Military Force Must Remain an Option With North Korea

February 23, 2021

Trump’s personal diplomacy failed, but Biden can’t go back to the Obama approach.

This article appeared in Bloomberg Politics on February 23, 2021. Click here to view the original article.

By John Bolton
February 23, 2021

President Joe Biden last week made his most extensive foreign-policy remarks since taking office, speaking virtually to a G-7 meeting and the annual Munich Security Conference. Despite its worldwide proliferation threat, North Korea’s nuclear program went unmentioned, continuing its near invisibility under the new administration.

One reason for Biden’s reticence might be the pressure from the international left and others to reject three decades of bipartisan U.S. policy ostensibly aiming to denuclearize North Korea. While diplomatic tactics, focus and priority varied considerably under Presidents Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, Barack Obama and Donald Trump, they all stressed that Pyongyang’s quest for deliverable nuclear weapons was unacceptable.

Unfortunately, they all produced the same result, namely the North’s continued progress toward an arsenal. During these long decades, we repeatedly heard that using force to keep the world’s most dangerous weapons away from the world’s most dangerous regimes was premature, provocative and unnecessary.

Now, some critics assert that because Pyongyang has essentially developed deliverable nukes, we should abandon denuclearization as unrealistic and unfeasible. The U.S. and its allies must instead accept a nuclear North Korea, working to contain its menace, as they say (in a facile analogy) the West did to the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Force must now be entirely off the table. Parallel recommendations have been made about Iran’s nuclear efforts.

Not surprisingly, many now rejecting denuclearization earlier believed the rogue regimes were either not pursuing nuclear weapons, or (contradictorily) were doing so only defensively. They strenuously opposed military action, or policies of reunification (Korea) or regime change (Iran), at least not without far more extensive negotiations to resolve the nuclear issue peacefully — a la the Obama administration’s North Korea policy of “strategic patience.”

Somehow, using force moved seamlessly from being “too much” to being “too late” without anyone noticing. Skeptics may ask whether this choir of the high-minded wasn’t being disingenuous all along: They never really believed diplomacy aimed at denuclearization would work, and they simply did not worry that rogue states with weapons of mass destruction were all that dangerous. How many of them are now on Biden’s national security team?

The contrast between continuing to strive for denuclearization versus swallowing failure as a fait accompli could not be starker. Japan, South Korea and many others simply cannot accept a nuclear North, with potentially far-reaching implications for their relations with the U.S. Every aspiring nuclear-weapons state or terrorist group watching North Korea could reasonably conclude that the U.S. and its allies lack the fortitude, concentration, attention span and perseverance to stop them from acquiring nuclear capabilities. And anyone understanding the fearful effects of the coronavirus pandemic can also only conclude that seeking the “poor man’s nuclear weapon” — biological and chemical capabilities — cannot be lightly dismissed either.

Biden would make a potentially fatal mistake if he surrenders the goal of denuclearization. Of course, even if he continues espousing a non-nuclear North Korea rhetorically, that would hardly guarantee he knows how to bring it about, any more than his four immediate predecessors did. Weak arms control and nonproliferation diplomacy is a specialty of Democratic presidencies, and there is every reason to fear Biden will follow suit.

Trump’s performance artistry with Pyongyang also weighs heavily on the Biden administration. Three failed photo-opportunity summits, a U.S. president who fell in love with the latest iteration of the Kim family dictatorship, and four years of continued North Korean progress toward deliverable nuclear weapons are enough to create migraines for those who must now pick up the pieces.

Nonetheless, from all the available evidence, North Korea is weaker today than perhaps ever before in its history. For its own opaque reasons, Pyongyang decided to impose even-greater detachment from the rest of the world during the Covid-19 pandemic, almost certainly reducing its already rickety economy to desperate levels. This is hardly the time to relieve the pressure of economic sanctions and international isolation. This is the time to demand concessions from Pyongyang, not reward its obdurate behavior.

Moreover, Biden’s biggest challenge, developing a strategy to contest China’s desire for Asian and ultimately global hegemony, should put North Korea at its center. For too many years, U.S. diplomats argued that China is a constructive actor in trying to resolve the North Korea nuclear issue. This has long since been made demonstrably false.

China has always been Pyongyang’s enabler, politically, economically and scientifically. President Xi Jinping could end the North’s nuclear aspirations in a stroke if he chose, and Washington must stress this reality at every opportunity. This will be the real test of Biden’s North Korea policy.

Boris Johnson holds the future of the fatally flawed Iran Deal in his hands

February 18, 2021

This article appeared in The Telegraph on February 18, 2021. Click here to view the original article.

By John Bolton
February 18, 2021

News that Iran is fabricating uranium metal, reported to the International Atomic Energy Agency’s members on February 10, sent shock waves through national-security circles. Uranium metal’s most common use is forming the hollow sphere of highly-enriched uranium at the core of nuclear weapons. When imploded, the compressed uranium reaches critical mass and detonates in an uncontrolled fission chain reaction.

Predictably, Iran concocted various pretenses for its uranium-metal work, which fooled no one. Indeed, this is simply one more opening for Tehran to make public illicit work already undertaken but previously undisclosed. The mullahs are upping the stakes ahead of any negotiations with the Biden Administration, which is overly eager to rejoin the 2015 nuclear deal (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA).

The UK’s reaction to Iran’s latest ploy will be critical. The JCPOA was long a Holy Grail for the European Union, which the willfully blind Obama administration was delighted to embrace. Washington’s withdrawal from the deal amounted to sacrilege for the EU and its US arms-control acolytes. But however ambitious to rejoin Biden’s team may be, the world has changed dramatically since America’s departure in 2018.

In particular, the Middle East has shifted tectonically. Israel now has full diplomatic relations with Bahrain and the UAE, and with others likely in the near future. The shared reality that Iran is the greatest threat to regional peace and security is largely driving this Arab-Israeli rapprochement. The former adversaries will not react kindly to efforts to expose them to more imminent danger from Iran.

Continue reading the full article on The Telegraph by clicking here.

Biden’s bad move in Yemen

February 08, 2021

This article appeared in The Daily News on February 8, 2020. Click here to view the original article.

By John Bolton
February 8, 2021

Yemen’s long, bloody “civil war” — which has essentially become a proxy war between Iran and Gulf Arabs — is correctly seen as a humanitarian tragedy. Too many, however, including President Biden, mistakenly think that solving the tragedy requires blaming the wrong side, effectively exonerating the real culprits and their surrogates.

Biden said last week in his first presidential foreign-policy address that “we are ending all American support for offensive operations in the war in Yemen, including relevant arms sales.” This sounds significant, except that direct U.S. involvement ended with the 2018 suspension of in-flight refueling of Saudi air operations in Yemen.

Biden had already “paused” several pending weapons sales to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, although these arms were always intended for general military purposes, not specifically for use in Yemen. Moreover, perhaps unwittingly, Biden’s ambiguous phrasing calls into question the separate U.S. campaign against Al Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula, which threatens both Yemen and Saudi Arabia.

On Friday night, Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced plans to revoke the Trump administration’s designation of the Houthi rebels, the principal target of Saudi and UAE military action, as a foreign terrorist organization. The Houthi, a Shia opposition sect, have long received considerable Iranian financial and military support, including in recent times cruise missiles and drones.

These weapons have been used against civilian targets in Saudi and the UAE, including airports and oil infrastructure. Along with weapons supplied by Iran to Shia militia groups in Iraq, they constitute real threats to the oil-producing Gulf monarchies.

In effect, Iran is trying to encircle its Arab enemies, chief among them Saudi Arabia, by installing a friendly regime in their backyard. Among the Arabian Peninsula states, Yemen is the poorest and most notably the only one without oil. Armed conflict and political hostility are the rule, not the exception, there: long-term, multilayered and ever-changing. Ancient strife led to repeated civil wars under British colonial rule and after 1967 when two independent states superseded the colony. Periodic conflicts between (and within) the two Yemens followed until, remarkably, reunification came in 1990.

It didn’t last long. Despite some short-lived stability, a Shia rebellion broke out in 2004. That revolt, after multiple permutations, is the primary conflict in Yemen today.

It is important to understand just what is going on here. Biden is not reversing President Trump’s strategy on Yemen, because Trump had none. He only branded the Houthis on his way out, Jan. 19, all but inviting Biden’s new team to upend the designation. Internal disputes and Trump’s own apathy thwarted action until his term was almost over.

Rather, Biden is making unforced concessions to Iran, laying the basis for resurrecting President Obama’s failed 2015 nuclear deal with Tehran. The symbolic rhetorical gesture of “ending” U.S. support for Saudi war efforts is really a slap at Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman, since 2015, Riyadh’s most forceful advocate for decisive action in Yemen.

Despite Biden’s implicit effort to characterize this as a brutal Saudi assault on an impoverished country, the central problem is Iran and its proxy, the Houthis. Biden’s decision to inhibit the Saudis and placate the Houthis will not contribute to peace, but will instead inspire the latter to further stiffen their position. Biden is following Obama’s utterly erroneous notion that appeasing Iran will induce it to engage in more civilized behavior on nuclear and other issues, and that Yemen’s Arab neighbors are the real threats to regional peace and security.

In fact, Tehran and its allies will be delighted that the Biden administration’s giveaways have begun, and you can anticipate the mullahs to ramp up their bloody and destabilizing mischief throughout the region and the world.

The White House justifies its policy by citing humanitarian concerns, ignoring that Iran and the Houthis, far better at ideological propaganda than their opponents, are cynically manipulating Yemeni civilians and foreign aid workers for their own strategic purposes. Listing the Houthi as terrorists, for example, was not an obstacle to the distribution of food or medical assistance, or to peacefully resolving the conflict. The obstacle is that the Houthis are terrorists, seeking, with Iran, tactical advantage over their local enemies while reducing the external support they can call upon.

At a bare minimum, U.S. pressure to bring peace and save civilian lives should be applied in an even-handed, not one-sided, manner. Doing that, however, might offend the terribly sensitive mullahs Biden is assiduously courting.

Iran has Biden right where it wants him. The losers are the Yemeni people. And, ultimately, the United States.

Beijing Won’t Let America ‘Compartmentalize’ Climate Change

February 03, 2021

Biden officials’ urgency about emissions makes them likely to sacrifice more-important goals.

This article appeared in The Wall Street Journal on February 3, 2020. Click here to view the original article.

By John Bolton February 3, 2021

President Biden is eager to make climate change a central issue, and he can expect an intense debate. The trade-offs are complicated and the politics are difficult and uncertain. But the biggest challenge may be international, particularly dealing with China, America’s pre-eminent adversary. Does the Biden administration have the slightest idea how to reconcile its global environmental goals with its China strategy?

The early signs aren’t encouraging. Right or wrong, climate change wasn’t on President Trump’s priority list for dealing with China. But it is paramount to Mr. Biden. In Beijing’s eyes, this makes Washington the demandeur—in diplomatic parlance, the one asking for something. It is never a preferred position in negotiations. You want China to take action on climate change? asks Xi Jinping. Let’s talk about what you’re going to give to get it.

Climate diplomacy czar John Kerry knows he has a problem. Taking his first swing last week, he whiffed. Mr. Kerry told the world, “The stakes on climate change just simply couldn’t be any higher than they are right now. It is existential.” He added that Mr. Biden is “totally seized by this issue.” Asked about handling China, given the many contentious disagreements, Mr. Kerry answered that “those issues will never be traded for anything” relating to climate change, which “is a critical stand-alone issue” that it is “urgent that we find a way to compartmentalize, to move forward.”

He didn’t explain how he’d compartmentalize. Nor does former Obama official John Podesta, who recently said that climate change “changes defense posture, it changes foreign policy posture” and “begins to drive a lot of decision making.” He then contradicted himself, urging Mr. Biden to build “a protected lane in which the other issues don’t shut down the conversation on climate change.” Driving down that protected lane will be interesting.

Climate adviser Gina McCarthy compounded the confusion, stressing that “we have to start shifting to clean energy, but it has to be manufactured in the United States of America, you know, not in other countries.” Her own words prove that “compartmentalization” is a fantasy. Moreover, she underscored the risk, distinctly present under Mr. Trump, that national security concerns can easily devolve into old-fashioned industrial policy.

Unfortunately for Mr. Biden, China has a vote, too. Beijing reacted quickly, criticizing Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s affirmation that oppressing the Uighurs constitutes genocide. A Chinese government account tweeted: “China is willing to work with the US on climate change. But such cooperation cannot stand unaffected by the overall China-US relations. It is impossible to ask for China’s support in global affairs while interfering in its domestic affairs and undermining its interests.” In response, Mr. Blinken repeated Mr. Kerry’s compartmentalization mantra.

China’s Asian neighbors worry about the consequences if the U.S. makes climate its priority. There are many reasons why climate change should rank lower than the Biden administration puts it. Plenty of us still believe that wind turbines don’t rise to the level of intercontinental ballistic missiles as a national security concern.

Beijing will obfuscate the stakes and trade-offs of its demands. Mr. Xi won’t propose substantially reducing carbon emissions in exchange for Mr. Biden recognizing the mainland’s sovereignty over Taiwan. But Chinese planners are certainly contemplating how to slice and dice their policy choices to achieve precisely that and other objectionable goals more subtly. Beijing’s negotiators could, say, be stubborn about climate-change issues with Mr. Kerry until Uighur sanctions are scaled down—then stay stubborn until the U.S. acknowledges Chinese sovereignty over the South China Sea.

It isn’t enough to say that closer cooperation with the European Union will increase American bargaining leverage with China. In recent months, the German-led EU has been thoroughly accommodating Beijing on both trade and strategic issues, such as the threat Huawei poses to 5G telecommunications. For now, teaming up with a limp-wristed EU could leave America in a squeeze between China and our purported allies.

Nor can America ignore its Asian friends. India will resist greater global climate-change regulation and any weakening of America’s posture on China. Japan may be closer to Mr. Biden on climate, but it opposes significant concessions on security. Taiwan will be justifiably nervous for four years. Southeast Asia and Australia also have critical interests, which they won’t cast aside lightly.

Success on climate change and China won’t be as easy as the Biden administration may imagine.

Trump didn’t think, or act, strategically about China. Biden needs to do both.

January 26, 2021

This article appeared in The Washington Post on January 25, 2020. Click here to view the original article.

By John Bolton
January 24, 2021

China honored me with an Inauguration Day surprise, sanctioning 28 former Trump administration officials, myself included, for being generally unkind to its authoritarian rulers. China’s real target, though, was the minutes-old Biden administration — a hint of things to come if it doesn’t dance to Beijing’s tune.

President Biden now has an evanescent opportunity to think strategically about China-U.S. relations across the full range of politico-military and economic issues. Chart the wrong course, and the negative consequences for America and the West generally could be crippling.

In 1989, George H.W. Bush conducted an analogous review of U.S.-Soviet relations. Criticized for dawdling and initially being too skeptical, Bush nonetheless got it right. His calibrated response to Eastern European unrest hastened the Warsaw Pact’s collapse, and his 1991 support for Boris Yeltsin led inexorably to the U.S.S.R.’s breakup. Freedom found an opening only a few believed possible.

Stressing the need for strategic planning shouldn’t be necessary, but after former president Donald Trump, even simple things need restating. The media usually focus on discrete decisions, but the primal question is whether his successor will think, and then act, strategically. Trump did neither. He didn’t read the fine strategy papers set before him, or else didn’t absorb them. His chaotic “decision-making” led from a bromance (in his mind at least) with Chinese President Xi Jinping to a trade war.

If Trump had won a second term, he might have careened back to bromance and a disastrous trade deal, just for starters. His pre-Nov. 3 “hard line” sought to reap the perceived political benefits of attacking “the China virus.” The post-election tsunami of sanctions and other diplomatic gambits from the administration reflected the reality that he was just no longer paying attention.

In policy terms, these measures were largely correct and should have been taken years ago. As presented, however, they were not strategically coherent, but simply additions to the archipelago of dots constituting Trump decision-making. Beijing clearly sees this, and by thus striking preemptively at the outset of Biden’s term, hopes to roll back as much as possible.

Of course, it matters enormously whether the administration pursues the correct strategy. Precisely because I both reject Trump’s strategic incoherence and fear that Biden represents merely a warmed-over version of President Barack Obama’s limp China policy, there must be real debate, both in public and in Congress, on the substance of Biden’s China strategy. That should not be too much to ask.

Brief op-eds are inadequate for the hard strategic task of matching U.S. resources to its China policy objectives, but here are several key markers. Once Deng Xiaoping broke from orthodox Marxism in the late 1970s, America’s China policy rested on the premise that economic reform would produce increased domestic freedom, and that internationally China would be a “responsible stakeholder” engaged in “a peaceful rise.” Both predictions have proven false, as Secretary of State-designate Antony Blinken tacitly acknowledged in his recent confirmation hearing.

We need to know whether Biden shares this conclusion and what flows from it, because the stakes are high. For example, China can no longer be seen as just a normal trading partner. Trump had it backward, typically, when he frequently described the European Union as like China, only worse. The E.U. often out-bargains U.S. trade negotiators, a legitimate concern; China seeks not just trade advantages but also hegemony in the Indo-Pacific and then globally. This is a far more serious cause for alarm than E.U. auto tariffs. China’s theft of intellectual property alone is a paramount national-security threat, not an obscure trade issue.

Similarly, China’s military belligerence in the East and South China seas, its designs on Taiwan, its enormous buildup across the full spectrum of military capabilities and its bullying of benign powers (such as abusing Canada for arresting Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou in 2018 at the U.S. government’s request) all belie any notion of a peaceful rise. Faced with such Chinese provocations, a substantial reduction in the U.S. defense budget sought by some Democrats would hardly bespeak resolve. Instead, a major increase is needed, and not just because of China.

Understanding the nature of Beijing’s threat is also critical. This is not an ideological, Cold War struggle. China is not pursuing Marxist theory, although its domestic policies certainly have nothing to recommend them. Xi is not only crushing Uighurs and other non-Han minorities, but also extinguishing religious freedom and crushing Hong Kong’s pro-democracy movement. American minds do not take kindly to “civil-military fusion,” or “social credit scores,” whereby Beijing measures the worthiness of its own citizens. This is not Communism at work, but authoritarianism, pure and simple. Misreading it as Marxism 2.0 will impede strategic clarity, not enhance it.

Finally, a process point. Debate about the United States’ China strategy must be … strategic. We exacerbate political partisanship if policy debates are about personalities rather than substance. Because Trump didn’t “get” policy, he saw criticism from his political foes as a personal affront and lashed out. His opponents responded in kind, and partisanship worsened. Trump is now yesterday’s news, as his style of politics should be, especially in national-security affairs.

Trump Impeachment 2.0 Is as Flawed as the First

January 25, 2021

I am not saying Trump is innocent. But if his foes really wanted to punish him, they would simply ignore him.

This article appeared in The National Review on January 25, 2020. Click here to view the original article.

By John Bolton
January 25, 2020

I have nothing good to say about Donald Trump’s meretricious argument that Joe Biden stole the 2020 election; or Trump’s trying to steal it for himself by frivolous if not fraudulent litigation and administrative proceedings and intimidating elected officials at all government levels; or his inciting violence on January 6 to preclude Congress from fulfilling its duty to certify the Electoral College vote; or Trump’s sundry efforts to convert the Justice Department into his personal law firm (including trying to suppress my recent book, on the pretext that it contained classified information, which it did not).

Nonetheless, like Impeachment 1.0, the 2021 edition is badly conceived, poorly executed, and likely to produce precisely what the first round did: results 180 degrees contrary to the objectives that impeachment supporters say they want. Last year, Nancy Pelosi said endlessly that Trump was “forever impeached,” somehow never mentioning that he was also “forever acquitted” by the Senate. Instead of deterring and constraining Trump, as Pelosi contends, the failed first effort, if anything, emboldened and enabled him. He got away with it once and could thereby reasonably conclude he could get away with it at will.

Which brings us to Impeachment 2.0. Like the first, it is too narrowly drawn (first Ukraine, now the Capitol desecration) and was rushed through the House on largely partisan lines. Neither scenario is the right way to do impeachments, 50 percent of which in U.S. history have occurred in the past twelve months. Let me be clear: I am not saying Trump is innocent. Or that he has “suffered enough.” Or that we should “turn the page.”

I am saying we should be clear-eyed and cold-blooded about what a Senate trial and conviction would mean. Holding Trump “accountable” is not the only cost-benefit metric, or even the right one. The real measure is whether the country will emerge from the ordeal better than when it entered, not how gravely Trump is damaged. With blood in their eyes, however, impeachment proponents ignore the bigger picture.

A critical unknown is whether the Constitution permits impeachment or trial of a former president. Trump, we know confidently, will contest jurisdiction not only in the Senate but also in court. Endlessly. His great fundraising Wurlitzer will work overtime, as will his followers’ echo chamber, while the litigation plods on long after the Senate’s work is over.

The constitutional debate is already underway, and those arguing that former presidents (and other ex-officers subject to impeachment) cannot be tried have the better argument. In particular, Article II, Section 4 says expressly that such officers “shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.” Trump obviously cannot be removed from office if he no longer holds it, which would render this provision of the Constitution meaningless. So doing would violate a basic principle of contract, statutory, and especially constitutional construction that such writings should be construed so that no provision is rendered meaningless. Was it just a slip of the pen when the Framers wrote “shall be removed from Office”?

But the clause’s real importance is in the light it sheds on the fundamental jurisdictional issue of whether post-incumbency impeachment trials are permissible at all.

If fairness to an impeached incumbent president, in the extraordinary circumstances of a Senate trial, requires the chief justice to preside, why doesn’t fairness also require the chief to preside after a president leaves office? Did the Framers believe that it was acceptable to be less fair to a former president — as many would say if Vice President Kamala Harris or Senate President Pro Tempore Patrick Leahy presided? The only logical conclusion we can draw from this dilemma, reinforcing the points made above, is that there is no constitutional warrant here for a Senate trial.

There’s no doubt that the Senate trial will only provide more oxygen to Trump, in his self-absorbed efforts to garner attention. Attention is what Trump lives for. If his foes really wanted to punish him, if they wanted to inflict the most terrible fate possible, they would simply ignore him. They could organize societal “shunning” of Trump, as some religious denominations do.

Nor would a Senate conviction bring closure to the Trump era; instead, it would simply add fuel for the Wurlitzer and the “stab-in-the-back” narrative Trump is already crafting. Perversely, conviction would validate Trump’s basic complaints. On balance, therefore, the country generally and the Republican Party particularly would be better off without the Sturm und Drang that surely lies ahead. If I were cynical, I would say that Democrats believe they benefit by keeping Trump center stage, rather than Republicans. Congressional Democrats benefit from Republican fratricide and Trump’s toxicity (as demonstrated in the January 5 Georgia Senate runoff results), and avoid attention to their own internal strife and leftist policies.

I predict that a sufficient number of Senate Republicans will conclude that their chamber lacks jurisdiction, and Trump will again skate free. Felicitations to all who participate. Let’s not do it again soon.

What’s Wrong with a European Army

January 19, 2021

An expiring arms-control deal is a chance to address hypersonics and make China come to the table.

This article appeared in FORUM.EU on January 18, 2020. Click here to view the original article.

By John Bolton
January 18, 2020

The United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union, now completed at last, is the most consequential event in EU history for its aggregate military power. And it is entirely negative. At a stroke, the EU has lost its second-largest armed force, with no prospect that remaining member states, individually or collectively can fill the gaping hole left by London’s departure. The European Union has long been less than the sum of its parts, and that sum is now considerably smaller. Decades of fantasising about an independent “EU army” should have come to an end on December 31.

That won’t happen, of course, because many Europeans have long-believed, often quietly and in discrete conversations, that Europe was “a state under construction,” and, like all proper states, had to have a proper state’s accoutrements: army, central bank, currency, and more. But some aspects of national sovereignty are almost impossible even for the most fervent Europhiles to relinquish, and military power is understandably the hardest of all.

The fantasising should stop for reasons unrelated to Brexit, notably the existence of Nato. The Atlantic alliance is perfectly capable of doing anything the EU could do, has been doing it for seven decades, and is poised to become even more important in the coming years. Britain’s renewed independence will have a powerfully uplifting effect in Nato’s politico-military decision-making, and more broadly, such as in the UN Security Council, with London now entirely free from the cumbersome, puree-making EU common foreign and security policy.

Some persistent advocates of greater independent EU military capabilities are arguing that Washington is no longer a reliable partner, but that is false. Unquestionably, Donald Trump was no friend of Nato, but Europeans should not draw long-term conclusions from his attitudes toward Nato or international affairs generally. He never proceeded according to coherent philosophical or policy logic, and history will rapidly judge his administration to be an unfortunate aberration. Trump saw problems in narrowly transactional (and largely financial) terms, and through the prism of how events could be made to benefit him personally. Extrapolating future US policy from Trump’s “policies,” therefore, is not only wrong, but dangerous.

That is not to say that European Nato members can now safely ignore the 2014 Cardiff Commitments, especially the pledge to spend two per cent of their GDP’s on defence capabilities by 2024. Trump’s obsession with the need to raise Nato spending may have been expressed in his usual idiosyncratic fashion, but it reflects the consistent view, across America’s political spectrum, that its allies must better understand the array of threats facing the west, and the need for everyone to pull their weight.

In a famous 2016 interview just before leaving office, for example, Barack Obama chastised Britain and France, along with many others, as “free riders” for their inadequate 2011 performance against Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi. Obama Secretaries of Defense Robert Gates and Leon Panetta repeatedly echoed these complaints. The cost-sharing issue is not going away under Biden, both because he likely agrees with Obama, and because Republicans won’t let it.

Even leaving Brexit and Trump aside, EU efforts on defence matters have been, and are almost certain to remain, long on rhetoric and process and very short on substance and resources. After considerable fanfare and arduous effort almost twenty years ago for example, the “Berlin Plus” agreements have resulted in only two EU peacekeeping operations, both merely taking over from prior Nato forces. While Commission President Ursula von der Leyen may urge the EU to develop “credible military capabilities,” that is far easier said than done. It would be much more persuasive to see Germany raise its defence spending to the Cardiff target, which von der Leyen knows from her tenure as FRG Defence Minister is not going to happen; Chancellor Angela Merkel’s coalition government with the Social Democrats has struggled just to maintain defence spending, let alone increase it. The same is true across Europe. As 2020 ended, Reuters reported that the first EU defence review “found that only 60% of the national troops and weapons nominally available to Nato are in a fit state to be deployed.” Pushing for more “independence” from Washington could leave Europe bereft of America’s presence and continuing inadequate defence spending EU-wide.

Von der Leyen also said, after Brexit, that “our future is made in Europe.” But this too is fantasy. Global threats, from China in particular, but also from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism, are growing, not receding. UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s vision of “Global Britain” is considerably more astute than an inwardly-focused “little Europe.” European capitals would be better advised to heed the suggestion made by former Spanish Prime Minister José María Aznar to expand Nato into a global organisation, including possible new members like Japan, Australia, Singapore and Israel. There is no need to create a “league of democracies,” as some have suggested, to confront increasing threats from authoritarian regimes. We already have one in Nato, which simply needs to be enlarged beyond its birthplace in the North Atlantic area.

The basic reality is that a sustained programme to create a meaningful EU military would constitute a dagger pointed at Nato’s heart. That is undoubtedly what some really hope for, and not just our adversaries, but even many in Europe and America. Let us hope they are disappointed, at least until the lions lie down with the lambs.

Joe Biden’s Early Test From Moscow and Beijing

January 19, 2021

An expiring arms-control deal is a chance to address hypersonics and make China come to the table.

This article appeared in The Wall Street Journal on January 17, 2020. Click here to view the original article.

By John Bolton
January 17, 2020

President-elect Joe Biden’s advisers have been signaling that they will rely on arms-control agreements with Russia to reduce the Defense Department budget. This is no surprise from a new, liberal administration promising dramatically increased domestic spending. Yet a second Trump term might have been little better. Eager to indulge in Covid-19 stimulus spending and convinced of Pentagon mismanagement, even under his own appointees, Mr. Trump was easy prey for Senator Rand Paul.

But reliance on arms-control deals with Russia is a fool’s paradise. Whatever relatively small near-term fiscal savings might accrue will be outweighed in the long term by increased threats not only from Moscow, but also from Beijing and rogue states aspiring to become nuclear powers.

Mr. Biden’s first arms-control decision will be whether and for how long to extend the New Start treaty. It expires Feb. 5, but can be extended for up to five more years, in whole or in part. The threat of the treaty’s expiration should be negotiating leverage for the U.S., but Mr. Biden appears certain to extend it in some form. Vladimir Putin recently proposed a one-year extension, perhaps worried he had received no signals from the president-elect. Mr. Biden should offer six months, thus keeping the heat on, and showing that his team will be more than stenographers for Moscow’s diplomats.

The hard policy questions are still the ones Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev and I discussed in August 2018, continued by Marshall Billingslea until the 2020 election rendered Mr. Trump a lame duck. Whether and how seriously Mr. Biden’s negotiators address these issues will determine whether a revised New Start agreement has any chance of being approved by the constitutionally required two-thirds Senate majority.

The existing deal doesn’t cover tactical nuclear weapons—those generally intended for battlefield use, as opposed to strategic nuclear weapons, typically more powerful and longer-range, intended for targets in the enemy’s homeland or other essential locations. During the 2010 ratification debate, this omission persuaded two-thirds of Republican senators to vote against the treaty. The global tactical-weapons threat has not eased in the intervening 10 years. Further Russian deployments, typically associated with violations of other treaty constraints on delivery vehicles, and significant increases in China’s tactical nuclear arsenals are serious and continuing.

Even Russian officials acknowledge that capabilities such as hypersonic glide-missile technology weren’t contemplated in New Start and should be addressed. Moscow and Beijing are both ahead of Washington in operational deployment of hypersonics and other advanced technologies. It would be strategic and budgetary malpractice if Mr. Biden believed he could count on Russia’s treaty compliance, let alone China’s, to prevent the U.S. from falling even further behind in this vital field.

Russia is willing to include China in negotiations about New Start’s successor, but Moscow has nonetheless so far accepted Beijing’s demurral that its current strategic nuclear arsenal is too small to warrant participating. But that is precisely the point: Is the U.S. supposed to wait until China reaches its comfort level of strategic warheads, and only then commence negotiations about reducing its capabilities? Contemporary arms control isn’t a serious effort if China is a bystander. To assuage Beijing’s concerns, the administration should invite Paris and London to join the talks. All five legitimate nuclear-weapons states would thus be involved, depriving China of ground to complain.

Mr. Biden’s advisers also seem open to Russia’s desire to revive the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, from which America withdrew in 2019. Whether through a new agreement or by incorporation into a revised Start framework, resurrecting the INF is dangerous. Russian overtures and promises to resolve compliance issues, worth as much as earlier Russian pledges, may appeal to those focused on Europe. But Europe is a secondary consideration. The impetus for INF withdrawal was that it didn’t bind China—the bulk of whose ballistic-missile inventory would violate the treaty—nor the likes of Iran and North Korea. Russia’s noncompliance, China’s absence, and the rogue-state proliferators meant that the U.S. was the only country in the world actually complying with INF limits. Beijing’s surging rearmament won’t stop because of resumed U.S.-Russian constraints on launchers, but that reinforces why China must be included in any follow-on New Start.

These are heavy-duty questions. This is not Mr. Biden’s first arms-control rodeo, but what he does and how he does it could define both his presidency’s ideological direction and its competence.

Trump has caused the Republican Party great damage. Here’s what conservatives should do next

January 16, 2021

Trump had no philosophy, no principles and no plan to govern, and yet the GOP supported his rise to power – with distastrous consequences. The party needs to understand how that happened before it can do better

This article appeared in The Globe and Mail on January 16, 2020. Click here to view the original article.

By John Bolton
January 16, 2020

The United States, its Constitution and its civic structures suffered a miserable four years during Donald Trump’s presidency. His duplicity, short attention span, ignorance of history and cluelessness about the actual workings of the very government he headed – among other things – brought to the Oval Office unequalled incompetence. His words and his conduct exacerbated partisan tensions – already too high when he took office – and undermined public faith in the integrity of critical government institutions, particularly the credibility of America’s entire electoral process.

Mr. Trump’s tenure would have dismayed the Founding Fathers – most tragically on Jan. 6, when he incited a mob to enter the Capitol building in Washington, intending to disrupt Congress from fulfilling its constitutional responsibility to certify the 2020 election results. His second impeachment by the House of Representatives, and the general public outrage, show how unhappy Americans are with his conduct.

While the Constitution is fortunately far stronger than the likes of Mr. Trump, we should nonetheless all remember Ronald Reagan’s wise counsel: “Freedom is never more than one generation away from extinction. We didn’t pass it to our children in the bloodstream. It must be fought for, protected, and handed on for them to do the same, or one day we will spend our sunset years telling our children and our children’s children what it was once like in the United States, where men were free.”

Mr. Trump’s departure from office is a relief, but it obviously does not repair the significant damage he has caused. To begin the recovery effort, we must understand fully why Mr. Trump’s appearance on America’s political scene represented an aberration of historical dimensions. Once that phenomenon is better appreciated, the way forward becomes clearer.

Fundamentally, Mr. Trump has no philosophy, does not think in terms of “policy” (as we normally understand that term) and sees essentially everything through the prism of what benefits Donald Trump. Thus, his decisions as President constitute “an archipelago of dots,” as I wrote in my recent book, not a coherent pattern resting on principles and logic. Mr. Trump is not a conservative. He is not a liberal, either. He is simply entirely pro-Trump.

His favourite lawyer, Roy Cohn, once described how former senator Joseph McCarthy (a Republican from Wisconsin) became an anti-Communist: “Joe McCarthy bought anti-communism in much the same way as other people purchase a new automobile. The salesman showed him the model; he looked at it with interest, examined it more closely, kicked the tires, sat at the wheel, squiggled in the seat, asked some questions and bought. It was just as cold as that.”

It is entirely possible that Mr. Cohn taught Mr. Trump this very lesson about “conservatism.” Whatever the background, the contrast between Mr. Reagan and Mr. Trump could not be more vivid.

Mr. Trump’s approach to business in his pre-White House years, which he himself has described, was entirely transactional: buy this property, sell that property and move on to the next deal. Mr. Trump’s final balance sheet has not yet been written, and it may be that his transactional style brought him all that he wanted in private life. For America’s governance, however, it is wholly inadequate – especially in national-security matters.

Without a coherent philosophical framework, Mr. Trump’s decisions (including all those with which I strongly agreed) emerged through discrete deals that he found beneficial to him personally, not because he “believed” in what he was doing. A roulette wheel is more philosophically consistent than Mr. Trump’s decision-making.

This is far from saying, of course, that Mr. Trump made only erroneous substantive decisions as President. Au contraire. During the 2016 campaign, to gain the support of conservatives, especially evangelical Christians, he promised to nominate judges who were originalists in their interpretation of the Constitution and laws. This he did. He endorsed, if elected, lower taxes and less economic regulation – orthodoxy that any Republican presidential nominee would advocate. This he did. He repeatedly stressed opposition to the Obama administration’s 2015 Iran nuclear deal, and pledged to withdraw from it. This he did. (And, in full disclosure, ramrodding this withdrawal through the bureaucracy was my principal focus during my first 30 days as national security adviser – something in which I take considerable satisfaction.)

On the other hand, Mr. Trump was the most profligate spender in U.S. history, particularly during the coronavirus pandemic, when fiscal discipline disappeared from a nominally “Republican” White House. Why should Mr. Trump care? It’s not his money. He supported reversal of criminal sentencing principles that had been hard-fought-for under Mr. Reagan, whose administration sought to limit the federal judiciary’s sentencing discretion, especially to prevent overly lenient sentences.

In the national-security field, Mr. Trump, among other mistakes, blotted his copybook by craving a new deal with Iran’s ayatollahs on their nuclear weapons program; by seeking deals with strongmen Kim Jong-un, Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping, Recep Tayyip Erdogan and so on ad infinitum. I can say with confidence he had little or no idea what the terms of such deals would be. He simply wanted deals he could announce with great fanfare because he saw them as marks of success. Who reads the fine print, anyway?

Worst of all, his erratic, non-strategic, utterly self-centred approach led directly to the disastrous U.S. response to the pandemic. This was a slow-moving crisis, one with terrible human costs. In a fast-moving international crisis – say, a nuclear confrontation with Russia or China – I believe Mr. Trump’s flaws would have almost certainly recurred. Fortunately, we were spared such a scenario, but had one erupted, Mr. Trump might well have simply melted down.

Mr. Trump’s opponents on the left side of the political spectrum routinely group his personal faults together with his decisions as President. In the same breath, for example, opponents list his mendaciousness, his withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal and his lack of self-discipline as if they were equivalent failings. They are attacking both Mr. Trump and the conservative philosophy as if the two were interchangeable. Doing so may gratify the critics, but it is fundamentally mistaken analytically.

For conservatives at least, it is precisely the important distinction between Mr. Trump’s personal deficiencies and his utter lack of any philosophy that should be our focus looking ahead. In concrete political terms, that means above all fixing conservatism’s chosen political vehicle, the Republican Party. The damage Mr. Trump caused is real, and, from his Mar-a-Lago bunker, he will likely obstruct our repair efforts. But the task is far from insuperable.

What model should Republicans follow? Returning to a Reaganite view of public policy, domestically and internationally, would do just fine. Today’s issues are obviously different from Mr. Reagan’s time, but his principles remain correct, never better explained than in his Oval Office farewell address just days before his second term ended in January, 1989. In those remarks, we also saw Mr. Reagan’s characteristic optimism, so different from Trump’s “American carnage.”

One of Reagan’s anecdotes, embodying both policy and perspective, stands out – he called it “a small story about a big ship, and a refugee and a sailor. It was back in the early eighties, at the height of the boat people, and the sailor was hard at work on the carrier Midway, which was patrolling the South China Sea. The sailor, like most American servicemen, was young, smart and fiercely observant. The crew spied on the horizon a leaky little boat – and crammed inside were refugees from Indochina hoping to get to America. The Midway sent a small launch to bring them to the ship, and safety. As the refugees made their way through the choppy seas, one spied the sailor on deck, and stood up and called out to him. He yelled, ‘Hello, American sailor – hello, Freedom Man.’”

These are words Mr. Trump is simply incapable of uttering, let alone conceiving.

Returning to Mr. Reagan’s fundamental conservative principles leads some to ask who the “new” Reagan will be. That is the wrong approach. Indeed, it is dangerously close to the mistake many made with Mr. Trump. Politics, at least for conservatives, is about policy, not personalities. One of Mr. Trump’s worst consequences was torquing America’s political discourse around the question whether people agreed with Mr. Trump or not. That is, ultimately, a totally irrelevant question. Loyalty oaths to individuals contravene basic democratic theory – our loyalties should have higher aspirations: the country, the Constitution and our conscience.

There will never be another Ronald Reagan, just as the Democrats will never have another Franklin D. Roosevelt. Instead, looking to the 2022 midterm House and Senate elections and the 2024 presidential race, Republicans should seek candidates who can articulate a conservative philosophy, not fealty to any individual.

In the wake of Mr. Trump, emphasizing character must also be a key factor. Many decent, honourable people agree that Mr. Trump had a hole where his character should have been, but argued nonetheless that Republicans had to overlook this unpleasant reality. We cannot allow ourselves to settle for second-best (or worse). Looking ahead, we should insist that we recruit, nominate and elect candidates who are both philosophically conservative and possessed of real character.

To be successful, therefore, conservatives will need to spend considerable time and effort over the next four years fixing the institutions and structures of the Republican Party. It is essential that party committees and organizations remain strictly neutral as members select nominees at all levels: local, state and federal. Neither Mr. Trump nor anyone else should be allowed to tip the scales in their favour, or in favour of candidates they endorse. Ensuring this neutrality at the Republican National Committee – for example, in allowing fair and equitable access to its enormous amount of voter information, polling data and the like – is crucial. Party structures should not be at anyone’s beck and call – certainly not Mr. Trump’s. Over the next several years, all eyes will be on the RNC leadership, and the state parties, to ensure scrupulous neutrality.

Defeat does not entitle Mr. Trump to further influence – it entitles him to retirement. At noon on Jan. 20, everyone should understand that Mr. Trump moved from the most powerful office in the world to the swimming pool at Mar-a-Lago. He will doubtless still have influence, but he does not have power. This is a decisive inflection point, dawning on everyone with increasing clarity. Even before the Jan. 6 tragedy, Mr. Trump’s influence was declining, as reflected in December’s congressional override of his veto of the crucial defence authorization bill. Mr. Trump, of course, is a major contributor to his own decline, by falsely denying the outcome of the 2020 election, and provoking both the congressional efforts to overturn those elections and the mob that entered the Capitol at his behest. This is fitting: Mr. Trump is always the star in his own mind – even when shooting himself in the foot.

Joe Biden’s inauguration reflects not only Mr. Trump’s loss of power, but the dramatic and irreversible shift of the U.S.’s attention to the new administration. I take no joy in this, especially in the national-security domain, because I believe the new president’s likely policy directions will frequently be grievously in error. But it is also inevitable, as new policy lines are drawn and new political battles break out, that the national attention will focus on current events and not the rapidly receding past. In addition to substantive disagreements, in Congress it has ever been true that “the duty of the opposition is to oppose.” More likely than not, therefore, internal Republican disagreements over Mr. Trump – which remain significant – will nonetheless subside over time as Republicans unite to make their shared rejection of Mr. Biden’s policies more effective. Who will cite a disgraced Mr. Trump as support for any policy position? No Republican who expects to succeed over the long term, that is certain.

The Biden administration’s opening years thus represent for Republicans a two-front struggle: repairing their damaged party while simultaneously preventing the new administration, faced with a Congress in both houses divided almost exactly 50-50, from achieving its worst philosophical objectives. There is little time left to worry about what Mr. Trump says or does. He should go play golf. We have better things to do.

One of the saddest days in American history has broken Trump – and deservedly so

January 08, 2021

The sooner the Trump aberration passes, the better

This article appeared in The Daily Telegraph on January 8, 2020. Click here to view the original article.

By John Bolton
January 8, 2020

January 6 was one of the saddest days in American history. A sitting President incited a mob of his supporters to attack the United States Capitol building, where the Senate and House of Representatives were meeting in the Constitutionally required joint session to count the votes of the Electoral College. Donald Trump’s clear intention in urging this act of violence against the final concluding act of the 2020 presidential election was to disrupt the counting procedure, thereby buying more time to escape the otherwise inevitable outcome of the election.

This is as shameful as it gets, but it is nonetheless only one of a long series of shameful acts by Trump before, during, and after the November election. He has lied repeatedly about what happened in that election, convincing millions of decent, honest people that his opponents committed systematic fraud, in effect conning his own supporters. If there is evidence of this fraud, Trump has yet to provide it to any judicial or administrative tribunal, Federal or state. In his view, the anti-Trump conspiracy is so vast and so successful that it left behind no evidence. Either that, or his campaign had the worst team of lawyers in Anglo-American legal history.

Trump’s charade promulgated the idea that Congress could overturn the duly certified results of the election from the key battleground states, enough to shift the Electoral College majority to his favour. And there was more: that somehow his Vice President, Mike Pence, would ignore the plain words of the Constitution, and impose his own outcome on the election, by deciding which state certificates of the results to count and which to ignore.

The Framers created the Electoral College for the sole purpose of electing the President. It has no other role; like Brigadoon, it comes and goes every four years. Clear logic underlies this approach: to create a true separation of powers, Congress’s role in presidential elections had to be limited to a purely formal duty to declare the results. The Frames rejected a parliamentary system, with a President in any way dependent on Congress for his legitimacy. (In the truly exceptional case where no presidential candidate has an Electoral College majority, the House votes on the rule of one vote per state, not on the basis of individual House members).

In addition, the Constitution left the essentially exclusive responsibility for the “manner” of selecting the Electoral College to the States, not the national government. The certificates of election outcomes are sent by the responsible State official to the Vice President in his capacity as President of the Senate (a dual role that forms a key part of “the checks and balances”). What happens next is plainly stated in the Twelfth Amendment: “The President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates, and the votes shall then be counted.”

That’s it. Nothing more. Trump’s plans for Congress and the Vice President were themselves assaults on the Constitutional order, an effort to replace the state elections with his preferred outcome as dictated by majorities in Congress. It was appalling in its own right, and doomed to fail, which it ultimately did.

Trump and his supporters, therefore, were threatening grievous harm to two pillars of the American constitutional system: the separation of powers (at the national level) and federalism (the division of powers between the national and state governments). Not surprisingly, these two precepts are also foundational to American conservative thought. If proof were ever needed that Trump is not a conservative, there it is.

Realising that his effort at what Washington attorney Chuck Cooper (my long-time friend and colleague at the Reagan Justice Department) called “a congressional coup” was failing, Trump decided to resort to force. At a rally a few hours before Congress convened on January 6, Trump said to his supporters, “you’ll never take back our country with weakness. You have to show strength, and you have to be strong.” Key adviser Rudy Giuliani called for “trial by combat.” They knew exactly what they wanted, and so did the supporters.

Fortunately, they failed. They failed in their attempted congressional coup, and they failed in their attempted violent coup. The Constitution was tested, and stood strong. The Trump aberration will pass, the sooner the better. American conservatives have considerable work ahead to repair the damage that Trump has inflicted on our country, our civil discourse, and the Republican Party. But they are only damaged, not broken. Trump is the one who has been broken, and deservedly so.

John Bolton is a former National Security Adviser to President Donald Trump and former US ambassador to the United Nations.