The Fall of Assad

December 17, 2024

History is moving fast in the Middle East, raising the possibility, for well or ill, of massive changes throughout the region. The collapse of Syria’s Assad-family dictatorship took everyone by surprise, starting with Bashar al-Assad himself, and certainly including Russia and Iran. Arab and Western intelligence services missed the regime’s vulnerability, particularly the weakness and disloyalty of its military and security services.

The brutal dictatorship is gone, but what comes next? Most importantly, Assad’s removal is yet another massive defeat for Iran’s ruling mullahs. Following Israel’s thrashing of Hezbollah and its near-total dismemberment of Hamas, this is the third major catastrophe for Tehran’s anti-Israel “ring-of-fire” strategy. While Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu agreed to a cease fire with Hezbollah, he has made clear it lasts for only sixty days, ending just after the Joe Biden leaves office. Hezbollah will be in further dire trouble if its overland supply route through Iraq and Syria is permanently blocked. There is no cease fire with Hamas, meaning both terrorist proxies could face further Israeli decimation.

As for Iran itself, the situation could hardly be worse. With three major pillars of its regional power already fallen or on the way, the ayatollahs are now at great risk both internationally and domestically. Recriminations and finger-pointing among top leaders of the Revolutionary Guards and regular Iranian military(https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2024/12/09/iran-armed-forces-at-war-with-themselves-fall-assad-syria/) has already spread widely in the general population(https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/13/world/middleeast/iran-syria-assad.html).

Disarray and fragmentation in the senior ranks of authoritarian governments are often the first signs of regime collapse. Popular discontent in Iran was already extensive due to long-standing economic decline, the opposition of young people and women generally, ethnic discontent, and more. If the Revolutionary Guard and regular military leaderships begin to come apart, the potential for internal armed conflict grows. Assad’s collapse showed that a façade of strength can mask underlying weakness, with surprisingly swift collapse following.

Externally, Iran’s regime has not been this vulnerable since the 1979 revolution. Jerusalem has already eliminated Tehran’s Russian-supplied S-300 air-defense systems, seriously damaged its ballistic-missile capabilities, and destroyed elements of the nuclear-weapons program(https://www.axios.com/2024/11/15/iran-israel-destroyed-active-nuclear-weapons-research-facility). Netanyahu has never had a better opportunity to obliterate all or vast swathes of the entire nuclear effort. So doing would make Israel, neighboring states, and the entire world safe from the threat of Iran’s decades-long nuclear-proliferation threat, which has long contravened the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Israel, with US assistance if requested, should go for the win on the nuclear issue. Not only would that eliminate Tehran’s threat of a nuclear Holocaust, it would simultaneously strike yet another domestic political blow against the mullahs. In addition to the tens of billions of dollars wasted in supporting Iran’s now-decimated terrorist proxies, but the billions spent on nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles would also be seen as squandered. Iran’s citizens would be perfectly entitled to conclude that the ayatollahs had never had their best interests at heart, and that their removal was now fully justified.

Russia is the next biggest loser. Distracted and overburdened by its unprovoked aggression against Ukraine, now about to enter its third year, the Kremlin lacked the resources to save its puppet in Damascus. Vladimir Putin’s humiliation is reverberating globally, and it will also have corrosive impact inside Russia, perhaps finally stimulating more-effective opposition to the ongoing burdens the Ukraine war imposes on Russia’s citizens and economy.

Even more significant losses may be coming. The Kremlin’s main interests in Syria are its Tartus naval station and its Latakia air base. These are Moscow’s only military facilities outside the territory of the former Soviet Union. They are vital to Russia’s position in the eastern Mediterranean. If forced to evacuate these bases, Moscow’s ability to project power beyond the Black Sea would be dramatically reduced, as would be the threat to NATO across the Mediterranean. Although there were early indications Russia might to retain the bases, recent commercial overhead photography indicates it may be preparing to withdraw some or all of its forces. The situation remains fluid(https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/12/13/world/syria-news).

Without doubt, Turkey, the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) terrorists, and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army are the big winners so far. However, Syria’s internal situation is far from settled. American troops remain in northeastern Syria assisting the largely Kurdish Syrian Defense Forces in the anti-ISIS campaign, and at al-Tanf. The Kurds should not be abandoned, especially to President Recep Erdogan’s neo-Ottomanist aspirations to expand Ankara’s control and influence in Arab lands It would be a mistake, at this point, to remove HTS from Washington’s list of foreign terrorist organizations, although, unwisely, the Biden administration is reportedly considering doing so(https://www.politico.com/news/2024/12/09/us-debates-lifting-terror-designation-for-main-syrian-rebel-group-00193367).

While eliminating Assad is a critical contribution to reducing the Iranian threat, neither Israel nor neighboring Arab governments nor the United States have any interest in seeing another terrorist state arise, and this one on the Mediterranean. Delicate diplomacy lies ahead. In the meantime, Biden was right to bomb ISIS weapons storage depots in eastern Syria to deny those assets to HTS, and Israel is justified in eliminating the Assad government’s military assets for the same reason.

Importantly for the region and beyond, urgent efforts are required to locate and secure all aspects of Assad’s chemical and biological weapons programs(https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/12/12/syria-chemical-weapons-search-mustard-sarin/). Assaad used chemical weapons against his own people as recently as 2017 and 2018, so there is no question whether these capabilities exist.

Thus, while there is considerable good news surrounding Assad’s ouster and exile to Moscow, circumstances in Syria still pose serious threats to peace and security in the Middle East and globally. This is no time to relax or turn away, especially for the incoming Trump administration.

This article was first published in Independent Arabia on December 17, 2024. Click here to read the original article.

Kash Patel Doesn’t Belong at the FBI

December 10, 2024

At the NSC, he was less interested in his assigned duties than in proving his loyalty to Donald Trump.
The president’s constitutional obligation to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed” requires evenhanded action in the national rather than his personal interest, a distinction Donald Trump doesn’t grasp. His oft-stated intention to seek retribution against opponents, if implemented, facially contravenes the Take Care Clause.

Too many of Mr. Trump’s personnel selections evidence his assiduous search for personal fealty, not loyalty to the Constitution. Kash Patel’s nomination as director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation squarely fits this pattern.

Rep. Devin Nunes pushed Mr. Patel for the National Security Council staff after Republicans lost the House in 2018. Notwithstanding Mr. Patel’s lack of policy credentials, the president ordered him hired. NSC staff has long been divided into directorates responsible for different policy areas. Charles Kupperman, my deputy, and I placed Mr. Patel in the International Organizations Directorate, which had a vacancy.

Some five months later, we moved him to fill an opening in the Counter-Terrorism Directorate. In neither case was he in charge of a directorate during my tenure as national security adviser or thereafter, as he contends in his memoir and elsewhere. He reported to senior directors in both cases and had defined responsibilities. His puffery was characteristic of the résumé inflation we had detected when Mr. Trump pressed him on us. We found he had exaggerated his role in cases he worked on as a Justice Department lawyer before joining Mr. Nunes’s committee staff. Given the sensitivity of the NSC’s responsibilities, problems of credibility or reliability would ordinarily disqualify any job applicant.

He proved to be less interested in his assigned duties than in worming his way into Mr. Trump’s presence. Fiona Hill, NSC senior director for Europe, testified to Congress during Mr. Trump’s first impeachment hearings that Mr. Patel, at that time assigned to the International Organizations Directorate, participated in a May 2019 Oval Office meeting on Ukraine, and that he had engaged in various other Ukraine-related activities. Whatever he did on Ukraine while an NSC staffer, at least during my tenure, was unrestrained freelancing. (He has denied any communication with Mr. Trump on Ukraine.)

In August 2019, when I was overseas, Mr. Trump called Mr. Kupperman and White House counsel Pat Cipollone to the Oval Office. They arrived to find Mr. Patel already there. The subject of the discussion was making him an administration enforcer of presidential loyalty. Messrs. Cipollone and Kupperman strongly objected to any such role, whether in the NSC or the counsel’s office, and the issue disappeared. I resigned in September 2019.

According to former Defense Secretary Mark Esper’s memoir, during an October 2020 hostage-rescue mission, Mr. Patel, then in the Counter-Terrorism directorate, misinformed other officials that a key airspace-transit clearance had been granted. In fact, Mr. Esper writes, the clearance hadn’t been obtained, threatening the operation’s success, and his team “suspected Patel made the approval story up” but wasn’t certain. Typically, Mr. Patel’s version of this episode in his memoir denies any error—though, ironically, it also boasts of his acting beyond the authority of NSC staffers. Then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo also knew the day’s details, including about the clearance issue. He hasn’t spoken publicly about the incident. He should.

Last week Olivia Troye, who served as counterterrorism adviser to Vice President Mike Pence, elaborated on these concerns, tagging Mr. Patel with “making things up on operations” and lying about intelligence. His lawyers responded by threatening to sue her for defamation, writing that “at no point did Mr. Patel ever lie about national intelligence, place Navy Seals at risk, or misinform the Vice President.” What Mr. Esper and Ms. Troye accuse Mr. Patel of lying about is the airspace-transit clearance, the lack of which would have made transit by U.S. forces though the airspace of the country in question an act of war.

These are but a few of many cases that touch directly on Mr. Patel’s character and his consistent approach of placing obedience to Mr. Trump above other, higher considerations—most important, loyalty to the Constitution. His conduct in Mr. Trump’s first term and thereafter indicates that as FBI director he would operate according to Lavrenty Beria’s reported comment to Joseph Stalin: “Show me the man, and I’ll show you the crime.”

Mr. Patel has frequently called for investigations of journalists, comments he has since tried to walk back. He has been accused of seeking to declassify sensitive information for political rather than legitimate national-security reasons. During Mr. Trump’s first term, both Attorney General William Barr and Central Intelligence Agency Director Gina Haspell threatened to resign if Mr. Patel was forced on them as deputy FBI or CIA director, respectively.

Mr. Trump claims to have been unfairly, even illegally, targeted by partisan Biden prosecutors. That may or may not be true. But if illegitimate partisan prosecutions were launched, those responsible should be held accountable in a reasoned, professional manner, not in a counter-witch-hunt. The worst response is for Mr. Trump to engage in the prosecutorial conduct he condemns. Simply threatening to do so politicizes and degrades the legal process and the American people’s faith in evenhanded law enforcement. A president possessed of civic virtue wouldn’t launch retribution against opponents, and he certainly wouldn’t appoint an FBI director who saw himself solely as the president’s liege man.

If Mr. Trump is determined, wrongly, to remove Christopher Wray as FBI director, there are previous examples of appointees who restored faith in a battered Justice Department and FBI. In 1975 President Gerald Ford selected Edward Levi, dean of the University of Chicago Law School, as attorney general, and in 1978 President Jimmy Carter named Judge William Webster, a Republican, to be FBI director.

Mr. Patel is no Ed Levi or Bill Webster. To resolve questions over his integrity and fitness, a full-field FBI investigation, as prior nominees have undergone, is warranted. With more facts available and less rhetoric, the result will be clear. I regret I didn’t fully discern Mr. Patel’s threat immediately. But we are now all fairly warned. Senators won’t escape history’s judgment if they vote to confirm him.

This article was first published in the Wall Street Journal on December 10, 2024. Click here to read the original article.

Dark days lie ahead with Trump on the world stage once more

November 30, 2024

Soon to be cast adrift by President-elect Trump, Ukraine’s likely future is bleak. Let’s not make it worse by a feckless peace deal
Donald Trump’s looming inauguration bodes poorly for vital Western security interests, and Ukraine in particular. Trump’s hostility to NATO is palpable, and his feelings about Ukraine follow close behind. After January 20, US military and economic assistance will likely drop significantly, and negotiations with Russia begin quickly. In turn, European financial support for Ukraine will diminish, as EU members rush to revive now-defunct commercial ties with Moscow. Despite contrary press reports, Trump has not yet spoken to Vladimir Putin. When they do, Trump’s desire to put this “Biden war” behind him could, at worst, mean capitulation to maximalist Russian demands. After all, if assisting Ukraine’s defence against unprovoked aggression is unimportant to Washington, why worry about Kyiv’s terms of surrender?

In fact, core America national interests remain. Since 1945, European peace and stability have been vital to advancing US economic and political security. The ripple effects of perceived American and NATO failure in Europe’s centre will embolden Beijing to act aggressively toward Taiwan and the East China Sea; the South China Sea; and along its land borders. These aren’t abstract, diaphanous worries at the periphery of our interests, but hard threats to US physical security, trade, travel and communications globally.

Biden put these interests at risk by bungling implementation of nearly three years of aid to Kyiv. He never developed a winning strategy. His administration helped create the current battlefield gridlock, deterred by constant but idle Kremlin threats of a “wider war.” Parcelling out weapons only after long public debates prevented their most effective use. Biden failed to explain clearly Russia’s threat to key Western interests, thereby fanning the belief there are no such interests, and abetting the Trump-inspired isolationism spreading nationally.

What to do? Aiding Ukraine is in NATO’s vital interest. That interest does not diminish because of persistent Biden administration poor performance. Do we ignore the continuing reality that Russia’s aggression threatens Alliance security? Does Ukraine simply give way to Trumpian capitulationism?

Certainly not. In the coming negotiations, certain points are essential to any potential agreement. The following suggestions, which are hardly my preferred outcome, are the absolute minimum we must obtain. They are only indicative, not exhaustive, and certainly not NATO’s opening position.

Any agreement must be explicitly provisional to keep Ukraine’s future open. Moscow will treat any deal that way regardless. For the Kremlin, nothing is permanent until its empire is fully restored, by their lights. Putin needs time to restore Russia’s military capabilities, and believing any “commitment” to forswear future aggression against Ukraine is dreaming.

A ceasefire along existing military frontlines during negotiations may be inevitable. Nonetheless, we should insist that any ultimate agreement explicitly state that the lines eventually drawn have no political import whatever, but merely reflect existing military dispositions. Russia may later disregard such disclaimers, but such claims must be rendered clearly invalid in advance.

Similarly, the agreement should not create demilitarised zones between Ukrainian and Russian forces inside Ukraine, or along the two countries’ formal border elsewhere. The surest way for a ceasefire line to become a permanent border is to make it half-a-mile wide, extending endlessly through contested territory. A DMZ inures solely to Moscow’s benefit.

Deployments of UN peacekeepers have an unhappy history of freezing the status quo, not helping to resolve the underlying conflict. Consider the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) which has partitioned the island since 1964. The UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) has patrolled the Golan Heights since 1974, and may last forever, but did not prevent Israel from annexing the Golan. The list goes on. In Ukraine, a disengagement force could mean permanent cession of twenty percent of Ukraine to Russia.

The problem is not mitigated if the peacekeepers are under NATO rather than UN auspices. It is not the quality of the military that makes a difference, but the intentions of the parties to the conflict. Does anyone doubt what Russia’s long-term aims are? Or Ukraine’s for that matter? My guess is that the Kremlin won’t agree to NATO peacekeepers anyway, at least not unless augmented by thousands of North Korean troops.

Finally, Ukraine should not be constrained in its future options to join or cooperate with NATO. What’s left of Ukraine will still be a sovereign country, striving for representative government, and free to pick its allies on its own. We should not acquiesce in enforced neutralisation, what in the Cold War was called “Finlandisation”. Even Finland turned out not to like it, finally joining NATO in 2023. And if some hardy nations want to provide security guarantees to Free Ukraine, they should be able to do so, not subject to Russian vetoes.

Soon to be cast adrift by President-elect Trump, Ukraine’s likely future is bleak. Let’s not make it worse by a feckless peace deal.

This article was first published in The Telegraph on November 30, 2024. Click here to read the original article.

Trump and Iran

November 11, 2024

Donald Trump’s election as President guarantees that America’s Middle East policy will change. The real question, though, and a major early test for Trump, is whether it will change enough. Does he understand that the region’s geopolitics differ dramatically from when he left office, and could change even more before Inauguration Day? The early signs are not promising that Trump grasps either the new strategic opportunities or threats Washington and its allies face.

The region’s central crisis on January 20 will be Iran’s ongoing “ring of fire” strategy against Israel. Right now, Israel is systematically dismantling Hamas’s political leadership, military capabilities, and underground Gaza fortress. Israel is similarly dismembering Hezbollah in Lebanon: its leadership annihilated, its enormous missile arsenal steadily decimated, and its hiding places shattered. Israel will continue degrading Hamas, Hezbollah, and West Bank terrorists, ultimately eliminating these pillars of Iranian power. Even President Biden’s team has already urged Qatar to expel Hamas’s leaders(https://www.cnn.com/2024/11/08/politics/qatar-hamas-doha-us-request/index.html).

Unfortunately, Yemen’s Houthis, still blocking the Suez Canal-Red Sea passage, have suffered only limited damage, as have Iran’s Shia militia proxies in Syria and Iraq. Iran itself finally faced measurable retaliation on October 26, as Israel eliminated the Russian-supplied S-300 air defenses and inflicted substantial damage on missile-production facilities. Nonetheless, Iran’s direct losses remain minimal. Due to intense White House pressure and the impending US elections, Jerusalem targeted neither Tehran’s nuclear-weapons program nor its oil infrastructure.

Whether Israel takes further significant action before January 20 is the biggest unknown variable. Israel’s October 26 air strikes have prompted unceasing boasting from Tehran that it will retaliate in turn. These boasts remain unfulfilled. The ayatollahs appear so fearful of Israel’s military capabilities that they hope the world’s attentions drift away as Iran backs down in the face of Israel’s threat. If, however, Iran does summon the will to retaliate, it is nearly certain this time that Israel’s counterstrike will be devastating, especially if during the US presidential transition. Israeli Defense Forces could lay waste to Iran’s nuclear-weapons and ballistic-missile programs so extensively they rock the foundations of the ayatollahs’ regime.

Washington’s conventional wisdom is that Trump will return to “maximum pressure” economically against Iran through more and better-enforced sanctions, and stronger, more consistent support for Israel, as during his first term. If so, Tehran’s mullahs can relax. Trump’s earlier “maximum pressure” policy was nothing of the sort. Even worse, a Trump surrogate has already announced that the incoming administration will have “no interest in regime change in Iran(https://www.timesofisrael.com/ex-envoy-says-trump-aims-to-weaken-iran-deal-of-the-century-likely-back-on-table/),” implying that the fantasy still lives that Trump could reach a comprehensive deal with Tehran in his second term.

Moreover, despite the staged good will in Bibi Netanyahu’s call to Trump last week, their personal relationship is tense. Trump said in 2021, “the first person that congratulated [Biden] was Bibi Netanyahu, the man that I did more for than any other person I dealt with. Bibi could have stayed quiet. He has made a terrible mistake(https://www.axios.com/2021/12/10/trump-netanyahu-disloyalty-fuck-him).” In practice, this means that Israel should not expect the level of Trump support it received previously. And, because Trump is constitutionally barred from seeking a third term, he need not fear negative domestic political reactions if he opposes Israel on important issues.

Much depends on the currently unclear circumstances Trump will face on January 20. In addition to shunning regime change, Trump seems mainly interested in simply ending the conflict promptly, apparently without regard to how(https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trumps-erratic-foreign-policy-meet-a-world-fire-2024-11-06/), which has proven very effective in US politics. This approach is consistent with his position on Ukraine. Asserting that neither conflict would have even occurred had he remained President, which is neither provable nor disprovable, Trump sees these wars as unwanted legacies from Biden.

If Israel does not demolish Iran’s nuclear aspirations before Trump’s inauguration, those aspirations will be the first and most pressing issue he faces. If he simply defaults back to “maximum pressure” through sanctions, he is again merely postponing an ultimate reckoning with Iran. Even restoring the sanctions to the levels prevailing when Trump left the Oval Office will be difficult, because Biden’s flawed and ineffective sanctions-enforcement efforts have weakened compliance globally. Trump will not likely have the attention span or the resolve to toughen sanctions back to meaningful levels. The growing cooperation among Russia, China and Iran means Iran’s partners will do all they can to break the West’s sanctions, as they are breaking the West’s Ukraine-related sanctions against Russia.

As they say in Texas, Trump is typically “all hat and no cattle”: he talks tough but doesn’t follow through on his rhetoric. Since he has never shown any inclination to move decisively against Iran’s nuclear program, that leaves the decision to Israel, which has its own complex domestic political problems to resolve. An alternative is to assist Iran’s people to overthrow Tehran’s hated regime. Here, too, however, Trump has shown little interest, thereby missing rare opportunities that Iran’s citizens could seize with a minimum of outside assistance. If Tehran’s ayatollahs are smart, they will dangle endless opportunities for Trump to negotiate, hoping to distract him from more serious, permanent remedies to the threats the ayatollahs themselves are posing.

Of all the critical early tests Trump will face, the Middle East tops the list. China, Russia, and other American adversaries will be watching just as closely as countries in the Middle East, since the ramifications of Trump’s decisions will be far-reaching.

This article was first published in The Independent Arabie on November 10, 2024. Click here to read the original article.

North Korea comes to Europe: How will the next president respond?

October 30, 2024

The threat of North Korea fighting alongside Russia in Ukraine is no longer a nightmare, but a real possibility. Two weeks ago, Kyiv said Pyongyang’s soldiers were already in Ukraine and had sustained casualties. Now the Biden administration has confirmed that 10,000 North Korean troops are training in Russia, adding that they will be “fair game” if deployed to Ukraine.

As Election Day approaches, voters should worry whether either Vice President Kamala Harris or former President Donald Trump are awake to and able to handle this immediate danger and its longer-term implications.

Having Pyongyang’s forces fighting in Ukraine would both bolster Moscow tactically and provide those troops with battlefield experience, greatly benefitting them in future conflicts on the Korean Peninsula. Moreover, the risk that, in return, the Kremlin supplies Kim Jong Un with nuclear-weapons and ballistic-missile technology — if it hasn’t already — directly imperils South Korea, Japan and deployed U.S. forces in the region.

By contrast, in 2018, Trump canceled regular U.S.-South Korean “war games” to please Kim, thus compromising allied combat readiness. In a tense environment, where the U.S.-South Korean troops’ preparedness mantra is “Fight Tonight,” this is crucial.

There is no sign that Trump understands his mistake. And Harris’s thoughts on Pyongyang’s menace appear to be a blank slate.

South Korea is hardly standing idly by. Having previously sold tanks, artillery and ammunition to Poland, President Yoon Suk Yeol is currently considering selling weapons to Ukraine. Additionally, Pyongyang’s growing closeness to Moscow, and fears of Washington’s fecklessness, will only increase Seoul’s ongoing debate about whether to acquire an independent nuclear-weapons capability. We are well into uncharted territory.

The broader threat is not just North Korea but the emerging China-Russia axis, now widely understood as a reality, not a prediction. While similar in appearance to the Cold War’s Sino-Soviet alliance, today’s version differs dramatically: China this time is inarguably the dominant partner. The axis is far from fully formed. Disagreements and tensions clearly exist, notably over Pyongyang’s increasing affinity for Russia, as Kim emulates his grandfather Kim Il Sung’s uncanny ability to play Moscow off against Beijing.

Contemporaneously with Kim and Vladimir Putin locking step, the Kremlin is also reportedly supplying Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthis with targeting data, thereby augmenting its campaign to effectively close the Suez Canal-Red Sea maritime passage (other than to “friendly” vessels like Russian tankers). Thus, notwithstanding its problems and quirks, the axis and its outriders are rolling along.

Worryingly, however, one variety of America’s contemporary isolationist virus, epitomized by vice presidential nominee Sen. J.D. Vance (R-Ohio), holds that the Middle East and Europe should be downgraded as U.S. priorities in order to focus on China’s threat in Asia, particularly against Taiwan. This menace is indeed real, but far wider than just endangering Taiwan or East Asia generally. While not yet comprehensive or entirely consistent internally, the Beijing-Moscow hazard is worldwide.

Worst of all, the latest manifestation of Beijing’s sustained, aggressive military buildup is the new projection that China’s nuclear-weapons arsenal will reach 1,000 warheads by 2030, much earlier than previous predictions. Increasing Chinese nuclear capabilities portend a tripolar nuclear world, one radically different and inherently riskier and more uncertain that the Cold War’s bipolar U.S.-USSR faceoff.

This is not simply a new U.S.-China problem. All our assessments about appropriately sizing America’s nuclear deterrent, allocating it within the nuclear triad (land-based and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, plus long-range bombers), along with all our theories of deterrence and arms control, were founded on the basic reality of bipolarity. Impending tripolarity means that all those issues need to be reconceptualized for America’s security, not to mention the extended deterrence we provide our allies.

Do we face one combined China-Russia nuclear threat, or two separate threats? Or both? The questions only get harder. This is not an Asia-based risk, but a global one, inevitably implying substantial budget increases for new or rehabilitated nuclear weapons and delivery systems.

Responding to North Korea with yet another four years of “strategic patience” — the Obama and Biden do-nothing policy — is both wrongheaded and increasingly dangerous. As for China, focusing on securing bilateral climate-change agreements, Biden’s highest priority, is wholly inadequate. Even where his administration acted strategically — enhancing the Asian Security Quad, endorsing the AUKUS nuclear-submarine project, agreeing to trilateral military activity with Japan and South Korea — Biden demonstrated little sense of urgency or focus.

Surely the image of Pyongyang fighting Kyiv should jar both the simplistic premises of “East Asia only” theorists and the quietude of Biden-Harris supporters. We must immediately overcome any remaining French and German objections to increasing NATO coordination with Japan, South Korea and others, including ultimately joining NATO, as former Spanish Prime Minister José Maria Aznar suggested years ago. Existing Asia-based initiatives like the Quad, AUKUS and closer military cooperation among America’s allies need to be rocket-boosted.

We need a president who understands the importance of American leadership and has the resolve to pursue it. Let’s pray we get one.

This article was first published in The Hill on October 30, 2024. Click here to read the original article.

A Biden-Starmer Giveaway Helps China

October 16, 2024

As a one-term president, Joe Biden appears eager to take actions he might not have taken if he had to worry about getting re-elected. The latest example: He apparently pushed the U.K. to cede sovereignty of the Chagos Islands in the Indian Ocean to the island country of Mauritius. The Chagos archipelago is unremarkable but for one key fact: Diego Garcia, its largest island, houses a critical U.S.-U.K. military base near the Indian Ocean’s geographic center point.

British media report that U.S. officials, fearing that existing International Court of Justice rulings and a potential push in the United Nations General Assembly would pose political problems, pressured British Prime Minister Keir Starmer to cede them on Oct. 3. Whatever Mr. Starmer’s motivation—whether to appease Mr. Biden or lessen guilty feelings about imperial history—the decision was utterly misguided.

The Chagos “problem” hasn’t figured prominently in British politics before now, except in certain Labour Party circles. Jeremy Corbyn, Labour’s leader before Mr. Starmer, obsessed over the issue, long a priority for Labour’s Trotskyite wing. Worried about disapprobation by biased global courts, the White House and State Department during Mr. Biden’s term fell in sync with Britain’s Corbynites.

Under the deal, Diego Garcia will remain under British jurisdiction for at least 99 years. The site is home to a critical U.S. military facility, fittingly nicknamed the “footprint of freedom.” The island will only become more important to U.S. resistance against China’s efforts to achieve hegemony in the Indo-Pacific.

Mauritius, meantime, is increasingly China-friendly. China is its top trading partner, and Beijing has used debt-trap diplomacy—lending with strings attached—to ensnare the island nation. If the British Parliament approves transferring the Chagos to Mauritius, China will be able to maneuver ships and planes near Diego Garcia for intelligence-gathering and military operations. Given Beijing’s history of militarizing comparable tiny landmasses in the South China Sea, the threat is clear.

China has long conducted extensive undersea surveys of the Indian Ocean, ostensibly for commercial reasons but obviously in pursuit of maritime dominance. A Beijing presence in the Chagos will facilitate these efforts, posing a direct threat to India, which it appears wasn’t consulted by either Whitehall or Foggy Bottom.

There’s no compelling logic for ceding the islands to Mauritius. That the Chagos are associated with Mauritius is actually a fluke of colonial administration: France was Mauritius’s first colonial European power, governing the islands from the larger chain after taking control in the early 1700s. Britain acquired Mauritius after victory in the Napoleonic Wars and continued France’s governing mode. Many alternative solutions for the islands are available, but neither Washington nor London have shown an appetite for considering them.

The U.S. faced analogous challenges in ending its administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, or TTPI, during the 1980s and ’90s. Once German colonies, the islands became a Japanese mandate under the League of Nations, and, after 1945, a U.N. trusteeship under U.S. control. One part of the TTPI, the Northern Marianas, became an American commonwealth. Three others—Palau, the Marshall Islands and Micronesia—chose independence but entered into Compacts of Free Association with the U.S., giving Washington authority over their foreign and security policies.

For all the overblown rhetoric about a British “diplomatic success,” it seems no one bothered to ask Chagossians their views. Given Mauritius’s prior poor treatment of Chagossians, Chagossians might have preferred to have become a U.S. commonwealth.

China has already tried to take advantage of Washington’s inattention in the former TTPI by aggressively pressing its interests and intentions and using debt-diplomacy tactics. Although Washington is now pressing back against Beijing, we can’t afford to make similar mistakes in the Chagos or the broader Indian Ocean.

Messrs. Biden and Starmer have checked the Chagos Islands off Mr. Corbyn’s to-do list. Let’s hope there aren’t any other foreign-policy surprises in Mr. Biden’s remaining lame-duck period.

Mr. Bolton served as White House national security adviser, 2018-19, and ambassador to the United Nations, 2005-06. He is author of “The Room Where It Happened: A White House Memoir.”

This article was first published in the Wall Street Journal on October 16, 2024. Click here to read the original article.

What Next in the Middle East?

October 07, 2024

One year after Hamas launched Iran’s “Ring of Fire” strategy with a barbaric attack against Israeli civilians, the Middle East has changed significantly. Now, the world awaits Jerusalem’s response to Tehran’s ballistic-missile attack last week, the largest such attack in history. It was the current war’s second military assault directly from Iranian territory against Israel, the first being April’s combined drone and ballistic/cruise missile barrage. We do not know how Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu will respond, but it is nearly certain Israel’s answer will be far stronger than in April.

Meanwhile, Iran’s Ring of Fire is clearly failing. Israel is systematically destroying Hamas and Hezbollah, two critical foundations of Iran’s terrorist power. Whatever now happens between Jerusalem and Tehran, Iran’s efforts to debilitate Israel — and potentially the Gulf Arab states — with terrorist and conventional military assets may well suffer irreversible defeat.

According to Israel, 23 of 24 Hamas combat battalions have been destroyed, and what’s left remains under attack. Numerous Hamas leaders have been killed, not the least being Ismael Haniyeh in a supposedly secure compound in the heart of Tehran. Yahyah Sinwar remains at large; Hamas still holds Israeli civilian hostages; and Gaza’s enormous underground fortress is still partially in Hamas hands, but the ending is increasingly clear.

Hezbollah is still in the process of being destroyed. Israel’s killing of Hassan Nasrullah is already a turning point in Middle East history, so great was the shock in Lebanon and beyond. As effectively as against Hamas, or perhaps more, Jerusalem is relentlessly decapitating Hezbollah’s leadership, eliminating officials even as they are being promoted to the fill vacancies left by dead colleagues. Israel also claims to have destroyed half of Hezbollah’s enormous arsenal of missiles and launchers. That estimate seems high, and in any case leaves significant work remaining against Hezbollah’s estimated inventory of up to 150,000 missiles. Nonetheless, with Nasrullah’s demise and with its leadership decimated, Hezbollah is reeling.

The Gulf Arab states and others should now be considering what the future holds for the people of Lebanon and Gaza without Hezbollah and Hamas. What has been unthinkable for decades may now be within sight. As long as Hezbollah, the world’s largest terrorist group, controlled Lebanon and its government, there was no possibility to achieve political freedom and stability. Given the prospect of Hezbollah’s eradication as both a political and military force, urgent attention is required to the possibility of a society without intimidation and control from Iran. Lebanon with Hezbollah could and should be a very different place.

Gaza, although smaller, is more complicated. Palestinians are the only major refugee population since World War II that has not benefitted from the basic humanitarian principle of either returning to their country of origin or being resettled. Palestinians are, unfortunately for them, the exception, not the norm. The international community needs to confront the reality that Gaza is not and never will be a viable economic entity, even if some distant day combined as a state with “islands” on the West Bank. Far better, once Hamas is on history’s ash heap, to treat Gazans more humanely than simply being shields for their terrorist masters. It makes no sense to rebuild Gaza as a high-rise refugee camp. The most humane future for innocent Gazans is resettlement in functioning economies where their children have the prospect of a normal future.

Although Gaza and Lebanon have something to look forward to, the same cannot yet be said, sadly, for Yemen, Syria and Iraq. Yemen’s Houthi terrorists and Iranian-backed Shia militias in Syria and Iraq remain largely untouched after October 7. That should change.

Although the Houthis have launched missiles and drones against Israel, and Israel has retaliated, the Houthis main contribution to Iran’s Ring of Fire has been effectively closing the Suez Canal-Red Sea maritime passage. This blockade has been extremely harmful to Egypt through lost Suez Canal transit fees, and has hurt the wider world by significantly increasing shipping costs. A clear violation of the principle of freedom of the seas, the major maritime powers would be fully warranted to correct it through force, with or without UN Security Council approval.

For the United States, freedom of the seas has been a major element of national security even before the thirteen colonies became independent. In the last two centuries, America and the United Kingdom led global efforts to defend the freedom of the seas, and should do so now, eliminating the ongoing Houthi anti-shipping aggression. Cutting off Iran’s supply of missiles and drones is a first step, coupled with destroying existing Houthi stockpiles. Washington’s opposition to prior efforts by Saudi Arabia and the UAE to defeat the terrorists was misguided and should be reversed. Destroying Houthi military capabilities would afford Yemen the same opportunities now opening for Lebanon and Gaza, and should be urgently pursued.

In Iraq and Syria, as Iran’s power fades (and may well fade dramatically after Israel’s coming retaliation), action against the Iran-backed Shia militias should be the highest priority. In such circumstances, Baghdad at least may well think twice before demanding that the few remaining US forces still in Iraq and Syria be removed.

For Iran itself, loss of its terrorist proxies, after having invested billions of dollars over decades to build the terrorist infrastructure, will be a dramatic reversal of fortune. If Iran’s nuclear program is similarly devastated, the threat Iran has posed by seeking to achieve hegemony in the Middle East and within the Islamic world will likely be impossible for the foreseeable future. In these circumstances, the people of Iran may finally be able to achieve the downfall of the ayatollahs and the creation of representative government. It is far too early to be confident of such an outcome, but it is not too early to hope for it.

This article was first published in Independent Arabia on October 7, 2024. Click here to read the original article.

Lasting Middle East peace requires regime change in Iran

October 07, 2024

October 7, 2023, is truly “a day which will live in infamy,” to borrow Franklin Roosevelt’s
memorable description of Japan’s December 7, 1941, attack on Pearl Harbor.
But what Hamas did to innocent Israeli civilians on October 7 and thereafter is the more
infamous for its outright barbarity, savagery committed with malice aforethought, the
very definition of terrorism.
Stunningly, however, and sadly, many Westerners, one year later, still fail to grasp the
full implications of the Iran-Hamas attempted holocaust.
October 7 initiated Iran’s “Ring of Fire” strategy against Israel, “the little Satan”. The
immediate response from Iran’s Western media and think-tank apologists was to deny
Iran’s central role.
They pointed to US intelligence that elements of Iran’s leadership were unaware Hamas
was about to blitz Israel. They argued there was no “smoking gun” evidence of Tehran’s
command-and-control over the Hamas terrorists. But even if these assertions are true,
they do not refute the logic and reality of Tehran’s responsibility.
Why should anyone expect that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which takes
orders directly from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, would tell anyone who didn’t have
an urgent “need to know” what was to happen? The Quds Force and its ilk are not
exactly communicative; they are not like US or other Western bureaucracies. Among
those quite likely kept in the dark would be Iran’s foreign ministry and even higher
authorities.
Iran’s October 1, 2024, barrage of 180-plus ballistic missiles against Israel corroborates
the point that civilian Iranian officials are not in the decision-making loop. The New York
Times’s Thomas Friedman reported that day, citing Israeli sources: “The Iranian
president, Masoud Pezeshkian, was not informed of the attack until shortly before it
began, the sources said, indicating that the Iranian regime is divided over the operation,
which will probably add to the fractures in the government.” If the President himself was
blindsided by the enormously significant second missile attack on Israel, it is no stretch
to conclude many were iced out before October 7.
Nor is the failure of Israeli and other intelligence agencies to uncover an Iran-to-Hamas
“execute order” surprising. No Western intelligence agency detected the impending
Hamas attack, a massive failure all around. Missing the “execute order” is simply one
piece of a more profound intelligence debacle.
This history is critical. It helps explain, although certainly does not justify, the larger
Biden administration failure, shared by all European governments, to react strategically
against the real threat: Iran.
The past year has not been a Palestinian war against Israel, nor an Arab war against
Israel. It has been an Iranian war against Israel, fought directly by Tehran’s own military
and through its numerous terrorist proxies, including Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad,
Hezbollah, Yemen’s Houthis, and Iraqi and Syrian Shia militia groups. And behind the
terrorist storm troopers lies Iran’s nuclear-weapons programme, seeking to produce the
world’s most dangerous weapons. This is the ring of fire now directed against Israel, but
readily convertible to a ring of fire around the Arabian Peninsula’s oil-producing
monarchies.
The Arab governments at risk are acutely aware of the dangers they face from Tehran.
They understand that their strategic assessment is essentially identical to Israel’s,
explaining the basis for the Abraham Accords to establish full diplomatic relations with
Israel.
Further progress on more Abraham Accords is now on hold for the duration of the
conflict, but many believe the possibility of broader recognition of Israel in the Islamic
world was what motivated Iran to implement the “Ring of Fire” in the first place.
One year into the conflict, Israel is doing well. Hamas is nearing complete elimination of
its top leadership and organised military capabilities. Hezbollah is well on the way to the
same fate. The Houthis, for inexplicable reasons, are still largely untouched, despite
their broader threat to the basic principles of freedom of the seas that Britain and
America have sought to defend for centuries.
The blame for failing to destroy the Houthi military capabilities can be laid on US and
UK incompetence rather than on Israel. The same applies to Washington’s failure to
decimate Shia militias in Iraq and Syria that have repeatedly attacked American civilian
and military personnel since October 7.
Israel’s schwerpunkt, however, has been and undoubtedly remains Iran itself. After this
April’s missile-and-drone attack, the Biden administration forced Israel to “take the win”
and respond with only one pin-prick strike. That piece of brilliance has obviously failed.
Now, Israel is deciding whether to retaliate against Iran’s nuclear-weapons programme,
oil infrastructure, top leadership, military facilities, or a creative mix-and-match
combination. We will know shortly what Prime Minister Netanyahu and his Cabinet
decide.
Israel’s next move is on behalf of everyone in the world who rejects terrorism from Iran,
or any other source. We can only wish Jerusalem the best, hoping it encourages the
people of Iran to take their fate into their hands, beginning the overthrow of Tehran’s
mullahs.
Whatever Israel does now, the only durable outcome for Iran is ousting the Islamic
Revolution of 1979.

Learn from History or Lose

October 03, 2024

Divining the future of European-American relations is particularly difficult when so many Western nations face contentious, rapidly changing domestic politics. In America, the one certainty is that there will be a new president on January 20, 2025, although we cannot confidently predict who. Since neither Donald Trump nor Kamala Harris have clear national security views, the prospect is for more confusion and disarray. Recent European elections have also produced inconclusive results, with more ahead. In such circumstances, taking a longer view of recent US-European relations may tell us more than speculating about transitory election results. A convenient starting point is the West’s victory in the Cold War. Today, few remember the Cold War theory of “convergence,” which held that communism and capitalism would gradually grow more alike, with peaceful relations emerging as socio-economic systems shed many differences. In short, pro-convergence advocates saw a world not too hot and not too cold, but just one large, happy social democracy.

Instead, Ronald Reagan proposed, “We win and they lose.” To the dismay of the chattering class worldwide, he was right. Unfortunately, when the Warsaw Pact dissolved and the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the West drew exactly the wrong conclusions. Analysts proclaimed “the end of history,” with “globalization” sweeping away geopolitical conflict. Former enemies like Russia and China would be merely economic competitors. NATO members could, therefore, reduce their defense budgets dramatically without fear and spend the resulting “peace dividend” on welfare programs rather than weapons systems. In America, Bill Clinton won the 1992 presidential election under the mantra “It’s the economy, stupid,” implying no need to worry about outmoded geostrategic factors.

Fantasies like “global governance” emerged, recalling post-World War II ideas of “world government,” and imagining that the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly would arise from their Cold War stupor to function as originally intended. New multilateral institutions like the International Criminal Court, and the ICC, were conjured, as if the failures of the International Court of Justice and other transnational tribunals could be ignored.

Many Europeans became absorbed in transforming the Common Market into “ever closer union,” as in a religious crusade. This process began before Cold War victory, but accelerated via the Maastricht Treaty, with the geographic term “Europe” substituted for “European Union” as if Nirvana had already been reached. As EU member governments ceded sovereignty to Brussels, they thought helpfully they would cede some of America’s as well to the UN and other international bodies like the ICC. Instead, Americans disagreed, viewing collective-defense alliances as fundamentally different from other multilateral organizations. A part from traditional politico-military alliances, the US tended toward unilateralist rather than multilateralist approaches, which remains true today. Even presidents Barack Obama and Joe Biden made no effort for America to join the ICC, although they cooperated with it more than Presidents George W.Bush and Donald Trump.

No end of history in sight

The end of history, globalization, and global governance embodied a new, worldwide convergence theory, which proved just as wrong as the original convergence theory. From this conceptual mistake flowed serious real-world consequences for both Europe and North America, albeit often producing differing attitudes and strategies. In particular, mutual mistakes and differences regarding the two principal former adversaries, Russia and China, were significant and remain so today.

The West broadly saw the Soviet Union’s collapse leading inevitably toward democracy and market-oriented economic policies, which Russia attempted in the 1990s. After a decade, however, Russia receded into authoritarianism from which it has never recovered. We failed to predict this outcome and did little to prevent it. Still, in the Cold War’s waning days, when Britain’s Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher said she could “do business” with Russian President Mikhail Gorbachev, Ronald Reagan warned Europe generally not to become dependent on Russian oil and gas. Europe ignored this warning to its detriment even before Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine and even more painfully now. Europe, ironically, clung to Cold War paradigms as Washington abandoned them, particularly on arms-control issues.

Wrong on China

Our mistakes on China were even more profound and continued well into this century. There were two foundational errors, both based on the belief that Deng Xiaoping’s mid[1]1980s economic reforms would produce lasting change in China, particularly sustained economic growth and a rising middle class. Few outsiders perceived that Deng was not permanently abandoning communist theory, but making tactical changes to overcome the human and material devastation of Mao Tse-tung’s Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. We took Deng’s admonition for China to “hide and bide” as a sign of appropriate modesty, rather than seeing the real meaning of “hide your strength and bide your time.” We see it now, to our dismay. The first mistake was to predict China would accept the existing international norms and pro[1]cesses in international trade and more broadly that Beijing would engage in a “peaceful rise,” and would be a “responsible stakeholder” in global affairs. The exact opposite was true. China’s economic growth fueled its unprecedented full-spectrum arms buildup in peacetime, from nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles to creating a blue-water navy, to war-fighting capabilities in space and cyberspace. Our second mistake was believing that China’s growing economy would lead to democratization at all levels of government. Precisely the opposite has happened. The Communist Party has strengthened its control, and Xi Jinping is China’s most powerful leader since Mao, with the opposition fragmented and underground. So much for democratization.

Unfortunately, Europe and the United States perceived the rising threats from Russia and China as well as nuclear proliferation threats of rogue states like Iran and North Korea in significantly different ways.

Consider what comes next, starting with China and the so-called “pivot” to Asia. In recent years, both Presidents Trump and Biden have imposed sanctions and tariffs against China, in part for reasons of pure protectionism but also because of Chinese theft of intellectual property and because of the weaponization of companies like Huawei and ZTE. Europe has been harder than expected to convince of the severity of Beijing’s threat despite ample evidence. Of course, it took the U.S. time to grasp the reality, and we are fortunate Australia and New Zealand saw it as early as they did. Nonetheless, Europe’s dependence on China’s market, reminiscent of its reliance on Russian oil and gas, remains a significant obstacle to cooperating effectively against the threat. Japan, South Korea, and others along China’s Indo-Pacific periphery have responded with far greater alacrity.

Politically and militarily, the threat is hardly distant. For over ten years, China has sought to engorge nearly the entire South China Sea. China is not kidding, building air and naval bases on rocks and reefs that are normally only inches above water. States like Vietnam and the Philippines see exactly what China is up to, and so must the West. Taiwan is most often mentioned as a Chinese target, with good reason. Taiwan’s citizens have a functioning democracy, and having seen what happened to freedom in Hong Kong, have no intention of suffering the same fate. Taiwan is a major global trading partner, and its manufacture of highly sophisticated chips for telecommunications and information-technology applications makes it critical for the global and especially Western economies. Fortunately, acting effectively now can strengthen Taiwan’s defenses and its political ties to the West, thereby deterring China before it launches a military conflict. The next few years are extremely dangerous, which East Asia already fully understands.

America’s “pivot” to Asia was an Obama brainchild, reflecting both Beijing’s growing threat, and Obama’s fatigue with Middle Eastern wars against terrorism. Today, even some Republicans, including Vice Presidential nominee J. D. Vance, believe America must concentrate its limited resources against Chinese belligerence in Asia and mostly leave defending Europe and the Middle East to the nations in those regions. This theory is wrong and dangerous on many levels, not least of all because America’s capabilities, allowed to weaken after the Cold War, can certainly be restored.

An Asia-only focus misses the critical point that reducing the US presence in Europe and the Middle East would invite China and Russia to fill the vacuum, as they have already started to do. Ignoring the China-Russia axis and its ability to support its members’ respective objectives is a fatal weakness to a Washington strategy focusing nearly exclusively on threats in Asia. The China-Russia threat is global, and so must be America’s and Europe’s response.

The threat from Russia

Turning to Russia, French President Emmanuel Macron called NATO “brain dead,” even though NATO allies were fully consulted, and indeed concurred because of consistent Russian violations of INF obligations. Macron’s criticism followed a long line of French thinking that rests on the view that the EU should have its own defense capabilities as a way of easing the United States out of a major role in Europe. That, at least, is how the United States sees it, on a bipartisan basis. Macron may get what he asks for if Trump is elected in November, because there is little doubt he would withdraw from NATO at an opportune moment, as he almost did in 2018.

Just over two years after Macron’s “brain dead” comment, Russia attacked Ukraine, extending its 2014incursion.NATOrespondedwith near unanimity to provide Ukraine with lethal, financial, and other assistance. Although there is considerable debate about the strategic efficacy of NATO’s response and outliers like Hungary and Turkey have sympathized with Russia, NATO’s support for Ukraine’s fierce defense has clearly prevented a Russian victory. Sweden and Finland abandoned decades of Cold War-era neutrality to become NATO members.

Unfortunately, it is also clear that China provides Russia with considerable support for its invasion through significantly increased purchases of Russian oil and gas, facilitating financial flows through China’s banking system to avoid international sanctions, and providing other material assistance for Russia’s war effort. Outliers of the China-Russia axis like North Korea and Iran also provide military supplies for Moscow to use against Kyiv. This tangible evidence shows how the emerging Chinese-Russian alliance works against vital Western interests.

Europe needs to do more

Nonetheless, the virus of isolationism now circulating in the US, caused in substantial measure by Trump, sees Europe as unwilling to carry its fair share of the burden. At some point, Trump’s simplistic views might prevail even if he loses in November, as Americans tire of French carping and German and others’ unwillingness to hit the 2 per cent GDP defense spending target consistently. This would be tragic, because opposing the emerging Beijing-Moscow axis means defense spending, urgently and inevitably, must rise above the 2014 Cardiff 2 per cent commitment for NATO members. Indeed, Washington must return to Reagan-era defense-spending levels of 5 – 6 per cent of GDP, meaning European NATO states will have to increase to 4 per cent or beyond. This is hardly the time to talk about alternative European defense arrangements.

All this tells us that the illusions that arose at the end of the Cold War must finally be laid to rest. The lions are not lying down with the lambs any time soon.

This article was first published in European Voices on September 24, 2024. Click here to read the original article.

Israel has exposed the lie at the heart of Starmer and Biden’s foreign policy

September 29, 2024

Jerusalem’s bold strike at the heart of terror should bring shame to Western states still in thrall to false peace

Hassan Nasrullah, Hezbollah’s Secretary General, died on Friday, courtesy of an Israeli air strike. Iran’s “Ring of Fire” strategy, unfolding militarily against Israel across the Middle East since last October 7, has suffered a major setback.

Jerusalem has already nearly destroyed Hamas’s organised military capabilities in Gaza and, combined with “Operation Grim Beeper” just over a week ago, has repeatedly imposed shock and awe on Hezbollah’s top cadres and infrastructure.

Since Nasrullah met his maker, Israeli forces have pounded Hezbollah strongholds by air and are readying a ground attack, likely aiming to clear out all terrorist threats south of Lebanon’s Litani River.

Israeli Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu flatly ignored President Joe Biden’s pressure not to escalate military action against Hezbollah, and also Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s speech to the United Nations.

The BBC derided Israel’s efforts, headlining that Netanyahu was trying to “chase victory” Israel, however, clearly signalled its resolve against Iran, a quality much lacking in recent US and UK policy. Hezbollah and, more importantly, its paymasters in Tehran, should recognize that Israel is determined to do what it takes to establish its security, notwithstanding enormous external pressure.

Also on Friday, Yemen’s Houthi rebels attacked US Navy vessels in the Red Sea, the latest example of Iran’s year-long campaign via its Houthi proxies to close the Suez Canal-Red Sea passage to all but friendly vessels. The Houthis openly declared they would support Hezbollah “without limits”. Showing solidarity with its mates, the Houthis again launched missiles against Israel itself.

These terrorist groups, like their allies Hamas and Shia militias in Iraq and Syria, have been armed, equipped, trained and financed by Iran for decades, as part of Tehran’s Ring of Fire strategy. Tehran is now arranging for Moscow to arm the Houthis with anti-ship missiles, evidence of Iran’s growing Russian ties.

Both the White House and 10 Downing Street need to lift their eyes to the strategic level. The barbaric Hamas October 7 attacks constituted but one facet of Iran’s multifront threat against Israel.

Britain and America once understood what it meant to fight a multi-front war. They did so together successfully in two World Wars, and then again during the Cold War.

Today, Messrs Biden and Starmer have trouble with this concept. Fortunately, Israel’s leaders do not. For the good of the West as a whole, Israel is now decimating our terrorist enemies in the Middle East.

Although Jerusalem still receives military aid from Washington, London has turned icy, and Biden’s White House is growing more frigid. Neither America’s Secretary of State nor its UN Ambassador attended Netanyahu’s General Assembly speech. And that was before Israel’s strike at Nasrullah.

Despite pro-terrorist propaganda, and the media echo chamber of supporters, the current conflict was never a war of Palestinians against Israeli oppressors. From the start, it has been an Iranian war against Israel.

Failure to grasp this bigger picture, a failure common to the national-security departments and agencies in Washington and London since October 7, persists in their opposition to Jerusalem’s determination to at the very least neutralise the serious terrorist threats it faces.

Certainly, Israel has made its share of mistakes over the past year, along with the West generally, and can be faulted for allowing the terrorist menace to grow to its present levels.

We have all repeatedly dealt fecklessly with Iran’s efforts to create nuclear weapons. But now that the reality of present danger has become crystal clear, quibbling about Israel’s determination to survive is quite unbecoming to the West’s leaders.

Failed and misbegotten diplomacy toward Iran and Hezbollah particularly has helped produce the current conflict. I know personally because of my service as US Ambassador to the UN during and after the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War.

Although the inadequacies of Security Council Resolution 1701, which brought that conflict to a halt, were evident even as the Council was voting unanimously to approve it, recent years have shown it to be wholly ineffective. Resolution 1701’s central objective was to prevent the rearmament of Hezbollah after Israel’s devastating retaliation for combined Hamas-Hezbollah attacks from Gaza and Lebanon (sound familiar?).

To say the least, this UN diplomacy facilitated exactly the opposite result. It did not strengthen an independent Lebanese government, with the backing of enhanced UN peacekeeping forces, to stand against Hezbollah. Instead, Hezbollah in effect took over the Lebanese government.

As with Hamas in Gaza, not until Hezbollah is eliminated will the truly innocent civilians have a chance for representative government.

Today’s real issue is Iran. Far from being eager to aid now-beleaguered Hamas and Hezbollah, Iran is clearly worried it will face direct, devastating retaliation from Israel. Indeed, there were reports even before Israel’s elimination of Nasrullah that Iran was dodging Hezbollah entreaties for Iran to come to its defence.

Iran has been visibly nervous about responding to Israel’s killing of Hamas leader Ismael Haniyah on July 31, and Nasrullah’s exit will only make the ayatollahs more nervous.

The fear that this time Netanyahu will not succumb to American pressure to “take the win,” as Israel did in April after Iran’s unsuccessful missile and drone attack, is clearly chilling Iran’s leadership. As well it should.

While the future is decidedly murky, Israelis undoubtedly remain determined to defend themselves. Too bad the current United Kingdom and the United States governments are not proud to stand with them.

This article was first published in The Daily Telegraph on September 28, 2024. Click here to read the original article.

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