here to view the original article.

President Biden admitted last week that his long-suffering efforts to revive the 2015 Iran nuclear deal were finally nearing their end: “We’re waiting for their response. When that will come, I’m not certain. But we’re not going to wait forever.” Of course, we’ve been hearing this since December 2021, even from the Europeans, the deal’s most devoted acolytes.

The cascade of White House concessions during the negotiations, Iran’s additional time to advance its nuclear-weapons and ballistic-missile programs, and the loosening enforcement of U.S. sanctions, have considerably emboldened Tehran’s ayatollahs. While the current ambiguity is far from their ideal, they may well accept living with it indefinitely.

That should not, however, satisfy Washington. Instead, the U.S. should fashion diplomatic strategies to align the original deal’s other Western parties (France, Germany and the U.K.) with Israel and the Arab states most threatened by Iran. For two decades, America’s Middle Eastern and European allies have taken opposing views on how best to prevent Iran from obtaining deliverable nuclear weapons. This divide has sometimes been public, sometimes not, and preferred policies have shifted, but the Europeans have generally stressed negotiation while the regional allies have taken a tougher approach. Unsurprisingly, with the two most concerned groupings of American allies in disagreement, Iran has been able to traverse the disarray, coming ever closer to producing deliverable nuclear weapons. Fixing this problem is a top priority.

Since negotiations have failed repeatedly, Mr. Biden’s main diplomatic goal must be cajoling Europeans into adopting a harder economic and political stance, and accepting that clandestine military actions [BY WHOM?] against Iran’s [YES?] nuclear program have already begun. Even harsher measures may be necessary. If the Europeans share America’s view that a nuclear-capable Iran is unacceptable, they should be prepared to act on that belief.

An initial diplomatic step would be to have those most immediately endangered by Iran, both from its nuclear aspirations and as the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism, take the lead with our European friends. One could imagine a delegation of, say, Israeli, Bahraini and Emirati foreign ministers visiting their European counterparts to urge a united front against Iran. What an impressive display that would make in Paris, Berlin and London. The tour could include Tallin and Warsaw to symbolize for other Europeans the dangers of living near hostile neighbors.

This joint Arab-Israeli flying squad would bring compelling arguments beyond the global threat of Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. The White House has revealed that Iran is near to selling several hundred “attack-capable” drones to Russia, almost certainly to use in Ukraine. Sending drones to Russia is in keeping with Iran’s policy of supplying Yemen’s Houthi rebels with drones and missiles, which are often used to target civilian Saudi and Emirati airports and oil infrastructure.

Iran’s oil sales to China, evading U.S. sanctions weakened under Mr. Biden, have also increased dramatically. By contrast, the Bahraini and Emirati foreign ministers, on behalf of the hydrocarbon-producing Gulf Arabs, can be part of Europe’s solution to its catastrophic mistake of becoming overly dependent on Russian exports.

The traveling foreign ministers could also emphasize that the original deal never delivered the increased visibility into Iran’s nuclear program the world was promised. Instead, Tehran has ignored both its 2015 commitments and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Europe’s leaders, strong U.N. adherents, should be deeply disturbed by International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Rafael Grossi’s criticisms of Iranian obstructionism. The IAEA board of governors agreed overwhelmingly in June to censure Iran’s noncompliance, with only Russia and China voting against.

The diplomatic mission can also stress that Tehran’s intransigence over nonnuclear issues ultimately torpedoed revival of the 2015 agreement. Demanding that Washington de-list Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps as a foreign terrorist organization is completely unrelated to nuclear issues. Of course, the IRGC has threatened terrorism in Europe, such as the foiled 2018 attack on an opposition rally in Paris. Incredibly, Belgian legislators are now considering releasing the Iranian “diplomat” convicted of this bomb plot; perhaps Brussels should be the Middle Eastern flying squad’s first stop. Moreover, albeit under the flawed “universal jurisdiction” concept, Sweden recently convicted Iranian agents for prison murders shortly after the 1979 Islamic Revolution [WHAT’S THE CONNECTION??].

And, as for potentially using force against Iran’s nuclear efforts, who better than Israel’s current prime minister, Yair Lapid, to deliver the message? As he said during Mr. Biden’s visit: “The only way to stop them is to put a credible military threat on the table.” The Europeans should hear that from Mr. Lapid directly, one-on-one, in their capitals.

America’s counter-proliferation diplomacy on Iran will need to be much more extensive, accompanied by far-tougher economic sanctions and assistance to legitimate opposition groups to overthrow the ayatollahs. A joint Israeli-Arab, foreign-minister traveling team would be a good start.

Mr. Bolton is author of “The Room Where It Happened: A White House Memoir.” He served as the president’s national security adviser, 2018-19, and ambassador to the United Nations, 2005-06.

The Case For American Leadership

June 27, 2022
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This article first appeared in the Washington Examiner on June 27th, 2022. Click here to see the original article.

This week, President Joe Biden attends the G-7 summit in Germany and a NATO summit in Spain. 

These meetings of the free world’s major economic powers and its paramount political-military alliance are particularly significant. America and its allies, seeking recovery from the coronavirus pandemic, have spent their way into dangerous inflation and the face grim prospect of an imminent recession. NATO is engaged in proxy military hostilities with Russia in Ukraine as Europe’s worst land war since 1945 grinds on, producing death, destruction, and global economic consequences. Looming above all else is China, the existential threat for the West’s foreseeable future. 

In Henry Luce’s “American Century” (his 1941 aphorism), these diverse, menacing circumstances evoked calls for U.S. leadership to solve the West’s problems. Such calls still ring out today, but few seem to know what they mean. In the United States, the low-grade infection of isolationism persists, questioning why events in the wider world should concern us so much. Ironically, this skepticism is reinforced by reflexive demands for “leadership” that prize heading the parade without actually knowing where the parade is going. It is, therefore, entirely appropriate to consider what “American leadership” means and why we have it. 

We should dispense first with the myth that from independence, America had an almost entirely domestic focus, emerging only reluctantly into international affairs in World War I. Hardly. Transforming 13 weak colonies into a transcontinental giant was no mere domestic affair, marked as it was by foreign conflicts — starting with the undeclared 1798-1800 Quasi-War with France and against Barbary pirates in 1801-1805, as well as huge territorial expansion, culminating in 1900 with U.S. control over distant lands such as Alaska, Hawaii, and the Philippines. 

This is not the history of an insular, inward-looking people but the most successful and enduring expansion since ancient Rome. The immeasurable economic capabilities resulting from territorial growth, the flood of immigrants to America, and our determination to maintain free, constitutional, representative government, along with soaring trade, travel, and communications, created the basis on which modern U.S. leadership rests. Three hot wars in Europe in less than a century, starting with the 1870-1871 Franco-Prussian War, followed by the Cold War, did the rest, decimating Europe and ending its global empires. 

China’s empire is now the last one standing. Nostalgia for quieter times internationally has been out of date for at least a century. The issue today is whether to continue the way of life we now enjoy by acting in our own interests, together with friends and allies, to protect against common threats. It is a false choice to think we can turn away from the rest of the world and bear no consequences domestically for doing so. We exercise international leadership because we thereby better protect America’s interests, not because we feel charitable toward others. We can choose to abandon U.S. interests, as some advocate, but make no mistake: No one else will protect them for us. The absence of American global leadership produces not greater stability but either growing anarchy or the emergence of hostile powers seeking to advance their interests to our disadvantage. 

President Biden should demonstrate this week that America is still capable of providing leadership to confront unprovoked aggression, whether from Russia or China; handle our economies responsibly, undistracted by fanciful economic theories and social ideologies; and strategize on global challenges ahead. Whether Biden is capable of so doing is entirely another question, and his record does not provide much confidence. 

NATO is not as allied with Ukraine as the president’s rhetoric suggests; he apparently has no idea that heedless expansion of the money supply has created the inflation now endangering the global economy, and whether he understands the China threat remains to be seen. The real test of U.S. leadership lies not in international diplomatic theatrics, but in hard battles over seemingly mundane, often mind-numbing subjects like the federal budget. One such ongoing struggle is over the size of our defense budget, which has suffered for 30 years since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Lulled into spending the “peace dividend” in non-defense areas, the West’s ability to deter and resist growing global threats has not kept pace. 

Even as domestic government spending needs drastic reductions to combat inflation, we also need a significant increase in defense capabilities across the full spectrum of military threats. The 2024 presidential contest has already begun. It is not too soon, during 2022’s congressional campaigns, to debate not just budget numbers but America’s place in the world and why our international leadership benefits us and our allies. Our greatest strength is not our political leaders but the people themselves. Treated like adults by politicians, we are fully capable of doing what is required to safeguard our way of life. Let’s see which candidates grasp that reality. There we will find the next president. 

John Bolton was national security adviser to President Donald Trump between 2018 and 2019. Between 2005 and 2006, he was the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. 

Twilight of Turkish Democracy

April 22, 2022
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This article appeared in The Washington Examiner on April 22nd 2022. Click here to view the original article.

Turkish democracy has reached a turning point. 

Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s two-decade strongman rule has reversed his country’s progress toward a liberal society. On April 6, the Turkish President secured the passing of new electoral laws that will make it more difficult for smaller parties to enter parliament, thereby inhibiting opposition coalitions and allowing him to use state resources to organize his own campaign events. These changes will make it harder for opponents to challenge Erdogan’s tightening grip on the Turkish electoral system. 

As Erdogan prepares to run for re-election in the coming year, the importance of a vibrant and functioning Turkish civil society cannot be overstated. And it could not be more at risk. 

These changes are the latest in a string of moves designed to dismantle what remains of Turkey’s once-promising democratic architecture. Erdogan’s authoritarianism has galvanized resistance in the form of an opposition coalition — the “Nation Alliance” led by the Republican People’s Party — while the dire state of the economic, social, and political situation in Turkey has catalyzed vibrant anti-government protests against inflation and for women’s rights and academic freedom. 

The June 2023 elections will be a crucial test for pro-democracy voices in Turkey to rebuild their institutions. Their success will depend on their ability to bolster Turkey’s most at-risk hallmarks of free and fair elections: transparency, non-interference in voting, loser’s consent, and a free press. 

They face an uphill battle. President Erdogan’s regime has curtailed media access, undermined an open campaign process (though bribery, intimidation, and violence), and is now seeking to further obfuscate the voting process through blatantly undemocratic reforms. 

Erdogan’s campaign to degrade free media has made Turkey one of the world’s leading jailers of journalists, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists. The government now controls 90% of the country’s media through regulatory bodies like the High Council for Broadcasting; the Press Advertising Council, which allocates state advertising; and the Presidential Directorate for Communications, which issues press cards. 

Under Erdogan, censorship laws have also been wielded as a weapon against online political discourse. A 2020 media law imposes requirements on social media platforms to remove content at the command of the Turkish government or else risk punitive fines. Facebook and Twitter have submitted to Turkish government censorship, closing another avenue for healthy political discourse among Turkish voters. 

Outside of media and online discourse, civil rights activism in general has been targeted by Erdogan’s regime. Reporters Without Borders has said that “questioning authorities and the privileged is now almost impossible” under Erdogan. Opposition parties are also increasingly persecuted by the regime, making effective political resistance increasingly difficult. In 2021, the state Prosecutor argued that the pro-Kurdish HDP party was working toward breaking the “unity of the state.” The Constitutional Court forced the closure of the party and banned 451 elected officials. These most recent reforms take further aim at the opposition, legalizing the use of state resources when the President is campaigning for himself while other ministers will be barred from doing the same. 

In prior elections, Erodgan’s government has conducted systematic campaigns of intimidation. In Ankara, a local election was marred by claims of vote-rigging. Kurdish communities in particular face acts of intimidation and voter suppression. The government militarizes voting centers in the Kurdish region, claiming the security forces must “protect” against the threat of attacks by Kurdish terrorists. The People’s Democratic Party reported that political activities were banned from organizing in the streets. Under threat of intimidation by the state, Kurds are stripped of their right to vote freely. 

In 2019, in what may prove a premonition of the 2023 elections, Erdogan showed that he is willing to directly interfere with democratic processes to try to cling to power. 

He commanded that the Higher Electoral Commission rerun the Istanbul mayoral election after his party lost in spite of systematic irregularities that had actually worked in its favor. Despite his best efforts to intervene, his party also lost the re-run. The subsequent blowback shows it is not a foregone conclusion that Erdogan can get away with electoral interference in 2023. 

The global pandemic and war in Ukraine have precipitated economic volatility and internal political turmoil. However, the free world cannot lose sight of the importance of Turkey’s upcoming elections, which will be watched by many of the world’s autocrats in waiting, keen to find out what they can get away with. Erdogan has systematically undermined every one of Turkey’s major democratic institutions to create a deeply skewed playing field. Holding his regime to account requires coordinated action from the international community, illumination of his thuggish tactics to suppress political minorities, and real consequences should he fail to make meaningful progress to restore civil discourse within Turkey. 

Progress here means releasing imprisoned journalists to restore some semblance of a free press, allowing NGOs to effectively monitor the upcoming election, and cessation of hostilities against and censorship of opposing political voices. The international community should wield sanction power (as it has against Russia), turn-off foreign military sales, and level severe consequences should Erdogan fail to achieve these objectives. 

John Bolton is a former UN ambassador and White House National Security Adviser. He serves as an advisor for the Turkish Democracy Project. 

European leaders obsessed with continental integration are undermining NATO

April 18, 2022
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This article appeared in The Telegraph on April 18th, 2022. Click here to view the original article.

Commentary on Nato “unity” against Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been misplaced. Nato is not unified in seeking Moscow’s defeat, and Kyiv’s memory of the execrable Minsk agreements, imposed with French and German participation, remains strong. Ukraine stays in the fight largely through its own determination and homegrown capabilities such as the missiles that sent the Moskva to the Black Sea floor. 
 
The alliance’s performance on sanctions is scattershot, with results mixed so far and the future uncertain. Military assistance is uneven, though the UK and Eastern European responses have been outstanding. The biggest failure is Joe Biden’s uneven political leadership: weak, often late in coming, grudging and strategically incoherent. Germany, France and others are lagging. 
 
This war is not over, and the negotiations that will ultimately ensue will be tortuous. It is no time for Nato members to pat themselves on the back. Nonetheless, now is precisely the moment for policymakers to consider the alliance’s future. We should not forget that Henry Kissinger’s classic 1965 study was called The Troubled Partnership; it still is, and will be, though for radically differing reasons. 
 
First, the good news. Finland and Sweden seem poised to apply for membership. Public opinion in both countries has shifted dramatically in favour of joining Nato since Moscow’s aggression. These additions would strengthen Western dominance in the Baltic Sea, further isolate Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave, and eliminate an ambiguous grey zone between Nato’s eastern and Russia’s western borders. Other “neutrals” might now also step up. Here’s looking at you, Ireland. 
 
On the negative side are Turkey and France. Turkey’s President Erdoğan is now the least-allied of Nato allies. Notwithstanding Kyiv’s effective use of Turkish-supplied drones, Ankara’s acquisition of Russian S-400 air-defence systems risked compromising the critical F-35 program, thereby endangering other Nato allies. 
 
If Turkey’s 2023 elections are free and fair, Erdoğan’s defeat, which is entirely possible, would significantly repair the damage he has done. If he wins, his neo-Ottoman Middle East ambitions (and other troublesome behaviour) will remain threatening. 
 
France, facing a potentially close presidential run-off, is problematic, especially given Emmanuel Macron’s persistent efforts to enhance the European Union’s military capabilities in ways that undercut Nato. Marine Le Pen has gone further, calling explicitly for a second French withdrawal from Nato’s integrated military command. None of this is constructive. 
 
Most important is the German question. Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s pledge to invest €100 billion in defence, including purchasing 35 nuclear-capable F-35s, is helpful. Nonetheless, much more is needed to upgrade Germany’s pitifully inadequate military capabilities, and to ensure Scholz’s dramatic commitment is sustained over time. Will Germany revert to its Cold War resolve to maintain adequate national defences, or will it relapse into pretending it is too dangerous to be trusted with guns? 
 
Central to Nato’s future is the appropriate division of labour with the EU. For Macron and others, increased EU political integration is the highest goal, leading them to advocate increased EU military capabilities and related programs that impinge on Nato responsibilities. For example, the EU made its first ever budgetary expenditure for military assistance to Ukraine, even as Nato was making precisely the same allocation decisions. This was no coincidence. 
 
Do these integration-obsessed leaders believe the EU has no other problems worthy of their attention? Is this why they focus on expanding EU mission creep into Nato territory? For America, such efforts are daggers pointed at Nato’s heart. If anyone truly believes the EU treaty’s mutual defence clause is equivalent to Nato’s Article 5 – good luck to them. Let’s remember, the EU has only one nuclear-weapons state, whereas Nato has three. Insistence that Europe be responsible for its defence risks undercutting American support for Nato, leaving Europe protected primarily by politicians’ rhetoric. 
 
Better leadership in Washington, new alliance members, renewed German (and even, post-election, Turkish) Nato commitments, and a substantially enhanced British role, exemplified by its current performance, would all be major pluses. Moreover, the growing threat from China should brace every Nato country for global threats to their security. History still has plenty in store for Nato if it can vindicate itself by performing successfully in today’s Ukraine crisis. 
 
John Bolton is a former US national security adviser 

Let Ukraine or Russia, Not the ICC, Prosecute War Crimes

April 14, 2022
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This article appeared in The Wall Street Journal on April 14th 2022. Click here to view the original article.

Harrowing images of slain Ukrainian civilians add to the evidence of Russian war crimes. While many Europeans favor hauling the perpetrators into the International Criminal Court, Washington has largely ignored the ICC since removing its signature from its foundational Rome Statute in 2002. 

That may be changing. The Biden administration has made noises about cooperating with the ICC, and on March 3 a bipartisan group of senators introduced a resolution that “encourages member states to petition the ICC and the ICJ [International Court of Justice] to authorize any and all pending investigations into war crimes and crimes against humanity” committed by Russia. 

Many Americans seem unaware that aiding the ICC has significant implications. The ICC is a fundamentally illegitimate assertion of power, thoroughly lawless in purportedly exercising jurisdiction over countries (and their individual citizens) not parties to the statute. The court and its prosecutor, who decides what cases to launch, aren’t part of any coherent governance structure and are under no restraining constitutional checks and balances or democratic controls. These and many other defects are unfixable, as I told Congress in 1998. ICC proponents say its 123 state parties govern the court, but this is laughable. The ICC governs itself. The prosecutor is selected by the court, which may not trouble Europeans but contravenes America’s separation of executive and judicial powers to protect liberty. It lacks jury trials, traditionally important to Americans. 

The ICC’s existence, therefore, is potentially threatening. Fortunately, its record is negligible, largely because its pretensions to authority mirror those of the equally impotent ICJ. That neither has yet become dangerous to America’s democratic, constitutional sovereignty is cause for relief, not complacency. 

European Union members seem fine with surrendering their sovereign powers to supranational bodies and appear ever ready to surrender ours as well. What they and others do is their business, but it shouldn’t be ours. The imperative some Americans now feel to “do something” risks putting the U.S. in the hypocritical position of invoking the ICC when it suits us, but not otherwise. We should continue ignoring the ICC because of its fundamental flaws from America’s perspective, and instead support sounder alternatives. 

Ukraine provides an excellent test case. The crimes were committed there; the overwhelming mass of evidence is there; and Ukraine remains a viable state whose prosecutors have already begun their work. ICC supporters, for their own ideological reasons, say Ukrainian courts are biased and unable to administer evenhanded justice. Even some Ukrainians favor washing their hands of this burden. Nations don’t mature politically, however, by ducking responsibility, fearing they might be imperfect. Neither America nor Ukraine should succumb to these temptations. When national courts afford equal justice to all, they validate constitutional, democratic legitimacy and sovereignty. If colonial courts in 1770 could conduct fair trials of the Boston Massacre’s perpetrators, represented by John Adams no less, why should we assume today’s Ukrainian courts can’t also measure up? 

ICC supporters say Ukrainian courts can render only mundane judgments, whereas Russian defendants should be charged with “war crimes” and “crimes against humanity”—offenses within the ICC’s jurisdiction. “Mundane” crimes like murder, rape, torture, arson and destruction of property are insufficiently condemnatory of Russia’s behavior, they say. This is a fundamentally political argument, revealing precisely why the ICC is in key respects a political and not a judicial body, devoid of effective constitutional or democratic control. Clear-eyed people world-wide can see and understand what Ukrainian courts will reveal. We need no schooling by Platonic Guardians in The Hague. 

Even better would be a new Russia conducting criminal prosecutions. Vladimir Putin’s rule won’t last forever. How countries handle war crimes and human-rights abuses committed in their names is the truest test of, and the best way to achieve, real political maturity. Allowing a successor regime to shrug off moral responsibility for reckoning with the nation’s past is erroneous. Ceding authority to a distant international body is cowardice, not enhanced maturity. 

Certainly, risk of mistake and failure is ever present, but without taking that risk, there is no easy national path back to trustworthiness and honor. Even worse, shirking enables future autocrats to assert that Russia was sold out by traitors and foreigners. Read “Mein Kampf” for the road map. 

Especially if very few defendants come into Ukrainian custody, a new Russian government would have considerable work to do. Post-1989 regime change across the former Soviet bloc required successor authorities to confront their nations’ unsavory pasts. Some, such as former East Germany and Hungary, responded with prosecutions; others, such as Czechoslovakia, with procedures similar to the truth-and-reconciliation model South Africa followed after apartheid, or a mixture of approaches. The victors in 1945 began Germany’s de-Nazification, but elected German governments continued it. 

Choosing the right judicial decision-maker isn’t an arcane jurisdictional issue, nor is it deferrable to the vague future. American leadership can significantly enhance Ukraine’s principled national sovereignty and remind Russians that their ultimate place in history is in their hands, not in a distant international court. 

Mr. Bolton is author of “The Room Where It Happened: A White House Memoir.” He served as the president’s national security adviser, 2018-19, and ambassador to the United Nations, 2005-06. 

What’s Next for Russia and Ukraine?

April 04, 2022
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This article appeared in 19FortyFive on April 4th, 2022. Click here to view the original article.

Six weeks into Russia’s second invasion of modern Ukraine, Moscow’s stunning military failures dominate the West’s attention. Unsurprisingly, therefore, basic misperceptions are becoming conventional wisdom, thereby potentially distorting future U.S. policy, making it even less effective than at present. The following corrective effort is only illustrative, not exhaustive.

This is not Putin’s war, it’s Russia’s war. Western leaders are deluding themselves to think that Putin alone is responsible for the invasion. As Russia’s president, he obviously makes the final decisions, but he is far from alone in believing passionately that Ukraine (not to mention Belarus and other once-Soviet republics) should be returned to the rodina, Mother Russia. This is certainly true for the siloviki, the “men of power” forming the core of Putin’s advisors, from several of whom I once heard personally their message that Ukraine is a failed, illegitimate state.

Kremlin leaders have a thirty-year obsession with reabsorbing their lost empire. News reports on today’s war often read eerily and confusingly like 2014 news accounts of the Crimea annexation and Donbas invasion, reflecting the West’s historical ignorance and short attention span. The siloviki have many egregious, bloody faults, but short attention is not one of them.

No wonder America’s media and the Biden Administration are surprised by independent polls showing increasing Russian public support for Putin, even in the face of Western sanctions and Moscow’s flagging war effort. Not all Russians feel Putin’s irredentism as deeply as he. A sufficient number do, however, so that whatever else endangers Putin’s regime, public opinion is not only not a threat, it is for now a pillar of regime strength.

Putin does not have a screw loose, nor does he suffer from insufficient, inaccurate information. Not all of Putin’s advisors grovel and snivel, fearing from telling him the truth. Contrary analysis by unnamed Biden administration sources may be elements of our information war against Russia, but they do not describe Kremlin reality. Even in autocratic regimes, there are always advisors more than happy to point out their rivals’ failures, and to provide fulsome evidence to put them in a bad light. Like America, Russia has multiple intelligence agencies that vie bureaucratically for influence and attention. Besides, Soviet embassies don’t need the SVR to communicate back to Moscow what Western media are reporting. There is no upside for every fawning Putin advisor to cover for those who can easily be blamed for evident failures.

The Pentagon offered the most absurd lyrics for the “Putin is uninformed and a little nuts” mantra, speculating that his lack of information could impede ongoing Ukrainian-Russian peace negotiations. For Moscow, these negotiations are merely a propaganda exercise, something affording a patina of reasonableness to its belligerent position. Ironically, it was President Biden who brushed this chatter aside, saying “I don’t want to put too much stock in that at this time because we don’t have that much hard evidence.”

Westerners may not understand how much Putin and company value Ukraine, but that is our problem, not his. We heard this same psychoanalysis in 2014. Angela Merkel among others reportedly believed Putin was “out of touch with reality.” Andrei Illarionov, a former close Putin advisor now in the U.S., corrected her: “People in the West think Putin is irrational or crazy. In fact, he’s very rationale according to his own logic, and very well-prepared. It is not Putin who is out of touch with reality — it is the West.” This rings true. More than once, Putin has said to me, “you have your logic, we have ours; we will see which prevails.”

Part of the problem may be Putin himself. Not his advisors. He may have dismissed hard facts contrary to his preconceptions, a common human failing. It would be an equally grievous mistake, however, for America to think Putin has not by now recovered. Moreover, Russia’s battlefield failures may result from still-endemic corruption and incompetence throughout its military. “Ghost soldiers” whose salaries, weapons, rations and supplies found their way into black markets, as lower-ranking officers submitted false reports on unit strength and readiness up the chain, have now been laid bare. Despite twenty years trying to reform and modernize Russia’s military, the Ukraine conflict demonstrates that these efforts were far from successful.

Russia’s strategic mistakes have cost it dearly, but it has not yet lost the war. Russia did not launch this invasion with only one goal. The Kremlin was likely considering several options, depending on how the war unfolded. With the benefit of 20-20 hindsight, the top-line strategic objective seems to have been capturing Kyiv, overthrowing Zelensky’s government, and replacing it with a Quisling regime under Moscow’s control. This strategic blunder cost Russia numerous opportunities elsewhere in Ukraine that might already have been achieved, in turn enabling Moscow to pursue additional priority objectives. By trying too much at once, however, Moscow’s reach substantially exceeded its grasp, and it failed broadly.

Broadly, but not fatally.

The cliché tells us generals always fight the last war. In 2014, Russia seized the Crimea almost without firing a shot. Indeed, significant portions of Ukraine’s navy defected to Russia’s side. Fighting in the Donbas region was not so successful for Russia, but neither were the military costs high nor subsequent Western sanctions effective. One can easily imagine Moscow’s leaders envisaging a similar scenario in 2022. They were obviously wrong.

Even more importantly, on and after February 24, Russia violated the fundamental military doctrine of force concentration. Instead of aiming at a small number of key targets with overwhelming forces, Moscow attacked broadly with inadequate manpower, firepower and logistics. Ukraine’s heroic resistance was totally unanticipated. The result was failure to win most key objectives: Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odessa and more. Russian arms have had relatively greater success in southern and eastern Ukraine, but even these advances are far from overwhelming.

Now, Russia is belatedly trying to get its act together, withdrawing from areas around Kyiv and other northern cities Ukraine, perhaps back into Belarus and Russia, to regroup, reinforce and resupply. Moscow will either try again in the north, or redeploy these forces to the

east and south, where reinforcements are arriving from existing deployments in Georgia, the Middle East and elsewhere. The media report Syrian soldiers returning Russia’s earlier favors to Assad’s regime by coming to Ukraine, likely without crash courses on the Geneva Conventions.

The Kremlin’s goal now will likely be maximizing its military and political control throughout southern and eastern Ukraine. Russia’s overarching goal of fully conquering Ukraine is almost certainly out of reach for now, but there are many alternative, subsidiary objectives. If Putin could accomplish significant elements of these lesser goals, he would be well-placed to persuade Russia’s public that the war was worthwhile, and to induce all-too-many Westerners to turn the page, and return to “normal” economic and political relations.

Almost certainly the critical second-tier objective is control over Ukraine’s substantially Russophile areas, effectively splitting the country in two. The Kremlin’s targets are southern Ukraine, particularly control over the Black Sea’s strategically important northern coast, and eastern Ukraine, east of the Dnieper River to the city of Dnipropetrovsk and then north to the Russian border. Broadly speaking, eight Ukrainian oblasts (in addition to Crimea) are involved: Kharkiv, Luhansk, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Mykolaiv, and Odessa.

These oblasts are predominantly or substantially Russian-speaking and Russian Orthodox, as compared to areas more Ukrainian-speaking, Ukrainian Orthodox or Catholic. This, of course, is the Kremlin’s view, not an exercise in Wilsonian self-determination. Because Ukraine’s demographic distribution looks like a bad case of measles, and citizens are often ambivalent or conflicted in their religious loyalties, these characterizations are not bright lines. Russia may well fail to conquer all this territory, but the more it seizes, the stronger its bargaining position when negotiations actually turn serious.

For now, Russia’s military position in eastern Ukraine is relatively strong, and “victory” entirely possible. Along the Black Sea, however, Moscow had been blocked, and Odessa seems beyond its grasp at the moment. Nonetheless, if Moscow reconstitutes its forces, coordinates its land, sea and air efforts, and Western support for Ukraine’s military insufficient, taking Odessa is still feasible. With the east and much of the south secure, Russia could make territorial “concessions” by withdrawing from areas it still holds in the north, but which are no longer tenable long-term. Putin is counting on flagging Western interest and unity. This would make it difficult and costly if not impossible to push Russia from what it holds near its current borders and Crimea. Uti possidetis remains a powerful form of diplomatic inertia.

Washington needs to step up its leadership, and NATO its performance. Let’s be clear: NATO is not fully united. The West must do better in tightening the economic noose around Russia and increasing and speeding its military assistance to Ukraine. Performance to date is mixed. Despite incessant hosannas about Alliance unity, the West is already fraying. The United Kingdom and the United States have led in supplying hardware and intelligence, but others, like France and Germany, have lagged, starting with Berlin’s pre-war offer of 5,000 military helmets, and continuing later by supplying former East German Strela missiles, over thirty years old, that did not work. Time and again, President Biden has responded to pressure from Congress and the Allies rather than leading himself, acting either belatedly or not at all, as in his refusal to authorize transferring the Polish MiGs.

Remember, every day the war grinds on is further evidence of NATO’s fundamental, unalterable shame: failing to deter Russia in the first place because of shredded credibility (see Georgia, 2008, Ukraine, 2014, and the 2021 Afghanistan withdrawal); grossly inadequate threats

of future punishment through selective, inadequate sanctions; and Biden’s early December unforced error, rejecting even the possibility of U.S. force, in exchange for exactly nothing.

This pattern must be reversed, and quickly. Given Russia’s mistakes so far, it would be a fool’s errand to bet it can successfully reculer pour mieux saute, but it is at least possible. We are likely therefore in a slow-motion race to see whether Moscow can get off its back before Ukraine’s military breaks under the strains (incompletely reported by Western media) it has felt. Time is on Moscow’s side, so slow or inadequate Western resupply efforts could be ruinous. The Western is not unified on sanctions.

Europe’s purchases of Russian oil and gas continue, and China, India and others are providing financial lifelines keeping Russia’s economy afloat. Looking ahead, the real efficacy of sanctions turns on rigorous enforcement and enhancement to close loopholes as Russia creates them. The best day for any sanctions’ regime is the day it is announced, dropping rapidly if the sanctioning powers are not as least as creative as their target. Historically, U.S. sanctions enforcement and enhancement has been decidedly mixed, and the Europeans are, to be polite, far from diligent. Modern history’s most effective and comprehensive sanctions were imposed on Iraq after it invaded Kuwait in 1990. Enforced by the U.S. and allied militaries, even these were not enough to oust Saddam’s invading forces.

The Alliance’s biggest test will be maintaining diplomatic unity at the inevitable moment when Moscow decides on serious negotiations. The siloviki see the West’s weakness for money not for the ideological reasons of their Communist predecessors, but with at last equal clarity. Already, France and Germany are searching for ways to end military hostilities before one side or the other scores a decisive victory, thus freezing the conflict without materially resolving it. This would certainly be the typical European approach. If, however, Russia emerges from its current military debacle with anything even remotely smacking of victory, the reverberations in Europe and worldwide, especially in Beijing, will be enormous. Nattering on about NATO unity may warm hearts in elite Washington circles, but all that talk is worth what you pay for it. American leadership and NATO performance to date have been inadequate. Face up to it.

The clear lesson is that Americans should not bliss out prematurely. This is a European conflict. Think Thirty Years War or Hundred Years War. Putin is