JCPOA 2.0

January 07, 2021

This article appeared in The National Review on January 7, 2020. Click here to view the original article.

By John Bolton and John Yoo
January 7, 2020

The first great conflict of Joseph Biden’s presidency could erupt on the field of national security. In his most significant foreign-policy achievement, President Donald Trump withdrew from Barack Obama’s 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which traded limits on Iran’s nuclear program for immediate financial relief (an estimated $120–$150 billion) and the lifting of Western economic sanctions. Signaling a knee-jerk return to failed Obama policies, the president-elect has promised he will immediately rejoin the JCPOA in a hopeless quest for a peaceful settlement with Tehran’s mullahs.

New presidents feel the need to score policy wins in the first months of their term. Democratic down-ballot failures in 2020 mean Biden will have little maneuvering room to advance his domestic issues, and will instead have to turn to foreign policy for any early successes. Despite gaining the presidency by a healthy Electoral College margin (and winning the popular vote), the Democrats have seen their advantage in the House of Representatives shrink to a 222–212 majority (depending on two possible challenges), their narrowest since 1942. The Senate outcome is even closer, with the majority turning on the January 5 Georgia runoffs. Biden could be the first new president since George H. W. Bush 32 years ago to enter office without a Senate controlled by his party.

While the executive enjoys vast power in foreign affairs, Republicans can put up a stiff fight through a combination of constitutional strategy, congressional tactics, and political infighting. (We wrote on this subject for NR six years ago, in “Advice on ‘Advice and Consent,’” December 31, 2014, without noticeable effect on the Senate; but we decided to try again under new circumstances.) They should refuse to accept the JCPOA as an international agreement because of its failure to undergo the treaty process required by Article II of the Constitution. If Biden emulates Obama and withholds JCPOA 2.0 from Senate consideration, Congress should deploy its own constitutional powers by imposing mandatory sanctions on Iran, beefing up military spending in the region, withholding appropriations to the State Department and other agencies, and refusing to confirm nominees to national-security positions or cooperate with the White House on other elements of its agenda.

The JCPOA is not the only international agreement the incoming administration intends to revive. “The United States will rejoin the Paris Agreement on day one of my presidency,” Biden promised in December, referring to the global climate-change agreement. Biden also envisions reentering the World Health Organization, from which Trump withdrew for its cover-up of the COVID-19 pandemic’s China origins. The JCPOA, though, raises the most immediate and profound constitutional problems.

The multilateral JCPOA reflected Obama’s misbegotten notion that, with the nuclear-weapon issue “resolved,” Iran under the mullahs would begin behaving like a normal nation. Rather than using Iran’s financial bonanza to benefit its impoverished people, however, the mullahs funded terrorists in Lebanon and Iraq, Assad’s regime in Syria, and Yemeni rebels. President Trump wisely pulled the U.S. out of the agreement in May 2018 and imposed even harsher sanctions that have pushed Iran to the brink of economic collapse. The ability of Iran to foment terrorism and employ conventional forces to undermine our allies in the region, such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, has suffered, but it remains deeply threatening.

Nevertheless, Biden announced in December that, “if Iran returns to strict compliance with the nuclear deal, the United States would rejoin the agreement as a starting point for follow-on negotiations.” So doing would only reward Iranian malevolence. The mullahs have never given up their nuclear ambitions; they lied repeatedly to conceal their covert nuclear-weapons program and greeted European efforts to save the JCPOA by building up Iran’s enriched-uranium stockpiles beyond approved limits. According to media reports, Iran is demanding that the incoming administration immediately rejoin the deal and lift all sanctions unconditionally, without any corresponding freeze in Iranian uranium enrichment. Tehran also intends to seek compensation for the economic losses caused by the Trump-administration sanctions, making Iran the clear favorite for 2020’s “Chutzpah of the Year” award.

Republicans should attempt to thwart Biden’s plan by demanding adherence to the Constitution. In one of many demonstrations of his disregard for the separation of powers, President Obama refused to submit the JCPOA to the Senate as a treaty. Article II of the Constitution, however, recognizes only a single manner in which the United States may enter international agreements: The president “shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties,” but only if “two thirds of the Senators present concur.” Article II’s plain meaning and history require that any agreement that restricts the nation’s sovereignty must undergo Senate approval by a two-thirds supermajority.

Joe Biden himself used to believe that the Senate’s consent was required for all significant international agreements — at least when Republican presidents made them. “With the exception of the SALT I agreement, every significant arms control agreement during the past three decades has been transmitted to the Senate pursuant to the Treaty Clause of the Constitution,” Senators Biden and Jesse Helms declared about the 2002 Treaty of Moscow, in which the U.S. and Russia agreed to deep reductions in their nuclear arsenals. “No constitutional alternative exists to transmittal of the concluded agreement to the Senate for its advice and consent.” In the 1980s, Biden even attacked President Reagan’s missile-defense programs because they went beyond the terms of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with the Soviet Union and therefore required a new amendment to the treaty. He went so far as to pen a scholarly article declaring the treaty power to be “a constitutional partnership” between the president and the Senate.

Unfortunately, the Senate over nearly a century has allowed its treaty role to be frittered away, as “sole executive agreements” have become the overwhelmingly dominant mode of U.S. international agreements. While there is no “bright line” that establishes what must be considered a treaty rather than an executive agreement, JCPOA 2.0 clearly qualifies as a treaty. And for senators seeking to begin the long-term project of restoring their body’s authority, the Iran nuclear deal is an excellent starting point.

Senate Republicans should force President-elect Biden to live up to his own words. The Constitution’s requirement of supermajority consent to treaties was meant to guarantee that they would be backed by the highest levels of political consensus. As Alexander Hamilton explained in Federalist No. 75, “The vast importance of the trust, and the operation of treaties as laws, plead strongly for the participation of the whole, or a portion, of the legislative body in the office of making them.” Allowing a single man to make international agreements, he warned, would not just risk unwise decisions but also invite the possibility of the personal corruption of a president who might be tempted by either avarice or ambition.

The Biden administration is sure to resurrect Obama’s claim that the JCPOA did not amount to a treaty because it did not constitute a legally enforceable agreement. The JCPOA was not even “a signed document,” the Obama State Department under John Kerry explained, but just a series of “political commitments.” But in 2015 congressional hearings, the administration more candidly admitted that it simply could not persuade two-thirds of the Senate. Asked by a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee why the JCPOA was not considered a treaty, Kerry (who will join the incoming administration as Biden’s “climate czar”) replied, “Well, Congressman, I spent quite a few years trying to get a lot of treaties through the United States Senate, and it has become physically impossible.” He went on: “That’s why. Because you can’t pass a treaty anymore.”

Obama refused to submit the JCPOA to the Senate, which meant the Senate had nothing on which to vote. Republicans responded by enacting the 2015 Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act, which not only was toothless but unfortunately gave the JCPOA the patina of having survived congressional scrutiny. Reversing the Constitution’s presumption against entering international agreements, INARA required Congress to pass a law to reject the JCPOA, subject to presidential veto. Unsurprisingly, the JCPOA sailed on.

In 2015, senators effectively accepted defeat. This time, if Biden flouts the Senate’s constitutional treaty role, the Senate should retaliate asymmetrically. Most important is Congress’s appropriations power, perhaps its strongest constitutional sword. Threatening to defund large parts of the State Department would certainly get the new administration’s attention. Former Connecticut Republican senator Lowell Weicker, for example, once forced action on a nomination for U.S. attorney by obtaining a rider barring any use of appropriated funds for travel by the attorney general. Talk about getting someone to wake up! The appropriations power also allows Congress to earmark funding in military programs for those it considers priorities, such as increased capabilities to deal with Iran’s threat. Mandatory statutory sanctions against Iran reflect another possible front in the struggle against Biden’s appeasement.

Similarly, if the Senate isn’t afforded an opportunity for advice and consent on JCPOA 2.0, it can easily withhold advice and consent on everything else, starting with the nominee for secretary of state. This is a test of constitutional wills rather than a matter of the Senate’s proper role in confirmations — on that front, both parties have been overdoing it for decades. Fixing the specifics of the confirmation process, now badly out of sync, is a subject for another day.

Make no mistake, we are proposing Senate (and House) hardball here. As in 2015, JCPOA opponents in the legislative branch may not want to play. But if that’s the case, let’s hear no more complaints about the continuing decline of congressional influence in national-security affairs.

Biden Must Reverse Course on Western Sahara

December 15, 2020

Trump’s recognition of Moroccan sovereignty dangerously undermines decades of carefully crafted U.S. policy.

This article appeared in Foreign Policy on December 15, 2020. Click here to view the original article.

By John Bolton
December 15, 2020

Outgoing President Donald Trump’s Dec. 11 proclamation that the United States would recognize Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara marked yet another low for his administration. In an unrelated deal to facilitate the exchange of diplomatic relations between Israel and Morocco, Trump’s decision to throw the Sahrawi people under the bus ditches three decades of U.S. support for their self-determination via a referendum of the Sahrawi people on the territory’s future status.

Republican Sen. James Inhofe was exactly right when he said in a Senate floor speech on Dec. 10 that Trump “could have made this deal without trading away the rights of this voiceless people.” Inhofe is one of the few U.S. experts on Western Sahara, built up through years of service on both the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services, which he now chairs. I have worked frequently with Inhofe on the Western Sahara issue over the years, dating back to my own initial involvement as assistant secretary of state for international organizations during the George H.W. Bush administration.

Warm but unofficial relations between Israel and Morocco are nothing new. Morocco has long considered recognizing Israel, and King Hassan II aggressively pursued that option during the 1990s, as did other Arab nations. Secret Israeli-Moroccan contacts have been commonplace since. Today, full relations are thus neither new nor difficult to achieve. The United Arab Emirates and Bahrain have recently taken the plunge, and more could follow. But what Morocco has actually agreed to remains unclear; Rabat denies it will open anything more than a “liaison office” in Israel (which it did in the 1990s), or that its deal actually involves full diplomatic relations.

In making his rash decision, Trump consulted neither the Polisario Front—which has long represented the Sahrawis—nor Algeria and Mauritania, the most concerned neighboring countries, nor anyone else. This is what happens when dilettantes handle U.S. diplomacy, and it is sadly typical of Trump’s nakedly transactional approach during his tenure.This is what happens when dilettantes handle U.S. diplomacy, and it is sadly typical of Trump’s nakedly transactional approach during his tenure. To him, everything is a potential deal, viewed in very narrow terms through the attention span of a fruit fly. Fully weighing all the merits and equities involved in complex international scenarios is not his style. Historical background and future ramifications? Those are for losers. Fortunately, Trump made no nuclear deal with North Korea or Iran; one can only imagine what he might have given away.
His casual approach to notching one more ostensible international victory raises significant problems of stability across the Maghreb. And crossing Inhofe, reelected last month to another six-year Senate term, was a major political mistake. Trump knows exactly how Inhofe feels about the Western Sahara; I was there in the Oval Office on May 1, 2019, when the Oklahoma senator explained his support for a referendum. Trump said he had never heard of Western Sahara, and Inhofe replied, “Oh, we spoke before, but you weren’t listening.”

The Washington Post reports that in recent weeks, Trump became irate that Inhofe would not accede to nongermane amendments that the president wanted in the annual defense authorization bill, such as repealing Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which shields social media platforms from liability for what they publish. Trump’s advisors reportedly persuaded the president to stiff Inhofe on the Western Sahara in retaliation. But this standoff is far from over. Inhofe is a determined Sahrawi proponent, and, from his powerful position as chairman of the Armed Services Committee, he will make the argument to reverse Trump’s decision directly to Biden if need be.

Where, then, does Trump’s reckless and unnecessary move leave President-elect Joe Biden and the foreign governments most directly interested in the Western Sahara?

The answer begins with the obvious—the very name of the U.N. peacekeeping operation authorized by Resolution 690 of 1991 was “Mission of the United Nations for the Referendum in Western Sahara” (MINURSO being the Spanish acronym). When Spain’s colonial rule collapsed with Francisco Franco’s 1975 death, and after an initial conflict between Mauritania and Morocco, the Polisario-Moroccan military hostilities left the territory partitioned and its status unresolved. The Polisario’s fundamental choice in 1991 was to suspend its ongoing confrontation with Morocco in exchange for a referendum, in which the choice would be between independence or unification with Morocco.

King Hassan II fully understood that this deal was, in Resolution 690’s express terms, “a referendum for self-determination of the people of Western Sahara.” The choice, stated in the first paragraph of the U.N. Secretary General’s report approved by Resolution 690, was “to choose between independence and integration with Morocco.” The 1997 Houston Accords, negotiated under James Baker’s auspices as the Secretary General’s personal envoy, reinforced that understanding. (At the time, I worked for Baker at the U.S. State Department, and I later assisted him in his work as the U.N. envoy.)

Members of the Sahrawi People’s Liberation Army take part in a ceremony to mark 40 years after the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic was proclaimed by the Polisario Front in the disputed territory of Western Sahara at the Rabouni Sahrawi refugee camp in Tindouf, Algeria, on Feb. 26, 2016.
Can John Bolton Thaw Western Sahara’s Long-Frozen Conflict?
The Polisario Front has created an international diplomatic presence on a shoestring budget and sees the Trump administration as its best hope in decades to gain independence from Morocco.

Nonetheless, Morocco has spent nearly three decades preventing the referendum from taking place. Together with France and other Security Council allies, it has tried, unfortunately with some success, to blur Resolution 690’s referendum commitment. Rabat has offered a variety of so-called autonomy proposals, not one of which has ever come close to being acceptable to the Polisario, proposing a referendum on incorporation versus “autonomy.” To the Sahrawi, this is a take it or leave it proposition, and has therefore always been unacceptable. From Morocco’s perspective, this kind of so-called peace process could go on forever: Rabat not only controls the vast bulk of the Western Sahara’s territory militarily, but, through successive waves of settlement from Morocco proper, is trying to overwhelm the ethnic Sahrawi population. Secretary General António Guterres’s statement following Trump’s announcement, for example, called for preserving the 1991 cease-fire, but spoke only about a “resumption of the peace process.”

If Morocco won’t accept a referendum, it doesn’t deserve a cease-fire or a false “peace process.”

This is a pathetic—and authoritative—admission of 30 years of U.N. failure. The Polisario did not abandon its war against Morocco for a “peace process,” but for a referendum. One obvious option, therefore, is to terminate MINURSO, and return to the status quo ante of open hostilities. With the original deal broken, and Morocco for three decades evincing no intention of accepting a referendum, why keep a U.N. peacekeeping operation on perpetual life support? If Morocco won’t accept a referendum, it doesn’t deserve a cease-fire or a false “peace process.”

In fact, a major cease-fire violation occurred last month, so serious that many believed full military hostilities might resume. For now, there is no way to tell whether this is likely, or what the outcome might be. But make no mistake, the Polisario is at a crucial juncture. It would be fully justified if it chooses to return to the battlefield, but much depends on the positions of Algeria, Mauritania, and others—and what resources are available.

For the Polisario, Trump’s about-face is more than disappointing. It broke a U.S. commitment that once looked rock-solid, and which I tried to defend and advance during my time as national security advisor—often in the face of the State Department’s determination to find a way to solidify Moroccan control of Western Sahara.

Unfortunately, the Sahrawis are not the first during Trump’s tenure to experience an assault on one U.S. undertaking after another, imperiling even long-standing formal U.S. alliances like NATO. It is perfectly appropriate for a nation to modify its responsibilities in light of changed national-security circumstances, but it is quite another to gratuitously destroy a commitment, with no consultation, just to make a so-called deal in a completely separate context.It is perfectly appropriate for a nation to modify its responsibilities in light of changed national-security circumstances, but it is quite another to gratuitously destroy a commitment, with no consultation, just to make a so-called deal in a completely separate context. Fortunately, Trump’s time is all but over.
From the perspective of U.S. policy, the best outcome would be for Biden, once inaugurated, to reverse Trump’s acquiescence to Moroccan sovereignty. This will not be easy, given the expectations—misguided though they are—already built up in Rabat and Jerusalem. If Biden wants to do a 180-degree turn, he should do so immediately on taking office, which would minimize any damage.

There are other obstacles. Ironically, Trump’s insouciance gave the State Department bureaucracy exactly what it has wanted since Resolution 690 first encountered stiff Moroccan resistance within months of its adoption nearly three decades ago. Rabat had argued that losing the Western Sahara referendum would destabilize its monarchy, and the State Department’s bureaucrats lapped it up. In fact, the referendum’s outcome would almost certainly depend on who constitutes the voting-eligible population, yet another issue Morocco has contested despite its earlier commitment to the 1975 Spanish census defining the universe of eligible voters—an era before Morocco sought to engineer the territory’s demographics in its favor. Notwithstanding substantial Moroccan transfers of population into Western Sahara, and the supposed benefits of its rule, Rabat and the U.S. State Department both fear they haven’t done enough to achieve the result they want.

Morocco is no longer really concerned about its monarchy’s stability being undermined by formal diplomatic ties with Israel than are Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, or other Gulf Arab states yet to come around. What is really behind Morocco’s argument is that Rabat has come to believe its own propaganda, rather than its underlying reason for the occupation—which is that it wants control over possible substantial mineral resources buried under all that Saharan sand, fishing assets, and possible resort development opportunities for tourists.

Biden, of course, will have a few other things on his mind on Jan. 20 apart from Western Sahara. While Biden and his advisors formulate their own policy, they can lay down a marker that Trump’s about-face is under review, insisting in the meantime that a referendum is still a prerequisite before the United States will consider the Western Sahara issue resolved. There should be no outcome acceptable to Washington that is not approved by the Sahrawis in an internationally conducted, free, and fair vote—with a yes-or-no choice on full independence on the ballot. Morocco may gag at this option, but it has little choice but to accept it if the United States insists on it.

For Algeria, Mauritania, Israel, and European leaders, there is not much to lose if Biden reverses Trump’s misguided move. It will be a welcome relief that the prospect of conflict with Morocco has been at least postponed. These states should all insist that the Western Sahara’s future should not be shuffled aside, a development that only benefits Morocco, given its de facto control over the bulk of the territory.

Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates have already freed Israel from the formal diplomatic isolation it faced for many years. Whatever Morocco does in response to a new Biden policy that reaffirms Western Sahara’s status quo will affect Israel only slightly. And graciously accepting what a new Biden administration says about the territory may well be in Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s interest. In this way he could, at essentially no cost to Israel—for which the Western Sahara is a non-issue—add to his political capital with Biden for issues that really matter, like taking on the threat posed by Iran.

The European Union—especially Spain, the former colonial power, where support for the Sahrawi remains quite strong; and France, Morocco’s protector—could summon up a few words about self-determination to help move the process along. If they choose not to say anything, they should remain silent bystanders and avoid compounding Trump’s mistake.

A post-inauguration bipartisan agreement between Biden and Inhofe could repair the disarray caused by Trump’s gratuitous grandstanding. Such a deal would mark a welcome change from the past four years of chaos and division, and a return to pursuing U.S. national interests rather than those of Donald Trump.

John Bolton: Four ways Republicans can move on from the election results

December 10, 2020

This article appeared in The Washington Post on December 10, 2020. Click here to view the original article.

By John Bolton
December 10, 2020

On Monday, Donald Trump will officially lose the 2020 presidential election. In their respective states, electoral college delegations chosen by the citizens will meet to cast their ballots. If there are no “faithless” electors, 306 votes will go to Joe Biden for president and Kamala D. Harris for vice president, and 232 to Trump and Mike Pence. There will be no lawful way to change this result.

Most Americans will be relieved that the election is over. Unfortunately, too many Republicans will see only the ratification of a “stolen election.” Why? Because for months Trump has proclaimed he could lose only through foul play, and because too few Republicans said this was nonsense.

Rather than “America First,” Trump’s true slogan is “Trump First,” so his fantasy will not end easily. Nonetheless, starting with the resolution of the electoral college vote, Republicans, and all Americans, can take significant steps to move beyond Nov. 3, without endless, debilitating reargument of what happened.

First, everyone — Republicans especially — should recognize that the national political dynamic will change irrevocably at noon on Jan. 20. It will never be the same again for Trump. There will be a new president, doing his job, whether Trump adjusts to it or not. Even though barely more than five weeks now remain until the transfer of power, many who have been unable or unwilling to feel the tectonic plates shifting will finally recognize the change. Mar-a-Lago is not the same as the Oval Office. Foreign leaders will not flock to Florida for meetings.

Despite four years as president, Trump never fully grasped the issues before him, and he won’t learn anything new once he leaves. His observations will become increasingly irrelevant.

Trump will not disappear entirely. But the thrill will assuredly fade.

Second, with this coming dramatic shift in the political universe in mind, every Republican as of next Monday’s electoral college vote should publicly acknowledge what they have known in silence for many weeks: Biden is the president-elect. We Republicans should all just say it and get it over with.

If confronted by bitter-enders, stuck on Trump and dreaming of continuing the fight, for example on Jan. 6 when the electoral college ballots are opened and counted in Congress, Republicans should take their cue from Nancy Reagan: Just say no.

Third, there is every reason to believe Republicans can make Democrats’ hold on the White House last just one term. Analysts across the political spectrum have noted the GOP’s November successes, other than Trump’s loss. Winning at all levels in coming elections, however, requires a party not obsessed with contemplating its 2020 presidential navel.

That will necessitate disbanding the GOP’s circular firing squads now blasting away in Georgia, Arizona and elsewhere. This internecine warfare is not along ideological lines; by any coherent measure, all the main participants are conservatives. The common denominator is that Trump set these dumpster fires to advance his own interests.

The Republican Party’s lasting strength is its focus on policy, not personalities, and certainly not cults. To reclaim the high ground, national, state and local party structures must focus impartially on enhancing support for all Republicans, not just Trump. We must have open debates on policy, and new platforms reflecting those debates. As long as Trump continues broaching a possible 2024 candidacy, this neutrality is threatened.

Any party official unable to remain impartial should be a candidate for retirement. Historically, after presidential-election defeats, Republicans have sought new party leadership. Following Barry Goldwater’s 1964 defeat, Ray Bliss took charge as national chairman, with excellent 1966 and 1968 results; after Gerald Ford’s 1976 loss, Bill Brock stepped up and laid the groundwork for Ronald Reagan’s 1980 victory.

This is an entirely normal intra-party transition. It is not about any particular losing candidate or party official, and saying so casts no blame. But without ironclad assurances of impartiality by current party officials, based on their personal honor, Republicans risk missing a big opportunity for revitalization. Contested elections for party positions are not bad things.

Fourth, speaking as a baby boomer, I make perhaps the most painful point: Republicans should begin thinking about finally selecting a non-boomer presidential candidate. Recalling Ronald Reagan’s line about Walter Mondale, the “youth and inexperience” of these late-comers may be a burden for them, but it should not be insuperable.

If Biden again bears the Democratic standard in 2024 — when he will turn 82 — and faces a non-boomer Republican opponent, the contrast will be palpable. If Biden doesn’t run, and a 78-year-old Trump is again the Republican nominee, the contrast will also be palpable. This one should not be hard for the GOP, as long as the succession is based on merit, not heredity.

The U.A.E. Needs U.S. Arms to Ward Off Iran

December 06, 2020

Misguided opposition in the Senate bodes ill for U.S. Mideast policy in the Biden administration.

This article appeared in The Wall Street Journal on December 6, 2020. Click here to view the original article.

By John Bolton
December 6, 2020

Senate opposition to the proposed U.S. arms sales to the United Arab Emirates reflects a dangerous reversion to the Obama-era understanding of the Middle East. While opponents of the deal claim that the Emirates have misused other U.S. weapons in Yemen, the real issue is much broader.

A Senate vote on legislation to halt the $23 billion arms deal is expected in days. While opposition will likely fail—even if the bill passes, supermajorities would be needed to override the expected presidential veto—the thinking behind it foreshadows an ill-advised Biden administration policy toward Iran.

The Iranian threat to regional peace and security has altered the strategic reality of the Middle East since the misbegotten 2015 nuclear deal. Arab states increasingly fear Tehran’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, but also its support for terrorism in Yemen, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq, as well as its conventional military activities. The decision by Bahrain and the U.A.E. to establish full diplomatic relations with Israel shows how Iran’s increased—and largely unchallenged—belligerence has realigned the Middle East’s correlation of forces.

Many of these shifts stem from the nuclear deal, which released between $120 billion and $150 billion in frozen assets and freed Iran from arduous economic sanctions, providing Tehran the resources to expand its military and clandestine capabilities. Iran’s Quds Force used its share of the windfall to beef up support for Iraqi Shiite militias, Syria’s Assad, and Hezbollah in Lebanon and Syria. In response, the Emirates and other U.S. friends rightly want more-advanced arms.

Less reported, but of vital importance to the Gulf Cooperation Council’s six Arab member states, was Iran’s dramatic expansion of support for Yemen’s Houthi rebels. Previous Iranian aid to the Houthis had been intended to stalemate Saudi and Emirati efforts to install a stable, pro-GCC government in San’a, but in 2017 Tehran ramped up shipments of sophisticated weaponry that could strike far beyond Yemen’s borders. This threatened Saudi Arabia’s oil infrastructure; important civilian airports in Riyadh, Dubai and Abu Dhabi; and commercial shipping in the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, critical sea lanes to the Suez Canal.

The Gulf Arab states are entirely justified in resisting Tehran’s intrusion into their backyard. Yemen’s conflict has had more than its share of brutality, much of it caused by the Houthis’ inhumanity and ruthless exploitation of food-aid programs. Iran’s intervention and cynical manipulation of the disarray has compounded the humanitarian problem.

Blocking arms sales to the U.A.E. or Saudi Arabia wouldn’t ameliorate conditions in Yemen. The Emiratis have scaled back their involvement, and the Saudi-led coalition has taken much-needed steps to avoid civilian casualties. U.S. weapons are needed more urgently to defend against Iran’s threat in the Gulf. U.S. vacillation could thwart the emerging Israeli-Arab template for regional peace and stability. The Arabs are deeply concerned by President Trump’s policy gyrations, including troop withdrawals from Iraq and Afghanistan. They fear that under Joe Biden the U.S. presence will recede further, leaving them increasingly vulnerable to Iran’s aspirations for hegemony.

Unlike in years past, Israel doesn’t object to the proposed arms deal. While it is too early to call Israel’s ties with the Arabs “alliances,” such relations could arise. In any case, they are all U.S. allies. Strengthening these links benefits America.

Other than virtue signaling, what conceivable reason is there to oppose arming a vulnerable ally, the U.A.E.? The most troubling possibility is that Mr. Biden and Senate Democrats cling to the romantic notion that Tehran’s ayatollahs long to join “the international community.” If only America and its regional allies dropped their hostility and Washington rejoined the 2015 deal, the argument goes, Iran’s nuclear-weapons and ballistic-missile programs would cease to be problems. Other issues could be negotiated and the Middle East would be at peace. This was nonsense in 2015 and still is.

The Biden team stresses constantly the need to strengthen relations with allies—conventional wisdom for all but Mr. Trump. But not every ally thinks alike. America’s Middle Eastern friends, who live well within range of Tehran’s missiles, drones, terrorist proxies and conventional forces, don’t buy the “peace in our time” theory. U.S. allies in Europe want to revitalize the nuclear deal, but does it tell us anything that Russia and China agree?

This is an early test: Does Mr. Biden know that Iran is the biggest threat to regional security? Will he realize how dramatically the ground in the Middle East has shifted?

The Conservative Future Requires Optimism and Confidence

November 30, 2020

How the GOP can regain the voters Trump alienated, but also keep those whom he attracted.

This article appeared in The Dispatch on November 30, 2020. Click here to view the original article.

By John Bolton
November 30, 2020

Donald Trump’s post-November 3 conduct has been consistent with his entire presidency: wholly centered on Donald Trump. One of the worst consequences of this self-indulgence for conservatives is the treacherous fixation on whether one agrees or disagrees with Trump. Even when he embraces some element of conservative truth, he typically so exaggerates or distorts it that one can barely discern the underlying principle.

Or worse. Remember, for example, his diktat at an April 13 coronavirus briefing: “When somebody’s the president of the United States, the authority is total, and that’s the way it’s got to be.” An unvarnished Trumpism, made in Trumpian style, and utterly contradictory to American conservative thinking.

Rather than aligning with principle (which Trump lacks), long-standing conservatives torqued themselves uncomfortably to support his positions. This is unnatural and unwise, and we must stop it. Politics based on personality rather than philosophy is not conservatism’s credo. When politicians go astray, we judge their failures against our principles. We do not readjust our principles to suit their personal interests, as the paradigm case of Richard Nixon demonstrates. James Buckley, New York’s Conservative Party senator, was the first Republican to call for Nixon’s resignation. In the congressional delegation to the Oval Office that told Nixon he had to go, Barry Goldwater had the most impact.

Liberal pundits complain ceaselessly that today’s Republicans do not demonstrate sufficient courage against Trump. This is surely what liberals want to believe, but they misread conservatives as badly as Trump’s misreading that he owns the party.

Consider Michigan, where Trump’s post-election conspiracy theories met their Waterloo. Defeated by more than 150,000 votes, he authorized litigation asserting massive fraud and electoral malfeasance, as he did nationwide. Not one of his cases produced facts changing even a single vote. This conspiracy must be so vast and so successful that it left no evidence behind, making it modern history’s pre-eminent covert operation.

Rebuffed in state and federal courts, Trump abandoned legal reasoning for pure political force, attempting to rewrite the constitutional role of state legislators to generate slates of pro-Trump electors. He summoned Mike Shirkey and Lee Chatfield, the top Republicans in Michigan’s Senate and House, to Washington, hoping to intimidate them into overturning their state’s counting and certification process. They refused.

The pressure shifted to Michigan’s State Board of Canvassers. The Republican national and Michigan state chairs urged the board to postpone certification for two weeks, thereby enabling more mischief. Republican board member Aaron Van Langevelde disagreed, in plainly conservative terms: “We have a clear legal duty to certify the results of the election, as shown by the returns that were given to us. … We cannot and should not go beyond that. As John Adams once said, ‘We are a government of laws, not men.’”

Shirkey, Chatfield and Van Langevelde are heroes, and far from alone. National GOP leaders can profit from their example. If these three Michiganders can do it, so can the rest of us.

With Trump’s efforts now defeated in fact, if not yet in his imagination, what comes next? One immediate project is producing documentation analogous to the Black Book of Communism, to serve as a definitive refutation of Trump’s extravagant, unsubstantiated claims of “stealing the election.” Such a work will not convince all conspiracy theorists, but we need an authoritative, even encyclopedic, recital of the truth for future use.

Longer term, there must be a broad “conversation” about the direction of the conservative movement and the Republican party. Much of the havoc Trump wreaked is uniquely due to his ego, his public style, and his distortion of basic conservative philosophy. We should have no illusions that excising Trump’s lesions from the body politic will be easy. Many conservatives invested themselves in his success and have not yet receded. Still, there is no point in demanding that they confess error as an auto da fe. We need instead a “malice toward none, charity toward all” approach, which is fully justified by the Democratic left’s larger threat, whether from Biden or his successors.

Our objective should be restoring to conservatism an unmistakably Reaganite optimism and confidence: the “morning in America” crowd defending our “shining city on a hill,” not Trump’s dystopian “American carnage” approach. We can thereby regain the voters Trump alienated, but also keep those whom he attracted. Blue-collar families who left the Democratic party in 1980 were called “Reagan Democrats,” and those who have voted for Trump are essentially their contemporary counterparts. The proposed “conversation” may be lengthy, but there is every reason to believe it will succeed with enough work.

We need to start now, in time for Georgia’s critical January 5 runoffs. Victory for incumbents David Perdue and Kelly Loeffler will produce a 52-vote Republican Senate majority, a major check against Biden administration excesses. Placating desolate Trump supporters is purportedly the rationale for not speaking truthfully about Trump’s defeat, but hard political logic points in exactly the opposite direction. By pursuing his personal interests, Trump has vastly complicated the prospects for winning both runoffs. For no reason other than ego, he induced Perdue and Loeffler to demand the resignation of Brad Raffensperger, Georgia’s Republican secretary of state. Now, some Trump supporters argue for boycotting Perdue and Loeffler because they are insufficiently pro-Trump, perhaps writing in Trump’s own name to show their dissatisfaction.

Nothing like fratricide to kick off a crucial election campaign. Obviously, keeping a GOP Senate majority is the immediate electoral priority, which underscores precisely why remaining silent on Trump’s conspiracy theories is so damaging. His impending campaign visit to Georgia could well cause more harm. Republican voters will accept the truth if explained rationally by responsible party leaders. But if all they hear is Trump barking, they may well believe, and far beyond Georgia, that no one disputes his version of “the stolen elections.” That would be dangerous beyond calculation.

Looking toward 2024, the risks of silence only grow. The “Trump lane” to the party’s presidential nomination will be congested, especially if Trump is still in it. Just as Democrats almost blew their 2020 prospects by endlessly rehashing “Russian collusion,” we could do the same by relitigating “the steal” merely to gratify Trump’s fantasy. While a crowded race to be Trump’s heir would free up lanes for those who do not seek that role, such lanes might disappear if the “stolen election” becomes dogma. It is far easier to avoid this calamity by speaking now, rather than waiting until minds and memories are hardened by unrefuted Trump logorrhea.

Preparing the battlefield for 2024 will largely unfold through Republican responses to Biden’s priorities. We will see no lack of enthusiasm for the opposition party’s most important duty: opposition. The issue is whether we proceed in Trump mode, further undermining the integrity and legitimacy of our institutions, or whether we fight as true conservatives, attacking leftist policies without despoiling the foundations of America’s flourishing.

The Senate in particular will have a frontline role dealing with the Biden presidency through the “advice and consent” process for his nominees. Several Republican senators have already criticized those nominated for national-security positions, laying down markers that they might fight confirmation. I agree with their policy critiques, especially Biden’s likely fecklessness on China. What they have not addressed, however, is the Senate’s proper role in assessing executive branch nominees (life-tenured judicial nominees residing in a completely separate analytical framework). In a world truer to the intent of the Framers, the Senate would grant wide deference to a president’s choices, recognizing that his views control executive policies, not the views of his subordinates. The legitimate targets of opposition should be only those with grave personal failings or views beyond the range of reason.

I have some standing to raise this issue. Twice in George W. Bush’s presidency, Biden unjustifiably tried to block my nominations, first as an undersecretary of State, and later as U.S. ambassador to the U.N. My complaint, however, is constitutional, not personal. In recent years, increasing partisanship in advice-and-consent matters has risked transforming our system of separated powers into something quasi-parliamentary. So far, Biden’s nominees are not beyond the pale. Quite the contrary. He and his team instead embody Disraeli’s famous put-down of Gladstone’s front bench: “You behold a range of exhausted volcanoes. Not a flame flickers on a single pallid crest.”

Allow Biden these nominees; it will serve him right. Make their confirmations miserable, to be sure. Harry them with uncomfortable questions, exposing the weaknesses in Biden’s and their own stated policy positions and records. Once they take office, haul them back repeatedly for hearings. This would all serve the greater good. I am not so naïve to believe that reversion to the norm here will arise solely from constitutional arguments. Still, one can appeal to conservative Senators aspiring to the presidency to imagine their reactions when Democrats with blood in their eyes are rampaging against their nominees. Just a suggestion.

With Trump thrashing around for the next four years and Biden in the White House, conservatives face a sustained two-front struggle. Nonetheless, it is entirely winnable with persistent concentration and effort. We must remind ourselves that it was always morning in Reagan’s America, and it should be in ours as well.

How Trump is weakening America

November 17, 2020

How Trump is weakening America: His refusal to concede defeat strengthens Russia and China

This article appeared in The New York Daily News on November 17, 2020. Click here to view the original article.

By John Bolton
November 17, 2020

As Russia, China and other adversaries try to undermine our citizenry’s confidence in American institutions, Donald Trump has been their hopefully unwitting ally. Oblivious to anything not directly benefitting him, Trump spent much of the 2020 campaign, and has spent nearly every waking hour since Nov. 3 complaining that the outcome was rigged, and that massive conspiracies to commit fraud are overturning his re-election.

Trump’s unprecedented insistence that the core machinery of U.S. elections (voter identification and vote casting, counting and certification) is being manipulated is obviously wrong. Significant protections and safeguards are built into the electoral process in every state and county because we know that the possibilities for fraud and stolen elections are ever-present, notwithstanding the dewy-eyed view of some commentators. If Trump had evidence of election-rigging or fraud, he should have produced it by now. He has not; lawsuits have flamed out or been radically pared back.

But his continued aspersions on the 2020 election buttress the case our enemies make against us. Now, they can quote an American president for their own ends.

Without a doubt, Russian and Chinese efforts in the 2016 and 2020 elections have been devoted to undermining America’s confidence in its own institutions, increasing mistrust among our fellow citizens, and confusing the public discourse with false and misleading information. They have most certainly used cyberwarfare against the integrity of our elections, and China’s subversive efforts especially have ranged far more broadly, as Vice President Mike Pence has previously made clear.

We, and Trump in particular, do Moscow’s and Beijing’s work for them when we argue whether they favor Trump or favor Biden. Russia and China favor themselves; merely inducing Americans to argue about their strategies is likely a vital part of the strategies themselves. Trump has been told all this, but his fascination with himself bleaches out all other concerns in his public remarks.

Attacking America’s institutions is not a Republican Party or conservative hallmark. For Trump, it is something of a commonplace. For example, in a 2017 pre-Super Bowl interview with Fox News’ Bill O’Reilly, Trump said he respected Russia’s Vladimir Putin. O’Reilly responded that Putin was “a killer.” Trump paused for a few seconds — perhaps actually reflecting on what was he wanted to say — before responding, “We’ve got a lot of killers. You think our country is so innocent?”

This Trumpian moral equivalency emerges all too often. Prior to his embarrassing exchange with O’Reilly, Trump said of Putin in 2015, “he’s running his country, and at least he’s a leader, unlike what he have in this country.” The list of comparable examples is depressingly long.

After Nov. 3, Trump’s antics reached fever-pitch. In nearly incoherent remarks during the early hours of Wednesday, Nov. 4, as the vote totals were turning against him, Trump said, “This is a fraud on the American public. This is an embarrassment to our country. We were getting ready to win this election. Frankly, we did win this election.” On Nov. 5, Trump said further, “If you count the legal votes, I easily win. If you count the illegal votes, they can try to steal the election from us.” Even when he seemingly lets the truth slip out, as on Nov. 15, when he admitted a Biden win, he quickly reverses course.

All of this is propaganda, which does constitute “an embarrassment to our country,” coming as it does from the president. Trump’s record over four years, and continuing right until today, is in the sociological expression Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan popularized, “defining deviancy down” in the political world. Our expectations for Trump are so low, we have lost the capacity to be surprised.

Fortunately, however, Trump’s abnormality provides precisely the way to repair the damage his presidency, and especially his post-election performance, have caused us internationally. We must stress that Trump is an aberration, an anomaly, rather than an accurate reflection of the American system or its people. Trump’s war with the election results, sadly but ironically helpfully, is the best proof of his aberrant status.

To repair the damage that his tweets and his actions have caused in recent days, as with repairing the larger damage he has done to our reputation overseas, we need to emphasize that the 2020 election has, hopefully, brought a return to “normalcy.” Biden may not like being this century’s Warren Harding, but that may just be his lot, at least in the rest of the world’s estimate.

We will have significant debates between normal Republicans and Democrats about Biden’s foreign and domestic policies, which we and the world will welcome as normal, and this too will help repair Trump’s damage. The process could actually move quickly. Let’s hope so.

Bolton, Trump’s national security adviser from 2018 to 2019, is author of “The Room Where It Happened: A White House Memoir.”

The China Nightmare’ Review: Beijing Never Got the Memo

November 17, 2020

China is not the juggernaut of Wall Street ﬁnanciers’ imaginations, but that doesn’t make its expansionism any less of a threat.

This article appeared in The Wall Street Journal on November 17, 2020. Click here to view the original article.

By John Bolton
November 17, 2020

With Joe Biden’s election now declared by the press, albeit still unacknowledged by Donald Trump, it is appropriate to consider what policies his administration will pursue starting Jan. 20. Any new president’s national-security policy would be more coherent, consistent and sustained than Mr. Trump’s. The risk with Mr. Biden is not that his policy will be chaotic, but that it will be badly misguided.

One thing is certain: China is the most significant international threat that America—and the global West generally—now faces. And that will be true for the rest of this century. Mr. Biden’s real views on dealing with China are obscure, more collateral damage from an election campaign that rarely debated foreign and defense policy in any substantive way.

Much remains to be seen, especially in light of China’s responsibility for worsening the coronavirus pandemic by its concealment and disinformation. Beijing’s disingenuousness has worsened U.S. public opinion about China, a shift echoed world-wide, potentially far more negatively than the adverse reactions to the 1989 Tiananmen Square repression.

Dan Blumenthal of the American Enterprise Institute has stepped into this void with “The China Nightmare: The Grand Ambitions of a Decaying State.” Serious practitioners and students of U.S.-China relations will need to reckon with his analysis.

Mr. Blumenthal’s approach will catch many by surprise. He says plainly that “China has taken advantage of American complacency.” He rejects the conventional thinking that China’s domestic economy is still moving from strength to strength, thereby providing Chinese president Xi Jinping and the Communist Party with the wherewithal to insist on China’s centrality in Asia and to challenge the U.S. globally. Indeed, it is key to Mr. Blumenthal’s “China nightmare” thesis that Mr. Xi’s domestic policies (and those of his immediate predecessor, Hu Jintao) have rolled back many of the dramatic, market-oriented reforms of the Deng Xiaoping era in favor of increased state control. The Xi regime is impairing China’s economic growth (and any prospect for an innovation-based economy) and laying the basis for failure internationally. Mr. Blumenthal writes that the main thesis of his book “is that despite (or perhaps because of) China’s growing internal weaknesses, it is pushing forward grand strategic ambitions.” China is not the juggernaut of Wall Street financiers’ imaginations, but that doesn’t make its expansionism less a threat.

Mr. Blumenthal challenges received wisdom in other ways. Contrary to the prevailing mantra of China’s “peaceful rise,” his analysis stresses that Mao Zedong and his successors repeatedly used military force against their geographical neighbors. They are doing it today, from the East and South China Seas to the “line of actual control” on the disputed frontier with India.

Domestically, the Xi regime is, among other things, engaging in armed repression against ethnic minorities like Tibetans and Uighurs; crushing dissent in Hong Kong (and thereby violating the “handover” agreement with the U.K.); and initiating a “social credit” system so the state can rank all Chinese citizens in every aspect of their lives, from jaywalking to dissent. China faces “insurmountable social problems,” Mr. Blumenthal writes. But “a weaker China . . . does not necessarily mean a risk-averse China.”

While China’s theft of intellectual property is a huge problem for the U.S., Mr. Blumenthal argues further, we cannot ignore the reality that America and Japan purposely transferred considerable scientific and technological knowhow to China. When we assign responsibility for the consequences of this catastrophic error, we need not look far.

Beijing apparently never received the memo that the age of empire is over. The Chinese Communists have focused on fully restoring the Qing empire’s boundaries, and no lacuna in achieving that goal is more painful than Taiwan’s de facto independence. In resolutely Orwellian fashion, China has insisted so fiercely on its distorted interpretation of the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué’s “one China” language that even Americans now unwittingly accept China’s version. That suits Beijing; it doubtless hopes Mr. Biden’s team will find those pesky Taiwanese as much a nuisance as did Jimmy Carter, for thwarting what Mr. Blumenthal calls China’s “main strategic-military priority since the end of the Cold War.”

Taiwan’s example of freedom and openness, Mr. Blumenthal contends, is enormously disruptive on the mainland. The U.S. could put the Communist Party in a vise by using information statecraft and other forms of political warfare. China has for years been waging political warfare against us, so it is well past time to implement a counterstrategy. In cyberspace, America is doing precisely that, forestalling or retaliating against efforts to influence our domestic political discourse, thus building deterrence to prevent such attacks in the future.

While a true grand strategy toward China is urgently needed, Beijing’s obsession with Taipei provides Washington an asymmetric response to objectionable Chinese behavior. We can answer its belligerence and intransigence through diplomatic or political means, wounding the Chinese Communists deeply, and simultaneously bolstering Taiwan.

The most consequential step, one I have urged for over 20 years, is for America to grant Taiwan full diplomatic recognition. By all customary international law criteria (a defined territory and population, a capital city, and a government carrying out normal governmental functions), Taiwan is a sovereign state, and democratic to boot. Relations between the U.S. and China would chill dramatically, but that is what China should fear, not America. There are smaller steps Washington could take. We could, for example, regularly receive Taiwanese officials in U.S. government buildings, which would seriously undermine the legitimacy of China’s campaign to force Taiwan into a morganatic union.

Our relations with Beijing will not get easier over the next four years. Mr. Blumenthal has done the Biden administration a favor with “The China Nightmare.” Let’s hope the president-elect takes advantage of it.

Trump will draw up hitlist of ‘traitors’ to blame – I fully expect to be on it JOHN BOLTON

November 15, 2020

THE 2020 US election is over. Welcome to another uniquely American institution, the “transition” to the Biden Administration.

This article appeared in The Daily Express on November 15, 2020. Click here to view the original article.

By John Bolton
November 15, 2020

We have perhaps the longest transition of any democracy, inherited from the Constitution’s first days, because of the geographic reach and limited transport capabilities among the 13 newly united states. Today, with presidential Inaugurations fixed for January 20, the transition is over a month shorter than originally. America’s most important presidential transition followed the 1800 election, when John Adams, the defeated Federalist incumbent, handed over to his Republican challenger, Thomas Jefferson.

In 1797, George Washington left office graciously, succeeded by Adams, his own Vice President. For Adams to accept defeat by the opposition party, however, was a big deal.

Jefferson said memorably in a brief inaugural address “we are all Republicans; we are all Federalists.”

He was sworn in by the new Chief Justice, John Marshall, nominated by Adams after his defeat, and confirmed by the last Federalist Senate majority after their defeat; so much for the supposed “inappropriateness” of nominating Amy Coney Barrett to the Supreme Court before the 2020 election.

Marshall was serving contemporaneously as Adams’ Secretary of State, and also served under Jefferson for approximately a month, a practice now unthinkable.

The 1800-01 transition was not free from rancour. Adams left town before Jefferson’s swearing-in, something we may also see on January 20.

But in their later years, Jefferson and Adams renewed their friendship from the time they crafted the Declaration of Independence.

They both died on July 4, 1826, the Declaration’s fiftieth anniversary. You can’t make it up.

Can anyone imagine Trump playing the roles of the Founding Fathers? Of course not. He will not leave graciously like Washington; so far, he has made Adams look like a man of noblesse oblige; and, unlike Jefferson, he is incapable of saying “we are all Republicans, we are all Democrats.”

So, what is likely in the two months before Joe Biden is sworn in?

At present, Trump has not only not conceded, he continues to insist the election was rigged.

He has unleashed Rudy Giuliani and other surrogates to “litigate” his legal challenges through news conferences and interviews, rather than in State and Federal courts.

Press reports indicate that lawyers previously recruited by the Trump campaign are now making themselves unavailable to join the legal efforts, and new recruits are scarce.

Judicial results for Trump so far are dismal, and little or no probative evidence or new legal arguments seem to be forthcoming.

The likely outcome is that Trump’s badly-faltering legal offensive will continue to collapse, perhaps ending with a whimper within the week. That doesn’t mean Trump will concede, gracefully or otherwise. Instead, he will proclaim “stab in the back” theories about why he lost: list the many “traitors” in his Administration and campaign who undercut him (I expect to be on that list, and in very good company indeed); and attack the always unpopular news media, political pollsters, and left-wing activists now poised to destroy the country.

Make no mistake, unless Republican leaders speak out against this fantasy, Trump will convince many people that the 2020 election was stolen.

Commentators left and right argue that any effort to present the truth to Republican base voters will inevitably fail, so loyal are they to Trump. Ironically, this theory’s most ardent advocates are leftist Democrats, who hope to tie the Trump albatross around Republicans’ necks forever. The stakes are high.

Ultimately, of course, if truth cannot prevail, the future would indeed be dire.

But all that is really required is for Republican leaders other than Trump to do some leading.

If more speak out, the Trump fantasy can be exposed, and his supporters will reconcile themselves with his defeat while remaining loyal to what will hopefully be a revived, Reaganite Republican party.

In the meantime, the current controversy over whether Biden and his team can formally begin the transition process will also be resolved.

Growing numbers of congressional Republicans are pressing for Biden and his senior staff to receive intelligence briefings; others have concluded what should now be obvious, namely that the formal transition itself should get underway.

There need be no admission or concession by Trump that he has lost in order to make the prudent management point that whoever wins needs to be fully prepared on January 20.

Trump obviously doesn’t need a transition, but Biden does, and the sooner it begins, the better.

Forecasting what happens after January 20 remains difficult until the results of two runoff elections for Georgia’s Senate seats are held on January 5.

Peculiarities of Georgia election law require the runoffs, which will be hotly fought. If Republicans prevail in just one, they will retain control of the Senate; if they win both, they will have come through a difficult 2020 campaign losing just one seat net.

Effectively, therefore, anything Biden wants will require dealing with Republican Senate leader Mitch McConnell, who will be the second most powerful man in Washington.

Somewhat under-reported is the success story for Republicans in the House of Representatives, where they are already projected to gain six-to-seven seats from their pre-November 3 totals, and probably more.

A majority of the House is 218 members, and Republicans could be just around 212. If House Democrats maintain their unity, they can still work their will, but the possibility of splitting their slender majority present numerous opportunities for Republicans.

Even more troubling for Democrats and Speaker Nancy Pelosi are the upcoming 2022 elections; in US history the incumbent President’s congressional party almost always suffers losses, sometime quite significant, in the midterms.

This shadow alone will diminish the Democrats’ maneuvering room for the next two years.

In short, the 2020 election was a loss for Trump, but a surprising success for Republicans in the House and Senate, and also in the States, where they picked up one additional governership, and several state legislative houses, crucial in the redistricting required by the 2020 census results. Stay tuned!

Time is running out for Trump — and Republicans who coddle him

November 11, 2020

This article appeared in The Washington Post on November 11, 2020. Click here to view the original article.

By John Bolton
November 11, 2020

As of this writing, the Republican Party has not suffered permanent damage to its integrity and reputation because of President Trump’s post-election rampaging. This will not be true much longer.

Trump has so far failed to do so, and there is no indication he can. If he can’t, his “right” to contest the election is beside the point. The real issue is the grievous harm he is causing to public trust in America’s constitutional system. Trump’s time is running out, even as his rhetoric continues escalating. And time is running out for Republicans who hope to maintain the party’s credibility, starting with Georgia’s two Senate runoffs in January. Here is the cold political reality: Trump is enhancing his own brand (in his mind) while harming the Republican brand. The party needs a long internal conversation about the post-Trump era, but first it needs to get there honorably.

Consider the competing interests. Donald Trump’s is simple and straightforward: Donald Trump. The near-term Republican interest is winning the Georgia runoffs. The long-term Republican interest emphatically involves winning those Senate seats, but it also involves rejecting Trump’s personalized, erratic, uncivil, unpresidential and ultimately less-than-effective politics and governance.

One approach holds that coddling Trump while he trashes the U.S. electoral system will help him get over the loss, thereby making it easier to reconcile him to leaving the Oval Office. But this coddling strategy is exactly backward. The more Republican leaders kowtow, the more Trump believes he is still in control and the less likely he will do what normal presidents do: make a gracious concession speech; fully cooperate with the president-elect in a smooth transition process; and validate the election process itself by joining his successor at the Jan. 20 inauguration.

Coddling proponents plead that an enraged Trump will jeopardize the chances of victory in the Georgia runoffs. But that is true only if party leaders do not speak up, explaining to voters what the real facts are. Do we in the GOP not trust our own base enough to absorb the truth? They will find out in due course anyway if Trump’s election litigation indeed crashes into reality. Once in court, state or federal, before judges appointed by Republicans and Democrats, actual witnesses will have to raise their right hands and tell the truth, and then face gale-force cross-examination from lawyers for President-elect Joe Biden’s campaign. It’s one thing to tweet; it’s another thing to testify.

Who is going to explain that to Georgia’s voters? Republican leaders should lay that groundwork now and not cede the field to a president whose interests directly contradict the party’s. Otherwise, they will rue the day they stood silent.

In the meantime, the litigation swirls on, risking, if it is ultimately exposed as unfounded, even more destructive consequences to public trust in the electoral process. Trump says he wants the truth. Surely, therefore, his lawyers will not engage in frivolous arguments, obfuscation, pettifoggery or dilatory tactics that would complicate uncovering the truth, right? Sadly, that has never been Trump’s style during a long career of litigation as a lifestyle.

Republican passivity risks additional negative consequences for the country. Trump is engaging in what could well be a systematic purge of his own administration, starting with the utterly unjustified firing of Defense Secretary Mark T. Esper this week and continuing through high- and mid-level civilian offices in the department. Lisa Gordon-Hagerty, head of the National Nuclear Safety Administration, was forced to resign. Washington is filled with rumors that the CIA and FBI directors are next.

This is being done with just 10 weeks left in the administration. All transitions bring uncertainty, but to decapitate substantial parts of the national-security apparatus during such a period for no reason other than personal pique is irresponsible and dangerous. Republicans know this.

Simultaneously, Trump is frustrating Biden’s transition, based on the 2000 precedent, when George W. Bush’s transition was delayed for 37 days by Al Gore’s contesting the Florida results. Two wrongs don’t make a right. It implies no acknowledgment of Biden’s legitimacy as president-elect for Trump to facilitate prudent transition planning, certainly in the national-security field, nor in finalizing distribution plans for a coronavirus vaccine, which will largely occur next year. At least, that’s how a confident, mature, responsible president would see it.

For the good of America, the 2020 election needs to be brought expeditiously to the conclusion that all logic tells us is coming. National security requires that the transition get underway effectively. These are Republican values. We will acknowledge reality sooner or later. For the good of the party as well as the country, let’s make it sooner.

Donald Trump’s disgraceful behaviour risks doing lasting damage

November 09, 2020

This article appeared in The Sunday Telegraph on November 7, 2020. Click here to view the original article.

By John Bolton
November 7, 2020

The US presidential race has now widely been called for Joe Biden. The counting has been slower than we’d like, and legal challenges to the process are under way. But if things end as now seems likely, whatever damage the electoral process and the nation’s institutions have suffered in recent days is easily repairable. After the 2000 election, Democratic nominee Al Gore precipitated a contentious recount in Florida – I spent 33 days there on George W Bush’s legal team – and America recovered in due course. We will recover from this, too.

There is, however, one significant caveat: if the Leader of the Free World continues to claim, with essentially no supportive evidence, that the election was stolen through fraud, we will have far more serious problems than merely reconciling disappointed partisans to the reality of defeat.

In the early hours of Wednesday, and again on Thursday evening, Donald Trump asserted unambiguously that he had won the election. He argued that Democrats, in league with corrupt, dishonest or incompetent election officials in six or seven states, were dumping out hundreds of thousands of fake ballots, thereby producing fraudulent majorities affording Biden an Electoral College victory. His surrogates made equally exaggerated claims in multiple state and federal lawsuits, not one of which has brought the Trump campaign any significant vindication, or done the slightest thing to change the results.

This disgraceful performance by the US president is deeply troubling. Any candidate is entitled to express disappointment when he or she loses, complain that life is unfair, and trigger all legitimately available election-law remedies to seek redress for alleged improprieties. Of course, raising claims, however permissible, is not the same as proving them, or showing that even validated claims have had an actual, let alone dispositive, effect on the election itself.
Responsible politicians know that, ultimately, they will pay a price if they go too far, even rhetorically. Apparently, no one ever explained this to Trump, or if they did, he didn’t pay any more attention to it than he usually pays to good advice.

The result is that the Republican Party now faces a character test. The party’s leaders can either reject Trump’s false claims and insist that he provide actual evidence in court, or join in his fantasia and forever tar their own reputations, and that of the party. To date, only a small number of elected Republican officials have commented publicly, evenly divided between these two possibilities. Many more need to speak out, and soon.

There is also a larger question ahead once the election is well and truly behind us, quite possibly once the Electoral College votes, which this year will be on Dec 14. The Republican Party must begin a serious conversation about its new direction going forward, which I hope will return it to a Reaganite approach. It is profoundly wrong to contend, as many commentators already are, that Trump has an iron grip on the party, and will dictate its strategy and determine its candidates from exile at Mar-a-Lago in Palm Beach, Florida, perhaps plotting a 2024 Trump presidential campaign.

In fact, Trump’s influence will drop precipitously once he leaves the Oval Office. He will be, in a word he hates, a loser, and the whole world will know it. Only one defeated incumbent president has ever regained the office, and that was, in 1892, Grover Cleveland (who was both the 22nd and 24th president), hardly a compelling precedent. Dozens of prospective 2024 Republican presidential candidates are already lining up. Trump the man will certainly remain a factor, but there is no “Trumpism”; his administration has had no coherent philosophy, certainly not on national security matters. And after Jan 20, the world will no longer hang on every new Trump tweet.

In Washington, attention will shift rapidly to the new Biden administration and its plans, and how well (or poorly) they will fare in a Congress where Republicans probably still control the Senate and Democrats have a diminished majority in the House. Biden faces an angry Left wing in his own party, and his relations with Mitch McConnell, the Senate majority leader, could well be the big political story ahead.

Not all of Trump’s legacy is bad. Millions of blue-collar voters have rejected the Democratic Party’s radicals. Even more inconveniently for the Left, Hispanic support for Republican candidates has swelled nationwide. Without Trump, we can now seek the return of voters whom his behaviour repulsed, and build a long-term Republican governing majority.

Soon again, we will elect a real conservative Republican president.