Trump may be abandoning Taiwan to China’s tender mercies

Recent reports that the Trump administration is withholding roughly $400 million of military assistance to Taiwan are deeply disturbing. Although the White House maintains no final decisions have been made, the pause is eerily similar to Trump’s summer 2019 withholding of security assistance to Ukraine, for reasons entirely unrelated to Kyiv’s defense needs.

China’s threat to Taiwan is beyond dispute. Congressional support for aiding Taiwan militarily, and thereby hopefully deterring Beijing’s aggressive intentions, remains firm and fully bipartisan — highly compelling in an otherwise highly partisan, politicized Washington. If anything, the principal criticism of Taipei’s national security efforts since the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 is that they have been insufficient, although those criticisms are now badly outdated.

Unfortunately, the case for America’s interest in Taiwan’s self-defense and de facto independence has long been less than clearly stated.  Since 1949, the United States has been vitally interested in preventing Taiwan from being swallowed by the mainland Peoples Republic of China. Taiwan’s critical geographic location in the “first island chain” between China and the open Pacific, an island once prompted Douglas MacArthur to call it “an unsinkable aircraft carrier.” Taiwan’s economic importance and its vibrant, constitutional, representative government also underline its centrality to U.S. national security.

That is why the reported halt in military assistance is so troubling. The apparent reason for the arms cutoff is Trump’s obsession with a trade deal with China and his palpable hunger for a summit with Xi Jinping. In his first term, Trump spoke repeatedly of making “the biggest trade deal in history” with China, which he failed to do. Today, reaching a China deal is significantly harder because of the incoherent, worldwide “reciprocal” tariffs he promulgated this spring, which deny Washington numerous potential allies in blocking China’s deeply invidious trade policies.

On Sept. 19, Xi and Trump spoke to discuss several issues, including the status of Tik Tok. As with his overall kid-glove treatment of Beijing, Trump has defied clear statutory deadlines to shut Tik Tok down or else sell it to new owners with assurances that it will no longer vacuum up American users’ information. Trump’s initial opposition to Tik Tok’s espionage threat disappeared when he concluded that it boosted his re-election campaign, and the ownership interests of several key supporters.

Taiwan has long feared Trump might trade away its interests in pursuing mega-trade arrangements with the Chinese communists. There is already ample evidence, beyond arms-supply issues, that he is going out of his way to placate Beijing.

Since Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, China has been, by a considerable margin, the largest international purchaser of its oil and gas. Nonetheless, despite threating rhetoric, Trump has imposed no additional tariffs or secondary sanctions on China.

In contrast — India, a clear strategic priority for Washington to constrain Beijing’s hegemonic ambitions — has been hit with 25 percent U.S. tariffs on top of 25 percent “economic” tariffs. This burdens Indian exports to the U.S. by 50 percent, a level far higher than other trading partners.

And despite Russia’s s clear disdain for his proposals to stop the Ukraine war, Trump has rejected new sanctions on Russia. He has, in fact, conditioned such action on European nations hitting India and China with significant tariff increases. Whatever Trump’s motives, the net effect is to spare both Moscow and Beijing.

Taiwan is America’s seventh-largest trading partner and the world’s key manufacturer of sophisticated computer chips, which underlines the enormous risk of mainland Chinese hegemony over the island. But what troubles Taiwan most deeply is the risk of political concessions. If, for example, Trump agreed to revise the Shanghai Communique (or even reinterpret it unilaterally) to concede communist China’s sovereignty over Taiwan, it would gravely compromise Taiwan’s political viability. Asian governments especially would see such a concession (or lesser versions of it) as Washington effectively abandoning Taipei to Beijing’s tender mercies.

A radical restatement of the U.S. position on Taiwan could well violate the commitments to support Taipei’s defense that were legislated in the Taiwan Relations Act and undoubtedly cause a political firestorm in Congress. Of course, as the Tik Tok case demonstrates, Trump ignores statutes he dislikes, and Congress remains quiescent. Violating the Taiwan Relations Act might seem easy for an emboldened Oval Office occupant. It would unquestionably incentivize Xi to increase his squeeze on Taiwan.

This is no time for Taiwan’s supporters to be passive. Taiwan could be cast adrift at a moment’s notice. In Trumpworld, posts on social media, government by whim, are the preferred medium of communications, all too often without considered analysis by the National Security Council, let alone close consultations with allied governments.

Whether Trump can negotiate the biggest trade deal in history is problematic. Even more problematic is whether China would deign to adhere to any “commitments” it might make. The U.S. should urgently restore the suspended military assistance and make clear that Beijing will not rule Taiwan any time soon.

This article was originally published in The Hill, on September 24, 2025. Click here to read the original article.

Russia’s Drone Attack Is an Opening for U.S.-India Repair

Russia’s recent breach of Polish airspace may be Donald Trump’s last chance to show resolute opposition to Moscow’s assaults against Ukraine. But the stakes aren’t limited to the European battlefront. America must also make clear to China and others that unprovoked aggression against U.S. friends and allies beyond Europe is equally unacceptable. For peace and security in Europe and the Indo-Pacific, Washington must repair U.S.-India relations damaged by imposing 25% tariffs on India for importing Russian oil and gas.

This is a pivotal moment. White House equivocation on Poland will undercut support for Ukraine and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and will encourage potential aggressors in Asia and the Middle East. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi made his displeasure with Washington clear through his recent Beijing meetings with Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, and Kim Jong Un. Despite social-media efforts to revive Trump-Modi personal relations, India remains seared by the Russia-related tariffs and doubts about Mr. Trump’s good faith in trade negotiations, which he abruptly terminated in August before imposing the tariffs.

Mr. Trump’s earlier claims of resolving Indo-Pakistani conflict over terrorist attacks in Kashmir violated longstanding Indian insistence, embodied in the 1972 Simla Agreement, that such disputes be resolved only between the parties. India is also smarting from the Trump administration’s welcome to Field Marshal Asim Munir, chief of staff of Pakistan’s army, in June. He was the first Pakistani military leader hosted at the White House with no civilian leaders present, and the first world leader to nominate Mr. Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize.

All this outrages India, harking back to the era of a “hyphenated” U.S. policy toward New Delhi and Islamabad. Under that approach, Washington tilted toward one or the other—usually Pakistan during the Cold War. Neither India nor Pakistan liked being hyphenated. Each wanted to be treated on its own merits, which George W. Bush’s administration succeeded in doing.

No serious observer believes Russia’s contention that its drone strikes in Poland weren’t intentional. Moscow was likely testing NATO in two ways, first by assessing its capabilities against drones. On this score, the results were unfortunate. Neither NATO nor U.S. alliances generally have cost-effective defenses against drone capabilities evolving daily in the Ukraine conflict. This deficiency isn’t surprising, but now there is proof.

Second, Moscow wanted to test whether crossing a NATO border is really the red line we have long declared. The early signs aren’t encouraging. Mr. Trump’s reaction was to dismiss Russia’s drone attack, saying “it could have been a mistake.”

He later urged Europeans to impose tariffs of as much as 100% on India and China for buying Russian hydrocarbons. Mr. Trump then demanded that NATO members cease buying Russian oil before Washington imposes further sanctions on Moscow. This ploy could simply excuse him, yet again, from taking meaningful action against Russia. Most likely, it means the Ukraine war continues, and India remains singled out as collateral damage.

China’s purchases of Russian oil and gas are part of the problem, as is the two countries’ growing axis. By contrast, India’s purchases, and most others, while undesirable, are symptoms of the problem. One major reason existing anti-Russia sanctions are ineffective is that they embody two inconsistent objectives. They were intended to reduce Russian revenue for funding the Ukraine war, but also, through a price-cap mechanism, to maintain flows of Russian oil into global markets, thereby avoiding increased European and American retail gasoline prices and the inevitable negative political consequences.

These conflicting objectives persist, but one must give way. Targeting China, the largest buyer of Russian oil and gas, and a predator on Pakistan, makes sense. Leaving India hanging is a mistake. America and Gulf oil producers should help India make the transition away from reliance on Russian hydrocarbons, just as major buyers of Iranian commodities shifted to new suppliers after 2018 when Mr. Trump withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal and reimposed U.S. sanctions. Curtailing the international availability of Russian oil opens opportunities for other producers, not least the U.S., to expand sales to India and others. Our goal should be to constrain Russia and China, while rebuilding relations with India.

Showing political resolve in Europe and Asia requires White House leadership. If that is forthcoming, Russia will have to rethink its views of American resolve. If not, the future could be grim, both on NATO’s eastern flank and along China’s vast Indo-Pacific periphery.

This article was originally published in the Wall Street Journal, on September 19, 2025. Click here to read the original article.

Trump’s utterly incoherent Ukraine strategy

Donald Trump’s Ukraine policy today is no more coherent than it was last Friday when his administration executed search warrants against my home and office.  Collapsing in confusion, haste, and the absence of any discernible meeting of the minds among Ukraine, Russia, several European countries, and America, Trump’s negotiations may be in their last throes(https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2025/08/23/trump-ukraine-frustration/), along with his Nobel Peace Prize campaign. 

The administration has tried to camouflage its disarray behind social-media posts, such as Trump comparing his finger-pointing at Vladimir Putin to then-Vice President Richard Nixon during the famous kitchen debate with Nikita Khrushchev.  Why Trump wants to be compared to the only President who resigned in disgrace is unclear.  Trump also asserted Ukraine can only win by attacking inside Russia(https://www.wsj.com/world/trump-truth-social-ukraine-russia-a545b8a3?mod=article_inline), even as his own Pentagon blocked Kyiv from missile strikes doing just that(https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/pentagon-has-quietly-blocked-ukraines-long-range-missile-strikes-on-russia-432a12e1), reversing the Biden administration. Russia’s attack on a US-owned factory in Ukraine, which Moscow hasn’t acknowledged, only highlighted the disarray(https://www.nbcnews.com/world/europe/kremlin-casts-doubt-trumps-push-ukraine-peace-rifts-remain-unresolved-rcna226742).  

Russia’s unprovoked 2022 aggression against Ukraine is painfully straightforward, and the views of the combatants are completely contradictory.  Kyiv believes it is fighting for its freedom and independence, while Moscow seeks to recreate the old Russian Empire, positions which leave no middle ground.  They may ultimately agree to a ceasefire, but the threat of renewed hostilities will continue as long as the Kremlin maintains its imperialist goals.  Trump has called the conflict “senseless” and “ridiculous,” but Kyiv and Moscow, for widely varying but strongly held reasons, vehemently disagree.

Trump’s furious pace trying to move an extraordinarily complex conflict to resolution over the past two weeks was one of several significant mistakes.  So doing inevitably made reaching agreement even on a ceasefire, let alone a full-scale peace agreement, more difficult.  US envoy Steve Witkoff met with Vladimir Putin in Moscow on August 8, and immediately returned to Washington to inform Trump, among other things, that Putin wished to meet with him. Two days later, Trump announced the requested summit (soon thereafter revealed to be held in Alaska) would occur one week later, August 15.  Trump noted that he wished the meeting could have been held even sooner, but it is almost surely unprecedented in modern history that a summit between leaders of two major powers on such a contentious issue has been arranged so expeditiously.  After the Putin-Trump meeting, Trump executed a stunning about-face.  He said that, despite his pre-summit threats that sanctions would be imposed on Russia if Putin did not agree to a cease fire, he there would be no new US sanctions or tariffs.  Moreover, Trump announced he no longer favored a near-term ceasefire, but wanted instead to proceed directly to a final agreement.  Moscow and other capitals could hardly miss these U-turns.

Trump’s subsequent August 18 meetings in Washington with Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelensky and several European leaders also occurred with dizzying speed.  Emerging from that meeting, interrupted by a forty-minute Trump phone call to Putin, came the idea of a soon-to-follow bilateral meeting between Putin and Zelensky, perhaps joined at its conclusion by Trump, or with a follow-up trilateral meeting, presumably at which the three leaders would wrap up a final deal.  None of this was realistic, and now appears unlikely any time soon,

A corollary mistake was the very high level of generality at which the major substantive issues were discussed.  National leaders often converse together in broad terms, but almost always after their subordinates have plowed through the same ground in much greater detail prior thereto.  Inevitably, this more-traditional “bottoms up” process takes longer than the pace Trump wanted.  Speaking in broad generalities may seem to enhance chances of reaching agreement, but they may instead merely paper-over vast differences, potentially serious enough to derail discussions entirely.  We are not necessarily at that point, but today there is no clear path ahead.

Finally, other bilateral relationships have suffered considerable damage because of the fallout from the administration’s failing diplomacy.  India in particular feels deeply aggrieved by Trump.  It is the only victim of his threat to impose tariffs and sanctions, either directly on Russia or secondarily on countries purchasing Russian oil and gas.  Moscow has not been sanctioned in any way, essentially ignoring White House threats.  China, a considerably larger purchaser of hydrocarbons from Russia than India, also remains untouched, as Beijing-Washington trade negotiations continue.  By contrast, India has not only been subject to the comparatively high level of “regular” Trump tariffs of 25%, but also hit with another 25% tariff level because of its oil and gas trade with Russia.  The longer India hangs out to dry, the worse the New Delhi-Washington relationship gets.

Of course, it’s never over until it’s over, especially with Trump.  But his efforts over the last two-plus weeks may have left us further from both peace and a just settlement for Ukraine than before.

This article was originally published by Washington Examiner, on August 26, 2025. Click here to read the original article.

A Bad Summit’s Silver Lining

Vladimir Putin led Russia out of international isolation on Friday, striding down a red carpet to greet an applauding Donald Trump. He accepted a ride with President Trump in “the Beast,” and one-on-one applied his KGB training to restart one of Moscow’s most effective influence operations ever. After the Alaska summit, Mr. Putin could legitimately say, as generations of victorious generals have, “The day is ours.”

Since his first encounter with Kim Jong Un, Mr. Trump has argued that U.S. presidents lose nothing by meeting rogue foreign leaders without previously exacting a price. Most everyone else disagrees, especially the rogues. Friday’s summit should clear up Mr. Trump’s misapprehension. Mr. Putin emerged from diplomatic purdah with flags unfurled, literally. How long before Europeans like France’s ever-opportunistic Emmanuel Macron phone Mr. Putin or visit him in Moscow? And how does India, under sanctions from Washington for buying Russian oil, feel about still hanging out to dry?

At the summit’s concluding media event, the leaders were addressing multiple audiences: America, Russia, Ukraine, Europe and, never forget, China. Worried about all these audiences, the White House worked assiduously beforehand to lower expectations. Among Americans, only MAGA loyalists could assert their leader had a good day. Russians seemed exuberant, and in Kyiv and other European capitals the mood was disquiet or dismay. Xi Jinping may now be more inclined to meet with Mr. Trump, having noted his evident fatigue during the press conference.

We don’t know whether the economic teams—Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick and their Russian counterparts—took advantage of their free time to confer. From Moscow’s perspective, it was a real opportunity. Even if these ministers reached no conclusions, they could have laid the basis for future discussions between Messrs. Trump and Putin, or at least arranged for their own subordinates to prepare the way.

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Trump is deluded if he thinks his meeting with Putin is cause for celebration  

Friday’s Alaska summit between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin is not shaping up well for Ukraine. Every indication is that Trump believes he and his (once again) good friend Putin will conjure some land swaps and bring peace.

Of course, the land in question will be bits and pieces of Ukraine’s territory, not Russia’s, with Moscow probably ending this war controlling 20 per cent of Ukraine. If anyone needed proof that Trump acts in international affairs not like a strategist but like a free electron, this past week settles the matter. 

Before the Alaska summit even begins, Putin has scored a major propaganda victory. An international pariah, leading a rogue state guilty of unprovoked aggression against its neighbour, is landing on American soil for pictures standing next to the president of the United States. 

Trump has tariffed the entire world for the privilege of doing business in America, but asked and received exactly nothing from Putin. Inviting him to Alaska is not quite as offensive as inviting the Taliban to Camp David in 2019 to discuss the Afghanistan war, but it comes close. Most ironically, Alaska is former Russian America, purchased (thank God) by Washington in 1867, which some Russian ideologues wish to reclaim.

Putin almost certainly concluded from Trump’s recent pro-Ukrainian behaviour, such as allowing Patriot air-defence systems to be transferred indirectly to Kyiv, that he had pushed his “friendship” with Trump too far. With the August 8 deadline to have a Ukraine-Russia ceasefire looming, Putin was doubtless considering how to repair the damage and reel Trump back into line when Trump’s envoy-for-everything Steve Witkoff sought a Moscow meeting.  We don’t know when Putin decided to propose a US-Russia summit, but that idea was certainly conveyed to Witkoff to bring back to Trump. 

As before, Putin clearly hopes to work his KGB training on Trump, making the president his unwitting tool. Perhaps, Putin reasoned, he might even avoid pain for missing the August 8 deadline. He knew the lure of being the centre of massive press attention is a fatal attraction for Trump, who was almost instantaneously ready for a summit. Indeed, just before announcing that August 15 was the time and Alaska the place, Trump said he wished the summit could have been earlier. 

Putin not only got his meeting, but TACO (“Trump always chickens out”) worked again; August 8 came and went with no new tariffs or sanctions imposed on Moscow, or China, the largest purchaser of Russian oil and gas. Only India was left in the lurch, facing a doubling of its Trump tariff rate to 50 per cent for purchasing Russian hydrocarbons.

The Alaska summit recalls Helsinki in 2018, when Trump sided with Putin’s denial of Russian interference in the 2016 presidential campaign, contrary to what America’s intelligence community concluded. Putin is doubtless looking for something analogous. Moscow has already achieved another success by ensuring that no pesky Europeans, especially Ukrainians, would be invited to Alaska, reminiscent of the Trump-Zelensky meeting at Pope Benedict’s funeral, where Trump all but pushed French President Macron out of the picture. While Trump simply enjoys getting more attention, the one-on-one format provides exactly the kind of playing field Putin needs.

Moreover, the Alaska meeting afforded Russia a first-mover advantage, which it seized immediately. Within 48 hours of Witkoff’s Moscow trip, the two sides built on earlier outlines of what Russia would deem an acceptable solution. Press reports indicated that Russia’s terms, which seemed acceptable to Trump, resembled vice presidential candidate J D Vance’s proposal in September, 2024: Russia would essentially keep Ukrainian lands it had conquered; an undefined peacekeeping force would police the current front lines; and Ukraine would be barred from joining Nato. As observers noted, Vance’s plan looked like Russia’s.

Seemingly, therefore, Trump and Putin are preparing to present Zelensky with a fait accompli after meeting in Alaska. Trump said on Friday that Zelensky would have to remove Ukraine’s constitutional prohibitions against ceding territory to another country, which is exactly what Trump is expecting to come. Thus, even before the summit, Putin exploited his first-mover advantage by bringing Trump back to his side.

With this disturbing prospect now explicit, Zelensky, in his first public response to news of the Alaska summit, rejected any surrender of Ukrainian lands. Zelensky’s response is fully justified and hardly surprising, but it plays into Putin’s hands: Russia, he will say, took the lead in seeking peace, and Ukraine is the obstructionist. While we are not yet back to the disastrous February 28 Oval Office encounter between Zelensky and Trump, Putin would obviously like to reprise Trump telling Zelensky “you don’t have the cards right now”.

As of today, Putin again has diplomatic momentum, and Zelensky is on the defensive. Time for the UK and Europe’s other Ukraine supporters to step in before it’s too late.

This article was first published in the Daily Telegraph on August 11, 2025. Click here to read the original article.

Putin certainly sees Trump as an easy mark

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Judging a US president’s first hundred days began with Franklin Roosevelt.  For Donald Trump, however, certainly on national-security issues, comparison to Napoleon’s hundred-days campaign may be more apt, ending as it did in disaster for both the emperor and France.

Trump’s indifference to Ukraine and his conciliatory approach toward Russia are only one of several shocks to trans-Atlantic relations.  Disdain for NATO and the ever-present specter of US withdrawal, or even substantial disengagement, like renouncing the supreme European command, are also dangerous.  Combined with Trump’s chaotic, incoherent, economically illiterate trade decisions, there is reason to despair.

The good news, such as it is: Trump is not pursuing a grand strategy, or even “policy” as we normally understand that word.  He sees everything transactionally, through the prism of personal ties, and how he benefits from them, politically or economically.  If he and Vladimir Putin have good rapport, he believes America and Russia have good state-to-state relations.  This is not unique to Putin.  Trump said about North Korea’s Kim Jung Un: “We fell in love.”

Putin certainly sees Trump as an easy mark, not a friend, manipulating him on Ukraine, for example, by agreeing that Trump was correct to say that the Ukraine war would not have happened had he been president.  Putin then released a US hostage, followed by Belarus also doing so, always a winner with Trump.  Moscow has just recently exchanged yet another US citizen, even as Russia has been slow-rolling cease-fire negotiations.  This is not about a Trump strategy, but about his susceptibility to flattery and exploitation.

Trump is an aberration in American politics, someone entirely absorbed with himself.  That he has been elected twice says more about his opponents’ weaknesses than voter devotion to Trump personally, or his actions as president.  His public support is dropping and will drop significantly more if his newly launched trade wars cause an economic downtown.  Republicans in Congress are finally beginning to distance themselves from Trump and will steer further away as the 2026 elections approach.  Democrats, by contrast, still have not regained a pulse since last November’s election.

The answer is not to panic or do things that give Trump further excuses to quit Europe.  During the Cold War, Soviet leaders sought to split the Atlantic alliance.  Their failure to do so contributed significantly to Moscow’s defeat. This is not the time for us to do to ourselves what the Kremlin could not.

This article was first published in Atlantik-Bruecke on April 29, 2025. Click here to read the original article.

Dark days lie ahead with Trump on the world stage once more

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Soon to be cast adrift by President-elect Trump, Ukraine’s likely future is bleak. Let’s not make it worse by a feckless peace deal
Donald Trump’s looming inauguration bodes poorly for vital Western security interests, and Ukraine in particular. Trump’s hostility to NATO is palpable, and his feelings about Ukraine follow close behind. After January 20, US military and economic assistance will likely drop significantly, and negotiations with Russia begin quickly. In turn, European financial support for Ukraine will diminish, as EU members rush to revive now-defunct commercial ties with Moscow. Despite contrary press reports, Trump has not yet spoken to Vladimir Putin. When they do, Trump’s desire to put this “Biden war” behind him could, at worst, mean capitulation to maximalist Russian demands. After all, if assisting Ukraine’s defence against unprovoked aggression is unimportant to Washington, why worry about Kyiv’s terms of surrender?

In fact, core America national interests remain. Since 1945, European peace and stability have been vital to advancing US economic and political security. The ripple effects of perceived American and NATO failure in Europe’s centre will embolden Beijing to act aggressively toward Taiwan and the East China Sea; the South China Sea; and along its land borders. These aren’t abstract, diaphanous worries at the periphery of our interests, but hard threats to US physical security, trade, travel and communications globally.

Biden put these interests at risk by bungling implementation of nearly three years of aid to Kyiv. He never developed a winning strategy. His administration helped create the current battlefield gridlock, deterred by constant but idle Kremlin threats of a “wider war.” Parcelling out weapons only after long public debates prevented their most effective use. Biden failed to explain clearly Russia’s threat to key Western interests, thereby fanning the belief there are no such interests, and abetting the Trump-inspired isolationism spreading nationally.

What to do? Aiding Ukraine is in NATO’s vital interest. That interest does not diminish because of persistent Biden administration poor performance. Do we ignore the continuing reality that Russia’s aggression threatens Alliance security? Does Ukraine simply give way to Trumpian capitulationism?

Certainly not. In the coming negotiations, certain points are essential to any potential agreement. The following suggestions, which are hardly my preferred outcome, are the absolute minimum we must obtain. They are only indicative, not exhaustive, and certainly not NATO’s opening position.

Any agreement must be explicitly provisional to keep Ukraine’s future open. Moscow will treat any deal that way regardless. For the Kremlin, nothing is permanent until its empire is fully restored, by their lights. Putin needs time to restore Russia’s military capabilities, and believing any “commitment” to forswear future aggression against Ukraine is dreaming.

A ceasefire along existing military frontlines during negotiations may be inevitable. Nonetheless, we should insist that any ultimate agreement explicitly state that the lines eventually drawn have no political import whatever, but merely reflect existing military dispositions. Russia may later disregard such disclaimers, but such claims must be rendered clearly invalid in advance.

Similarly, the agreement should not create demilitarised zones between Ukrainian and Russian forces inside Ukraine, or along the two countries’ formal border elsewhere. The surest way for a ceasefire line to become a permanent border is to make it half-a-mile wide, extending endlessly through contested territory. A DMZ inures solely to Moscow’s benefit.

Deployments of UN peacekeepers have an unhappy history of freezing the status quo, not helping to resolve the underlying conflict. Consider the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) which has partitioned the island since 1964. The UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) has patrolled the Golan Heights since 1974, and may last forever, but did not prevent Israel from annexing the Golan. The list goes on. In Ukraine, a disengagement force could mean permanent cession of twenty percent of Ukraine to Russia.

The problem is not mitigated if the peacekeepers are under NATO rather than UN auspices. It is not the quality of the military that makes a difference, but the intentions of the parties to the conflict. Does anyone doubt what Russia’s long-term aims are? Or Ukraine’s for that matter? My guess is that the Kremlin won’t agree to NATO peacekeepers anyway, at least not unless augmented by thousands of North Korean troops.

Finally, Ukraine should not be constrained in its future options to join or cooperate with NATO. What’s left of Ukraine will still be a sovereign country, striving for representative government, and free to pick its allies on its own. We should not acquiesce in enforced neutralisation, what in the Cold War was called “Finlandisation”. Even Finland turned out not to like it, finally joining NATO in 2023. And if some hardy nations want to provide security guarantees to Free Ukraine, they should be able to do so, not subject to Russian vetoes.

Soon to be cast adrift by President-elect Trump, Ukraine’s likely future is bleak. Let’s not make it worse by a feckless peace deal.

This article was first published in The Telegraph on November 30, 2024. Click here to read the original article.

North Korea comes to Europe: How will the next president respond? ​

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The threat of North Korea fighting alongside Russia in Ukraine is no longer a nightmare, but a real possibility. Two weeks ago, Kyiv said Pyongyang’s soldiers were already in Ukraine and had sustained casualties. Now the Biden administration has confirmed that 10,000 North Korean troops are training in Russia, adding that they will be “fair game” if deployed to Ukraine.

As Election Day approaches, voters should worry whether either Vice President Kamala Harris or former President Donald Trump are awake to and able to handle this immediate danger and its longer-term implications.

Having Pyongyang’s forces fighting in Ukraine would both bolster Moscow tactically and provide those troops with battlefield experience, greatly benefitting them in future conflicts on the Korean Peninsula. Moreover, the risk that, in return, the Kremlin supplies Kim Jong Un with nuclear-weapons and ballistic-missile technology — if it hasn’t already — directly imperils South Korea, Japan and deployed U.S. forces in the region.

By contrast, in 2018, Trump canceled regular U.S.-South Korean “war games” to please Kim, thus compromising allied combat readiness. In a tense environment, where the U.S.-South Korean troops’ preparedness mantra is “Fight Tonight,” this is crucial.

There is no sign that Trump understands his mistake. And Harris’s thoughts on Pyongyang’s menace appear to be a blank slate.

South Korea is hardly standing idly by. Having previously sold tanks, artillery and ammunition to Poland, President Yoon Suk Yeol is currently considering selling weapons to Ukraine. Additionally, Pyongyang’s growing closeness to Moscow, and fears of Washington’s fecklessness, will only increase Seoul’s ongoing debate about whether to acquire an independent nuclear-weapons capability. We are well into uncharted territory.

The broader threat is not just North Korea but the emerging China-Russia axis, now widely understood as a reality, not a prediction. While similar in appearance to the Cold War’s Sino-Soviet alliance, today’s version differs dramatically: China this time is inarguably the dominant partner. The axis is far from fully formed. Disagreements and tensions clearly exist, notably over Pyongyang’s increasing affinity for Russia, as Kim emulates his grandfather Kim Il Sung’s uncanny ability to play Moscow off against Beijing.

Contemporaneously with Kim and Vladimir Putin locking step, the Kremlin is also reportedly supplying Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthis with targeting data, thereby augmenting its campaign to effectively close the Suez Canal-Red Sea maritime passage (other than to “friendly” vessels like Russian tankers). Thus, notwithstanding its problems and quirks, the axis and its outriders are rolling along.

Worryingly, however, one variety of America’s contemporary isolationist virus, epitomized by vice presidential nominee Sen. J.D. Vance (R-Ohio), holds that the Middle East and Europe should be downgraded as U.S. priorities in order to focus on China’s threat in Asia, particularly against Taiwan. This menace is indeed real, but far wider than just endangering Taiwan or East Asia generally. While not yet comprehensive or entirely consistent internally, the Beijing-Moscow hazard is worldwide.

Worst of all, the latest manifestation of Beijing’s sustained, aggressive military buildup is the new projection that China’s nuclear-weapons arsenal will reach 1,000 warheads by 2030, much earlier than previous predictions. Increasing Chinese nuclear capabilities portend a tripolar nuclear world, one radically different and inherently riskier and more uncertain that the Cold War’s bipolar U.S.-USSR faceoff.

This is not simply a new U.S.-China problem. All our assessments about appropriately sizing America’s nuclear deterrent, allocating it within the nuclear triad (land-based and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, plus long-range bombers), along with all our theories of deterrence and arms control, were founded on the basic reality of bipolarity. Impending tripolarity means that all those issues need to be reconceptualized for America’s security, not to mention the extended deterrence we provide our allies.

Do we face one combined China-Russia nuclear threat, or two separate threats? Or both? The questions only get harder. This is not an Asia-based risk, but a global one, inevitably implying substantial budget increases for new or rehabilitated nuclear weapons and delivery systems.

Responding to North Korea with yet another four years of “strategic patience” — the Obama and Biden do-nothing policy — is both wrongheaded and increasingly dangerous. As for China, focusing on securing bilateral climate-change agreements, Biden’s highest priority, is wholly inadequate. Even where his administration acted strategically — enhancing the Asian Security Quad, endorsing the AUKUS nuclear-submarine project, agreeing to trilateral military activity with Japan and South Korea — Biden demonstrated little sense of urgency or focus.

Surely the image of Pyongyang fighting Kyiv should jar both the simplistic premises of “East Asia only” theorists and the quietude of Biden-Harris supporters. We must immediately overcome any remaining French and German objections to increasing NATO coordination with Japan, South Korea and others, including ultimately joining NATO, as former Spanish Prime Minister José Maria Aznar suggested years ago. Existing Asia-based initiatives like the Quad, AUKUS and closer military cooperation among America’s allies need to be rocket-boosted.

We need a president who understands the importance of American leadership and has the resolve to pursue it. Let’s pray we get one.

This article was first published in The Hill on October 30, 2024. Click here to read the original article.

A Biden-Starmer Giveaway Helps China

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As a one-term president, Joe Biden appears eager to take actions he might not have taken if he had to worry about getting re-elected. The latest example: He apparently pushed the U.K. to cede sovereignty of the Chagos Islands in the Indian Ocean to the island country of Mauritius. The Chagos archipelago is unremarkable but for one key fact: Diego Garcia, its largest island, houses a critical U.S.-U.K. military base near the Indian Ocean’s geographic center point.

British media report that U.S. officials, fearing that existing International Court of Justice rulings and a potential push in the United Nations General Assembly would pose political problems, pressured British Prime Minister Keir Starmer to cede them on Oct. 3. Whatever Mr. Starmer’s motivation—whether to appease Mr. Biden or lessen guilty feelings about imperial history—the decision was utterly misguided.

The Chagos “problem” hasn’t figured prominently in British politics before now, except in certain Labour Party circles. Jeremy Corbyn, Labour’s leader before Mr. Starmer, obsessed over the issue, long a priority for Labour’s Trotskyite wing. Worried about disapprobation by biased global courts, the White House and State Department during Mr. Biden’s term fell in sync with Britain’s Corbynites.

Under the deal, Diego Garcia will remain under British jurisdiction for at least 99 years. The site is home to a critical U.S. military facility, fittingly nicknamed the “footprint of freedom.” The island will only become more important to U.S. resistance against China’s efforts to achieve hegemony in the Indo-Pacific.

Mauritius, meantime, is increasingly China-friendly. China is its top trading partner, and Beijing has used debt-trap diplomacy—lending with strings attached—to ensnare the island nation. If the British Parliament approves transferring the Chagos to Mauritius, China will be able to maneuver ships and planes near Diego Garcia for intelligence-gathering and military operations. Given Beijing’s history of militarizing comparable tiny landmasses in the South China Sea, the threat is clear.

China has long conducted extensive undersea surveys of the Indian Ocean, ostensibly for commercial reasons but obviously in pursuit of maritime dominance. A Beijing presence in the Chagos will facilitate these efforts, posing a direct threat to India, which it appears wasn’t consulted by either Whitehall or Foggy Bottom.

There’s no compelling logic for ceding the islands to Mauritius. That the Chagos are associated with Mauritius is actually a fluke of colonial administration: France was Mauritius’s first colonial European power, governing the islands from the larger chain after taking control in the early 1700s. Britain acquired Mauritius after victory in the Napoleonic Wars and continued France’s governing mode. Many alternative solutions for the islands are available, but neither Washington nor London have shown an appetite for considering them.

The U.S. faced analogous challenges in ending its administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, or TTPI, during the 1980s and ’90s. Once German colonies, the islands became a Japanese mandate under the League of Nations, and, after 1945, a U.N. trusteeship under U.S. control. One part of the TTPI, the Northern Marianas, became an American commonwealth. Three others—Palau, the Marshall Islands and Micronesia—chose independence but entered into Compacts of Free Association with the U.S., giving Washington authority over their foreign and security policies.

For all the overblown rhetoric about a British “diplomatic success,” it seems no one bothered to ask Chagossians their views. Given Mauritius’s prior poor treatment of Chagossians, Chagossians might have preferred to have become a U.S. commonwealth.

China has already tried to take advantage of Washington’s inattention in the former TTPI by aggressively pressing its interests and intentions and using debt-diplomacy tactics. Although Washington is now pressing back against Beijing, we can’t afford to make similar mistakes in the Chagos or the broader Indian Ocean.

Messrs. Biden and Starmer have checked the Chagos Islands off Mr. Corbyn’s to-do list. Let’s hope there aren’t any other foreign-policy surprises in Mr. Biden’s remaining lame-duck period.

Mr. Bolton served as White House national security adviser, 2018-19, and ambassador to the United Nations, 2005-06. He is author of “The Room Where It Happened: A White House Memoir.”

This article was first published in the Wall Street Journal on October 16, 2024. Click here to read the original article.

America’s Crucial First Line of Defense in the Pacific

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China’s recent incursions into Japan’s airspace and territorial waters materially escalate Beijing’s efforts to intimidate and dominate nations in the Indo-Pacific. Tokyo responded by announcing a multibillion-dollar satellite program to bolster detection capabilities against such intrusions.

Chinese “fishing vessels” have in the past periodically sailed near the Senkaku islands, which are claimed by Japan, Taiwan and China. Chinese coast guard ships and military vessels later began to appear, ratcheting up Beijing’s aggressiveness. Washington doesn’t explicitly recognize Tokyo’s sovereignty over the Senkakus but has committed to defend the islands under the U.S.-Japan mutual cooperation and security treaty.

These escalating forays follow Chinese interference in Taiwan’s airspace and waters, and its efforts to assert sovereignty over most of the South China Sea. Chinese naval encounters with the Philippines over disputed islands, shoals and reefs have made headlines. Vietnam and others have often faced Chinese challenges.

None of this is coincidental. Beijing is unmistakably contesting control of the First Island Chain. This variously described topography extends from the Kamchatka Peninsula to the Kuril islands, through Japan and the Senkakus to Taiwan, on to the Philippines and then Borneo and the Malay Peninsula.

America’s next president will have to face the strategic consequences of this belligerence. Climate-change negotiations with Beijing should no longer top Washington’s East Asia agenda. Tweets suggesting China consult Google Maps won’t suffice, though they at least show someone on Team Biden understands the problem.

With China pressing all along the First Island Chain, existing U.S. bilateral cooperation with affected states like Japan and Taiwan has plainly become insufficient. Finding seams in the intelligence or defense capabilities across the chain is far easier for Beijing when such efforts among the targets are absent. If China breaks through the First Island Chain at one place, other states in the chain and the Pacific would be at greater risk. Washington should recognize that the integrity of each nation’s air and maritime spaces requires multilateral cooperation, especially among air and naval forces and the intelligence communities of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand. Given the high stakes, involving other Asian and Pacific states, along with key European allies like Britain, could be critical.

Such cooperation doesn’t require creating an East Asian North Atlantic Treaty Organization or accepting a decision to contain China—at least not yet. More-robust multistate activities are nevertheless urgently needed across the island chain. Several areas of multilateral cooperation are already under way, but if much more isn’t done, Beijing will play one nation against another, calibrating belligerent activities along its periphery to advance its interests. If the affected nations don’t hang together, to paraphrase Benjamin Franklin, China may well hang them all separately.

A possible model is George W. Bush’s Proliferation Security Initiative against trafficking in weapons of mass destruction. A British diplomat described PSI as “an activity, not an organization,” almost entirely operational and not overtly political. Its success rested on military and intelligence exchanges and exercises, only rarely involving diplomatic palavering among foreign ministries. What worked for PSI on a global basis can work in Asia and the Pacific.

The elephant in the room is Taiwan. Without it, there is little chance other concerned countries can effectively thwart China’s destabilizing efforts. This time it isn’t Taipei asking for help, but other regional capitals that need help as much as Taipei. Losing effective control over what Douglas MacArthur labeled an “unsinkable aircraft carrier”—much less actual Chinese annexation—would fatally breach the First Island Chain. There are ways around the Taiwan dilemma that would irritate Beijing. But that need not precipitate a political crisis unless China is resolved to have one, which in itself would reveal Beijing’s hostile intent.

Long before the Abraham Accords established full diplomatic relations among Israel and several Arab states, they were working together. Wide-ranging intelligence cooperation, especially over the common threat of Iran, stimulated creative, mutually advantageous ways to do business. In another context, West Germany’s somewhat anomalous status didn’t prevent its full integration into NATO. Instead of hypothesizing about obstacles to closer cooperation with Taiwan, Asian and U.S. diplomats should emulate their predecessors and include Taiwan in collective security.

More Chinese air and sea incursions are coming, along with increased influence operations in Asian and Pacific countries and more intelligence-gathering efforts. Beijing is dictating the pace and scope of its intrusions, underscoring the need for closer cooperation among its targets. That alone would augment deterrence, but we haven’t got time to waste.

Mr. Bolton served as White House national security adviser, 2018-19, and ambassador to the United Nations, 2005-06. He is author of “The Room Where It Happened: A White House Memoir.”

This article was first published in the Wall Street Journal on September 10, 2024. Click here to read the original article.