DETERRENCE, UKRAINE, AND TAIWAN

March 29, 2022

This article appeared in The Washington Examiner on March 29th, 2022. Click here to view the original article.

President Joe Biden has again befuddled America and its allies. Biden not only advocated Russian President Vladimir Putin’s removal from power — until, that is, administration aides quickly “clarified” that he wasn’t doing so.

No, there’s more.

Last Thursday, a reporter asked why sanctions decided at NATO’s Brussels summit would make Putin change course when deterrence had failed before. Biden snapped back, “Let’s get something straight. You remember, if you’ve covered me from the beginning, I did not say that in fact the sanctions would deter him. Sanctions never deter. You keep talking about that. Sanctions never deter.” Last month, the White House had to explain away similar presidential remarks about deterrence.

Biden’s confusion is dangerous, given Russian threats throughout the former Soviet Union, Chinese assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific region, and the growing nuclear menace of Iran and North Korea. Notwithstanding Biden’s incoherence, we are desperately lacking in the contemporary theory and practice of deterrence. This functioning deterrence was critical to staving off nuclear hostilities in the Cold War and, in fact, significantly debilitated the Soviet Union.

Today, for example, even top-ranking Pentagon officials refer to “restoring deterrence” merely by tit-for-tat retaliation, not realizing that deterrence is most effectively established by imposing higher costs on an enemy than it inflicted. The post-1945 study of nuclear deterrence was intense. The West’s eventual Cold War victory obscures how dangerous and uncertain those decades were, the outcome hardly inevitable. Enormous amounts of hard work, study, and debate about deterrence were required in universities and institutions such as RAND. These were not mere ivory-tower affairs. Edward Teller, Thomas Schelling, Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter, Charles Hitch, Roland McKean, Herman Kahn, and others were key figures in the contentious debate over how to avoid nuclear wars — or fight and win them if necessary.

That was only the tip of the iceberg of research and writing undertaken year after year. Analysis covered very detailed and specific concerns, assessing not just the numbers and destructive capacities of nuclear weapons but how to deliver them, such as bombers, ground-based missiles, submarine-launched missiles, or all three, where to deploy the delivery systems, whether defenses against nuclear attacks were possible and how, the costs and relative values of nuclear capabilities versus conventional forces, the nature and culture of the Soviet Union and its leadership, civilian and military, the kinds of conflicts where nuclear options could be viable, and much more.

However, since the Soviet collapse, during and after the “peace dividend” euphoria, the study of nuclear deterrence and deterrence generally declined precipitously. We are now paying the price. In Ukraine, Biden obviously failed to deter Putin — and perhaps didn’t think he could. America’s credibility was weakened because of failures to follow through on early threats and commitments, such as Georgia in 2008, Ukraine in 2014, and Afghanistan. Biden then mistakenly, gratuitously ruled out the use of U.S. force in early December 2021, with no reciprocal gestures from Russia.

No other Western leader stepped up, although many options were available that, if undertaken, could have established sufficient deterrence to prevent the invasion. The problem is now worse: Moscow is deterring Washington and intimidating the Western alliance from doing more to halt and defeat Russia’s attack. Ukrainian bravery and Russian incompetence may yet produce results favorable to Kyiv, but if that happy day comes, we should not delude ourselves that it was any more inevitable than the Cold War’s outcome.

Quite the contrary. Without a doubt, China is attentively watching all aspects of the Ukraine war and its consequences for Beijing’s hegemonic aspirations on its periphery. Taiwan is the most endangered but not the only target in Beijing’s sights. Ukraine is more than ample advance warning that our deterrence thinking is tired, trite, and inadequate.

We urgently need not just a contemporary version of the Cold War Kremlinology and intelligence we had on the Soviet Union. We need China-specific deterrence theory and analysis, and we need it immediately and compellingly for Taiwan. Specific suggestions for Taiwan abound, including ending “strategic ambiguity,” placing U.S. military forces on Taiwan, and diplomatic recognition, but we haven’t yet found Taiwan’s Teller or Schelling. China’s nuclear, not to mention chemical and biological, weapons capabilities will be critical elements of new deterrence theory and practice, but deterring conventional warfare also needs far more creative thinking. Warfighting strategies are changing rapidly as asymmetrical and hybrid variations evolve. Cyberwarfare is still in its relative infancy, and we have no deterrence theory comparable to Cold War nuclear theory.

Obviously, enormous work has been done regarding possible conflicts with China. But within America’s political class, marrying that work with deterrence theory and practice is nowhere near adequate. Time is short.

John Bolton was the national security adviser to former President Donald Trump between 2018 and 2019. Between 2005 and 2006, he was the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations.

Why the Senate should insist Biden submit his dangerous Iran nuclear deal to a vote

March 23, 2022

This article appeared in The Washington Post on March 22nd, 2022. Click here to view the original article.

John R. Bolton served as national security adviser under President Donald Trump and is the author of “The Room Where It Happened: A White House Memoir.”

Blind faith, laced with willful ignorance, seasoned by arrogance, is not a formula for success, as the Biden administration will soon discover. After a year of humiliating American concessions — including preemptive sanctions relief — to the planet’s most egregious terrorist state, the 2015 Iran nuclear deal is rising from the dead. This appeasement will delight Iran, encourage North Korea, gratify China and Russia, appall Israel and our Arab allies, and endanger the United States and the world.

Throughout the negotiations, few administration officials knew key details, and outsiders only broad outlines. This secrecy wouldn’t have been to deny adversaries sensitive information, since Iran knew what President Biden’s team proposed to surrender, but to keep its full extent from the U.S. public. Fear of an incandescent political reaction against the agreement was well-grounded; it will erupt shortly, with the announcement of a deal reportedly imminent. At that moment, the Senate must assert its constitutional rights on treaty-making.

The original 2015 deal was fatally flawed. It ignored clear evidence Iran has always lied about its nuclear-weapons goals, buttressed later by overwhelming data from Israel’s stunning 2018 raid on Tehran. It fantasized away Iran’s continuing strategic intention to obtain nuclear weapons, a deathblow to any real chance to eliminate nuclear-proliferation threats. Pre-deal negotiations never established a baseline of Iran’s prior weaponization efforts, and its verification provisions have been repeatedly exposed as inadequate.

Also, far from ignoring Iran’s continuing terrorist and conventional military threats, the original deal empowered them by unfreezing assets and undoing sanctions inhibiting Iran’s Revolutionary Guard capabilities.

Most dangerously, Iran received better treatment than U.S. friends and allies, who must typically renounce uranium enrichment to receive licenses of American technology for civil purposes. By allowing Iran to enrich uranium to reactor-grade levels, it is plain physics that Iran was thereby enabled to do 70 percent of the work required to enrich to weapons-grade levels.

Assertions about reducing “breakout time” for Iran were childishly inadequate, only pretending that the United States possessed critical information about the actual numbers and sophistication of Iran’s centrifuge cascades. Beyond these flaws, of course, were Iran’s repeated violations, exacerbating the deal’s deficiencies.

As specifics emerge about the renewed agreement, the picture will inexorably worsen. One particularly menacing aspect is the concept of “inherent guarantees” reported by Reuters in February. Tehran demanded assurances that no future U.S. president would withdraw from the deal, a concession that would be both unconstitutional and potentially suicidal. Instead, Reuters reported, Iran was placated by U.S. assurance of “inherent guarantees,” a chilling phrase on which the coming debate could turn.

To the extent that Biden attempts to constrain his successors, to Iran’s benefit, he risks his presidency. Handcuffing future presidents to Iran’s advantage would be unprecedented, and dangerously so, in the history of American treaty-making. This is not simply a disagreement about the merits of one aspect of the deal, or the deal itself, but about how much a myopic White House is willing to endanger the United States simply to finalize a deal. If Biden is serious about preventing a nuclear Iran, the threat of another U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear deal provides a powerful, entirely credible deterrent of Iranian temptations to once again subvert the deal.

With the new deal essentially done, constitutional issues also arise in deciding its proper status. Under any coherent reading of the Constitution’s Article II treaty clause, Biden should submit this measure to the Senate as a proposed treaty to see if “two-thirds of the Senators present concur.”

The Senate has watched and even enabled the erosion of its ratification power for decades, but nothing will stop or reverse that erosion unless senators decide to fight for the Framers’ intentions. The Iran nuclear agreement, especially in light of the “inherent guarantees” issue, is the perfect target to vindicate the Senate’s constitutional responsibilities.

By not sending the deal to the Senate, Biden would flout its treaty role. If that happens, the Senate should use its constitutional power to withhold advice and consent on all presidential nominees, both executive and judicial, until Biden changes his mind.

Such a move by the Senate would focus attention on substantive flaws in the resurrected nuclear deal and their dangers for future presidents and the country generally. Article II’s supermajority requirement for treaty-making reflects the Framers’ firm belief that treaties are exceptional steps for the United States, very different from ordinary legislation.

The tone of this debate need not be partisan, although in today’s Washington that is far from likely. The Senate may be 50-50, but Republicans should seize the moment; perhaps there is at least one Democrat who cares enough about the treaty clause to force the administration to send over the Iran nuclear deal for a vote. This is a matter of statesmanship, not politics.

Biden gives Putin a win with his indefensible decision to deny Ukraine fighter jets

March 14, 2022

This article appeared in The New York Post on March 14th, 2022. Click here to view the original article.

On Friday, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said the war with Russia was at a “strategic turning point.” Unfortunately, America and NATO may have missed it. President Joe Biden’s decision to reject transferring Polish MiG fighter jets to Ukraine is inexplicable and indefensible.

Kyiv’s heroic resistance to unprovoked aggression has exceeded pre-war expectations, both NATO’s and Russia’s. Innumerable Russian mistakes and failures, from strategy down to basic logistics, have been equally startling. The Kremlin has not achieved key objectives, its advances have been slowed or halted, and its casualties are reportedly rising alarmingly.

But there is no guarantee that Ukraine can maintain the present standoff, let alone repel the invasion and restore the status quo ante bellum. It is not enough to say that Zelensky is losing slowly, especially if and when the moment for negotiations comes. Nor is it politically helpful for his purported allies to publicly refuse requests for help, like the MiGs or a no-fly zone over Ukraine, even a partial no-fly zone to stem the surging humanitarian tragedy of millions forced to flee their homes.

Biden’s White House has offered numerous rationales for rejecting the MiG transfer, so many that it suggests a desperate effort to hide the real reason: Biden is intimidated by Russian President Vladimir Putin. Whereas Biden’s effort to deter Russia’s invasion failed, Putin’s efforts to deter the United States from responding adequately have unfortunately been all too successful.

Washington in fact actively considered the Polish MiG transfer and sent signals it was all but approved. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said so expressly. CBS anchor Margaret Brennan asked him March 6, “If, for instance, the Polish government . . . wants to send fighter jets, does that get a green light from the US, or are you afraid that that will escalate tension?” Blinken replied, “No, that gets a green light. In fact, we’re talking with our Polish friends right now about what we might be able to do to backfill their needs if, in fact, they choose to provide these fighter jets to the Ukrainians.”

The administration and its media stenographers worked overtime to shift blame away from Biden, thereby revealing the weakness of the case against the MiG transfer. They said Poland could have made the transfer on its own. Of course, as a dependable ally, Poland wanted assurance that NATO’s leader — that would be the United States — supported the idea. Otherwise, Biden’s team would have complained Poland had gone rogue.

Next were arguments that Ukraine didn’t need the planes. The Pentagon said it was “simply not clear to us that there is a substantive rationale for it.” But Biden has long made it clear there would be no US combat role in the war. Why undermine the judgment of those actually engaged in combat, with the very survival of their country at stake, especially at no effective cost to Washington?

Finally, the real argument: Biden feared he would cross a Putin red line, thereby risking all-out war in Europe. We risk that war already, however, by supplying anti-aircraft and anti-tank systems, intelligence and cyberwarfare capabilities. All this aid has to cross NATO borders to get to Ukraine, just like the MiGs. Anything other than Ukraine’s unconditional surrender risks displeasing the Kremlin. There is no legal, moral or military rationale that supports disapproving the MiGs but allows other advanced-weapons assistance, only fear and sophistry.

Indeed, the administration is also leaking assiduously that it is considering alternative forms of aid. Undoubtedly, steady increases in rhetorical bombardments, permanent deployment of Vice President Kamala Harris to Europe to boost our allies’ confidence, ramped up White House and Pentagon press briefings and longer telephone calls from Biden to Zelensky are all under active consideration.

We cannot precisely measure the intangible effects on morale, both in Kyiv and Moscow, of Biden’s rejection of the MiG transfer. It would be stunning, however, if Zelensky’s advisers and Ukraine’s military were not dismayed and Putin’s elated. Whatever the precise operational value of the Polish MiGs, such a tangible sign of American and NATO support could have been inspiring. With both the MiGs and no-fly zones off the table, Ukraine’s options are narrowing.

Pentagon officials rightly remember Clausewitz’s insight: “Everything is very simple in war, but the simplest thing is difficult.” Biden took a simple idea, made it difficult and then rejected it. Congratulations.

John Bolton was national security adviser to President Donald Trump from 2018 to 2019 and US ambassador to the United Nations from 2005 to 2006.

How Russia Is Beating the West at Deterrence

March 09, 2022

This article appeared in New York Daily News on March 8th, 2022. Click here to view the original article.

Bolton was the national security adviser in 2018-19 for President Donald Trump. He was ambassador to the United Nations in 2005-06 and served in the administrations of presidents Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush.

Deterrence is working in the Ukraine crisis, just not for the right side. In this tragedy’s most catastrophic blunder, the United States and its allies failed to deter Russia from invading. President Joe Biden’s plan to create deterrence relied almost exclusively on threats that would be executed only after Russian forces crossed Ukraine’s borders. Unfortunately, the West’s credibility in threatening after-the-fact punishments was shredded by its earlier failures to impose stringent sanctions following the Kremlin’s assaults on Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014. America’s withdrawal from Afghanistan only increased Russian President Vladimir Putin’s doubts about our resolve.

Even beyond this yawning credibility gap, Biden’s total deterrence package was palpably inadequate. Most seriously, he said in early December 2021, and repeatedly thereafter, that U.S. military force was off the table. This was an unforced, unilateral concession, with no Russian reciprocity sought or given. Biden could simply have said nothing, hiding his intentions, and let the ambiguity weigh on Putin’s mind. Instead, he gave Putin a freebie.

That wasn’t all. No effort was made to inflict harm on Russia pre-invasion. Had appreciable costs been imposed before Moscow’s forces crossed an international border—damages felt in real time—they might have changed Putin’s cost-benefit calculus. For example, there was no push to halt the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, let alone economically cripple Russia’s broader energy sector, unless and until all Russian forces were withdrawn from European countries which did not consent to their presence, not just Ukraine, but also Moldova, Georgia and others. Russian financial assets, including those of prominent oligarchs, could have been seized or frozen until Russia’s military build-up on Ukraine’s borders was reversed, and the troops returned to their regular barracks. Sanctions work best when they are massive, swift, and ruthlessly implemented. In the Ukraine case, that didn’t before—or after—Russia invaded.

America and NATO could have deployed more forces to Ukraine to train and assist Ukraine’s military, joining those already there. Russian generals peering across Ukraine borders, could wonder what those new American flags meant. Considerably more weapons and ammunition could have been shipped to Ukraine at a far-more accelerated pace than was actually undertaken.

None of this happened. Instead, counter-productively, White House officials spoke frequently about imposing negative consequences for a “further invasion” of Ukraine, thinking themselves quite clever in not ignoring the 2014 attack. Ironically, however, their rhetorical flourish did just that, revealing critical deficiencies in their thinking, and confirming to Putin that there was no risk Russia’s actions in 2014 would be reversed. Opponents of raising Russia’s pre-invasion costs said so doing would actually provoke a Russian attack, as if that isn’t exactly what happened anyway. As Donald Rumsfeld observed, it’s not American strength that’s provocative, it’s American weakness.

Western deterrence failed, but now Russian deterrence is enjoying unfortunately spectacular success. Building on Biden’s earlier voluntary rejection of U.S. military involvement, Russia has convinced the West that even a whisper of NATO military action in Ukraine would bring disastrous consequences. Putin’s directive enhancing the alert status of Russia’s nuclear forces brought on something approaching panic in the West, although there is no publicly-available evidence that Russia’s forces have operationally changed anything. A battle in and around the Zaporizhzhia nuclear-power facility also produced near-hysteria, but neither the IAEA nor the Pentagon detected any radiation leaks or damage to the reactor complex itself.

Desperate Ukrainian requests for a NATO no-fly zone over Ukraine have been flatly rejected. On Friday, Secretary of State Blinken said, “to actually implement something like a no-fly zone…could lead to a full-fledged war in Europe,” and “the only thing worse than a war that’s contained to Ukraine is one that escalates even further and goes beyond it.”

This logic is false, a classic non sequitur. It rests on the tacit, but manifestly incorrect, premise that even one hostile encounter between Russian and Western forces will escalate immediately to all-out, possibly nuclear, war. Obviously, there are risks in any NATO military role. But it is utterly wrong to say, because there are some risks, that every risk leads inexorably to massive escalation, much less that the West should therefore take no military action. There is ample distance between Step Alpha and Step Omega, and considerable room for maneuver.

Clearly, however, once again, Putin is getting much of what he wants from NATO for free. He threatens, he blusters, he used the word “nuclear,” and the West wilts. This is the very paradigm of effective deterrence. There are undoubtedly hard and dangerous choices to be made, but total military quiescence also imposes costs, strategic and humanitarian, which are now unfolding.

Predictably, hesitant Westerners are fearful of giving Russia a “pretext” for attacking NATO members. That argument proves too much. If Moscow needs a pretext, it has one already. Washington has long, and quite rightly, provided intelligence to Ukraine at a “frenetic” pace. The White House boasts that “this includes information that should help them inform and develop their military response to Russia’s invasion.” This intelligence may not, strictly speaking, insert the U.S. into Ukraine’s military “kill chain” (find, fix, track, target, engage, assess), but if Russia is merely looking for a pretext, it surely would suffice.

Further “pretexts” include the White House boasting to favored media outlets about the massive provision of anti-tank weapons and cyberwarfare assistance. Since Putin has already declared economic sanctions akin to a declaration of war, hesitant Westerners will likely resist further efforts at real deterrence even more strenuously.

Europe and America are indulging in considerable self-satisfaction about the economic sanctions deployed against Russia. But we should not feel serene that, although our deterrence broke down and Ukraine is being devastated, Russia is suffering severe punishment. The purpose of deterrence strategy is to prevent the conflict entirely, and there Washington failed badly. Worse, Russia’s prospects of prevailing against Ukraine are enhanced by its successful deterrence against NATO acting in ways that could effectively counter its aggression. This is nothing to celebrate.

The Reckoning of Western Foreign Policy Elites

March 08, 2022

As yet, it is barely perceptible, but with each day it is becoming more apparent that only a week into a globe-shaping crisis, we are seeing the first signs of a new phase.

It is clear that the United States is not whole-heartedly engaged and is lagging far behind its European allies in showing resolve. For example, while the EU has sanctioned 490 entities as of March 3, and Switzerland 371, the United States has only sanctioned 118. Moreover, leaks from the administration show signs of faltering rather than steeling will. Articles are appearing in elite Western papers, such as the New York Times, which only a week ago led the charge into confrontation, already laying out intellectual paths to backing off and yielding to Putin. In conversations in the last 24 hours with people in the bordering lands north of Russia, from what I gather the populations of the Baltic states are beginning to assess that they are next in Putin’s plans, but that they will not be saved by NATO despite all the talk and commitments. As a result, in the last 24 hours, there has been a drop in the hitherto lava-hot housing market in all those lands, and we are even seeing the first signs of an exodus from them. Population movements are among the best indicators of what people really think since they are voting with their feet at the cost of great disruption. In this case, they are voting on their appreciation as to whether the US – as the only genuine leader that can pilot the Western world — will go the distance on this and draw the hard border on Putin to stop the slide at and within Ukraine and no further, or whether the United States will back off after the initial hoopla, which will then set everyone up for Putin’s next thrust of which those closest to Russia will pay first and hardest.

Israel, the UAE and the Saudis are on the other end of this rising Eurasian power and face off against one of its most important allies, Iran. While the West demands fealty on Ukraine, all are deeply fearful that if they go blazing in, they will be picking a fight with a colossus and be left alone holding the bag. Arab nations and Israel just do not have faith yet that the US is genuinely changed, is now serious and has effectively begun mobilizing for the long haul. The emerging Iran deal, in fact, tells them the opposite.

There also appears as yet to be no appreciation in the West as to how great and disruptive sanctions will have to become to genuinely sever Russia and isolate its economy – which is one of the first steps as the globe enters another Cold War. There is no way to do this but to also sever the West from China, since Beijing will cut out banks that commit to the sanctions, and others that won’t. For example, Chinese banks can just hide and transfer monies internally between the two, therein positioning China as a money-laundering superpower on a scale never before seen. At this point, our elites are hesitant on truly isolating Russia, and thus are hardly in a position to really draw the line on China too.

In fact, we are not even willing to disrupt our dependence on Russian oil and gas. The White House, via its spokesperson, Jen Psaki, has made that clear a dozen times over the week since the invasion of Ukraine. As a whole Germany is more serious, as are several other European nations. For this they are to be commended. And yet, in the end, even Germany is willing to suspend NordStream2, which was not going to truly come on line until next winter. In other words, it took a stand for which payment is expected to come due only after Ukraine falls or wins. In contrast, Germany allows NordStream to continue to flow. Again, Germany and some of its European allies are still to be given credit for what it has done, but we should be sober. The sanctions all Western nations have imposed on Russia via SWIFT structures are riddled with holes because of this continued trade.

If we are really not willing to wean ourselves off Russian gas and oil, then it is unlikely that we will be willing to do so on everything else. Once Ukraine settles into a festering mess (it will never be truly subjugated by Russia, even if the Ukrainian army dissolves as a coherent conventional fighting force, which is itself not even certain), we will begin to feel the full effects of severed economic ties to Russia — the consequences of which (devastated supply chains, for example) we really have not thought through, and certainly not felt, yet.

In general, at this moment, when suddenly things really matter and everything becomes deadly serious, there seems to be a verdict on the reckoning of the US foreign policy establishment and of its uninspiring record of missteps, delusions, inconsistencies and lapses since the end of the Cold War. Indeed, despite the unveiling by Putin of a chilling manifesto last summer, US diplomats, indeed our Under Secretary of State for Policy, Victoria Nuland, this last October traveled to Moscow and left the impression that we were distancing ourselves from Ukraine, and even reprimanding it for its resolute interpretation of the 2014 Minsk Agreement. For a leader like Putin, who outlined last summer a dangerous imperial vision, that was like throwing steak to a tiger. He understood this as weakness and an invitation to invasion. A seasoned official like Nuland should have understood, given the troubling evolution of Putin’s thinking as unveiled over the last half decade, that whatever diplomatic nicety or polite deference she expressed, and any light she showed between the United States and Ukraine, would be met by man who brags about physically subjugating tigers and bears as weakness, not refinement.

Thus, as Ukraine fights for its freedom, its identity and its survival, nations around the world and their peoples will settle into a hedging pattern until they are convinced the US has it in it to go the distance here linearly and decisively, rather than in a partial, waivering and hesitant process, the consequences of which are that many closest to the fire will pay a horrific price until the US finally comes around clearly and determinedly.

Sadly, the problem is not just the shortcomings of the Biden team. If it was, then we could just fix it by changing leaders. The problem is far deeper. It is, in fact, a civilizational reckoning. People are beginning to take note of the speeches and writings of Putin and his clique of intellectuals – teaching us once again that we are ill served us when we ignore the earnest nature of what others with ambition say. And yet, while people are beginning to realize the expanse of the challenge he poses, there is little discussion of the magnitude. The geographic parameters of Putin’s ambitions are coming into focus, but still ignored is his civilization critique of the West and his grandiose solution, which in the end is a far more dangerous assault than any real estate. He believes the rise of Western freedom has corrupted Christianity, and that his Eurasian fantasy is the salvation of European civilization. Along the way, he has no need for the small and weak, all of whom should be retuned to the strong and bog as minions.

In as far as Putin judges the flaws of Western civilization (as distinct from his grandiose answer), it is important the West appreciates that there may be part of this critique which demands serious introspection on our part. Indeed, there is a common thread uniting Hitler, Japan, the Soviet Union, Khomeini, and bin-Ladin with Putin: they all believed that the West was a soul-less, corrupted civilization that confronted with strong will can be swept aside as easily as breezes scatter dust on a floor. While Hitler and Japan were buried decisively and immediately when a relentless America obliterated both their armies and their ideas, continental European powers and elites had until that point failed and were in fact swept aside.

It bears consideration as to why that was so. European elites, led by failing aristocracies, had become a pessimistic lot that had traded the souls of their national identity for an increasingly performative but ultimately hollow rising set of international ideas and institutions. In the end, those elites never really internalized that they were part of their nations or accepted the passing of the baton of defining “legitimate” culture to their whole populations. They thus increasingly distanced themselves from their own people, whom they believed had rejected their inherently superior status. The elites, led by a dying aristocratic class, felt jilted. Hitler gauged that Europe’s elites simply could no longer tap into and leverage their nation’s cultures for power, and thus with utter disdain he played upon the elites’ resulting impotence, internally and externally. His appreciation of the continent was correct, and despite Germany’s initial weakness and his personally tenuous grip on power, it fell to him within half of a decade. He then leveraged this as a parade of Western retreats not only to destroy, but to humiliate along the way, his internal doubters.

And yet, America was different, and its elites at that time were still products of the culture and its informing ideas that all Americans shared. Thus, when either Hitler or the Japanese imperial leadership slammed against America, it slammed against an insurmountable tide of power. It took a still confident America a bit longer to lead the world to devastate the Soviet Union, but win it did in the end. Still, there were some warning signs along the way as elites in the 1970s increasingly began to resemble the elites of their trans-Atlantic allies who lacked civilizational confidence and instead of confidently tapping the sinews of power of their own cultures, increasingly invested in international structures, institutions and norms to codify inertia – or which they hoped would at least — and hide their fading self-confidence.

Reading Putin and his intellectuals for years, it is this question which most animates him. The imperial expansion of geography is the aim, but his imagination that he can realize his ambitions emerge from his appreciation of the rot and corruption of the West, which he fingers as emanating from freedom itself rather than from the Western elites’ abandonment (rather than embrace) of their cultural identity and soul. For Putin, the West is a desert of nobody people, but the new Russia is a land of faith and a soul. His substance will vanquish our emptiness. In this civilizational challenge, Putin follows in the footsteps of the Hitlers, Ishiwara Kanjis, Mussolinis, Stalins, Nassers, Che Guevaras, Maos, Xis, Khomeiinis and bin-Ladins.

So where is America today as we enter the next great challenge? Do people outside America measure us as a rising confident civilization with a strong sense of who we are? Or do our urban and foreign policy elites — which after all is what is most visible to the outside, not the patriot with a pickup truck sitting in a diner in Fargo with a gun rack on the back window — either act with deep pessimism as if either we assume our own decline or behave as if we are a nobody people (no soul, no faith, no history, no identity)?

Putin, and for that matter Xi, ISIS, al Qaida, Iran too, measured us up as deficient. The real question, the answer to which will determine how far and fast the world will mobilize around the new order — which is not yet clearly either a cold war or a world war, but which is rapidly approaching somewhere on that level of seriousness — is whether people eventually see Putin’s, Xi’s, bin-Ladin’s and Khomeini’s assessment as the better bet or not.

Ukraine is an opportunity, not only a bellwether, in this regard. Putin views core elements of the West’s foundations with disdain. Our response to the Ukraine crisis ultimately must be a reassertion of our confidence as a civilization and the values (that unique combination of Greek, Roman, Judeo-Christian, Renaissance and early Enlightenment foundations) upon which it is grounded, not a specific policy or action.

The first signs are the American people are beginning to appreciate the true civilizational nature of this challenge. But our political elites face a reckoning. For many decades so far, they have failed us. Will our foreign policy be based on the platform of our culture and values, or on a ratatouille of academic theories, reactive scrambling and shifting values based on diplomatic expediency?

Meanwhile, in the Middle East: The Biden administration’s strategy is causing real problems

March 08, 2022

This article appeared in New York Daily News on March 8th, 2022. Click here to view the original article.

Ukraine’s ongoing tragedy is now having dangerous ramifications in the Middle East, fueled by significant Biden administration policy failures. The United Arab Emirates, normally a staunch American ally, abstained recently on a UN Security Council resolution condemning Russia’s invasion. The reason: President Biden declined to relist Yemen’s Houthi rebels, who had repeatedly attacked civilian targets in the UAE and Saudi Arabia, as a foreign terrorist organization. Biden had earlier removed the Houthis, Iran’s surrogates in Yemen’s civil war, from the list, purportedly to mitigate Yemen’s sustained humanitarian crisis.

The UAE pressed to reverse Biden’s delisting after early February Houthi attacks on civilian targets in the UAE and Saudi Arabia, but the White House failed to act.

When Biden pressured the UAE, now a non-permanent Security Council member, to support his anti-Russia resolution, the UAE abstained instead. Embarrassing Biden reversals also include initially waiving, and now supporting, sanctions on the Nord Stream 2 Russia-to-Germany gas pipeline, which may have encouraged Moscow’s aggression.

Bumbling the Houthi threat reflects Biden’s profound misperceptions about what constitutes a serious menace to Middle East and global peace and security. Houthi strikes against civilian targets and threats to international shipping in the critical Bab-el-Mandeb Strait are, unfortunately, nothing new. Using missiles and drones, Houthi attacks increased markedly since mid-2019, along with increased Shia militia attacks on U.S. personnel in Iraq. These dangers would not exist without Iranian weapons shipments, training, targeting and logistics.

Because of the Yemen civil war’s complex politics, deeply-rooted underlying causes and resistance to solution, outsiders often focus on the hardships the conflict has caused. While severe and enduring, these hardships hardly explain the conflict’s causes or who is culpable. Instead, pre-existing hostility toward Saudi Arabia and the UAE, unrelated to Yemen, have colored outside judgments. The Houthis played the “victim card,” and sympathetic Westerners were duped.

Biden announced he was ending American support for the Saudi war effort in Yemen in hopes of ending the conflict, although that military support ad already been considerably reduced. Nonetheless, the Houthis continued their military efforts without evincing any real interest in resolving the conflict.

Unsurprisingly, therefore, Iran has largely escaped condemnation for meddling in Yemen, and for using the war to establish strategic positions literally in the backyards of its Arab enemies. Eliminating Tehran’s support to the Houthis would help end Yemen’s fratricide, and, equally importantly, end threats to commercial airports, oil infrastructure and other targets where innocent civilians live and work. Major airports are not far from urban population centers, and the reckless use of highly destructive weapons could easily cause mass-casualty events.
The Iran-Houthi alliance is almost entirely terrorist in its aims and methods. From its birth, Iran’s regime was a state sponsor of terrorism, so designated by Ronald Reagan in 1984. The Trump administration named the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, Tehran’s external military arm, to the foreign terrorists’ list in 2019. Iran’s ayatollahs have consistently pursued terrorism, from seizing U.S. hostages in 1979 to aiding Hamas, Hezbollah and Iraqi militias, and threatening Americans worldwide.

Even so, the Biden administration is still begging Iran to revive the 2015 nuclear deal, an agreement fatally flawed from the outset, and getting worse with age.

The Houthis and their top leaders are also terrorists, as their behavior both inside Yemen and regionally amply demonstrates. As with the IRGC, the only legitimate complaint is that the U.S. government didn’t designate them as a foreign terrorist organization earlier. The designation expressly provided ways to ensure it did not impede delivery of humanitarian assistance to Yemeni civilians, UN protestations to the contrary notwithstanding.

Accordingly, while Yemen’s conflict remains complex and difficult, and not easily solvable, Iran’s presence is totally self-interested. It is not about Yemen, but about Iran’s efforts to achieve regional and religious hegemony through its own terrorism, assistance to terrorist groups and its pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.

Unless and until Americans understand this reality, grave humanitarian challenges in Yemen will persist, and gullible Westerners will still believe they can make a viable agreement with Iran to limit its determined quest for nuclear weapons. But even if Houthis are returned to the foreign terrorist organization list, it is unclear the Biden administration understands these larger points.

Bolton is a former U.S. ambassador to the UN and former national security adviser.

Thinking strategically about Ukraine

March 04, 2022

This article appeared in The Hill on March 3rd, 2022. Click here to view the original article.

Just days into Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Europeans and Biden administration supporters are already urging that we begin finding “off ramps” for Russian President Vladimir Putin. These sources counsel “moderating” the West’s current efforts to avoid “backing Putin into a corner.” Some focus particularly on Russia’s heightened nuclear alert status, or speculation about Putin’s mental stability.

This is exactly the wrong approach at the wrong time for the wrong reasons. It ignores both what’s actually happening in Ukraine, and the real point of Putin’s aggression: to weaken NATO and reestablish Moscow’s hegemony (or even sovereignty) over the former Soviet Union.

Make no mistake: The stakes are global, as China watches what Russia achieves in Europe to see what it can do in the Indo-Pacific. President Biden’s State of the-Union address, remarkably substance-free on national-security issues, only confirms that he is running out of ideas on Ukraine and the larger strategic challenges.

Having failed to deter Moscow’s unprovoked aggression against Kyiv; with economic sanctions ramped up only belatedly, and insufficient to halt the ongoing assault; and as Russian military forces continue their attacks, the West does not have a sufficient position of strength to contemplate finding Putin graceful exits. Concessions now will only encourage Putin to continue and substantially expand military efforts to achieve his objectives. 

Ironically, to say the least, we were finally moving in the opposite direction from finding “off ramps.” NATO’s resolve has been strengthened, although not enough. Outside NATO, a recent poll showed for the first time that a majority of Finland’s population supports NATO membership. This unprecedented 53 percent level of support is up dramatically from the last pre-invasion poll in 2017, which showed only 19 percent in favor. Support for NATO membership in Sweden has also reportedly risen to new highs. The prospect of more NATO on its northern flank can only depress Russia’s Defense Ministry.

In sanctions policy, the United Kingdom and Canada have been leading the way, while complaining quietly about the lack of sustained U.S. leadership. In Britain, especially, concerns are growing that the European Union (EU) rather than NATO will emerge as the West’s main engine of policymaking. London correctly worries that the EU’s congenital institutional myopia will lead to premature concessions, which Biden’s lethargy only reinforces.

Broaching “off ramps” now is dangerous. So far, Ukraine’s defenses have been remarkably strong, and the courage of its people readily apparent, disproving the refrain of America’s Kremlin surrogates that Russia conquering Ukraine is a “natural” reunion of a common people. Ukraine’s willingness to fight alone (the sad reality, Western illusions to the contrary notwithstanding) against aggression evidences its determination to maintain independence.

However, and without minimizing the importance of Ukraine’s spirit and strength, today’s highly fluid battlefield demonstrates that the West’s collective effort is insufficient. Moscow’s own mistakes significantly contributed to its relative lack of progress. In the war’s opening week, Putin tried to achieve too many objectives with inadequate human and materiel resources. By ignoring the ancient maxim to concentrate forces on fewer targets, Putin opened defensive opportunities that Ukraine’s military readily seized. Moreover, Russian logistical support for its lead combat elements seemed poorly planned and inadequate, as press and social media reports show repeatedly. 

These early failures and miscalculations cost Russia dearly and bought precious time for Ukraine’s defenders, but the “correlation of forces,” as they said in Soviet circles, is changing in the Kremlin’s favor. Over 80 percent of the troops garrisoned near Ukraine’s borders are now moving into action, with the rest following shortly. Russia’s mistakes will lead in due course to purges in its defense ministry, but the blunt reality is that Moscow still has time to get its act together.

Existing sanctions will not materially hamper Russia’s near-term war effort, and not necessarily in the long-term either. Iran, North Korea and Venezuela’s Maduro regime have all faced equal or more-severe sanctions regimes, and sadly they are still standing. Russia had ample advance notice of what was coming, and we may well find that those long weeks watching Russian military assets accumulate on Ukraine’s border were also long weeks where Russian assets were exiting vulnerable positions abroad. Even now, the EU is leaving two of Russia’s three largest banks connected to the SWIFT interbank messaging system.

Most importantly, until the West drives a stake through the heart of Russia’s energy sector, Moscow will continue to profit from this crisis. Europe’s reliance on Russian energy supplies could soon open debilitating loopholes in the sanctions if “off ramps” for Putin take priority.

The historical record does not provide a solid basis to believe in EU staying power, whatever the current rhetorical bravado. Russian hydrocarbon sales are reportedly down and selling at bargain-basement prices. The next step: more pressure.

Russia’s real territorial objectives in Ukraine are still, in my view, expanding control over (1) eastern and southern Ukraine, home to a predominantly culturally, linguistically and religiously Russian population; and (2) the entire Black Sea northern coast, including the port of Odessa, thus landlocking a rump Ukraine, and severely squeezing it economically. 

Russia’s success to date in eastern Ukraine has been limited. But in the south, striking out from Crimea and attacking from the Black Sea, Russia has achieved more, while Western media have focused on Kyiv and Kharkiv. Putin is therefore actually closer to success, his preferred “off-ramp,” than the West realizes.

In coming weeks, we must avoid “off ramps” or anything else that undercuts the imperative of increasing pressure on Moscow. For example, we should eviscerate Russia’s energy sector by prohibiting sales of hydrocarbons to all NATO and EU countries, and anyone else we can sign up. Dry up Putin’s revenues, which amount to 30 percent of Russia’s domestic economy and 60 percent of its export revenues, and make it expend its foreign currency reserves as fast as possible. Declare a visa ban on all Russian citizens, not just a few elite figures. There is much more to do.

But above all else, no “off ramps” should be visible while Moscow insists on sustained belligerence in its “near abroad” and its efforts to weaken NATO. This is not the time for tactical thinking about Ukraine alone, but for strategic thinking about global peace and security.

John Bolton was national security adviser to President Trump from 2018 to 2019, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations from 2005 to 2006 and held senior State Department posts in 2001-2005 and 1985-1989. His most recent book is “The Room Where It Happened“ (2020). He is the founder of John Bolton Super PAC, a political action committee supporting candidates who believe in a strong U.S. foreign policy.

Entente Multiplies the Threat From Russia and China

March 01, 2022

This article appeared in The Wall Street Journal on February 15th, 2022. Click here to view the original article.

It’s been more than 75 years since the U.S. last faced an axis of strategic threats. Fortunately, that axis proved dysfunctional. Had it been otherwise, Japan and Germany would have systematically attacked the Soviet Union, not America, first.

Our current strategic adversaries, Russia and China, aren’t an axis. They’ve formed an entente, tighter today than any time since de-Stalinization split the communist world. Involving some mutual interests and objectives, displays of support, and coordination, ententes are closer than mere bilateral friendships but discernibly looser than full alliances. The pre-World War I Triple Entente (Russia, France and Britain) is the modern era’s prototype.

Moscow is junior partner to Beijing, the reverse of Cold War days. The Soviet Union’s dissolution considerably weakened Russia, while China has had enormous economic growth since the death of Mao Zedong in 1976. Russia’s junior-partner status looks permanent, given disparities in population and economic strength (whatever today’s military balance), but Vladimir Putin seems determined to move closer to China.

This entente will last. Economic and political interests are mutually complementary for the foreseeable future. Russia is a significant source of hydrocarbons for energy-poor China and a longtime supplier of advanced weapons. Russia has hegemonic aspirations in the former Soviet territory, Eastern Europe and the Middle East. China has comparable aspirations in the Indo-Pacific region and the Middle East (and world-wide in due course). The entente is growing stronger, as China’s unambiguous support for Russia in Europe’s current crisis proves.

Washington would undoubtedly be more secure if it could sunder the Moscow-Beijing link, but our near-term prospects are limited. This entente, along with many other factors, renders especially shortsighted the common assertion that opposing China’s existential threat to the West requires reducing or even withdrawing U.S. support for allies elsewhere.

Barack Obama’s “pivot” or “rebalancing” to Asia produced a decade of variations on the theme that China matters and other threats don’t. Donald Trump agreed, although he wanted primarily to strike “the biggest trade deal in history” or impose tariffs if he couldn’t, along with assaulting China for the “Wuhan virus” when it became politically convenient. Some analysts argue that the global terrorist threat is diminishing and that hydrocarbon resources are becoming less important because of the green-fuel revolution. Both would mean that we could safely reduce U.S. attention to the Middle East. Thus, Joe Biden argued that withdrawing from Afghanistan was required to increase attention to China’s menace. Sen. Josh Hawley and others even believe we shouldn’t be deeply involved in the Eastern Europe crisis, to avoid diverting attention and resources from countering Beijing.

Such assertions about reduced or redirected U.S. global involvement are strategic errors. They reflect the misperception that our international attention and resources are zero-sum assets, so that whatever notice is paid to interests and threats other than China is wasted.

This is false, both its underlying zero-sum premise and in underestimating non-Chinese threats. Our problem is failing to devote anything like adequate attention or resources to protecting vital global interests. Political elites (who are noticeably lacking in figures like Truman and Reagan) focus on exotic social theories and domestic economics rather than national-security threats. America’s own shortsightedness, particularly an inadequate defense budget, makes us vulnerable to foreign peril. Washington must pivot not among competing world-wide priorities, but away from domestic navel-gazing.

Critically, those who exclusively fear China ignore the Russia-China entente. The entente serves to project China’s power through Russia, as Beijing also projects power through North Korean and Iranian nuclear programs. Moreover, Beijing closely assesses Washington’s reactions to crises like the one in Ukraine to decide how to structure future provocations.

Mr. Biden had it exactly backward in Afghanistan. The U.S. withdrawal not only signaled insularity and weakness, but allowed China and Russia to extend their influence in Kabul, Central Asia and the Middle East. Beijing and Moscow thereby also became more confident and assertive. And that’s not to mention that even the Biden administration admits that terrorism’s threat is rising again in Afghanistan.

Beijing is not a regional threat but a global one. Treating the rest of the world as a third-tier priority, a distraction, the U.S. plays directly into China’s hands. Pivoting to Asia wouldn’t strengthen America against China. It would have precisely the opposite effect and weaken our global posture.

We need to see this big picture before the Russia-China entente grows up to be an axis.

Mr. Bolton is author of “The Room Where It Happened: A White House Memoir.” He served as the president’s national security adviser, 2018-19, and ambassador to the United Nations, 2005-06.

A Littoral Foothold Strategy for Africa

March 01, 2022

By Dr. David Wurmser

One of the most intense and potentially most important battlegrounds of the new Cold War between the United States and China is sub-Saharan Africa. Absent from the competition, the United States, and for the most part Europe, Japan and other Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries as well, have largely ceded the entire sub-Saharan continent to China over the last few decades as part of China’s amorphous Belt and Road slogan. And yet, at the same time, the OECD lands need with great urgency to begin to find alternatives to raw and rare materials to replace those coming from either Chinese or Russian origins. In this context, the United States and its OECD allies have little choice but to consider how the stability and development of sub-Saharan Africa, the proper husbanding of its resources, and the development of its ports are becoming a vital US interest.

The bad news is China has spent several decades anchoring its dominance on the continent. China is not just ahead of Europe and the US; the latter two are not even on the playing field yet. The good news is two-fold. First, China’s heavy-handed and exploitative behavior has left many African nations bristling and seeking to reorient to the West, provided it pursues appropriate development strategies while leveraging their resources. Second, rapid shifts in the energy sector – both in terms of focusing on non-hydrocarbon energy production (such as nuclear) as well as the rise in importance of energy storage in addition to production – are transforming global industry but demanding many raw materials still untapped which have remained out of China’s grip in Sub-Saharan Africa. The United States, leading its OECD allies, thus, has an opportunity as well as need to develop a strategy to gain a foothold on the continent which will serve as a model to offer African nations a different, more mutually beneficial path than that offered by the exploitative Chinese Belt and Road campaign.

Background – Chinese neo-Imperialism in Africa

Over the last decades, China has aggressively pursued its interests in sub-Saharan Africa under the ”Belt and Road” slogan. To a lesser extent, Russia has cultivated its ties as well. While the precise meaning of China’s “Belt and Road” slogan is at best misty – perhaps intentionally so — the pattern under which China operated was clear and consistent. China offered the promise of vast economic development by building grand infrastructure projects, starting with the Chinese financed and built “Tazara” railway project in 1975 to transport primarily copper to the Tanzanian coast from landlocked Zambia. China began the pattern of a trifecta win for itself: 1) witheringly indebting countries, 2) exporting its own labor and goods to build the railway, which then 3) serviced China’s keen interest in securing a critical resource, which in this case was copper. Recent rail projects dominated by China are the Kinshasa-Mombasa port railway in Kenya, and the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway in Ethiopia and Djibouti ports – essentially granting China control of Africa’s Indian Ocean coastal ports from the Red Sea to the Tanzanian coast. China’s EXIM bank provided 70 percent of the funding for this grand project.

These projects are often of highly dubious utility, but China offered to provide the funding, the expertise, materials (capital equipment) and even labor force to execute the projects. As such, it essentially exported internal Chinese labor pressures and guaranteed export of Chinese equipment at the cost of a foreign country’s incurring insurmountable debt. Of course, these grand projects involved very little local labor or industry, ensuring that the Chinese labor market and its industrial export sectors would be the prime benefactors.

The infrastructure built was thus grand but basically useless other than for the Chinese, and most became unmaintainable boondoggles that in the end left nations with jumbo debts and white elephant memorials. The Addis Ababa-Djibouti line, for example, was billed and sold to these two nations as the spine of a new Africa rail network to service the passenger pressures emanating from the rapidly urbanizing African population. And yet, this rail network carries only about 84,000 people per year last year – far less than the Washington, DC subway carries in one day. This essentially leaves only freight service of consequence, most of which services Chinese firms extracting raw materials from Africa to fuel and supply industry and employment in China, leaving almost no economic and industrial growth in Africa itself. Overall, this project is returning only about USD 40 million in revenue per year, while the cost of operating the line is USD 70 million. There is a similar story with the Nairobi-Mombasa line in Kenya, 90% of which was financed by China’s EXIM bank to the tune of USD 4.7 billion.1 Not only are both Ethiopia and Djibouti unable to even begin recouping enough money to begin to pay the debt on initial investment and construction expenses (Kenya is unable to pay the USD 245 million loan payment due already on its railway to China), but both are continually hemorrhaging more money per year on the gap between revenue and ongoing operating costs.2 The result: Djibouti became China’s first military base in Africa, turning the Horn of Africa into a Chinese strategic asset.

Essentially, these projects – the Chinese funded portion of which amounts to 42 percent of all construction and infrastructure spending on the African continent – have become a modern rendition of colonialism following the worst practices of the old colonial powers of a century or two ago. Having ironically originated in the 1955 Bandung Conference, which was ostensibly organized to de-colonialize the world from Western imperial control, these projects are predatory and serve exclusively Chinese economic and strategic interests, not those of Africans.

There was also a geopolitical dimension to this ensnarement via debt. China was quick to follow by leveraging the debt and the attending erosion of sovereignty not only to secure access and control local resources (rare earth as well as critical raw materials), establish dominance in many critical ports, but also to demand fealty in global international institutions, such as UNESCO, the UN Human Rights Commission or the UN General Assembly and Security Council itself – leading to such embarrassments as Tedros Ghebreyesus to lead the WHO.

Recently, China forged new alliances with Iran and Turkey, reducing both to dependence on Beijing in exchange for Beijing’s floating their sinking economies. This not only strongly positioned China as a dominant player along the old silk and caravan routes of Central Asia and the Near East, especially in Pakistan and Afghanistan, but it further entrenched Chinese control in sub-Sharan Africa by exploiting Iranian/Hizballah networks in sub-Saharan Africa and Turkey’s machinations in eastern Africa (Somalia especially) and the Maghreb (such as western Libya), as well as Turkey’s robust port operations companies. As such, the West now finds itself having essentially surrendered sub-Saharan Africa, its nations, its resources and its ports strategically on the eve of an era of heightened geo-political tensions.

And yet, China may have seized the wallets and resources of the African continent, but they have not won the hearts and minds. China – and many of its admirers among the Western elites — may tout the success of its “soft-power” influence strategy, but underneath, China is really facing a soon-to-erupt geyser of pent-up local resentment at indebtedness, loss of independence, and the exploitation of resources in ways that produce neither African wealth nor local industrial development. The emerging resentment to China’s heavy-handed subordination of African economies has opened unprecedented opportunities to the West to reenter the continent, provided it is done so on a very different footing than the Chinese and encourages local wealth accumulation and industrial development in ways that help these nations regain their independence.

Industrial and Strategic Shifts Changing the Role of Africa

The United States officially began to take note of this gathering danger and rising opportunity on the African continent during the Trump administration. The NSC under Ambassador John Bolton coordinated with Ambassador Peter Pham at State (Secretary

of State Mike Pompeo’s Sahel region and de facto Great Lakes/sub-Saharan Africa point person) to developing a strategy to help states across Africa break their entrapment via “predatory” debt to China and to some extent Russia as well. The strategy was first revealed in December 2018 by Ambassador Bolton at a speech to the Heritage Foundation. Apparently, the classified version of the strategy outlined was reported to be far more expansive and specific.

Bolton described China thus in targeting this strategy:

“China uses bribes, opaque agreements and the strategic use of debt to hold states in Africa captive to Beijing’s wishes and demands. Its investment ventures are riddled with corruption and do not meet the same environmental or ethical standards as US development projects.”

After Ambassador’s Bolton’s departure, Matthew Pottinger at the NSC (Deputy NSC Adv) continued to coordinate with Pham to try to bend the IMF — by campaigning to secure a sympathetic leader there in order to restructure sovereign debts and begin to challenge China’s domination of the African continent via indebtedness. But the problem was that the IMF and other US structures (and especially US NGOs who were under the sway of George Soros) placed demands on these African leaders for restricting loans that were tantamount to their endangering their own power. Dangling the prospect of governmental suicide is hardly an effective enticement to strategically reorient toward the West away from China or Russia. As such, the effort launched by Bolton and Pham, and furthered by Pottinger, faced a constant headwind that left only minor initial progress by the end of the Trump era. Still, the contours remained and, as Ambassador Pham noted, continuity in Africa policy historically persists between administrations, and it likely will continue to some extent going forward into the Biden years.

But substantial changes in industry and patterns of demand of raw materials offer the West a brief window to break China’s grip on Africa. Specifically, the transformation of the energy sector from exclusive focus on energy production to additional focus now on energy storage changes the mix of raw materials in high demand. While China has locked up many sources of critical raw materials in sub-Sharan Africa, it did not entirely anticipate the speed with which a new category of raw materials would be demanded – such as lithium and graphite. Having left such critical materials still up for grabs is a strategic lacuna of China’s and a great opportunity of ours. It leads to a unique opportunity for the West to try to help African nations, many of whom bristle with great

resentment not only at their loss of sovereignty to China but also at the complete absence of China’s use of local labor or industry, to wean themselves off of Chinese debt, build wealth through the export of these raw materials, allow for local employment and ultimately give African nations the ability to leverage the wealth to finally develop their economies properly. And a coherent strategy with our allies to help some of these nations — starting with some sort of littoral foothold — to mine, develop industry to employ locals, and build modern and efficient port structures not only will further contribute to local employment, but also help begin the process of nudging China out of critical areas.

The Great Lakes Basin as a Foothold for Change

There are several potential openings in Africa at this point, but the Great Lakes Basin and adjacent lands might be a place to start. One of the key principles upon which Bolton, Pham and Pottinger focused was the need to replace the predatory practices of China and Russia with genuine development policies that allow local African governments to become more independent, accrue national wealth and genuinely grow the local economies and expand local industry and employment.

With the vast debt, however, with which China has saddled many of these nations, they must carefully but aggressively leverage their natural resources to build national wealth, wean themselves off Chinese debt, and establish sovereign wealth funds as vehicles to grow the prosperity and reinvest revenues in their economies and when necessary and economically prudent, build out infrastructure.

While the politics of some nations can be challenging, the geology of the Great Lakes Basin is particularly promising. Burundi, in addition to copper, nickel, cobalt and vanadium also has rare earth elements. Its Waga, the Musongati and the Nyabikere deposits rich in nickel, cobalt and copper – are all critical for energy transmission and storage — are already owned by the UK’s Kermas Group rather than China. The Democratic Republic of Congo is the source of a great deal with the world’s copper and cobalt.

And then there is Tanzania, which has substantial deposits of the critical raw materials of graphite and lithium. The Great Lakes Basin, especially Tanzania, might thus represent an interesting place to begin. The graphite resources in Tanzania are naturally recurring jumbo-flake deposits, which are practically non-existent elsewhere other than synthetically produced but are critical for the nuclear power industry, particularly in encasing spent nuclear fuel.

Flake graphite is also critical for making lithium-ion batteries, but even more necessary in making fuel cells, meaning any eco-friendly vehicle requires it. Not only is graphite — which in Tanzania occurs as a very pure deposit — as a whole critical for so many industrial sectors at this point, as its strength and light weight allows for replacement of metal, but the jumbo-flake graphite occurring in Tanzanian deposits are also critical for the nuclear power industry.

As the current limits on wind and solar power become apparent, the move away from hydrocarbons by Western economies will highlight the continued importance of nuclear power. Over time it is likely that the demand for the materials needed to supply the nuclear power sector will only grow in importance as many nations begin to realize there is no path to green energy that also includes rapid and total simultaneous elimination of both all hydrocarbon and nuclear power. Germany will soon discover that its decision to shut down its last power plants was a significant misstep in strategic and energy policy. It reduced Germany to dependence on Russian natural gas supply just as the Ukrainian crisis began in earnest. It is hard to imagine that Germany will likely not eventually be forced to reconsider this decision. France, in contrast to Germany, has already realized the continued potential of nuclear power. President Emmanuel Macron announced on February 10, 2022, that it will place a priority on reinvigorating its nuclear power industry to usher in a French nuclear industry “renaissance.” And even the United States over recent weeks has returned to considering nuclear power as a “green” energy, and thus a rehabilitation of our nuclear power industry appears more desirable. Indeed, even Secretary of Energy Jennifer M. Granholm said in early February that, “U.S. nuclear power plants are essential to achieving President Biden’s climate goals and that the DOE is committed to keeping 100% clean electricity flowing and preventing premature closures.” The more the OECD lands return to nuclear power, the more they will value many of the resources the Great Lakes Basin hold, not the least important of which is the jumbo-flake graphite deposits of Tanzania.

As far as infrastructure to extract these materials or downstream industrial use of them to develop local industry there needs to be a focused port through which to send these products to the world. Sadly, Djibouti has allowed the Doraleh container port to fall to Chinese control, and thus the Horn of Africa. But the strategicallylocated port of Dar Es-Salaam, which is a deep water port in a strategically critical area, is still out of China’s grip and adds to Tanzania’s importance, especially given how Tanzania suddenly finds itself in possession of two critical raw materials of great value over which China has not yet asserted control.

So by serendipity of geopolitics, economic change, and supply demands, Tanzania manifests a unique nexus between a government which is eager, indeed very eager, to wean itself off of Chinese debt, has world class resources that service growing industrial demand in exactly those materials that can be tapped and used as a foundation not only to extract itself from that debt but for broader industrial investment, and a geopolitically important location with direct access to the sea and the potential for making Dar Es-Salaam a major West Indian Ocean port and hub. These resources can help in what might be considered a US “foothold” strategy, wherein the combination of Tanzanian government willingness and export resources availability with rising global demands, and a critically strategic port can be combined under US and European encouragement to become a foothold and serve as a model for other nations in the sub-Continent to strip China of its influence and dominant presence as well as deny China, along with Russia, their domination over critical resources. Adding the other Great Lakes Basin countries to this bloc can create an industrial/resources development zone with its own port structure, to anchor an African revival and US strategy.

Conclusion

It is likely that in the coming years, the emergence of a new Russian civilizational challenge to the West will combine with the increasing assertiveness of Chinese communist leaders to painfully remind the West that its geopolitical inattentiveness and excessive reliance on cheap production costs in China had led it to be highly vulnerable to geopolitical blackmail. Supply chains, raw material access, energy production and storage capabilities, mining capacity among other things are now preserved only at the indulgence of these emerging adversaries.

As the ensuing threat is more broadly realized, the West will begin to mobilize, both in terms of reconstituting its power, but also addressing its geopolitical position, reinforcing its structure of alliances, strengthening its global presence (including in a network of port structures) and remedying its supply chain dependencies.

At the same time, there will be dramatic shifts in the mix of industries and materials needed. On the one hand, change from production alone to linked production-storage-use structures in the energy sectors, and the rise of a new cluster of materials (hitherto of far more limited use if any) needed for cutting edge industries – such as neodymium for new non-polar magnetic structures in quantum computing – will change our understanding of the geography of economic reliance. For example, lithium mines will become as strategically important as oil wells. These changes will make parts of the world important that were hitherto largely ignored.

In short, the West finds itself with a great economic and strategic opportunity if it embarks on a plan to partner with an African nation or nations who seek to regain their independence from China’s tightening grip. And this can serve as a foundation for the West to establish a foothold.

But with one significant caveat.

Predatory haughtiness burdens China and Russia in their relations with Africa. Africans are beginning to see their “altruism” for what it is: neo-colonialism. As such, when Ambassador Bolton unveiled the new Africa strategy in 2018, he carefully noted the predatory nature of China’s involvement, and emphasized the need for partnership with the US rather than control by it. And it was consistent with a broader change in US policy globally in the last several years. The US had always correctly used the language of partnership and decolonization, but in practice, our diplomacy and strategic posture was based on control. It was perhaps a function of the Cold War when containment demanded a tightly controlled alliance structure to damn up Soviet expansion and maintain a stable cordon around it. But any policy on Africa that aims to succeed will assert American leadership and strategic confidence, but at the same time demonstrate to Africans that we are the antithesis of Chinese Communist haughtiness or Russian

John Bolton on the lessons to be drawn from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine

March 01, 2022

This article appeared in The Economist on February 28th, 2022. Click here to view the original article.

The West must not lapse back into complacency about potential aggressors, says a former US national security adviser

JUST DAYS into what might be a protracted Russia-Ukraine war, politicians and pundits are already drawing sweeping conclusions. For some, Russia’s failure to gain a swift, decisive, low-casualty victory renders Vladimir Putin’s downfall inevitable, and imminent. For others, a Russian victory, however bloody, directly threatens Ukraine’s neighbours and would mean sustained tensions in Europe. Which is correct, I can’t tell. Edmund Burke’s advice is, as usual, apt: “Please God, I will walk with caution, whenever I am not able clearly to see my way before me.” A few prudential lessons, however, are clear.

First, pay attention to what adversaries say. In 2005 Mr Putin said that the Soviet Union’s disintegration was the 20th century’s greatest geopolitical catastrophe. Slowly but systematically since then, he has sought to reverse the collapse, most visibly through invasions, annexations and creating independent states—in Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014). Mr Putin has also used less kinetic means to bring states like Belarus, Armenia and Kazakhstan into closer Russian orbits.

While this unfolded, the West remained largely insouciant: not spending adequate amounts on defence; growing increasingly reliant on Russian oil and gas supplies; and mirror-imaging Russia’s leadership as Europeans-in-waiting (ie, just like us except not as refined). Those days may be over, but Winston Churchill’s insight as to “the confirmed unteachability of mankind” remains profound. Been reading speeches by Xi Jinping, Ayatollah Khamenei and Kim Jong Un recently?

Second, the aggressive use of military force is back in style. The “rules-based international order” just took a direct hit, not that it was ever as sturdy as imagined in elite salons and academic cloisters. Although the steps taken to prevent Russia’s invasion and aid Ukraine in advance were obviously inadequate, the strength of the international reaction once the shooting actually started is impressive. It helps immeasurably that, so far, Ukraine’s resistance has been stiff. But let’s not be naive. Reports that Russian forces got lost, ran out of fuel, surrendered readily or even refused to cross into Ukraine all bespeak a Russian military not nearly so prepared, in morale or resources as Mr Putin believed.

The real unknown remains whether the widespread spontaneous outrage is sustainable, or whether the West lapses back into complacency regarding Russia and other potential international aggressors. World peace is not at hand. Rhetoric and virtue-signalling are no substitute for new strategic thinking and higher defence budgets. Germany’s commitment on February 27th to meet a commitment it had already made in 2014 to spend 2% of its GDP on defence merits applause. More will be merited when we see the colour of its money.

There has rightly been growing attention to the enormous threat China poses to Taiwan’s independence. So grave is it that Abe Shinzo, a former Japanese prime minister, and others have advised Washington to abandon “strategic ambiguity” over whether it will defend Taiwan against a Chinese attack. The Japanese now fully understand that an attack on Taiwan is an attack on Japan.

North Korea’s threat to South Korea is neither trivial nor a cold-war relic, especially in light of Pyongyang’s increasingly successful nuclear-weapons and ballistic-missile programmes. For Beijing, the prison-state North is an asset with which to threaten the western Pacific and beyond. South Korea’s impending presidential election will reveal much about the impact of Russia’s attack on Ukraine, and its implications for smaller countries abutting large, former-Communist, land empires.

In the Middle East, Iran proves that extremist, expansionist theology is still alive and well. Tehran’s hostile activities parallel Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile threats, and extend to providing drones and missiles to Yemen’s Houthi rebels to attack civilian targets in nearby countries; aiding terrorist outfits like Hamas and Hizbullah; and using conventional forces and terrorist tactics in Iraq and Syria to advance Iran’s interests.

Third, the new Russia-China entente is rolling along. Breast-beating about isolating Russia refers primarily to isolating it from Europe (which has, entirely through its own fault over several decades, become over-dependent on Russia for energy supplies). It remains to be seen whether the rest of the world will concur in the long run. Merely as one example, when Russia vetoed a UN Security Council resolution condemning the Ukraine invasion, India, China and the United Arab Emirates all abstained. China may well be providing Russia with a tacit insurance policy through a willingness to buy any oil and gas Europe decides to embargo (not that Europe has acted yet; it’s cold in Berlin).

More important is the strategic positioning of the Russia-China entente. Although not yet a full-scale alliance, the Beijing-Moscow relationship is something the West feared during cold-war days. Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger were determined to “play the China card” to widen the gap between Beijing and Moscow that had been opening since Nikita Khrushchev launched de-Stalinisation. There is no doubt the entente has legs, after years in which the two countries’ interests have been converging. With both empires now showing their fangs, playing a new strategy “card” to split them will be difficult. The entente is likely to be a threatening reality for decades.

In sum, international threats are back with a vengeance. The critical unanswered question is whether the United States and the West generally can shake off their lassitude. ■

John Bolton was America’s national security adviser in 2018-19 for President Donald Trump. He was ambassador to the United Nations in 2005-06 and served in the administrations of presidents Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush. 

Posts by: Eric Sherred

The West must not lapse back into complacency about potential aggressors, says a former US national security adviser