Iran ‘Snapback’ Isn’t Worth the Risk

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It would weaken the Security Council veto, which serves U.S. interests at the U.N.

This article appeared in The Wall Street Journal on August 16, 2020. Click here to view the original article.

By John Bolton
August 16, 2020

For the U.S., there is one point of high principle worth dying in a ditch for at the United Nations: Never impair the Security Council veto. That’s what President Trump is preparing to do, exacerbating President Obama’s mistakes in negotiating the 2015 Iran nuclear deal.

Mr. Trump rightly withdrew from that agreement in May 2018. The attendant renewal of U.S. sanctions, although imperfectly implemented, brought crushing economic pressure against Tehran. Even so, despite Iran’s continuing violations of the agreement and its widespread belligerent and terrorist-supporting activities, this diplomatic zombie still lurks in the minds of its progenitors, threatening a return next year. Iran Deal 2.0 could come in a Biden administration or even in a second Trump term. The president confidently predicted he could negotiate one in four weeks.

Among the 2015 agreement’s many grievous mistakes was setting a 2020 expiration date on a broad Security Council arms embargo against Iran that specifically enumerates several categories of sophisticated and heavy weapons systems, especially ballistic missiles and their components. There was no reason for Mr. Obama to make this concession except his zeal to make a deal. On Friday the Trump administration tried to extend the council’s embargo, but failed devastatingly; the vote was 2-2 with 11 abstentions; both Russia and China voted no. Approval required nine votes and no vetoes.

The administration had threatened, if the extension failed, to invoke the deal’s “snapback” mechanism and renew all suspended sanctions. Paragraph 11 of Security Council Resolution 2231 provides that a “participant state” in the nuclear deal, asserting “significant non-performance of commitments” thereunder, can force a Security Council vote on snapback within 30 days. That entails a new resolution authorizing the continued suspension of the sanctions, which the U.S. would veto, ensuring that they come back into effect.

The agreement’s backers argue that Washington, having withdrawn from the deal, has no standing to invoke its provisions. They’re right. It’s too cute by half to say we’re in the nuclear deal for purposes we want but not for those we don’t. That alone is sufficient reason not to trigger the snapback process. Why afford any American legitimacy to this misbegotten creature? Further, the U.N. Charter allows no vetoes to decide “procedural” questions, and that is how between nine and 13 members may categorize, and thereby stymie, Mr. Trump’s ploy.

But the real injury is done when a second U.S. administration in five years even attempts, successfully or not, to take actions that undercut America’s veto. The damage here is potentially permanent.

The veto wasn’t widely popular in 1945 when the U.N. Charter was adopted. The idea of eliminating or curtailing it never died. Eleanor Roosevelt and others repeatedly urged against exercising the veto, saying such forbearance demonstrated “moral superiority.” So powerful was this mindset that not until 1970 did Washington first use the power. Thereafter, America has wielded the veto forcefully, largely to protect Israel and other allies.

The U.S. has risked endangering the veto before, notably by introducing the 1950 Uniting for Peace resolution in the General Assembly. Because Moscow had boycotted the Security Council after North Korea invaded the South, Washington was able to obtain the council’s authorization to repel the attack. When the Soviets ended the boycott and threatened vetoes of further Korea measures, America proposed vesting the General Assembly, which had a large pro-U.S. majority, with greater responsibility for international peace and security.

Britain saw the trap immediately. As Dean Acheson wrote, London “wisely forecast the dangers of the idea in the future if the then-majority in the United Nations should give way to one holding contrary views.” He confessed, however, that “present difficulties outweighed possible future ones, and we pressed on.” Sidestepping Russia’s veto seemed attractive, but Uniting for Peace was a potential disaster—averted only because the General Assembly’s own increasing impotence and irrelevance saved the Security Council from political collapse, the fate that befell the assembly.

The snapback concept could be substantially more threatening, enervating the council under the ironic guise of making it more effective. The next time it proves useful to some or all of the permanent members to propose a snap back or similar device to avoid the veto, pressure to acquiesce so as to avoid unnecessary disputes at the U.N. will mushroom. The process may be gradual, but it is nonetheless threatening, either under U.S. administrations that look for temporary deals rather than long-term strategy or ones that overvalue multilateral approbation and tranquility at the U.N. We should skip this experiment.

Trump’s China Toughness Myth

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John Bolton says the president is not principled but transactional

This article appeared in The New York Daily News on July 28, 2020. Click here to view the original article.

By John Bolton
July 28, 2020

As November’s election approaches, philosophical conservatives and Republican stalwarts alike increasingly find themselves in an uncomfortable position. They understand with growing clarity that Donald Trump does not share their philosophy (or any other) and is palpably failing at implementing his own signature policies, let alone guiding the wider government. Instead of acting on policy or principles, he concentrates essentially only on getting himself reelected.

Nonetheless, conservatives and Republicans fear that a Joe Biden presidency, combined with Democratic control of both houses of Congress, will pose grave dangers, especially given the left-wing’s raging fantasies. Trump’s best argument, therefore, is that he’s better than the alternative.

For an incumbent president, this is an astonishing admission of failure. But Trump’s fumbling of the coronavirus pandemic, which alone could sink his re-election, leaves him few options. Typically, therefore, he is trying to change the subject, hoping his faults will be overlooked compared to the dangers a Biden administration would pose.

What Trump omits, but which the rest of us must understand, is that on critical, indeed existential, issues facing America, he offers precious little to warrant another term.

Take China policy. In the administration’s first three years, Trump relentlessly pursued “the deal of the century” to solve America’s longstanding trade deficits with China. Whether China would ever renounce the trade imbalance’s underlying causes, such as massive theft of U.S. intellectual property, was questionable. Nonetheless, Trump wanted a deal.

Pursuing it, Trump sneered at concerns about Beijing’s belligerence in the South China Sea; its intentions to subjugate Taiwan; repression of the Uighurs; the shredding of China’s pledge to maintain Hong Kong’s separate status after the “handover” from Great Britain; and more.

Then came COVID-19. At first, Trump simply ignored Beijing’s culpability. China’s disinformation, concealment and willful misrepresentation went unanswered. Instead, Trump strove to keep the trade negotiations alive, rejecting any implication that the U.S. economy, his prized ticket to re-election, would suffer. On Jan. 24, for example, Trump tweeted cravenly: “China has been working very hard to contain the Coronavirus. The United States greatly appreciates their efforts and transparency. It will all work out well. In particular, on behalf of the American People, I want to thank President Xi!”

Six months later, Washington’s rhetoric against China is harshly critical on political, economic and social issues. Strong measures, from economic sanctions to closing China’s Houston consulate, have been taken. And the Trump campaign is working overtime to present Biden and his party as “soft on China.”

I am delighted by both the administration’s rhetoric and its actions against China. Too bad it all didn’t start in January 2017.

Don’t count on it lasting beyond Nov. 3 if Trump wins. His transactional, non-philosophical (indeed, anti-philosophical) approach to governing will almost certainly re-emerge. This has happened repeatedly, as with North Korea’s nuclear-weapons threat: from “fire and fury” rhetoric to three unprecedented, failed summits with Kim Jong Un, to no meetings at all. Can anyone doubt that this year’s “October surprise” might be a fourth Trump-Kim meeting?

With China, most of the recent anti-Beijing rhetoric has actually come from Trump’s subordinates. It can be easily thrown over the side, along with the Uighurs, Hong Kong and Taiwan. Sanctions and other punitive measures can be jettisoned just as tariffs and massive civil and criminal penalties against Huawei and ZTE and Chinese belligerence along its periphery were ignored. A congratulatory call from Xi Jinping would provide the perfect pivot for Trump to urge resuming trade negotiations for “the deal of the century.” We’ll be back on the Trump Train, not planning U.S. grand strategy.

Indeed, if Trump prevails, right-of-center political pressure on his China policy will need to be strong and unrelenting. So too if Biden wins, which shows how little Trump has to offer here. Conservatives, Republicans and independents can legitimately reject Trump, however unhappy they are with Biden. Far better to face the perils of opposition than to risk irreversibly tarnishing the philosophy of conservatism and its party with Trump’s brand.

China’s Hostage Diplomacy

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Prominent Canadians urge the government to agree to a feckless and dangerous prisoner swap.

This article appeared in The Wall Street Journal on July 7, 2020. Click here to view the original article.

By John Bolton
July 7, 2020

Important structural changes in international affairs are often encapsulated in discrete incidents, easy to grasp even if somewhat oversimplified. The War of Jenkins’ Ear, for example, had more to do with competing British and Spanish ambitions in the Caribbean than the severing of Capt. Robert Jenkins’s appendage in 1731.

Similarly, America’s request that Canada extradite Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou to face criminal charges personifies the escalating economic conflict between China and the world’s industrial democracies. It poses a test of Western resolve that Beijing honor the rule of law in its commercial dealings; abandon statist, mercantilist policies in fact, not only in rhetoric; and stop weaponizing “commercial” companies in telecommunications, computing and artificial intelligence.

The immediate issue, now much debated in Canada, is whether China’s belligerent reaction to Ms. Meng’s arrest and possible extradition will disrupt the West’s nascent efforts to coalesce against China’s unacceptable behavior. Ms. Meng was arrested on Dec. 1, 2018, in Vancouver, British Columbia. Within weeks, Chinese authorities arbitrarily seized and imprisoned two Canadian citizens; they were formally charged last month with fictional allegations of espionage. Ottawa fears more of its citizens are at risk, a concern other U.S. allies share regarding their nationals.

In an open letter, 19 former officials and other prominent Canadians recently urged Prime Minister Justin Trudeau to suspend the extradition proceedings and in effect swap Ms. Meng for Beijing’s two hostages. Because of President Trump’s transactional view of the case—as another bargaining chip to seal the elusive “big” China trade deal—some argue the U.S. case is “political,” and therefore illegitimate. Mr. Trudeau has so far rightly resisted domestic pressure, but the mood in Canada is increasingly febrile.

China’s and Huawei’s threats to the West are undoubtedly wide-ranging, but the sheer scope of their transgressions hardly justifies giving them a pass on “mere” financial fraud. The original indictment against Huawei and Ms. Meng alleged violations of U.S. sanctions against Iran and subsequent bank fraud and conspiracy to obstruct justice in misstating financial records to conceal those breaches. A later, superseding indictment added charges of stealing intellectual property and falsifying and misrepresenting these actions to financial institutions and others. Huawei and Ms. Meng deny all the charges.

The underlying Iran sanctions violations, perhaps misunderstood by some Canadians, triggered the initial opposition to Ms. Meng’s extradition, based on opposition to America’s Iran policy. Canada’s judiciary had no such trouble. Six weeks ago a Canadian judge ruled that the U.S. had satisfied the “dual criminality” requirement of the Canada-U.S. extradition treaty, namely that the conduct on which extradition is sought is criminal under the laws of both countries. This decision means extradition proceedings will continue, weighing Ms. Meng’s many other objections.

While the additional allegations of Huawei’s intellectual-property theft have received less attention, they will almost certainly prove more important in the long run. Over the past four decades, China’s persistent efforts to steal intellectual property and require forced transfers of foreign technology constitute the foundation for much of its economic success. Huawei, ZTE and other tech companies have been principal beneficiaries, and it’s unlikely China has ever been serious in its trade negotiations with the U.S. on these issues. Criminal prosecutions and massive civil cases against China and its firms for their wrongdoing may be the only way to get their attention.

If so, there is plenty of raw material. Such “structural issues,” as they are characterized in trade talks, are part of a larger, systematic Chinese strategy of mercantilism. China offers its companies enormous subsidies. Its debt-laden diplomacy with a range of countries similarly demonstrates that China isn’t playing by the same rules as the industrial democracies.

In a fine irony for Canadians seeking to appease Beijing, Bloomberg reported last week that the collapse of Canadian telecom champion Nortel might have been largely caused by China stealing Nortel’s once-cutting-edge technology.

Moreover, China’s economic brigandage is only part of the larger military and intelligence strategy. Huawei and ZTE are key actors in Beijing’s global effort to dominate fifth-generation telecom networks and thereby gain access to vital information from 5G networks’ information flows. Accordingly, the Federal Communications Commission had more than ample reason last week to designate both firms as national-security threats. This step also helps create space for truly commercial firms, U.S. or foreign, to compete in the 5G world. It goes without saying how dangerous unimpeded Chinese access to, and potential control over, Western communication networks would be in time of actual war.

Canada’s concern for its citizen-hostages is understandable, but Beijing’s ruthlessness should be seen in the context of the broader struggle it has long been waging while the West, in typical form, wasn’t paying attention. There are many more fronts in the struggle: China’s suppression of Hong Kong, violating its commitments to the U.K. in the 1984 handover agreement; its genocidal campaign against the Uighurs in Xinjiang; and the unilateral annexation of much of the South China Sea.

This is how China behaves now. Imagine how it will behave in the not-so-distant future if its belligerence continues unchallenged. If Canada lets Ms. Meng return to China, it would be a miscarriage of justice. There is no moral equivalency between Ms. Meng and the innocent Canadians Beijing holds hostage. Canada can’t afford such foreign-policy shortsightedness. With isolationist tendencies stronger than at any time since the 1930s, neither can the U.S.

No, the White House didn’t ‘dissolve’ its pandemic response office. I was there.

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By Tim Morrison

This article appeared on washingtonpost.com on March 16, 2020. Click here to view the original page.

Tim Morrison is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and former senior director for counterproliferation and biodefense on the National Security Council.

President Trump gets his share of criticism — some warranted, much not. But recently the president’s critics have chosen curious ground to question his response to the coronavirus outbreak since it began spreading from Wuhan, China, in December.

It has been alleged by multiple officials of the Obama administration, including in The Post, that the president and his then-national security adviser, John Bolton, “dissolved the office” at the White House in charge of pandemic preparedness. Because I led the very directorate assigned that mission, the counterproliferation and biodefense office, for a year and then handed it off to another official who still holds the post, I know the charge is specious.

Now, I’m not naive. This is Washington. It’s an election year. Officials out of power want back into power after November. But the middle of a worldwide health emergency is not the time to be making tendentious accusations.

When I joined the National Security Council staff in 2018, I inherited a strong and skilled staff in the counterproliferation and biodefense directorate. This team of national experts together drafted the National Biodefense Strategy of 2018 and an accompanying national security presidential memorandum to implement it; an executive order to modernize influenza vaccines; and coordinated the United States’ response to the Ebola epidemic in Congo, which was ultimately defeated in 2020.

It is true that the Trump administration has seen fit to shrink the NSC staff. But the bloat that occurred under the previous administration clearly needed a correction. Defense Secretary Robert Gates, congressional oversight committees and members of the Obama administration itself all agreed the NSC was too large and too operationally focused (a departure from its traditional role coordinating executive branch activity). As The Post reported in 2015, from the Clinton administration to the Obama administration’s second term, the NSC’s staff “had quadrupled in size, to nearly 400 people.” That is why Trump began streamlining the NSC staff in 2017.

One such move at the NSC was to create the counterproliferation and biodefense directorate, which was the result of consolidating three directorates into one, given the obvious overlap between arms control and nonproliferation, weapons of mass destruction terrorism, and global health and biodefense. It is this reorganization that critics have misconstrued or intentionally misrepresented. If anything, the combined directorate was stronger because related expertise could be commingled.

Opinion | Trump fans believe him over the media on coronavirus. This is dangerous.
Trump may think he can sugarcoat coronavirus, but media critic Erik Wemple says it is time for the government to speak with one clear voice about public health. (Video: Erik Wemple/Photo: Jabin Botsford/The Washington Post)
The reduction of force in the NSC has continued since I departed the White House. But it has left the biodefense staff unaffected — perhaps a recognition of the importance of that mission to the president, who, after all, in 2018 issued a presidential memorandum to finally create real accountability in the federal government’s expansive biodefense system.

The NSC is really the only place in government where there is a staff that ensures the commander in chief gets all the options he needs to make a decision, and then makes sure that decision is actually implemented. I worry that further reductions at the NSC could impair its capabilities, but the current staffing level is fully up to the job.

You might ask: Why does all this matter? Won’t it just be a historical footnote?

It matters because when people play politics in the middle of a crisis, we are all less safe.

We are less safe because public servants are distracted when they are dragged into politics.

We’re less safe because the American people have been recklessly scared into doubting the competence of their government to help keep them safe, secure and healthy.

And we’re less safe because when we’re focused on political gamesmanship, we’re not paying enough attention to the real issues. For example, we should be united behind ensuring that, in a future congressional appropriations package, U.S. companies are encouraged to return to our shores from China the production of everything from medical face masks and personal protective equipment to vitamin C and penicillin.

And we should be united in demanding to know why the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was aware of the coronavirus outbreak in Wuhan early in December, maybe even November, and didn’t tell the rest of the world, when stopping the deadly spread might have been possible.

The Opinions section is looking for stories of how the coronavirus has affected people of all walks of life. Write to us.

Just as the United States has fought against fake information aimed at our elections, we should fight back against CCP propagandists. They are not only campaigning against the use of the term “Wuhan virus” (a more geographically accurate description than “Spanish flu” ever was about the 1918 pandemic) but now also promoting the false claim that covid-19 was created by the U.S. Army. Public health officials have pinpointed a wild-animal market in Wuhan as the outbreak’s origin.

There are real threats emanating from this pandemic. We need to focus on getting our response right and save the finger-pointing for what comes after. This is the United States — we will get through this. And for the love of God, wash your hands.

Russian assault on ‘American idea’ enables Trump to take tough action

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This article appeared in The Hill on February 19, 2018. Click here to view the original article.

By John Bolton
February 19, 2018

Special counsel Robert Mueller’s efforts are far from over, and definitive conclusions about his work must still abide the day. Even so, Friday’s announcement that a federal grand jury in Washington had indicted 13 Russian citizens and three Russian entities for interfering in the 2016 elections and thereafter is highly significant, domestically and internationally. Mueller must still prove his wire fraud, identity fraud and other charges beyond a reasonable doubt, but the indictment alone powerfully reflects a wide-ranging investigation.

Domestically, the political ramifications for Donald Trump are clearly beneficial. After more than a year of public accusations, uninformed speculation and prodigious leaking by members of Congress and the media, the indictment contains no Trump-related allegations of knowing involvement in or support for Moscow’s pernicious activities. Both the indictment itself and Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein’s accompanying press conference describe the Americans manipulated by the Russian saboteurs as “unwitting” or “unknowing.”

Nor does the indictment allege that Russia’s machinations, which began in 2014, well before any announced Republican or Democratic candidates for the presidency, influenced the election’s outcome. Sen. Roy Blunt (R-Mo.) previously put Moscow’s social media spending in proper perspective: The known $100,000 of Russian expenditures amounted to a mere 0.005 percent of the approximately $81,000,000 of total social-media outlays by the Clinton and Trump campaigns. Facebook vice president Rob Goldman himself tweeted that the majority of Moscow’s spending occurred after the election.

The safest conclusion based on currently available public information is that Russia did not intend to advantage or disadvantage any particular candidate and that Russia was not “supporting” anyone for president. Instead, its saboteurs sought to sow discord and mistrust among U.S. citizens, undermining our constitutional processes and faith in the integrity of our elections. Advertising or demonstrations for or against Trump or any other candidate were means to the Russian end of corroding public trust, not ends themselves.

Mueller’s indictment, while likely not his last, nonetheless undercuts both ends of the logic chain that many Trump opponents hoped would lead to impeachment. There is, to date, no evidence of collusion, express or implied, nor can it honestly be said that Russia was “pro-Trump.” What Trump rightly feared earlier, based on his political instincts, was that the notion of clandestine Kremlin support for his campaign would morph into the conclusion that his campaign must have colluded with Moscow.

Such cooperation has yet to find anything like real evidence to support it, but the danger of people jumping to that conclusion was both obvious and continuously stoked by anti-Trump media reporting, asserting or implying repeatedly what Russia and Trump were purportedly up to. Typically, the media’s ideological excess is their own worst enemy. They would rather play “gotcha” on Trump’s skepticism of Russian involvement than recognize that their fantasies of bringing down his administration are now undermined.

Accordingly, Mueller has afforded Trump a not-to-be-missed opportunity to pivot from worrying about unfair efforts to tar his campaign with the “collusion” allegation, toward the broader growing danger of Russian subversion. What happened in the 2016 campaign was graver even than the “information warfare” alleged in Friday’s indictment. This is, pure and simple, war against the American idea itself.

Hence, the international ramifications of the special counsel’s indictment: The White House can and should now pivot to the real task ahead, which is dealing strategically and comprehensively with Russia’s global efforts to enhance its influence. Interference in America’s election, much as it necessarily focuses our attention, is only a part of Moscow’s disinformation operations. Russian agents have repeatedly interfered in European elections, although the exact scope remains uncertain.

The Kremlin has conducted cyberwarfare against the Baltic republics, and old-fashioned conventional aggression against Georgia and Ukraine, including annexing Crimea. In the Middle East, during the Obama administration, Russia cemented a de facto alliance with Iran, built and expanded military facilities in Syria, sold weapons to U.S. allies like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and propped up Bashar Assad’s dictatorship in Syria.

Moscow has blatantly violated the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, while rapidly modernizing and expanding its strategic nuclear capability. Heretofore under President Obama, Vladimir Putin hardly had reason to fear that anyone would push back on anything. Finally, because of the overhang of the “Trump collusion” heavy breathing by his political opposition and the media, the Trump administration has neither developed nor deployed a coherent Russia policy.

But it’s never too late to start. Putin’s global aspirations are not friendly to America, and the sooner he knows we know it, the better. It is not enough, however, to file criminal charges against Russian citizens, nor are economic sanctions anywhere near sufficient to prove our displeasure. We need to create structures of deterrence in cyberspace, as we did with nuclear weapons, to prevent future Russian attacks or attacks by others who threaten our interests.

One way to do that is to engage in a retaliatory cyber campaign against Russia. This effort should not be proportional to what we have just experienced. It should be decidedly disproportionate. The lesson we want Russia (or anyone else) to learn is that the costs to them from future cyberattacks against the United States will be so high that they will simply consign all their cyberwarfare plans to their computer memories to gather electronic dust.

In Eastern and Central Europe, the White House needs to expand its efforts to strengthen NATO’s hand by persuading all its members to spend the bare minimum necessary for the alliance’s military resources. At the Munich Security Conference this past weekend, for example, a luncheon discussion on Ukraine produced many solemn pronouncements on Russia’s “violations of the rules-based international order.”

This was music to Moscow’s ears. Let Putin instead hear the rumble of artillery and NATO tank tracks conducting more joint field exercises with Ukraine’s military. That, and much more, will get his attention. An analogous response is warranted in the Middle East, where the White House is already laying a foundation for more robust responses to Russia’s probes. At rare moments in politics, unexpected events produce opportunities which must be seized before they disappear. The Russia indictment is one of them.

North Korea wins, America loses, with our Olympic appeasement

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This article appeared in The Hill on February 12, 2018. Click here to view the original article.

By John Bolton
February 12, 2018

Appeasing authoritarianism comes in many forms. All of them are ugly. Some are obvious and extremely dangerous, and some are subtle, indicating a mindset portending future danger because of a propensity to ignore reality. Opening the 23rd Winter Olympic Games in Pyeongchang, South Korea, prominent American media outlets displayed the latter appeasement mentality in full measure, becoming stenographers for North Korea’s propaganda machine. Reflecting boundless gullibility, representatives of our free press stepped up to carry Pyongyang’s message.

Virtually North Korea’s entire purpose for participating in these Winter Games was to generate just such reactions. Kim Jong Un’s dictatorship is seeking propaganda advantage of South Korean President Moon Jae In’s “sunshine policy” to make inroads into global public opinion, to split Seoul from Washington and Tokyo in dealing with Pyongyang’s nuclear and ballistic-missile programs, and to distract America and the international community from the imminence of North Korea’s ability to target any spot in the world with nuclear weapons.

By agreeing to a “unified” team marching in Pyeongchang’s opening ceremonies, flying a flag showing an undivided Korean Peninsula, by forming a joint women’s ice-hockey team and by sending a large delegation of North Korean officials and “citizens” to support their athletes, Kim Jong Un played on the naïve and the gullible, of whom unfortunately there are all too many in both America and South Korea. The capstone of Kim’s propaganda campaign was the invitation to President Moon to visit Pyongyang for an inter-Korean summit. Delivered by the North’s nominal top official, Kim Yong Nam, and Kim Yo Jong, sister of the current dictator, the invitation was accepted reflexively.

Most noticeable initially about U.S. press coverage of these carefully programmed developments was the near-uniform lack of historical memory. Because the media either did not know or did not care about this history, the reporting carried the breathless excitement of something “new” that might lead to a diplomatic resolution of North Korea’s nuclear threat.

But Korean athletes have three times before marched as Olympic unified teams (in 2000, 2004 and 2006), under prior South Korean presidents who originated and followed “sunshine policies.” Moreover, there have been two earlier intra-Korean summits, in 2000 and 2007. Neither the unified Olympic teams nor the summits in any way impeded North Korea’s relentless progress toward achieving its goal of deliverable nuclear weapons.

Moreover, diplomatic progress is not possible here because Pyongyang’s purpose is not to “open a dialogue” for the umpteenth time with Seoul, Washington or Tokyo, but to conceal and distract from its menacing activities. Having the media fall for the “rapprochement” line rather than seeing the concealment motivation was precisely Kim’s objective. The U.S. media fully met his expectations. And then some. Vladimir Lenin is often credited with coining the phrase “useful idiots,” but even he would not have predicted the rhapsodizing we have seen.

Take, for example, a report by Morgan Winsor of ABC News describing the cheerleading cadre accompanying North Korea’s athletes: “Clad in coordinated outfits of red with white and blue accents, North Korea’s throng of more than 200 cheerleaders are stealing the spotlight at the 23rd Winter Olympic Games” as they “chant, sway and dance in unison.” I am assuredly not an aesthetics expert, but I saw the cheerleaders as a depressing manifestation of George Orwell’s novel, “1984,” not something that steals spotlights by their “synchronized chants” on behalf of the Korean team. Their “coordinated outfits” didn’t do anything for me either.

National Review editor Rich Lowry had it right when he tweeted to ask why ABC News didn’t realize “that what they are charmed by here is probably as close as you can get to a hideous real-world version of the ‘Handmaid’s Tale?’” Make no mistake, the well-fed visages of the cheerleaders mark them as among North Korea’s most privileged. Of course they perform vigorously. You would too in a society where lack of fealty to the regime is often a death sentence.

Next, enthralled by the combined North-South female hockey team, CNN reporter Aimee Lewis reported as matters of fact that “this women’s team became a tool for rapprochement” and that “not even the wildest optimist could have predicted recent events.” What exactly has happened recently? The joint team lost 8-0 to Switzerland, and many South Koreans resent that several of their female ice-hockey players were displaced by Pyongyang’s athletes. Without any reference to the vanishingly insignificant impact of this precise pattern in three previous Olympics, the real news is the number of reporters with the attention span of fruit flies.

Finally, consider the lionization of Kim Yo Jong, currently under U.S. sanctions for her role heading the ruling party’s Propaganda and Agitation Department. CNN’s Lewis dug into her trove of clichés to call her “the first member of Pyongyang’s ruling dynasty to set foot in the South” since the Korean War. Ruling dynasty? Sort of like the British royal family? There was, in truth, coverage of the brutal, dictatorial ways of the “ruling dynasty.” But reporters and their editors know, as does the North’s propagandists and scammers generally, that what typically matters most is what grabs quick headlines.

CNN wasn’t finished, however. Joe Sterling, Sheena McKenzie and Brian Todd wrote ecstatically that “if ‘diplomatic dance’ were an event at the Winter Olympics, Kim Jong Un’s younger sister would be favored to win gold.” She is the Ivanka Trump of North Korea, they “report,” and “not only a powerful member of Kim Jong Un’s kitchen cabinet, but also a foil to the perception of North Korea as antiquated and militaristic.” Words fail here.

While the media fun was unfolding, Pyeongchang’s Olympics organizers reported that their computers may have been hacked, and they are now investigating. Maybe those cheerleaders have other skills as well. Have reporters done any investigative work to ascertain where North Korea, under so much “pressure” of economic sanctions, found resources for the Olympics? Were they subsidized by South Korea, China or others, as has so often tragically been true, thereby subsidizing the dictatorship?

When P. T. Barnum allegedly said “there’s a sucker born every minute,” he may have been understating the problem. Not that you’d know it from our establishment media.

Fallout from the memo wars

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This article appeared in The Pittsburgh Tribune Review on February 11, 2018. Click here to view the original article.

By John Bolton
February 11, 2018

After over a year of accusations, leaks and speculation about “Russiagate” and Hillary Clinton’s e-mails, a recently-released memorandum authorized by Chairman Devin Nunes of the House Intelligence Committee has garnered extraordinary publicity. Democrats wrote a response, also scheduled for public release. Since neither document reveals the actual evidence underlying their assertions, the debate rages on.

The Nunes memo is certainly not the last salvo in the political debate, which extends well beyond its limited subject matter: Whether the process for applying for foreign-intelligence-related surveillance on U.S. citizens was abused in an effort to “get” Donald Trump or his 2016 campaign. There is widespread, far-from-fanciful apprehension that the FBI investigation of alleged wrongdoing by the Clinton Foundation was killed for political reasons; that the Clinton e-mail investigation was both badly directed and improperly discussed publicly by then-FBI Director James Comey; that the “Russia collusion” allegations against Trump and his campaign had no foundation other than political reprisal; that Russian efforts to affect American elections are simultaneously at risk of being ignored or overstated; and that the Obama administration abused aspects of legitimate U.S. intelligence gathering for partisan purposes.

Despite torrents of words, we still have no adequate basis for judging fairly the truth or seriousness of nearly all these allegations of political bias, double standards in law enforcement and abuse of power by government agencies. The debate’s net effect, however, has unfortunately been to corrode the legitimacy of American institutions critical to our national security and to the concept of equal justice for all. Many, for example, are using the possibility of abuse in the foreign-intelligence field to weaken the critical capabilities and programs that protect us from threats ranging from nuclear weapons to suicide-bomb terrorists.

Things have gotten out of hand. There’s no end in sight.

Much as it grates on my every instinct as a former Justice and State Department official, I believe we need massive disclosure of the underlying evidence in all the contentious areas described above. Just as a starter, we should provide full public access to all the testimony taken and documents produced for Congress. More will have to come from the Justice Department, perhaps jeopardizing future criminal prosecutions, but there are occasions where the public is better served by illustration than by prosecution. This is one of them.

Plainly, significant aspects of these materials (such as applications to the foreign-intelligence court) will raise legitimate fears of harming intelligence and law-enforcement capabilities. Few arguments against public disclosure are more compelling than well-grounded concerns to protect the sources and methods used to gather intelligence and conduct criminal investigations. It is also true, as I have myself experienced, that these legitimate government interests can be used for blatantly political purposes. Deciding what to declassify will be an arduous task, but that is a reason to begin the review process now — not delay it.

Animosities are so high that not even full disclosure may be enough to resolve the current disputes and restore faith to critical government institutions. And no matter how carefully analyzed, the disclosures will inevitably impair some legitimate government endeavors. But the most important government interest here is restoring the citizenry’s faith in its government. That interest above all must prevail.

Trump’s SOTU hit the right foreign policy notes — now comes the hard part

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President Trump’s first State of the Union address was not heavy on national security issues. It did, however, make one critical point: In reviewing the international achievements of his first year in office, Trump was abundantly clear that the Obama era is over. Primarily retrospective assessments like Trump’s are perfectly legitimate for a president finishing his initial year, especially given what his policies are replacing.

Gone was President Obama’s self-congratulatory moral posturing, replaced by a concrete list of accomplishments that will inevitably increase the power of America’s presence in the world. Trump’s policy is not only not isolationist — as many of his opponents (and a few misguided supporters) contend — his pursuit of Ronald Reagan’s “peace through strength” approach actually demonstrates that Obama’s detached, ethereal retreat from American assertiveness internationally amounted to the real isolationism.

Most importantly, Trump again committed to palpably more robust military budgets and an end to the budget-sequester mechanism, the worst political mistake made by Republicans in Congress in living memory. Sequestration procedures were liberal dreams come true, forcing wasteful increases in domestic programs in order to obtain critical military funding. The sooner this whole embarrassing exercise is behind us, the better.

As Secretary of Defense James Mattis frequently points out, harking back to Jeane Kirkpatrick’s famous comment, there cannot be an adequate American foreign policy without an adequate defense policy.

Trump chose to single out the need “to modernize and rebuild our nuclear arsenal,” the bedrock of America’s deterrence capabilities. Indeed, Trump went on, quite rightly, to cast doubt on the “Global Zero” notion of actively working to eliminate all nuclear weapons. For many of those who pursue “Global Zero,” the real target is not rogue states like Iran or North Korea, or strategic threats like Russia or China, but the United States itself. Trump basically said in response, “When the lions lie down with the lambs, call me.” Just so.

I wish the president had also stressed the profound need to rapidly scale up our national missile defense capabilities, a program that was all but eviscerated during the Obama administration. Indeed, we must devote far more attention to capabilities beyond the original Bush program, which focused on addressing the relatively limited threats of the rogue states, which might have the capability to launch handfuls rather than hundreds of ballistic missiles at American targets. It is past time to return to Reagan’s original vision of “strategic defense,” so that the United States can have adequate defenses against Russia’s large, newly upgraded and modernized missile arsenals, and also against China’s rapidly increasing capabilities.

Increasing our defense capabilities is not just important: It is urgent. The global bills accrued because of failures by prior administrations are coming due on Trump’s watch, underlining the gravity of the international threats facing the United States. With immediate, continuing threats from international terrorism and nuclear proliferators like North Korea and Iran, plus strategic threats from Russia and China, America’s agenda is full to overflowing.

On radical Islamic terrorism, Trump could point to the military success against the ISIS caliphate and new rules of engagement for U.S. forces in Afghanistan, while recognizing that we remain at risk as long as this dangerous political ideology persists. There was no better manifestation of the president’s commitment to winning the “long war” than his unequivocal statement that our terrorist prison at Guantánamo Bay would remain open. Trump thereby emphatically rejected the Clinton and Obama administrations’ “law enforcement” paradigm for handling terrorism, and embraced the “war paradigm,” which brings into play a different mind set, different national powers and different legal authorities and constraints.

Trump was very clear that he regards the regimes controlling Iran and North Korea to be the basic problems, and that nuclear weapons in their hands were unacceptable, a formulation very close to George W. Bush’s admonition that we could not allow “the world’s most dangerous weapons” to fall into the hands of “the world’s most dangerous leaders.” Trump did not explicitly call for regime change in Tehran and Pyongyang, but he came close enough that fire bells should be ringing in the night in both Iran and North Korea. U.S. actions, and those of other like-minded countries, should now follow, to make it clear that the way to minimize the chances for the use of force against the rogue states’ nuclear programs is to get new regimes that renounce the existing programs, and quickly dismantle them.

Trump cited both Russia and China as “rivals … that challenge our interests, our economy and our values,” thereby giving the lie (yet again) to those who say he is somehow blind to the Russian threat. While the president’s comments on China focused primarily on economic and trade issues, there is no doubt he understands the strategic nature of the Chinese challenge as well.

In the days following this well-received State of the Union, Trump must now develop a comprehensive series of policies for dealing with the due bills now cascading across his desk. Most immediately, the administration must decide on what it is prepared to do to ensure that, as Trump said to the United Nations General Assembly in September, denuclearization is the only way forward for North Korea and Iran. Preventing nuclear-capable rogue states (not accepting them, as Obama’s national security adviser, Susan Rice, said she was prepared to do) is clearly the right outcome.

What Trump must reject, immediately, is what we have been doing for years, and which has manifestly failed. In the military context, Gian Gentile has described what he calls “a strategy of tactics,” which purports to be a strategy but is not one in fact. Under a nonproliferation “strategy of tactics,” we have aimlessly tried a little of this, then a little of that, hoping that something would work out. It hasn’t. And there is not time for persisting in this failed approach.

Understandably, Trump may not have wanted to address these complex and dangerous issues in what was already a longer-than-average State of the Union. Fair enough, but the hard analysis and planning, and the even harder decisions, are coming very soon.

Beyond the Iran Nuclear Deal

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U.S. policy should be to end the Islamic Republic before its 40th anniversary

This article appeared in The Wall Street Journal on January 16, 2018. Click here to view the original article.

By John Bolton
January 16, 2018

President Trump seemingly served notice Friday that the days are dwindling for Barack Obama’s Iran agreement. Although deal proponents also gained time to pursue “fixes,” this is a forlorn option. No fix will remedy the diplomatic Waterloo Mr. Obama negotiated. Democrats will reject anything that endangers his prized international contrivance, and the Europeans are more interested in trade with Tehran than a stronger agreement.

There is an even more fundamental obstacle: Iran. Negotiating with Congress and Europe will not modify the actual deal’s terms, which Iran (buttressed by Russia and China) has no interest in changing. Increased inspections, for example, is a nonstarter for Tehran. Mr. Obama gave the ayatollahs what they wanted; they will not give it back.

Most important, there is no evidence Iran’s intention to obtain deliverable nuclear weapons has wavered. None of the proposed “fixes” change this basic, unanswerable reality.

Spending the next 120 days negotiating with ourselves will leave the West mired in stasis. Mr. Trump correctly sees Mr. Obama’s deal as a massive strategic blunder, but his advisers have inexplicably persuaded him not to withdraw. Last fall, deciding whether to reimpose sanctions and decertify the deal under the Corker-Cardin legislation, the administration also opted to keep the door open to “fixes”—a punt on third down. Let’s hope Friday’s decision is not another punt.

The Iran agreement rests on inadequate knowledge and fundamentally flawed premises. Mr. Obama threw away any prospect of learning basic facts about Iran’s capabilities. Provisions for international inspection of suspected military-related nuclear facilities are utterly inadequate, and the U.S. is likely not even aware of all the locations. Little is known, at least publicly, about longstanding Iranian-North Korean cooperation on nuclear and ballistic-missile technology. It is foolish to play down Tehran’s threat because of Pyongyang’s provocations. They are two sides of the same coin.

Some proponents of “strengthening” the deal propose to eliminate its sunset provisions. That would achieve nothing. Tehran’s nuclear menace, especially given the Pyongyang connection, is here now, not 10 years away. One bizarre idea is amending the Corker-Cardin law to avoid the certification headache every 90 days. Tehran would endorse this proposal, but it is like taking aspirin to relieve the pain of a sucking chest wound.

Politicizing Proliferation Policy

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This article appeared in Pittsburgh Tribune Review on January 14, 2018. Click here to view the original article.

By John Bolton
January 14, 2018

North Korea’s apparently rapid progress last year in both its nuclear-weapons and ballistic-missile programs raises entirely legitimate concerns about U.S. intelligence capabilities. The New York Times recently reported that, as the Obama administration ended, intelligence-community analysts estimated that Pyongyang was over four years away from mastering the complex science and technology necessary to deliver thermonuclear weapons on targets within the continental United States.

Then, seemingly overnight, North Korea was igniting thermonuclear weapons and testing missiles that could hit the lower 48. The Times calls this an intelligence failure, certainly a serious matter. But the real reason was actually much worse.

Evidence in The Times report indicates that President Obama’s team dangerously politicized intelligence gathering and analysis, as senior officials strove to support their preconceived notions of the North’s true progress.

Throughout his presidency, Obama pursued a North Korea policy called “strategic patience,” which was in fact a synonym for doing nothing. As long as intelligence agencies assessed that Pyongyang’s threat was remote, conveniently fitting Obama’s predilection to do nothing, he could contend there was no basis for more robust measures against the North’s nuclear program.

Obama-era intelligence also conveniently painted a very similar picture about Iran as Obama desperately sought a nuclear agreement later characterized as an achievement comparable to ObamaCare in his first term. As with North Korea, if Iran’s program were not increasingly threatening, there was no danger, supposedly, from lengthy negotiations and an imperfect final agreement.

In both cases, however, the truth was much more malign, as North Korea is now demonstrating graphically. During the presidential transition, Obama blithely advised President-elect Trump that Pyongyang would be his most serious foreign challenge. How convenient that reality “changed” for the worst just after Obama departed the White House. Indeed, this “coincidence” is simply further evidence of how deeply his administration had politicized intelligence collection and analysis.

Government insiders recognize that politicization does not emerge via written directives from high-ranking authorities demanding particular outcomes. It arises instead when the intelligence community’s bureaucratic culture intuits what policymakers want to hear — and gives it to them. Highly ideological intelligence-community decision-makers, like Obama’s CIA director, themselves sharing the same benign view of North Korea, create a self-reinforcing feedback loop, rewarding “good” intelligence while shunting aside and disregarding contrary information and analysis.

Before and after the second Iraq war, critics of President George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney leveled charges of politicization simply because Cheney and others asked hard questions of front-line intelligence analysts. But such questioning is something that first-rate analysts, proud of their work product, relish, providing analysts with key insights into policymakers’ thinking.

What happened under Obama was far different, an insidious ideological fixing of intelligence results.

Post-Obama, Trump’s White House has a full workload to repair and improve American national security, from significantly increasing military budgets to building a more assertive diplomatic corps. Importantly, however, eliminating the corrosive effects of politicized intelligence also needs to rank at the top of his agenda.