Although widely expected, Donald Trump’s selection of J.D. Vance as his running mate is nonetheless profoundly disturbing in its implications for American foreign policy in a Trump presidency. Ronald Reagan and Barry Goldwater are turning in their graves. Describing the substantive defects in the Trump-Vance approach could fill many pages of newsprint, but – taking Ukraine as an example – both men are disinterested, or openly disdainful, of assisting Kyiv’s defense against Russia’s unprovoked aggression. For Vance, the US lacks both the military assets and the defense-industrial base to be a global power, meaning it must concentrate its resources to defend against China. It is beyond debate that years of inadequate defense budgets have made Washington’s job harder. Bill Clinton’s eagerness (along with European governments) to cut military budgets after the Soviet Union’s collapse (the so-called “peace dividend”) and Barack Obama’s debilitating military budget cuts still need repair. But these are failures of will and resolve, typical of Democratic foreign policies, not inadequate assets. Trump should work to correct these deficiencies, not treat them as excuses for further reductions, thereby abandoning even more international positions of strength. Ironically, Trump rejects Vance’s foundational ‘logic’. He is apparently unwilling even to defend Taiwan. As re centently said: “Taiwan doesn’t give us anything. [It’s] 9,500 miles away. It’s 68 miles away from China…China’s a massive piece of land, they could just bombard it…Taiwan should pay us for defense. You know, we’re no different than an insurance company.” Isolationism combined with such incoherence is a toxic brew for US national security. But Vance’s nomination has additional implications beyond his and Trump’s poorly conceived statements. In Vance, Trump unmistakably named his heir-apparent, which he had heretofore resisted. Many first-term officials and members of Congress had hoped for that designation, but their hopes have now been dashed. The new reality may persuade many disappointed aspirants not to serve in a second Trump term. They know that a VP’s influence in decision-making can be profound, especially when his personal chemistry with the President is as strong as that between Vance and Trump. Working in the West Wing, just yards away from the Oval Office gives the VP’ a customary advantage of being the last person to speak with a President before a major decision. These advantages are not overcome even by running great Cabinet empires like Defense or State. Accordingly, the small army of political figures considering becoming candidates for the 2028 Republican presidential nomination might be best served by remaining in Congress or the private sector rather than joining a second Trump term, allowing them to retain their distance in case of disaster in the next four years, preserving their 2028 viability. Moreover, choosing Vance signals that Trump will not be “normalising” his policy or personnel decision-making in a second term. Non-Trump Republicans hoped desperately during his march to the 2024 nomination that a second Trump term would profit from the mistakes of his first. They longed for four years of consistent policy directions and sound implementation, rather than the first’s transactional, unpredictable neuron flashes. Unfortunately for that dream, and the country, Trump clearly wants no troublesome subordinates, only yes-men and -women. Vance isn’t going to modulate Trump’s behavior. He is no Mike Pence. Trump wants undiluted personal loyalty in his post-election government team, at all levels. Vance craved Trump’s endorsement in his 2022 Senate primary, and his help in that year’s general election. He worked for the past two years to get into Trump’s inner circle, adopting his policies as he went. He has now succeeded. As Chinese Communists describe their relationship with North Korean Communists: Trump and Vance are like lips and teeth.
This article was first published in the Daily Telegraph on July 20, 2024. Click here to read the original article.
Since the late 19th century, generally well-meaning idealists have tried to conjure an international judicial system that would transform diplomatic, military, and economic conflicts into legal disputes. Led by sensible legal experts (who, of course, thought as they did), the global rule of law would replace destructive strife. If the rule of law worked within nations, why shouldn’t it work internationally? Whether parading under the banner of “world government,” “global governance,” or “the rules-based international order,” this blinkered, reductionist view of foreign affairs always includes a judicial component.
After World War II, the pace quickened. The United Nations Charter created the International Court of Justice (ICJ), to which nations could bring their disputes, replacing the failed Permanent Court of International Justice (formed by the Treaty of Versailles as an adjunct of the League of Nations). No one noticed the irony. The charter admonished the Security Council “that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties” to the ICJ (Article 36), and U.N. members agreed to comply with ICJ decisions in cases to which they were parties.
Contemporaneously, the victorious Allies established the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals to try allegations of “crimes against peace,” war crimes, and “gross abuses of human rights” committed by Germany and Japan. These tribunals were controversial even in their day, faulted for trying ex post facto charges (thereby violating the principle Nullum crimen sine lege, “No crime without law”), for being “show trials” with largely predetermined outcomes, and for constituting mere “victors’ justice.”
Advocates of judicializing international affairs wanted more, and in 1998, by the Statute of Rome, established the International Criminal Court (ICC), seated in The Hague near the ICJ. The European Union and Bill Clinton were ardent supporters of the treaty. Clinton signed it in his administration’s waning hours, knowing there was no chance of Senate ratification. His chief negotiator described the ICC as “the ultimate weapon of international judicial intervention” and “a shiny new hammer to swing in the years ahead.” George W. Bush reversed course, ordering the treaty unsigned in 2002, effectively ending any prospect of U.S. membership far into the future. India, Russia, and China, among others, also did not join.
American opposition to both the ICC and the Rome Statute’s substantive provisions (defining four crimes: genocide, aggression, war crimes, and crimes against humanity) was hardly confined to the Bush administration. Shortly after the statute entered into force, Congress enacted the American Service-Members’ Protection Act, authorizing, among other things, “all means necessary and appropriate” to release Americans held by or on behalf of the ICC. For good reason, it was dubbed the “Hague Invasion Act.”
Simultaneously, President Bush launched a global campaign under the statute’s Article 98 to prevent U.S. citizens from being turned over to the ICC, in time securing agreements with over 100 nations. The Trump administration made further efforts to protect U.S. interests, although Joe Biden has abandoned many of them.
The ICC’s flaws are too numerous for one brief article. Fundamentally, the very concept of the ICC is illegitimate, an utterly unwarranted derogation of our constitutional, democratic sovereignty by an unaccountable entity operating in an international void. The court is not part of a coherent international-order structure. It is simply “out there” pretending to be a court in a pretend constitutional system that lacks even a pretend legislature to make laws and a pretend executive to enforce them. The ICC combines all three branches of government authority into one body, defying every American concept of separation of powers and the “structural constitutionalism” the Framers believed so critical to protecting our freedoms. Though ICC supporters claim it as vital, it is precisely this consolidating of functions that makes the court most dangerous.
The ICC is not checked anywhere in its jurisdictional reach, its legal conclusions, or its prosecutorial discretion. ICC supporters argue that its member governments ultimately control the judges and the prosecutor, but that is entirely theoretical. So far-reaching is the ICC’s purported jurisdiction that it applies even to nonmembers such as the United States and Israel when alleged crimes are committed on the territory of a state that is party to the Rome Statute. When such nonmembers try to protect themselves against the ICC’s excesses, they are accused of interfering with its independence. While the ICJ decides cases among nations, the ICC purports to exercise jurisdiction directly over individuals, authority no prior international organization ever claimed. Americans fought a revolution against such usurpations.
ICC advocates believe that if they just pretend hard enough, real governments will come to accept the prosecutor’s unaccountable decisions and follow the ICC’s orders. Unfortunately, for over two decades, it has been the court and its prosecutor that have done most of the pretending. Nonetheless, Westerners especially have a childlike capacity to pretend; they see hope in the ICC where potential aggressors see only opportunity. Those whom the threat of prosecution and punishment is supposed to deter have not been impressed, an outcome surprising to ICC partisans but not to history’s hard men. The likes of Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping, Kim Jong-un, and Ayatollah Khamenei couldn’t care less about the threat of “legal” consequences for their actions.
The ICC’s most dangerous component is its essentially unaccountable prosecutor, whose extraordinary leeway makes U.S. “independent counsels” look tame. As with the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals, the Rome Statute’s substantive crimes are vaguely stated, written in broad and sweeping diplomatic prose. They do not pass muster by American standards, which require clarity and precision in criminal statutes in order to give citizens notice of what prohibitions and obligations they face. The Supreme Court has long employed the “void for vagueness” doctrine to declare unconstitutional laws that afford too much discretion to prosecutors, impermissibly putting citizens at risk of prosecution for crimes they never understood existed.
Turned loose on the Rome Statute’s definitions of crimes, U.S. courts would not hesitate to declare much of them unacceptably vague. Moreover, the statute’s drafters openly advocated expanding the list of criminal prohibitions as the prosecutor and the ICC confronted new circumstances. Here, of course, the lack of separated powers and checks and balances figures importantly. It is one thing for a popularly elected legislature to enact new criminal laws but quite another for a prosecutor accountable to the ICC alone, and a court accountable to no one, to do so, especially where the ex post facto issue arises every time a new “crime” is detected. Nor are defendants protected by jury trials, as our Sixth Amendment requires; cases are tried instead before panels of the court, juries being so 18th-century to the statute’s drafters.
ICC supporters believe that many of these concerns are overstated because of the doctrine of “complementarity.” Embodied in the statute’s Article 17, complementarity means theoretically that jurisdiction to handle serious international crimes lies primarily in member states, with the ICC involved only rarely. Although reasonable-sounding, complementarity is not some well-settled principle of international law. It is simply an academic theory, carrying about as much force in the real world as most such fantasies. In practice, the ICC decides whether states have sufficiently met their obligations, and if not, the ICC will act. States are subordinated to the ICC’s unreviewable decisions, period. This is as plain a usurpation of sovereignty, especially from constitutional democracies, as one can imagine. What other countries accept is up to them, but America bends its knee to the ICC at its own peril.
Concern about the mirage of complementarity is not hypothetical. The prosecutor’s recent decision to seek arrest warrants against Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu and defense minister Yoav Gallant, along with two Hamas officials, amid the ongoing conflict in Gaza (and other Iranian-backed terrorist threats against Israel) was a fire bell in the night that complementarity was no protection at all. Moreover, by interfering in the heat of battle, the ICC undoubtedly made resolving the war politically more difficult, all the while exhibiting the stench of moral equivalence by seeking arrest warrants against both sides as if they were equally culpable. Similar concerns apply to the prosecutor’s decision to proceed against Vladimir Putin and then–Russian defense minister Sergei Shoigu in the ongoing Ukraine conflict. Who holds the ICC to account for these unilateral decisions? The precedent for irresponsible interference in future conflicts is unmistakable.
The solution is to treat questions of whether and when to prosecute internationally as unique to their circumstances. Prosecution über alles is not the answer. Nations should take responsibility for their own citizens’ crimes even if that is impossible until there is regime change in the offending state. That may mean justice delayed, but international probity will ultimately increase only when nations accept responsibility for crimes committed in their names. Merely that the ICC can try cases more immediately is no answer. The hard reality is that many (perhaps most) contemporaneous ICC trials would be in absentia, which simply fuels grievances that provoke future conflicts. Who, for example, believes that trying Putin in absentia would increase global peace and security? The most grievous crimes ultimately require international resolution in broad political terms, not narrow legal ones. The ICC cannot bear that burden.
For Americans, the fundamental question is how to protect ourselves and our allies from this illegitimate court and prosecutor. During two decades of operation, the concerns expressed while the Rome Statute was being negotiated have too frequently become realities. “Fixes” to the ICC, of whatever magnitude, will not suffice. The institution itself is irreparably flawed.
Sporadic U.S. cooperation with ICC investigations is potentially dangerous. Indeed, the most insidious temptation is for Washington to assist the ICC when the likely accused nation is discernibly evil. In George W. Bush’s second term, for example, the United States cooperated with the ICC in the Darfur conflict and more broadly. Barack Obama found numerous opportunities, including in Kenya, Libya, and the former Zaire. Under Joe Biden, with the support of several congressional Republicans, U.S. cooperation with and rhetorical support for the ICC advanced to its highest levels, especially regarding multiple allegations of Russian war crimes in Ukraine.
Although such cooperation has not to date increased the chance that Washington will join, the risk is still real, and the allegation of hypocrisy hard to ignore. The unpleasant reality is that U.S. cooperation with the ICC when it suits us is hypocritical and ultimately damaging to America’s principled case against the ICC’s legitimacy. Biden personally demonstrated the hypocrisy when he criticized the prosecutor’s pursuit of senior Israeli officials while simultaneously supporting the ICC investigation of Russian crimes in Ukraine.
The only safe and conscientious American approach is what I have long called the “three noes”: no U.S. cooperation of any sort with the ICC, no direct or indirect financial contributions to the ICC, and no negotiations with other governments to “improve” the Rome Statute. We should continue and expand our efforts, especially with European Union members, to obtain Article 98 agreements to protect U.S. citizens. And we should continuously reexamine the adequacy of our weapons against ICC efforts to investigate American conduct.
This zombie organization cannot ultimately survive without American support. We shouldn’t give it oxygen.
This article appears as “Lawless in The Hague” in the September 2024 print edition of National Review.
John R. Bolton served as national-security adviser to President Donald Trump and as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations under President George W. Bush. He is the author of The Room Where It Happened.
This article was first published in The National Review on July 25, 2024. Click here to read the original article.
Joe Biden’s decision to withdraw from the presidential race effectively makes him a lame duck. The odds favored his achieving this status on Nov. 5 anyway, but America now faces a nearly 100-day longer interregnum than in prior transition periods. We may focus on the election campaign, but the wider world worries what Washington’s global role will be for the next six months.
History affords no clear answer. The constitutional rule that we have only one president at a time is often hard for Americans, let alone foreigners, to grasp. The dangers posed by uncertainty about who’s in charge even in normal transitions are exacerbated by a weak incumbent no longer seeking re-election. U.S. adversaries, and even some allies, will see opportunities to advance their interests. Nor can we rule out what an otherwise responsible, but disappointed and possibly bitter lame duck might consider doing as his tenure in office dwindles.
The national-security risks and opportunities facing lame-duck presidents vary with the international environment and their own beliefs and proclivities. This year, the length of Mr. Biden’s lame-duckery offers unique complexities. Given the 22nd Amendment’s two-term limit, one could argue that presidents become lame ducks on their second Inauguration Day, but that obscures the key differences between how the Reagan, George W. Bush and Obama administrations ended versus the “defeated” Lyndon Johnson, Carter and Biden presidencies.
Past lame-duck periods don’t uniformly demonstrate presidential (or national) weakness. While Mr. Biden may simply slumber through the remainder of his term, that outcome is far from preordained. For good or ill, presidents retain broad discretion, and their approaches have ranged from high-minded to vindictive, with enormous consequences for their successors.
Wide-ranging actions by lame ducks are sometimes simply unnecessary. Transitions between same-party presidents, which may or may not happen this cycle, are rare, but in 1988-89 Ronald Reagan worked hard to facilitate Vice President George H.W. Bush’s accession to office.
In some cases, lame-duck presidents simply do their own thing, irrelevant to their successor. Bill Clinton continued to chase the gray ghost of Middle East peace while Gov. Bush and Vice President Al Gore slugged it out in the Florida recount. During the 2008-09 financial crisis, global disarray so thoroughly dominated international affairs that the U.S. didn’t seem particularly vulnerable.
Lame-duck periods during party-to-party transitions are the most dangerous, almost unavoidably so, whether the outgoing president was defeated or simply trying to finish without impairing his party’s nominee. Freighted with potential consequences, conflicts between the lame duck and his successor, and between their teams, are often testy, reflecting just-concluded campaigns, and most acutely raising the question of who’s in charge.
The 1980-81 Carter-Reagan transition was such a case, dominated by the Iran hostage crisis. The campaign had been bitter, with mutual recriminations on many fronts, including about the hostages. Fortunately, a potentially destructive Carter lame-duck period was averted by a deal that suited all the actors: releasing the hostages (a plus for Mr. Carter) after Reagan was actually inaugurated (a plus for Reagan), bringing a temporary end to Tehran-Washington tensions (a plus for Tehran). Nonetheless, with controversies like the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East and high tensions with China, the prospect of conflict clouding Biden’s lame-duckery is palpable.
After the 1992 election, George H.W. Bush intervened militarily in Somalia to open closed channels for humanitarian assistance. The White House made it clear Bush would act as he saw best while still president, but he offered to withdraw all U.S. forces before Mr. Clinton’s inauguration if the new president desired. Mr. Clinton chose to continue the mission, later mistakenly expanding it, but the two presidencies functioned smoothly during the handover.
In stark contrast, Barack Obama chose to settle scores with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in the United Nations Security Council. By abstaining on Resolution 2334 (passed 14-0-1 on Dec. 23, 2016), Mr. Obama figuratively knifed both Mr. Netanyahu and the incoming Trump administration, which had openly advocated a U.S. veto. While abstaining wasn’t a startlingly new position, it was unnecessary and vindictive, auguring in a small way what a determined lame-duck could do.
Mr. Trump made the 2020-21 transition perilous by trying frantically and erratically to thwart the results of the 2020 election. Whether one considers the Jan. 6 riot and the runup to it an insurrection or simply disgraceful and disqualifying for Mr. Trump, his lame-duck period was the second-worst in American history (after James Buchanan to Abraham Lincoln in 1860-61).
While it’s difficult to predict what Mr. Biden may do as a lame duck, or what external threats or crises might develop, our current circumstances hold uncharted dangers. Congress, the candidates and especially the American public need to begin thinking about the challenges ahead, and monitoring Mr. Biden’s prolonged lame-duck status closely.
Mr. Bolton served as White House national security adviser, 2018-19, and ambassador to the United Nations, 2005-06. He is author of “The Room Where It Happened: A White House Memoir.”
This article was first published in Wall Street Journal on July 21, 2024. Click here to read the original article.
Masoud Pezeshkian probably never expected to become Iran’s President, nor did most of his countrymen, nor the outside world. Whatever the reasons for his success, Pezeshkian’s victory means only that Tehran now shows a smiley face to foreigners rather than a mean face. Beneath surface appearances, nothing substantive has changed.
Westerners especially have long misunderstood that Iran’s elected Presidency does not hold decisive political power, certainly not on Tehran’s critical national-security priorities like nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and supporting innumerable terrorist groups. Ayatollah Khamenei is the Supreme Leader, like his predecessor and father of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini. “Supreme Leader.” That title tells you everything.
Elections for Iran’s presidency are hardly free and open. To start, only candidates satisfactory to the Guardian Council may run, and the Council has never been slack in applying rigid ideological standards. The races are ultimately never more than hardline-hardliners running against moderate-hardliners. If the Guardian Council had wanted to exclude Pezeshkian from the election, they could have. If they wanted to ensure he lost, they could have allowed multiple “moderates” in the race and only one “hardliner.” Instead, they did the opposite, and Pezeshkian prevailed. If the regime had really been worried about such an outcome, it would simply have stolen the election, as in 2009. Interestingly, voter turnout figures remain hotly disputed, so we may never know exactly how many people legitimately cast ballots.
Until the regime finally issues a definitive statement on why Pezeshkian’s predecessor, Ebrahim Raisi, died in a helicopter crash, questions about regime stability will linger. Whatever the cause of the crash, Pezeshkian is an accidental President. For Raisi, the presidency may well have been but a steppingstone, given Khamenei’s age and infirmities. He had been fingered by the Supreme Leader and others as potentially Iran’s third Supreme Leader upon Khamenei’s death or incapacity. Pezeshkian, by contrast, seems to be a temporary fill-in, even more of a figurehead than other Presidents, until the key ayatollahs and the Revolutionary Guard decide how to proceed.
Over 45 years, Iran’s two Supreme Leaders, through successive presidencies, have never deviated from their fundamental national-security precepts: (1) pursuing nuclear weapons and ballistic-missile delivery capabilities; and (2) creating and enhancing multiple terrorist proxies across the Middle East and globally. These have been foundational both to Tehran’s hegemonic regional ambitions and its broader aspirations for dominance in the Islamic world. No mere substitute President is going to obstruct that strategic vision.
What Pezeshkian does for the mullahs is to provide what Russians call “maskirovka”: camouflage that disguises Iran’s real foreign policy. Like other puppets and front men Tehran has used over the years, including former Foreign Minister Javid Zarif and Hossein Mousavian, a former nuclear negotiator now nestled comfortably at Princton, Pezeshkian is a walking, talking disinformation campaign. Susceptible Westerners, longing for resumed nuclear talks with Iran, now have a straw to grasp at. Nothing will come from any resumed diplomacy, of course, because there is no sign Iran the Supreme leader has made a strategic decision to change course.
Ironically, therefore, the mullahs have scored a public-relations coup by having an empty suit like Pezeshkian replace Raisi, widely called “the butcher of Tehran” for his judicial role in ordering executions of hundreds (perhaps thousands) of political prisoners. If Pezeshkian chooses to attend the UN General Assembly opening in New York this September, one can imagine the welcome America’s credulous media and academic institutions will afford him. He smiles, he waves, he acts informally, perhaps he likes progressive jazz, maybe he drinks a little Scotch whiskey in private (who knows!), he must want to make a deal the United States!
US liberals and the Biden Administration can dream about this scenario, but they may not be in office after November’s election. Even if they were, of course, the compliant Pezeshkian they imagine would not be making nuclear-weapons policy, nor would his Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, chief negotiator of the 2015 nuclear deal. Americans are all too apt to succumb to the diplomatic phenomenon known as “mirror imaging,” where negotiators look across the table and see people just like themselves: reasonable men and women simply looking to find practical solutions to shared problems. That’s exactly opposite from how the Islamic Revolution views the outside world.
Instead, if Donald Trump wins, now more likely than ever after the failed July 13 assassination attempt, his propensity to treat national-security issues simply as opportunities for making deals could lead to a Trump-Pezeshkian get-together. French President Emmanuel Macron almost seduced Trump into meeting with Zarif on the margins of the Biarritz G-7 in August, 2019. Trump’s “zeal for the deal” brought him within an eyelash of seeing Zarif, and foreshadows a contemporary version of that meeting early in a new Trump term. It may take second place to Trump visiting North Korean leader Kim Jung Un in Pyongyang to reopen nuclear negotiations, but it suits Trump’s singular focus on personal publicity.
Thus, while Pezeshkian’s election as President may not have been conscious Iranian maskirovka, there is no doubt the Supreme Leader and his cohorts can take advantage of the opportunity presented if they so choose. Such circumstances do not mean a new nuclear deal would emerge, since that would certainly not be Tehran’s negotiating objective. Instead, the mullahs would be playing for more time, which is uniformly beneficial to would-be nuclear proliferators, hoping to achieve a nuclear-weapons capability, and then to decide how to employ it. The same would be true for Iran’s terrorist objectives in the region and beyond. Trump would not even realize he was playing according to the Supreme Leader’s script.
Although the unsuspecting Masoud Pezeshkian may not realize it, he may be exactly the gift the ayatollahs never thought to ask for.
This article was first published in the Independent Arabia on July 16, 2024. Click here to read the original article.
Israel’s war in Gaza has become a Rorschach test for elites to examine their strategic assumptions and vision. While not a monumental war across several continents, the Gaza war has become a watershed in the evolution since World War II of how we think about war.
World War II was a defining event of the 20th century. It also was a seminal moment in the history of war. It was a dramatic total war. It ended with the delivery of absolute victory by the allies and vast destruction of our enemies, including widespread suffering. And it resulted in the annihilation and eclipsing stigmatization of the underlying ideologies of evil that caused the war.
The successful prosecution of that war provided at first a template for understanding war and strategy going forward – a set of understandings Paul Nitze captured in crafting the national security strategy of the United States which was codified in the NSC-68 document in 1948. The strategy assumed a twilight struggle with the Soviets, the strong possibility of an eventual total war, and an aggressive plan to win and ultimately to collapse and annihilate the underlying idea of communism. Even containment at first was an aggressive strategy that sought victory, not by invasion but by forcing the implosion of communism onto itself to eliminate it.
Although World War marked the greatest moment of American power, success and purpose – as well as the solidifying of its moral standing — ironically, within a decade, despite the precedent of World War II, elites in the West abandoned the basic template forged from World War II and have ever since rejected their own legacy and instead confidently concluded that total war is an immoral affair. They concluded as well that victory itself is no longer a valid objective in war. Moreover, despite the utter disrepute in which Nazism and Mikadoism had been relegated, war nonetheless began to be seen as futile as an instrument to defeat evil ideas, or even that ideas themselves can be evil and cause war.
Indeed, the conclusion that ideas cannot be vanquished in war underpins a conclusion that the aim of war is no longer to vanquish your enemy. Instead, war is part of a negotiation to moderate the enemy’s ideas enough to come to an accommodation.
Behind this shift is the idea that nations, especially their populations, do not go to war. Governments, or even sub-cliques in governments, do. Of course, this places a bloated emphasis on employing force so surgically that it guarantees “zero civilian causalities” — the standard indignantly demanded of Israel last month by Secretary of State Blinken. This is a truly impossible standard that gives overwhelming moral and tactical advantage to immoral, cynical and grotesque enemies, such as Hamas. Indeed, it makes the intentional slaughter of their own population a highly effective strategic imperative of such ideologies anchored to martyrdom and its cult of death.
Of course, if one needs in the end to defeat not even a government, let alone entire population, but only a sub-clique within the government, then war must be sharply harnessed and calibrated to allow for some sort of accommodation with your enemy to end the conflict. Undoubtedly it is generally advisable and moral to desist from debasing one’s adversary in ways to the point that it diminishes them as humans. There are many cases in which seeking such a humiliating victory – or seeking deliberately disgracing terms of victory over the defeated — indeed can dishonor a nation culturally to such an extent that it strips it of the confidence to reconcile to its defeat peacefully. Largesse in victory has its role.
And yet, the idea that war has evolved to such a surgical and refined point and demanding that absolute standard is both unrealistic and indeed often unhelpful. Moreover, to apply an antiseptic standard that rejects as valid the aim of defeating a nation and extend it even to a prohibition on inflicting a stunning defeat in war to its government as well, becomes highly problematic.
The idea of displaying largesse in victory and rejecting total dehumanization in his defeat has mutated in the last six decades into a prohibition altogether of victory as a valid goal and discarding entirely the subjecting of an enemy to obvious defeat. This evolution emerges from the idea that seeking victory and imposing defeat undermines those among our enemy who seek to moderate the offending ideology while at the same time vindicates those hardliners – the sub-clique within government which is ultimately guilty for causing or prolonging the war and who see the conflict in Manichean terms within which only one side can emerge as survivor. The world then is divided not between our nation and its ideas against its enemy population or even an enemy government and the ideas or cultural attributes that animate it, but between the sub-cliquish “hardline” advocates of a Manichean struggle to the death on both sides (ourselves and the enemy) against the “moderates” on both sides (ourselves and the enemy) who seek to reform their respective ideas to reach accommodation. In these terms, the goals of victory and the aim of defeat are then viewed not only as inappropriate, nor even just as irresponsible, but as dangerous, immoral and bloodthirsty. The battlelines thus are drawn between moderates and hardliners, not between ideas, government and nations.
The drift in strategic imagery among Western elites — which stands in stark contrast to the experience of World War II – proceeded until October 6, 2023, inexorably toward a universally (among Western elites) refined view of the world.
But then came October 7.
For Israelis, October 7, however, represented a collapse of the accumulated ideas of the last half century. An evil erupted in reality that had lived only in memory and generationally bequeathed trauma – or so the Israelis had thought. All attempts to moderate Palestinian nationalist ideology had failed. Israeli peace activists and those who reached out to Palestinians and railed against their own countrymen’s nationalism (against the hardliners) were butchered, raped and kidnapped without mercy. The savagery was cheered on by the very “moderates” on the Palestinian side that were imagined to be the partners in peace and accommodation. Nor was it just the Israeli memory and generational trauma bequeathed that was suddenly a reality. Internationally, the global left peace movements and camp – the progressive left which so many Jews imagined was their ally — turned on the Jews with animated hatred that confirmed that Hitler’s ghost had suddenly sprung back to life. Frenzied Jew-hatred became fashionable, and it was led not by an uniformed mass, but by elites and elite institutions. And left-leaning governments wholesale failed their Jews, leaving them unprotected in their streets against the raging mobs.
The Israelis and the Jews, thus, suddenly found themselves not in a conflict that resembled any affecting Western countries in the last eight decades, but in a conflict that resembled 1935-1945. Every horror a Jewish parent and grandparent had told their decedents about which we all were warned but nonetheless believed modern Western society had finally transcended were suddenly alive, insatiable and rampaging.
And the idea of the enemy, of Hamas, of Palestinian nationalism itself, was irreconcilable. Hades himself had emerged from his tunneled netherworld. Every action taken not only by those whom Israelis imagined as hardliners, but by those whom they regarded as moderates, and in fact the entire population, proved to be part of a carefully laid incremental strategy vectoring toward the final goal of destroying the Jewish state. Every attempt at moderating the idea of Palestinian nationalism had resulted in deepening violence, radicalization and finally unimaginable wholesale slaughter. If in the 1980s, Western elites contemplated the practical solutions that might allow Arab populations under Israeli control to exercise self-governance or even freedom, the Palestinian Arabs had now birthed an age in which Western elites rejected the very validity of the continued existence of the Jewish state itself, and implied – and increasingly overtly screamed for — the acceptability of a second Holocaust of its Jewish inhabitants.
In short, Israel found itself in total war, engaged in a twilight struggle to the death, with an enemy animated by an implacable ideology and supported by an entire population that was mentally and materially mobilized, as well as obsessively and entirely focused on the Jewish people’s destruction. Israel was fighting its modern World War II, and not an American war in Korea, Vietnam, Iraq or even a French war in Algeria. It was not fighting a Soviet-inspired proxy army or an insurgency seeking some sort of exit from a colonial structure. It was fighting to survive a total onslaught by a whole people animated by a genocidal cult of death and martyrdom.
In this moment, the sanitized rules of war, the very playbook of war, that had informed elites in the West thus since World War II was rendered vastly unaligned with the realities of the war Israel faced.
But Israel was torn.
On one side, it knew the war it had to fight, and it mentally transitioned (almost instantly) to an outlook akin to the allies’ image of their mission in World War II. Israel understood it had to restore its regional image of power, eliminate Hamas from controlling any part of Gaza and avoid any path to its reconstitution by controlling the Gaza border with Egypt, and to weaken and distance Hizballah a dozen kilometers or more form the northern border to reestablish a demilitarized buffer zone in Lebanon rather than the current de facto evacuation of norther Israel as a buffer zone so that Hizballah cannot launch a surprise attack. It knew it was in total war with not only Hamas, but the majority of the Palestinian population. It knew that war was not only necessary, but that unequivocal victory in it was the only path to peace and security.
But on the other, Israel labored under the refined and antiseptic standard that Western elites demanded. It was still dependent on US arms supply, so it had to pay homage to the consensus of Western elites detached from the strategic realities and determined to secure a ceasefire that leaves Hamas in control of at least a substantial portion of Gaza and Hizballah still tactically positioned to conduct of much larger and more deadly October 7-like attack at will. In short, Israel was not allowed to seek victory, let alone seek total defeat of the idea animating its adversary – an adversary that was both the majority of Palestinian Arab people and the government of Iran.
Israel in its war with Iran – fought through the arena of the Gaza strip and likely Lebanon too – has had to navigate a narrow, even a knife’s-edge width, path.
Essentially, Israel found itself having to seek the sort of victory, the validity, wisdom and justness of which Western elites reject. It must destroy Hamas in its entirety, leaving nobody within Hamas with whom to negotiate, but only to accept terms of unconditional surrender. It must inflict a generational realization among Palestinian Arabs of the self-destructive insanity of fighting to destroy the Jewish people and the futility of ongoing questioning of the permanence of Israel. It must fight to the point at which the very ideas underpinning Hamas, and indeed the ideas of its mentors in Iran, are seen as so suicidal and disgraced that they are taboo, as were Mikadoism and Nazism discredited and taboo after World War II.
Thus, Israel must achieve so total, decisive and absolute victory that it destroys Hamas as an organization and fatally wounds the idea animating it, while the West insists on its impossibility. Israel must deliver such an unrestrained blow to its enemies that even the population of its opponents realize that Israel is so strong that it is futile to attack it and thus discredit radical voices, while the West believes radical voices are defeated only by restraint and compromise.
In short, the very concept of war and conflict informing the West for the last half century is on trial by this war. If Israel actually does emerge victorious wherein Hamas collapses entirely, Hizballah is forced to retreat and Iran is left reeling and ripe for a “1982 Falklands-like meltdown for the Junta” scenario, it disproves so much of what Western elites so firmly believe.
Which is why so many elites in the West — even those elites in Israel who identify with these global elites — cannot fathom, let alone countenance, a total Israeli victory over Hamas in Gaza, cannot accept that Israel is at war with a people at this point (all polls confirm this) nor can tolerate even slightly the means or results that would deliver it.
But Israel does not live in the world of theories. The war it is fighting and the threat of destruction it faces is very real.
So the world is divided between elites who received and internalize the warning, wake-up call and sobering lesson of Israel’s agony, and those who retreat yet deeper and with more determination to preserve the paradigm of war that had defined in the last half century the West’s elites.
The war in Gaza – and how one relates to the idea of Israel’s quest for victory — has laid bare onto which side one falls.
The world has truly turned upside down when a U.S. president begs America’s allies to have a United Nations agency go easy on a terrorist nuclear proliferator. The Biden administration’s reported pleading on behalf of Iran isn’t merely a tactical error about yet another biodegradable U.N. resolution. It’s a persistent strategic blindness that existentially threatens key U.S. partners and endangers our own peace and security.
Iran’s largely successful effort to conceal critical aspects of its nuclear-weapons complex from scrutiny by the International Atomic Energy Agency and Western intelligence services is nearing culmination. IAEA reports about Iran’s uranium-enrichment program—and Tehran’s disdain for IAEA inspections, extending over two decades—finally have the Europeans worried.
Instead of welcoming this awakening, President Biden is reportedly lobbying European allies to avoid a tough anti-Iran resolution at this week’s quarterly IAEA board of governors meeting. The administration denies it. But limpness on Iran’s nuclear threat fits the Obama-Biden pattern of missing the big picture, before and after Hamas’s Oct. 7 attack on Israel, including cash-for-hostages swaps with Iran as recently as last year.
Mr. Biden has two objectives. The first is to keep gasoline prices low and foreign distractions to a minimum before November’s election. The second is the Obama-Biden obsession with appeasing Iran’s ayatollahs, hoping they will become less medieval and more compliant if treated nicely. Both objectives are misguided, even dangerous.
Election worries about gas prices have also weakened U.S. sanctions against Russia, which are failing because of their contradictory goals. It simply isn’t possible to restrict Russian revenue while keeping U.S. pump prices low. The ayatollahs don’t worry about elections, but they know weakness when they see it, including Mr. Biden’s relaxed enforcement of sanctions on Iranian oil exports.
Mr. Biden’s greater mistake is refusing to acknowledge Iran’s “ring of fire” strategy to intimidate Israel and achieve regional hegemony over the oil-producing monarchies and other inconvenient Arab states. The foundational muscle for achieving these quasi-imperial aspirations is Iran’s nuclear program, precisely the issue at the IAEA. Starting in his 2020 campaign, Mr. Biden repeatedly alienated Gulf Arabs, especially Saudi Arabia, which felt particularly threatened by his zeal to rejoin the failed 2015 nuclear deal. Mr. Biden’s willingness to exclude Israel and the Arabs from negotiations with Tehran, as Mr. Obama did, convinced Arab governments that Washington was again hopelessly feckless. Israel concurred.
Arab leaders privately see the need to eliminate Tehran’s terrorist proxies. Saying so publicly, however—even quietly—requires political cover, which Washington has failed to provide. The Biden administration could have sought to destroy, not merely inhibit, the Iran-backed Houthis’ capacity to close shipping routes in the Suez Canal and Red Sea. Since the U.S. failed to do so, rising prices from higher shipping costs increase the risk of a de facto Iran-Houthi veto over freedom of the seas. Not surprisingly, Iran now threatens to blockade Israel itself.
Mr. Biden decided to concentrate world attention on Gaza rather than on Iran as the puppet-master. Doing so has helped obscure that Gaza is only one component of the larger ring-of-fire threat. Many Israelis, including several members of the war cabinet, have long focused on the close-to-home threat of Palestinian terrorists rather than the existential threat of a nuclear-armed Iran. This joint failure enabled Tehran’s propaganda to outmatch Jerusalem’s, leaving the false impression of a moral equivalence.
Had the U.S. and Israel explained the barbarity of Oct. 7 in such broader strategic terms, they would necessarily have concentrated attention on Iran’s coming succession crisis. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is old and ailing. President Ebrahim Raisi’s still-unexplained demise has already launched a succession struggle that could transform Iran. The U.S. and its allies should help the Iranian opposition fracture the Islamic Revolution at the top. Instead, Mr. Biden, who couldn’t conceive of overthrowing the ayatollahs, has dispatched envoys to beg Iran not to stir things up further before November.
Sending Tehran what diplomats call a “strong message” from the IAEA isn’t much, but treating Iran as if it calls the shots is far worse. Praying that Mr. Biden wakes up to reality may be the world’s only hope.
This article was first published in the Wall Street Journal on June 4, 2024. Click here to read the original article.
Something is changing. The Western world was asleep, adrift, and decaying. But then came the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7. It instantly became a clarifying moment for Israelis – something which put them at odds even with their own elites, let alone the rest of the world. They were fighting for the very survival they thought they had reliably secured. But then came the campus frenzies against American Jews, as well as European Jewish communities, which became a clarifying moment for young American and European Jews and their families. And then the burning of American flags and the ensuing flag wars in the Palestine Encampments, the “little Gazas” as Senator Tom Cotton calls them, across American academia, in war memorials and on the streets, which became a clarifying moment for many Americans. And now we see the Eurovision song contest, which became a clarifying moment on the European continent. What started in the horrific shock of the depth of human moral depravity exhibited on October 7 appears to have a profound series of direct and ripple effects across the West, baring bankrupt elites, exposing rising new ones, and perhaps even signaling a return to the values and ideas grounding Western identity and civilization.
Everyone approached their clarifying event differently, as it was filtered through deep questions of identity, culture, pride and security – all issues unique to each of the communities mentioned. But there is across the broad a common theme: elites have failed and the populations – the common man – are stepping up to the plate. And they are all showing remarkable sobriety, resolve, leadership and moral lucidity in contrast to their drifting, weak, sheep-like and morally conflicted elites.
Israel
Israel is perhaps the easiest to grasp and understand. So much of the country donned their uniforms and for months – without internet, without social media – fought for their very lives. They came together in unity and wanted nothing short of full victory. They held a common sense of purpose. They defended their families and their homes and buried their friends and loved ones. They braved the missiles and sent another generation of their young children to battle.
Israelis all retreated more into their identity and deeper connection with the experience and trajectory of their 4000-year history that had been shunted onto the sidetrack of their culture for decades. Israeli soldiers took strength and meaning from their Jewish history, heritage and for many, their religion. The drift and complacence of Israeli society ended and its delusion burst that it had transcended its 4000-year fate and had became a normal nation among nations in a region that no longer sought to eradicate it. Wisdoms, admonitions, and enemies from the Bible sprang back to life and were reanimated in the Israeli psyche. Israel was suddenly intensely Jewish – for some in a religious, for others culturally and historic sense. Israel was fighting Amalek, and it was a unified family fighting to survive a siege.
But all Israelis understood one thing: what was before October 6 – the failed acrimonious debates, the intensity of brotherly hatred, and the bizarre perversion of elites – political, social and media — that relished the rising divisions as Roman emperors once did both in commanding and enjoying the mortal combat of gladiators – cannot be any more.
The debates now are shelved, the brothers fighting and dying shoulder to shoulder, and the elites in all sectors of society awaiting their verdict to go home which will come as soon as the guns fall silent. Israel will have a rebirth, and it will need a new elite to do so. All Israelis understand now they were in one boat; disagreements were and still will be there but the fate of all was common.
So now, a new Israeli, akin to the World War II generation of Americans, is being forged from the horrors of the dark Sabbath of October 7 and the grit of the battlefields of Gaza, Judea, Samaria, the Golan and Lebanon.
American and European Jews
American and European Jews grasped early, as well, that this was about them too. They quickly began to rally behind Israel and pay closer attention to their cousins. Their plight was neither theoretical nor separate. Jewish communities across the globe instinctively knew that the fate of Israel was their fate. Soon, the war thousands of miles away came closer and closer personally to them, not just their cousins. The taboo on antisemitic rhetoric in polite society was broken. There were random attacks on Jews – some fatal — and antisemitic hate crimes skyrocketed. And then came the Palestine takeover of our educational institutions. Left unprotected by the Biden administration, Jewish children found themselves exposed to hatred, physically prevented from access to libraries and free movement in campuses and ability to study, marked as separate, terrified of encountering teachers and professors that would fail them because of who they were, and finally facing increased threats and finally violence.
The curtain seemed to be descending on the golden age of American Jewry – the greatest Diaspora Jewish community of all times – as each American Jew personally, felt under siege. The moment that unleashed the realization into acute form was when the Chabad Rabbi at Columbia University declared in early April that the university’s Jews should leave the campus because their security could no longer be guaranteed.
The dam burst. Parents pulled their children out of school. Jews had lived in American paradise. The very foundations of the American enterprise was intertwined with the flourishing and freedom of the Jewish community for more than three centuries. The New Jerusalem and the Old Jerusalem were blood brothers in the American experiment. The rise of antisemitic hatred, however, not only shattered the Jewish sense of security, but also made Jews wonder how solid the American idea – upon which the welfare of the Jewish community is anchored – still is. Jews inherently understood what they faced was not just a wave of antisemitism, but something that so deeply threatened America that it could signal the passing of a great historical era, leading to another age of mass Jewish wandering to find safe harbor.
But then a remarkable thing happened. Young Jews, profoundly failed by elite Jewish institutions that stood helpless at this moment of truth, began to assert themselves. A new generation of Jewish leaders – eloquent, proud, rediscovering their faith and identity in parallel to their Israeli cousins, but also unwilling to give up on the American home and the idea behind it that supported their aspirations, dreams and gave them secure life – suddenly emerged on the campuses. They testified powerfully to Congress. They spoke on the quads and stairways to make a stand. They wove their affinity with Israel, respect for Jewish history, and love of America together. Socially and even physically brave, they stood up to their peers and professors to fight back.
Jewish elites had failed. Elite Jewish institutions stood paralyzed. But a new generation of Jews – which was more anchored to their Jewish history and identity, but also more unwilling to take the American idea for granted – rushed to the trenches and now rises to sweep them aside.
America more broadly
Non-Jewish Americans came next. The change emerged directly form the campus Jewish question and the chain of events originating in the October 7 attacks by Hamas. The “little Gazas” sprung up around the country like mushrooms not only focused on hating Jews, but also on attacking the idea of America – the very thing that these radicals understood was what made the Jews so secure and allowed them to flourish either as an American community or as the Israeli nation. Moreover, harboring the deep objective of destroying the ideas and cultural foundations of the American idea, these radicals – Islamist green or socialist red — knew the Jewish community embodied a strong part of the American nation’s Judeo-Christian core, and thus the road to destroy America lay through destruction of Judaism and Christianity. Soon, imported European ideas of antisemtic fascism – the Black – also appeard. The attack on American Jews was just part of the progressive Bolshevik-Islamist-Fascist attack on America itself. So, flags were burned. War memorials that have nothing to do with Jews or Israel were desecrated. Dead Americans who paid the ultimate price to defend their freedom and country were dishonored.
But the antisemitic assault was not broad in American society. They were not like the deep sense of guilt Americans still harbored in the summer of 2020 of the issue of the American Black experience – misplaced guilt because such feelings persist despite the remarkable arc or moral progress over a century – which led the Black Lives Matter demonstrations. Even that was a bait and switch exploiting genuine feelings of guilt to launch a violent attack on the very goodness that animated Americans. But that took time to sort out and realize.
But not so with the Israel issue. Polls consistently showed broad and deep American support for Israel, so there was no deeper sentiment of “anti-colonial” civil rights guilt these riots evoke. Americans identified with Israel and understood its attachment as an indigenous nation to the land for which it was fighting.
Moreover, Americans had become, even in its earliest days before independence, a remarkably Judeophilic culture. Whether George Washington or Abraham Lincoln, whether Mark Twain or John Steinbeck, American leaders and cultural icons committed to letters and words their respect and affinity with Jews. And Israel seemed to have struck the deep sense of Cincinnatus virtue that Americans always valued within themselves: the agrarian, farmer spirit of independence and making the land bloom, the fierce attachment to their values and willingness to alone defend them. So, Americans all along filtered their understanding of October 7 through such a favorable view of Israel.
But the frenzied world of the Palestine encampments and their flag-burning and “death-to-America-chanting” zombie seances not only triggered disgust and evoked a deep sense of American patriotism, but it also showed Americans how profoundly rotted their elite institutions were. Their kids were not alright, and they were not alright because the people to whom Americans had entrusted their childrens’ education was instead turning them against everything they held dear. Congressional hearings of college officials became awful spectacles of mediocre wokeness. Americans on the national level began to see the entire educational system – for which every American family had to part with their life-savings to pay for — the same way as local parents in Virginia had seen their school boards in 2022-23, which led then to pitched arguments across the country as well as the election of Republicans as senior state officials. Americans understood their elite institutions no longer transmitted to their young American values or culture, nor taught civic virtue, nor nurtured patriotism, nor even respected family or faith in any way.
And then came their moment. The Israeli and American Jewish question suddenly flowed together into the broader American question. In late April at the University of North Carolina, the little Gaza encampment – as all other encampments across the land – tore down the American flag at the university’s flagpole, burned it and replaced it with the Palestine flag. The president of the university sent for police and marched along with them to take down the flag of Palestine and raise the American flag, accompanied by a rousing speech about the meaning of the American flag and its unique purpose in flying above us all. No sooner had the flag been raised than the progressive Red-Green-Black (Bolshevik-Islamist-Fascist) radicals from the Palestine encampments sought to tear it down again. But it was not to be. They were met by a group from the university’s Jewish fraternity, Alpha Epslion Pi (AEPi), who in a Iwo-Jima like moment, surrounded the flag, protected it from touching the ground and being soiled, and stood firm against projectiles to ensure the American flag remains flying on the pole. The image that emerged from that incident was iconic and captured the American nation.
Those of us who remember the late 1970s, remember the humiliation – already bubbling from the fall of Saigon – reverberating as American hostages were taken by Iran’s Ayatollahs. They also remember the American victory in the Lake Placid Olympic hockey game of 1980, and the shift toward patriotism and energy generated by pride that took over the American soul in its wake. As Iran had done in 1978-9, Iran’s proxies (Hamas), their minions and their Bolshevik and fascist allies of progressive radicals on American campuses had done in 2024. So, those of us who do remember the American awakening of 1979-80 easily identify the current American re-Awakening of 2024 emerging from the images of the AEPi defense of the flag at UNC. The young frat boys were the equivalent of the young US hockey Olympic team at Lake Placid. Across the country, young Americans – indeed many frats but then far beyond– began to mobilize to defend their flag and march to assert their pride in America.
Israel, the American Jewish question, and the reawakening of America were all now flowing in alignment – and all by virtue of a young new leadership emerging on the ossified husk of their community’s elites and their failing stagnant structures.
Europe
But to the surprise of many Israelis, American Jews, and other Americans, it appears this is beginning to grip even Europe in the last weeks. True, there were signs: the wave of elections, starting with Brexit, that symbolized a welling rejection of elites, elite culture, and elite power, had been brewing for years. The discerning observer could see it. But there still wasn’t the moment – the defining event to lay bare the vast chasm emerging between the elites and the societies over which they lorded.
The moment may well have come this week – the usually politically marginal Eurovision song event. The artistic elites of Europe, along with the state broadcast authorities which ran it considered not inviting Israel – a traditional powerhouse at this song competition – to bow to the ostensible antisemitic sentiments gripping the European. Trying to use Israel’s song entry as “too political in hopes that Israel would thus disqualify itself – saving the EBU from the embarrassment of singling out and banning the Jewish state,” Europe’s elites demanded the wounded Jewish nation to go through several iterations of its song before the European Broadcast Union (EBU) would allow it to perform. But Israel played along, watered it down until its words were anodyne and palatable enough that the EBU could no longer hook its hopes of disqualification on them.
Israel came to the event in Malmo, Sweden – the epicenter of Islamist radical hatred of Jews and Israel — and so did the masses of enraged radicals and European Muslims from across the continent. They threatened the Israeli singer, forced her to lockdown in her hotel room and brave riots attacking her convoy on the way to perform. Other nations’ delegates refused to have their rooms in proximity to the Israeli singer, and thus she had to be removed to a remote and isolated wing of the hotel. Several delegations threatened a boycott and virtue signaled through costume and press conferences their dripping disdain of the Jewish singer. Those few singers who in an unguarded moment had been photographed interacting with the Israeli singer, even in fleeting moments, were forced to apologize and ask that the picture be expunged from the public record. Israeli journalists and presenters were even forced by the European Broadcaster Union to remove their small yellow ribbons some wore to symbolize their hope of the return of Israel’s 132 hostages from Hamas torture and captivity. The elites of Europe had decided that the people of Europe could not stomach association with Israel, in even song. Still, the desire of their national delegations to be feted outweighed their ostensible rage and they all performed.
But Israel’s 20-year old Eden Golan still quietly took the stage, stood alone in front a loudly jeering audience of booing and shrieking pro-Palestine chants that tried to drown out the performance. But in an act of bravery and immense discipline, she sang and sang true.
And when she did, a remarkable thing happened. The competition had a 50% popular vote across Europe and 50% an elite-board driven vote of judges that would combine to produce the winner. Israel swept the popular vote. Golan garnered a remarkable 327 points from the voting populations of Europe. Moreover in 15 of the 35 nations, Israel outright won the popular vote (12 points for each win) and took second place (10 points) in seven more. Clearly, the people of Europe made their voce heard: Israel was not to be shunned, and in fact was wildly popular.
Then the elites spoke through the EBU judges. They knew better what the people wanted than the people. While the judges’ votes historically have never varied too sharply from the popular vote, this time they did – and across the board. Israel received only 52 votes by the EBU judges’ panels. 24 nations awarded the Israeli singer 0 votes. 11 more gave her extremely low votes (3-5 votes). And no nation awarded Israel winning tallies. In fact, many of the nations in which Israel won the popular vote by wide margins had their judges award Israel zero points. Western European elites led the trend: the UK, Switzerland, Luxembourg, San Marino, Spain, Finland, Australia, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Andorra, Belgium, and Sweden all had been won by Israel with 12 points on the popular vote, but all had the judges award Israel zero points. Four of the five UK judges had ranked Israel as the worst song of the 35.
On the immense strength of the popular vote, and despite the unprecedented split action of the EBU broadcasting and artistic elites of Europe, Israel still finished in fifth place overall. What was equally interesting was not only the popularity, but the image of the Israeli next to the other contestants. Ireland and others fielded singers that were all twisted, depraved or sexually conflicted. They were all orc-like caricatures of art. Except Israel and one or two others (such as Armenia). It was really a contest not only over songs, but over avant-garde artistic depravity versus wholesome ballads. In many ways, Israel represented a return to normalcy, though swirling in a maelstrom of hate and threat. Most European singers represented the degeneracy of a dying culture – a dying culture not only tolerated by but peddled by the continent’s elites. A picture of the most anti-Israeli singer, Ireland’s Bambi Thug (right), juxtaposed with Israel’s, Eden Golan (left), could not be more symbolic and stark:
And yet, what had been laid bare was that the populations of Europe were just fine with Israel and liked the wholesomeness they saw, but the elites of Europe knew better and had to punish Israel and ensure it would lose to protect their twisted cultural bizarreness. The tide of antisemitism, and the self-destructive depravity of it and accompanying it, was largely an immigrant and elite phenomenon; it was not at all populist.
We have yet to see if a new generation will emerge in Europe that will seize the reins from their obviously out of touch elites. Recent elections suggest that may be happening, but it is too early to tell what sort of impact the Eurovision event had and what it may trigger.
Observations
But from these events from Israel on October 7th to Eurovision on May 11, several things are clear. Elites have failed the young generation, and a new generation is arising. In Israel and among American Jews, a new leadership is rising in front of our very eyes from the battlefields of Gaza and U.S. campuses. Among non-Jewish Americans, a new patriotism seems to be stirring that reminds one of the eve of the Reagan era. And in Europe, the populations seem refreshingly to be unmoved by their 2000-year legacy of hating Jews.
Antisemitism is dangerous and rampant, but it is not just tolerated, but encouraged and fomented by elites. We have learned how in the past how antisemitism was the vehicle used by cynical elites to tap into their population’s worst instincts – implying elites may be cynical but not the ultimate font of the evil. But what we see here and in Europe is the opposite: antisemitism is held by elites against the sentiments of the populations. It takes an active role of elites and tolerance, including the protection and encouragement of a minority of antisemites, as well as expressions of their own antisemitic libels, to create the 1930s-like climate of antisemitism that we see today. And still the population did not buy it, or at least this time.
October 7 was a horror. But it triggered an historic change, perhaps a change of eras. And this time, the Jews and Israel are not mere subjects of history, but its catalyst. Jews for two millennia spoke of being a light among nations – much like the American idea of itself being a beacon, John Winthrop’s shining city on a hill as the pilgrim leader on the Mayflower suggested – but by being disempowered, there was hardly any reality of this role for Jews as their quest for mere survival was all-consuming. But now, despite being small and in a war again for its every survival, Israel seems to be casting some light that is shining onto populations and peoples far away, triggering in them a rediscovery of themselves and what made those distant lands and cultures great. Rising from the ashes of October 7, Israel is leading the world to realizing the failure of its elites, the threat to their cultures, and the need to rally to defend the long line of western civilization that ran from Mts. Moriah and Sinai, and from Plato to NATO.
Intervening last week against Israel’s self-defense actions toward Iran and Hamas, the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice made resolving the war harder.
The courts’ actions are fundamentally illegitimate, and their meddling portends further involvement, which could be even more unhelpful. Despite the troubles the ICC and ICJ are causing, Israel and its allies should not be dissuaded from destroying Hamas’s politico-military capabilities.
The United States is not a party to the ICC’s foundational treaty, having unsigned it in 2002. And over time, Washington has renounced the ICJ’s major jurisdictions, leaving only treaties where the court has never been invoked. Similarly, Israel never joined the ICC and has rejected ICJ jurisdiction on Gaza and West Bank matters. One immediate lesson for both countries is to withdraw completely from any remaining ICJ jurisdictions.
Although Israel is bearing the ICC and ICJ’s wrath for now, Jerusalem has long served as a canary in the coal mine for Washington, giving advance warning of pending threats America may experience later. Faced with Iran’s “ring of fire” strategy, implemented through attacks by Tehran’s terrorist proxies, Israel is acting in self-defense to eliminate Hamas as a fighting force.
Hamas’s barbaric policy of using Gaza’s civilian population as human shields, hoping to spare itself, has incalculably increased the inherent difficulties of urban combat. The terrorists believe that by sacrificing enough civilians, they can mobilize international pressure to stop Israel from achieving its objectives. Provoking investigations by the ICC’s rogue prosecutor and inducing international allies like South Africa to initiate ICJ cases, Hamas aims to increase the political pressure under ostensibly legal guises. Iran and its terrorist allies thereby seek to make Israelis feel increasingly isolated internationally and thereby pressure Jerusalem to back down.
Israelis should not fear being isolated for defending themselves. Who else will defend them if they do not? Jerusalem need not comply with political decrees by courts so illusory they cannot enforce their decisions. Indeed, scrutinizing the ICJ’s May 24 decision and its obtuse, international-legalese wording, Israel concluded it need not change its Gaza military operations. Although widely reported as ordering Israel to cease the Gaza offensive, the ICJ’s operative language actually demands only that Israel “halt its military offensive … which may inflict on the Palestinian group in Gaza conditions of life that could bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.” Since Israel’s operations target Hamas, not all Palestinians, Israel sees its current approach as legitimate even by ICJ standards. That interpretation may sound Jesuitical, but it also demonstrates yet again why judicial intervention in wars is fanciful at best.
Unfortunately, however, the propaganda consequences look far different. Immediately after the ICC prosecutor announced he sought an arrest warrant for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, reporters asked German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s press spokesman if Germany would execute the warrant. The aide replied, “Of course. Yes, we abide by the law.” While Scholz himself later tried to soften the blow, the point had been made.
Propaganda by Iran, its terrorist surrogates, and its leftist supporters worldwide has outmatched Israel’s during this conflict, except for the weeks immediately after Hamas’s Oct. 7 barbarities. Undoubtedly, ICC and ICJ actions will now take center stage in that propaganda, fueled by each new utterance from The Hague.
But the problems are far deeper than mere public relations failures. In America, for example, university protests and surprising polling results show astounding support for Hamas, especially among younger voters. Faculty prejudices have obviously grown worse over time, even as baby boomer professors reach retirement age. Reform of faculty selection and tenure decisions, among other things, is essential in public and private universities alike. This means little near-term, but could be dispositive for the U.S.-Israel special relationship in the long term. In Europe, if anything, anti-Israeli sentiment and outright antisemitism are even worse.
In a perfect world, Israel’s information statecraft and that of its allies would have been more effective from the outset. Surprise attacks, however, do not give targets time to prepare in advance. Media coverage of the ICC and the ICJ has proven the urgent need to explain why their actions are illegitimate. The broader imperative is to explain more effectively, and with greater resources, why Israel is exercising its legitimate right of self-defense against Hamas and Iran.
This article was first published in the Washington Examiner on May 29, 2024. Click here to read the original article.
President Ebrahim Raisi’s May 19 death in a helicopter crash has the potential to shatter Iran’s regime and the 1979 Islamic Revolution itself. Raisi’s obviously unexpected demise was so unnerving and the stakes so high that we cannot yet fully discern the frantic maneuverings and vicious political infighting underway behind the scenes in Tehran.
The critical next step is the regime’s official, definitive statement on the cause of the helicopter crash. So far, authorities have said only there was no evidence Raisi’s aircraft was attacked (https://apnews.com/article/iran-statement-helicopter-crash-raisi-a19ed365f5f4813c31b3d696acc0a6cb), and the investigation continues. This obviously incomplete explanation is likely intended to buy time and reduce destabilizing speculation, but it cannot be the final word.
Huge political consequences flow from whatever cause is ultimately chosen. The reality was probably some combination of bad weather, mountainous terrain, pilot error or mechanical malfunction. Former Foreign Minister Javaid Zarif quickly blamed US sanctions for the lack of spare parts, which is laughable. Iran has earned hundreds of billions of dollars in international oil sales since Ronald Reagan imposed America’s first sanctions, enough to finance ballistic-missile and nuclear programs and arm countless terrorist groups. Iran didn’t have enough money to buy new helicopters from its Russian and Chinese friends?
Beyond the obvious non-political causes, Iran could choose to blame the usual foreign suspects (Mossad, CIA) or domestic political, ethnic, or religious opponents. Assignment of blame could thereby prefigure the leadership struggles already underway, which could explain the delay in saying anything conclusive. When truth is manipulated, elaborate preparations are often required to destroy conflicting evidence and counterfeit new “evidence.” Outsiders can only await the final word to assess its impact, if any, on the succession battle. Meanwhile, in the hours and days after the first reports of the presidential helicopter’s “hard landing,” military and security forces have shored up their defenses against potential unrest or interference from domestic or foreign source (https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/25/world/middleeast/iran-raisi-helicopter-crash.html).
The critical point is the need to select a new Supreme Leader, or at least devise a concrete process for that decision, sooner than anticipated. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is approximately 85-years-old and in poor health. With only two Supreme Leaders since the 1979 revolution, Iran has no established procedure regarding succession. Many believe the rigged electoral process that brought Raisi to the presidency was intended to establish a more-stable line of succession, with Raisi seamlessly replacing Khamenei at the appropriate time.
Not everyone accepted this ploy, least of all Khamenei’s son, Mojtaba, who aspires to fill his father’s shoes. Ironically, the father’s own concerns about establishing a hereditary line of succession, a criticism forcefully made by Mojtaba’s opponents, likely helped propel the notion that the presidency could serve as a stepping stone. With new presidential elections now set for June 28, it is questionable whether the victor will automatically have the clout to be a top-tier contender to be Supreme Leader. That means, inevitably, that there could be a plethora of candidates and intense infighting in government circles well ahead of the Supreme Leader’s death, which is likely the only way he will relinquish his office.
Avoiding uncertainty over the succession is precisely what the regime’s top religious, civil, and military leadership wanted, but it now seems unavoidable. Widespread politicking, conniving, and worse will widen already-existing splits within Iran’s top leadership and open new ones. Competing centers of power among the ayatollahs; leaders in the government’s legislative and judicial branches; and Revolutionary Guards and regular military commanders already exist or are developing quickly. The longer the struggle proceeds, the more bitter, more intense, and more protracted it will become.
In terms of raw power, the Revolutionary Guards already constitute a force that can easily resist the weak structures of civil government and even the regular military. Many characterized the now-deceased Quds Force leader, Qassem Soleimani, as almost a son to Ayatollah Khamenei, with influence far beyond what his official title conveyed. Given the regime’s unprecedented unpopularity across Iran, because of economic troubles, the discontent of the young people, the outrage caused by Mahsa Amini’s murder eighteen months ago, and longstanding ethnic and religious tensions, the Revolutionary Guards truly are the only reliably loyal shield for the ayatollahs and other regime leaders.
But what if the IRGC fragments? If Iran’s opposition can drive wedges between Revolutionary Guard leaders, or even within the conventional military, the regime’s near-monopoly of lethal force could be broken. Disaffected ethnic groups like Kurds and Baluchis could join in as well, raising the prospect of internal clashes, perhaps rising to levels approximating civil war.
Historically, outwardly imposing authoritarian regimes, such as czarist Russia, have often been hollowed out internally long before they fell. Confronted with determined opponents, they collapsed swiftly. It is too soon to tell whether the ayatollahs will meet the same fate, but, without doubt, their revolution is now in grave jeopardy.
This article was first published in Independent Arabia on May 28, 2024. Click here to read the original article.
Since Oct. 7, Hamas has been the tip of the spear in Iran’s “ring of fire” strategy against Israel. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government has not yet finished Hamas off militarily, largely because of intense White House pressure, now approaching a crescendo, not to do so.
But Iran has other options it can dial up, most worryingly Hezbollah, its most potent terrorist surrogate. The death of President Ebrahim Raisi, whatever its effects domestically in Iran, which may be significant, will not in the near term change the ayatollah’s regional aspirations or strategies.
Several recent developments have highlighted Tehran’s non-Hezbollah options, which, together or alone, pose significant risks for Israel, the United States and their allies. Whether Washington and Jerusalem are paying adequate attention is unclear. Biden seems intent on begging Tehran to resile from the “ring of fire,” as evidenced yet again last week. Iran has no reason to take these entreaties seriously.
Instead, Iran is actively recruiting local Palestinians in Jordan to aid Hezbollah and Hamas in destabilizing King Abdullah. Jordan was the second Arab country, after Egypt, to make peace with Israel, and its security and stability are vital interests for Jerusalem and Washington. Jordan’s fragile economy and endangered monarchy have over the years survived serious pressures, as during the Gulf Wars against Iraq’s Saddam Hussein.
The U.S. has important military facilities in Jordan and the at Tanf garrison in Syria, astride the Iraqi, Syrian and Jordanian borders. Amman was critical in the war against ISIS, and has long defended itself from Iranian threats. King Abdullah first underscored the threat of an Iranian-led “Shia Crescent,” reaching from Iran through Iraq, Syria and Lebanon to the Mediterranean. In April, Jordan played a critical role against Iran’s missile and drone assault on Israel, downing dozens of drones and allowing Israeli and other friendly air forces to conduct operations in its airspace.
The worst-case scenario would be Jordain’s monarchy falling to Hamas or other pro-Iranian terrorists. A hostile regime in Amman, mobilizing Palestinians on both sides of the Jordan River, would be far more threatening to Israel than the current Gaza strife. Iran and its surrogates fully appreciate this vulnerability, which is why undermining King Abdullah is so attractive. Perhaps Israel, the U.S. and Gulf Arab states have significant measures underway to help steady Jordan’s monarchy and economy — but, if not, they should begin immediately.
Another little-noticed increased threat is the mounting pressure on Israeli targets by Shia militias in Iraq and Syria. Israeli officials decline to comment on these attacks, and so far most of the drones and missiles launched against Israel have apparently been intercepted. The militias have also struck sites in Jordan, most notably the U.S. base near at Tanf known as “Tower 22” in February, where three Americans were killed and dozens wounded. Washington’s retaliation against the militias and their Iranian patrons resulted in attacks on U.S. positions declining, and likely redirected their attention to Israel.
To date, the Shia militias’ direct threat to Israel has not been large, but the prospect exists for more sophisticated and more effective weapons aimed at both Israel and Jordan. At a minimum, these developments enhance Tehran’s tactical flexibility, increasing the overall strain on Israeli air-defense capabilities, and heightening risks to U.S. personnel and facilities. Strategically, utilizing the Shia militias outside their Iraq and Syria base areas increases the overall integration of “ring of fire” proxies to Iran’s advantage. Coordinating with Hezbollah forces in Lebanon and Syria’s conventional military strengthens the Shia Crescent threatening both Israel and Jordan.
Also receiving relatively sparse media attention are attacks by Yemen’s Houthis on commercial vessels in the Red Sea, which the State Department warns are “resulting in enormous impacts on international shipping.” The Iran-Houthi strategy to disrupt freedom of the seas is particularly noteworthy for how targeted it is, with attacks largely exempting Chinese and Russian carriers, concentrating instead on barring Israeli, American and European shippers.
Rising transportation costs and higher insurance rates for oil and other cargoes diverted around Africa have significantly increased prices in Europe, and have advantaged Russia and China, notwithstanding sanctions against Russia for its 2022 invasion of Ukraine. The differential targeting of Houthi interdiction efforts not only signals Iranian control over Houthi operations, but the Beijing-Moscow alliance’s increasing importance in Middle Eastern affairs.
Moreover, Houthi attacks on U.S. and U.K. naval vessels and drones pose a direct challenge to Western military efforts to defeat the “ring of fire” strategy. Of course, American-led airstrikes have destroyed Iranian-supplied missile and radar capabilities used by Houthis in the Red Sea campaign, but the Biden administration’s retaliation has been quite limited.
The White House has made no effort to eliminate the Iranian-Houthi disruptive operations, nor has it considered the consequences of their discriminatory maritime targeting, which simply encourages the attacks to continue. Their tactics not only cause real economic damage, but are daily violating fundamental U.S. and Western interests in freedom of the seas. Impunity only encourages other global predators like China to think they too can disrupt freedom of the seas with only a minimal American response.
The Biden administration is seriously mistaken to believe the Middle East’s only real conflict is in Gaza. Hamas is but one part of a larger Iranian-led provocation. Our persistent failure to see the greater picture only invites more trouble.
John Bolton was national security adviser to President Trump from 2018 to 2019 and U.S. ambassador to the United Nations from 2005 to 2006. He held senior State Department posts in 1981-83, 1989-93 and 2001-2005.
This article was first published in The Hill on May 21, 2024. Click here to read the original article.
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