Dr. David Wurmser
As we enter the final dramatic moments of the Gaza episode, the issue of Egypt and its peace with Israel is entering unchartered territory. Moreover, this is not the result of only events in the last weeks, but the culmination of much longer-term dynamics that cannot easily, or even at all, be mastered and reversed at this stage. The conflagration that Hamas began on October 7 may have triggered a chain of events that exposes these long-term trends and failure and brings them to a dramatic head – perhaps even a broader war.
Egypt’s abysmal behavior in protecting its common border with Gaza from the dangerous smuggling of weapons, money and material to Hamas built the problem that exploded on October 7. Hamas could arm only to the level that Egypt enabled it. Once exposed, rather than help Israel fix the problem it enabled, Egypt manufactured tensions with Israel to divert attention from its own culpability; Egypt tried to bury the legacy of its failure by focusing on Israel’s control of the Philadelphia corridor and arguing that Israel’s presence violated the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty (it does not). While a diversion, it further exacerbates the problem.
Moreover, it did not solve the basic problem; October 7 had made the reemergence of a Gazan population under its own control with agency – whether at the hand of Hamas or the Palestinian Authority – as obsolete. After October 7, it had become too dangerous for Israel to allow Palestinian agency so close to its heart any more; it threatens the existence of Israel itself. As such, trying to resurrect the status quo dressed in some modification no longer was feasible. But this meant Cairo could no longer contain the Gazan problem across the border at arms length. So it began to reinforce its border — not to stop smuggling but to stop the potential outflow of Palestinians. This, however, solved nothing, and again dumped the entire Gaza problem – the parameters of which Egypt had a hand in vastly inflating by failing to control the border — onto Israel. And to make its point even more forcefully, Cairo began recently to deploy large numbers of armor, built airfields and deployments in violation of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty further complicated the situation and led to dangerous developments. The demilitarization of the Sinai is the alpha and omega of the peace treaty, and its violation is itself a gravely serious affair.
What was unfolding since October 7, and is accelerating now, is no doubt a failure of immediate policy in the Obama and Biden administrations. But it is a far greater failure that is both indigenous to the region and dates back for most to the last century. Egypt’s policy on Gaza was just one manifestation of the typical regional pattern of dealing with problems emanating from ideological danger: indulge and reconcile with the problem by exporting it to others who will deal with it.
Of course, that pattern of dealing with the problem solves nothing. The problem always returns, having acquired a far more dangerous form. Egypt did that with the Gamaat al-Islami, and it returned. Saudi Arabia did that with bin Ladin, and it exploded back onto the region on 9/11. Syria mobilized the Palestinians in the camps in Tripoli, Lebanon in the 2000s to create Ansar al-Islam and al-Qaida Iraq (Musab al-Zarqawi). Both eventually returned to haunt them as ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra/Haya at-Tahrir ash-Shams (HTS). The Arab world’s proclivity to export its problems outward for someone else to deal with rather than directly resolve or erase it consistently comes home to roost. Gaza, indeed the Palestinians as a whole, are no exception.
So, the Palestinian/Gaza problem returns to haunt Egypt. Egypt’s 75-year policy of tapping, appeasing and paying the Palestinian piper under the assumption it is Israel’s problem has finally come home to roost for Egypt itself. Israel can no longer tolerate Palestinian agency in Gaza, and the destruction that results from asserting its security control over it will leave no real option for Israel other than the removal of the population — perhaps temporarily but more likely permanently. Both Jerusalem and Washington have now come to this conclusion, resulting in the Trump plan for Gaza. Egypt, of course, opposes the American plan to resettle Gazans to safer lands because doing so imports the problem it so desperately exported. It would move it inside the house.
Though a circumstance of its own making, this places Egypt in a very difficult position. On the one hand, Egypt fears for its regime’s survival if it accepts the Trump plan. It would position Cairo as a participant in the second disaster, or “Nakba.” It knows from its own history; King Farouk was overthrown in the early 1950s for his failure to prevent the first Nakba in 1948. Any leader that fails to stop the second Nakba, let alone participates in it, will not only lose his legitimacy, but will be seen as a leader who has lost his image of strength. Not only did the perception of buckling on the Palestinian issue result in Anwar Sadat’s assassination, but as-Sisi will be seen by his own population as too weak to stand up to Israel or the United States, which will signal his people that he is losing his resolve and has retreated into their patronage to survive. He has not upheld his manliness, which is, of course, critical in the region for regime survival.
Ultimately, this will prove fatal. If Egypt buckles, as-Sisi would be seen as a wounded fish by the region’s sharks who stalk him. Turkey, Qatar and Iran – Cairo’s true enemies — will gather around the limping Egyptian nation and incite the population against the government in an invigorated attempt to carry the Islamist sweep to power in Cairo that had seized Damascus in December. That is the threat can bring the government down, not the United States.
On the other hand, refusing the Trump plan will drive a wedge in US-Egyptian relations, and likely will terminate the large amount of aid and weapons sales. But he can weather the U.S. opposition; he cannot weather an upheaval from below fomented by Qatar, Turkey and Iran. And indeed, if current reports coming out of Qatari news channels are true, as-Sisi already has made his choice and decided to indefinitely postpone his trip to Washington next week. In these circumstances, it is possible that we are not only approaching unchartered territory; Egyptian-US relations may have already entered it into a much deeper crisis than appreciated.
So how far can this go?
First of all, context. There are signs that Iran has made the decision to move toward confrontation, which will also of course drive Hizballah and the Houthis again. And then, within 48 hours of Hamas leaders visiting Tehran for consultations, Hamas announces it is suspending the ceasefire agreement. At the same time, Ayatollah Khamenei slammed the door shut on negotiations with the US over its nuclear program, and then in anniversary celebrations this week of the Islamic Revolution, billboards with facsimiles of a death notice for President Trump appeared, as well as a passion play of his trial and hanging. Iran has clearly decided to escalate against the United States, and this pushes Hamas to push Gaza back into war – the last thing Egypt needs right now.
While the current Egyptian threats, training, rhetoric and deployments are increasingly belligerent to Israel, the assumption of most Western analysts and intelligence agencies is that it is chest beating. Most in the West assume that an Egyptian-Israeli war is unthinkable. This should be reexamined; considering scenarios, unfortunately the idea that war is off the table for Egypt is not solid. There are scenarios in which Egypt would see it in its interest to go to war, even though it knows it would be devastating, that it would lose the Sinai and that it would terminate US alliance and aid.
Regarding the question of “why would Egypt see it in its interest to invite the destruction of its army and Air Force, alienate the Americans and lose the Sinai?”: It is undeniable that destruction of its assets & losing territory will wound the Egyptian regime deeply, but not as would as-Sisi’s evincing unmanly weakness. Regimes survive in the region on their ability to project ruthless, confident resolve to survive. Any sign of fear, weakness or faltering confidence can quickly turn fatal almost immediately.
As such, inviting devastation — losing a bit of his army and the Sinai — as painful as it is, may yet to him be viewed as preferable to the damage he would sustain in appearing to cower to Israel and accept, even participate, in the second Nakba. China and Russia can replace the material. Qatar can replace it.
But nobody can restore as-Sisi’s or his regime’s honor, and nobody in Egypt will forgive him for forfeiting it. Especially not Egypt’s real enemies — Turkey, Qatar and Iran.
Under those circumstances, as-Sisi may decide to assert his manliness, make a stand, knowing that he would lose good bit of the military as well as the Sinai, but he would emerge from this looking tough and willing to accept risk and inflict lots of losses, even on his own people in order to survive and uphold the stature of the Egyptian military government.
Added to this is the unfortunate dynamic that has before gripped Egyptian-Israeli relations; it has a habit of whipping itself into a frenzy over which it loses control and into a war it may not have originally intended.
It would thus be wise for Western intelligence agencies to at least consider that there is a real potential for an Egyptian-Israeli war. Sadly, this war has potential to still end in a conflagration. If such an unfortunate turn of events is thrust onto Israel, then it is one from which Israel would need to emerge with a victory as decisive as 1967 — despite its best efforts to the contrary.